university  of 

Connecticut 

ibraries 


BOOK    230. OM  1    c.  1 

OMAN    #    PROBLEM    OF    FAITH    AND 

FREEDOM    IN   LAST   TWO   CENTURIES 


3  T1S3  ODObbllS  b 


The  Problejn   of 

Faith   and  Freedom   in    the 

Last    Two    Centuries 


Vision  and  Authority 

Or,  the  Throne  of  St.  Peter 

A  Study  of  the  Nature  and  Object  of  the  Church's 
Authority 

By  the  same  Author 
Crown  8vo,  cloth,  ys.  6d. 

"It  is  not  often  one  comes  across  a  style  so  pregnant  and  sug- 
gestive, and  as  seldom  one  finds  so  much  solid  and  fearless  thought 
packed  into  a  single  book."  —  Rev.  John  Watson,  D.D.,  in  The 
Alnwick  Guardian. 

"  It  is  perhaps  only  a  select  class  of  minds  to  which  the  book  will 
appeal,  but  it  is  minds  of  the  finest  texture  that  will  do  it  most 
justice." — Rev.  Prof.  James  Orr  in  The  British  IVeekly. 

"  It  is  seldom  indeed  the  reviewer  has  the  good  fortune  to  come 
upon  a  book  like  this,  by  which  a  comparatively  unknown  author 
passes  at  a  bound  into  the  front  rank  of  serious  religious  thinkers. 
.  .  .  Many,  we  believe,  will  read  it  with  delight,  and  find  that  it  cuts 
a  path  for  them  through  a  jungle  ol  perplexities."— Glasgou/  Herald. 


London  :   Hodder  &  Stoughton 


Translation  and  Introduction 

On  Religion  : 

Speeches  to  its  Cultured  Despisers 

By  Friederich  Schleiermacher 

2>vo,  7s.  6rf. 

"  This  is  a  remarkable  book  because  it  had  a  remarkable  influence 
upon  a  nation  which  for  several  centuries  has  guided  the  religious 
thought  of  all  Protestant  countries.  .  .  .  And  yet  it  cannot  have 
been  an  easy  book  to  translate.  .  .  .  We  give  one  extract  to  show 
the  style  of  the  author  and  the  perfect  rendering  of  the  translator." 
— The  Spectator. 

"  In  Mr.  Oman's  admirable  introduction  will  be  found  an  excellent 
estimate  of  their  actual  worth,  and  a  lucid  explanation  of  the  place  they 
hold  in  relation  to  Schleiermacher's  spiritual  development,  as  well 
as  to  all  the  various  intellectual  and  political  movements  of  that 
very  yeasty  and  often  stirring  time,  no  single  phase  of  which  is 
unrepresented  in  the  thoughts  of  the  great  preacher,  patriot  and 
theologian." — Glasgow  Herald. 


London  :  Kegan  Paul,  Trench,  Triibner  and  Co.,  Ltd. 


^^^mi^v^-. 


r>-'iSi»£i&M»«kfite£ii£firii^i^^y'.£:;«-.«i««^^ 


The  problem  of  y^ 


Faith  and  Freedom  in  the 
hast  Typo  Centuries . 


By 

John  .Oman,  M.A.,  B.D.,  D.Phil. 

Author  of  "  Vision  and  Authority  " 


New  York 

A.    C.    Armstrong    and    Son 

3  &  S  West  Eighteenth  St 
1906 


\<{<bC 


THE   ABERDEEN   UNIVERSITY   PRESS   LIMITED- 


TO    THE    MEMORY    OF    MY 

FATHER 

A    SCHOLAR    ONLY   OF   LIFE   AND   ACTION,    BUT 
MY   BEST    TEACHER 


PREFACE 

To  save  the  reader  from  the  distraction  of  multi- 
tudinous notes  I  have  restricted  the  references  to 
three  types  of  passages :  (1)  where  the  source  was 
not  obvious  from  the  context ;  (2)  where  in- 
debtedness was  not  elsewhere  acknowledged ;  (3) 
where  the  use  is  controversial.  My  obligations  to 
other  students  of  the  subject  are  fully  set  forth  in 
the  book  itself,  but  in  the  first  half  of  Lecture  VIII., 
owing  to  the  vastness  of  the  subject,  I  have  had  to 
fill  up  with  their  aid  larger  gaps  in  my  own  first- 
hand knowledge  than  elsewhere. 

The  appointments  to  this  lectureship  have  not 
hitherto  gone  beyond  the  bounds  of  the  Church 

to  which  it  belongs,  and  I  take  the  opportunity 

(vii) 


viii  PREFACE 

afforded  by  this  preface  of  acknowledging  the  great 
honour  conferred  upon  me  by  the  United  Free 
Church  of  Scotland,  for  though  I  am  a  child  of  one 
of  the  churches  now  so  truly  united  in  her  fold,  I 
have  all  my  ministry  been  what  I  fear  she  regards 
as  a  ''stranger  of  the  Dispersion"  in  England. 

Principal  Lindsay  and  his  colleagues  in  the 
Glasgow  College  of  the  United  Free  Church,  where 
the  Lectures  were  delivered  last  January,  will 
suffer  me  to  mention  their  great  kindness ;  and  I 
cannot  omit  a  reference  to  Prof.  Hislop,  since  so 
suddenly  called  to  his  rest,  whose  sincere  and 
steadfast  friendship  so  many  mourn.  The  first 
outline  of  these  Lectures  was  also  given  to  the 
students  at  Westminster  College,  Cambridge,  in  the 
winter  of  1 904,  and  I  was  there  laid  under  the  same 
obligation  by  the  kindness  of  Principal  Dykes  and 
his  colleagues. 

But  for  the  interest  of  my  friends  Mr.  G.  W. 
Alexander  and  the  Rev.  D.  S.  Cairns  in  the  progress 


PREFACE  ix 

of  the  work  it  might  have  been  even  more  defective 
than  it  is ;  and  I  am  still  more  indebted  to  another 
friend,  the  Rev.  A.  C.  Welch,  who  has  borne  most 
of  the  burden  of  helping  me  to  put  the  book 
through  the  press. 

October,  1906. 


THE  FOLLOWING  EXCERPTS  ARE  TAKEN,  WITH  THE 
CHANGES  REQUIRED  BY  THE  UNION,  FROM  THE 
MEMORANDUM  BY  THE  TRUSTEES  OF  THE  LATE  MISS 
JOAN  KERR  OF  SANQUHAR  IN  REGARD  TO  THE  KERR 
LECTURESHIP 

III.  Generally  the  Lectures  shall  be  on  a  subject  in  any 
department  of  Theological  Science,  which,  subject  to  the  approval 
of  the  Committee  of  Selection,  the  Lecturer  may  choose,  or 
which  the  Committee  may  suggest. 

IV.  The  appointments  to  this  Lectureship  shall  be  made  in 
the  first  instance  from  among  the  Licentiates  or  Ministers  of 
the  United  Free  Church  of  Scotland,  of  whom  no  one  shall  be 
eligible,  who,  when  the  appointment  falls  to  be  made,  shall  have 
been  licensed  for  more  than  twenty-five  years,  and  who  is  not 
a  graduate  of  a  British  University,  preferential  regard  being 
had  to  those  who  have  for  some  time  been  connected  with  a 
Continental  University. 

V.  Appointments  not  subject  to  the  conditions  in  Section  IV. 
may  also  from  time  to  time,  at  the  discretion  of  the  Committee, 
be  made  from  among  eminent  members  of  the  Ministry  of  any 
of  the  Nonconformist  Churches  of  Great  Britain  and  Ireland, 
America  and  the  Colonies,  or  of  the  Protestant  Evangelical 
Churches  of  the  Continent. 

VI.  The  Lecturer  shall  hold  the  appointment  for  three  years. 

VIII.  The  Lectures  shaU  be  published  at  the  Lecturer's  own 
expense  within  one  year  after  their  delivery. 

IX.  The  Lectures  shall  be  delivered  to  the  students  of  the 
Glasgow  United  Free  College. 

XII.  The  Public  shall  be  admitted  to  the  Lectures. 


(xi) 


CONTENTS 

LECTURE   I 
The  Rise  of  the  Problem 

PAGE 

Problem   of   last  two  centuries :    How  faith  absolute  and  freedom 

absolute,   yet  both  one 1-6 

Reformation — initiated  the  new  era 6-24 

Distinguished  between  religion  and  the  Church   ....         6 

Ended  a  state  of  pupilage 

An  unavoidable  stage  : — 

(1)  The  distinction  always  latent     .... 

(2)  Followed  development  of  the  Northern  nations         .       10 
(.3)  Forwarded  by  knowledge  of  the  world  and  history    .       10 

Yet  new  era  ascribed  to  science 11 

Even  science  dependent  on  change  of  religious  attitude  13 
Reformation  : — 

(1)  Built  on  the  freedom  of  the  Christian  man        .         .  13 

(2)  Emphasised  the  relation  of  freedom  to  God       .         .  14 

(3)  Required  society  to  recognise  freedom        ...  15 

(4)  Sought  a  free  individual  and  a  religious  society        .  16 

(5)  Raised   question   of   freedom   both   of  Church   and 

State 17 

A  positive  movement  even  in  its  negative  aspects  ...  18 

Simplification  of  worship 18 

Rejection  of  external  authority 20 

Process  of  secularisation .  21 

What  is  at  stake  ?     Religion  or  only  religious  observance      .  22 
No  final  purifying,  yet  more  spiritual  faith  and  new  growth 

of  freedom  made  possible      ......  23 

Limitation  of  the  field 25-27 

(xiii) 


xiv  CONTENTS 

LECTURE  II 
Jesuitism  and  Pascal's  Pens6es 

FAOK 

Luther,  Concerning  a  Christian's  Freedom 31-33 

Relation  of  justification  to  freedom — fundamental  to  question     .       33 

Council  of  Trent — issue  at  stake 34 

Jesuitism 34-58 

Placed  Church  above  religion  .......       34 

Ignatius  Loyola 35 

Inquisition  logical .       37 

Immediate  success  and  ultimate  principle     .         .        .         .         .37 

Probabilism 39 

Provincial  Letters .41 

Montaigne  and  Pascal 43 

Rise  of  worldly  sceptical  literature  and  end  of  Scholasticism        .       44 

Full  effect — middle  of  seventeenth  century 44 

Religious  Wars 44 

Montaigne,  Pascal  and  M.  de  Saci 46 

Jansenists 47 

Jansen  and  Saint-Cyran 47 

The  Augustinus 48 

Jesuitism  issued  both  in  Bossuet  and  Descartes    ....       50 

Bossuet 50-53 

Polemic  against  Protestantism 50 

Panegyric  on  Louis  XIV. 51 

Poisonous  court  influence         ......       52 

Descartes 53-58 

Mathematical  method 54 

Clearness  and  distinctness — test  of  truth         ....       55 

Successors 56 

Connection  with  Jesuit  Schools       ......       57 

Pascal 58-77 

Associate  of  the  Jansenists 58 

Distrust  of  force  and  of  the  mathematical  method        ...       58 

Founded  apologetics  on  the  moral  sense 61 

Sense  of  history 61 

Pens^es 62-77 

Monument  of  Jansenism 63 

Austerities 64 

Style 66 

Sense  of  the  eternal  significance  of  things       ...       67 
Singular  relation  through  Jansenism  to  the  Church       .         .       67 

Drove  him  back  to  Christ 70 

God  known  in  Christ 71 


CONTENTS 


XV 


PAGE 

Reason  and  the  heart 7I 

Appeal  to  whole  man  with  all  his  contradictions    .        .  72 

Poverty  of  a  nobleman 75 

Proof  of  Christianity — meets  man's  greatness  and  his 

smaUness 75 

Defence  of  method 77 


LECTURE  III 
English  Deism  and  Butler's  Analogy 

French  influence  in  England gi 

Lord  Herbert  of  Cherbury gj 

De  Veritate  and  De  Religione  Oentilium         ....  82 

Connect  with  George  Fox 83 

Civil  War— greater  intercourse  with  France 83 


Hobbes 


84-90 


Connection  with  Descartes g^ 


Leviathan 


84 


Mathematical  ideal  of  reasoning 85 

Action  a  question  of  dynamics          ....  86 

Necessity  for  absolute  rule        ....  87 

Conscience,  the  Pope,  and  the  Civil  Ruler       ...  88 

True  significance  of  book gg 

Restoration— further  increase  of  French  influence       ...  90 

Practical  infidelity '90 

Charles  Blount,  Life  of  Apolloniiis  of  Tyana         ....  91 

Position  of  Church  of  England 91 

Charles  Leslie,  SJiort  and  Easy  MetJiod  with  the  Deists         .        .  92 

Courage  of  High  Churchism 9^ 

Inquiry  into  extent  of  human  knowledge 94 

Locke,  Essay  wi  the  Hicman  Understanding  ....  94 

Law  of  Gravitation og 

Clarke,  Boyle  Lecture 97 

The  Moral  Argument 97 

Orthodoxy  and  Utilitarianism 98 

Cudworth          •-....  qq 

Shaftesbury,  Characteristics 99 

Morality  and  religion  have  spheres  of  their  own      .         .  99 

Generous  admiration  the  right  ground  of  virtue      .         .  lOO 

Forerunner  of  Kant  and  Rousseau Iqq 

Yet  Coffee-house  oracle iqi 

Easy  optimism jqj^ 


xvi  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Deism 102-118 

Seemed  to  stand  for  liberty 102 

Associated  with  the  Revolution 103 

An  Account  of  the  Groioth  of  Deism  in  England      .        .         .  103 

Cofiee-house  wit 104 

Built  on  Locke 104 

Locke,  Essay  on  Toleration  and  Essay  on  the  Reasonable- 
ness of  Christianity 105 

Modelled  its  scheme  on  the  Law  of  Gravitation    ....  107 

Toland,  Christianity  not  Mysterious 107 

Collins,  A  Discourse  of  Free-Thinking 110 

A  Scheme  of  Literal  PropJiecy Ill 

Sherlock's  reply,  Use  and  Intent  of  Prophecy          .                 .  112 

Tindal,  Christianity  as  Old  as  Creaticm  .....  113 

Woolston,  A  Discourse  07i  the  Miracles  of  Our  Saviour  .         .  117 

Three  types  of   reply:    Sherlock,   Trial  of  the   Witfiesses  of  the 
Resurrection  of  Jesus  ;  Lardner,  Credibility  of  the  Gospels ; 

Butler,  Analogy 117 

Butler 118-134 

Presents  Christianity  as  a  View  of  the  World       .         .         .         .118 

Will  convert,  not  merely  convince 118 

Ridicule  deceives     . .  119 

Probability  and  a  State  of  Probation  regarding  truth     .         .  121 

Insistence  on  reason 121 

Freedom  a  genuine  option 122 

Analogy — its  full  title 125 

Butler's  assumptions        ........  125 

Use  of  revelation      .........  126 

Regulative  principles — conscience  and  self-love     .         .         .  127 

Conscience  and  probability 128 

Revelation : — 

(1)  Enforces  Natural  Religion         .....  130 

(2)  Makes  known  new  relations  involving  new  duties     .  131 
Two  criticisms:   (1)  Butler  deifies  conscience;    (2)  ends  in 

pessimism 132 

Not  wholly  the  faith  which  sets  us  free 132 

Compared  with  Pascal 134 

LECTURE  IV 

Rationalism  and  Kant's  Religion  Within  the  Limits  of 
Reason  Alone 

Paley  not  Butler  the  accepted  defender  of  Christianity        .         .         .  137 

Evangelical  Movement  more  than  Paley  simplified  Christianity .         .  139 

Hume  made  room  for  a  new  creation   .......  139 


CONTENTS  xvii 

PAGE 

English  Deism  in  France 141-146 

Voltaire 141 

Disturbance  of  easy  optimism 144 

The  old  Hebrew  Problem 144 

Candide  and  the  Confessions  of  a  Savoyard  Vicar  .        .         .     145 

The  State  of  Nature 146 

French  influence  in  Germany 146 

The  Aufkldrung  : — 

Political  situation  and  Scholastic  type  of  theology         .         .     146  . 
Kant,  An  Answer  to  tlie  Question,  Wliat  is  Aufkldrung  ?         .     147 

Frederick  the  Great  as  a  type 148 

Merely  intellectual  aspect  of  freedom      ....     150 
Discussion  of  first  principles  and  Natural  Religion      ....     151 

Nicolai 151 

Bahrdt 152 

Basedow 153 

The  Philanthropinum 153 

Perfectibility  of  human  nature       .......     154 

Mendelssohn  and  the  Popular  Philosophy 155 

The  Morgenstunden 156 

Faith  in  Providence 156 

Accommodation 157 

Rationalism,  theological  and  learned  : — 

Old  Deist  Trinity  158 

Chief  seat  the  universities 159 

Chief  influences : — 

English  Deism 160 

Pietism  and  Wolff's  philosophy 160 

Study  of  English  theology 160 

Baumgarten 160 

Translations 160 

Butler  practically  unknown 161 

Butler  and  Kant 161 

Semler 162-165 

English  discussion  not  radical 162 

Bible  not  one  whole 162 

Old  Testament  mere  national  book  of  the  Jews     ....     163 
Typical  mental  and  moral  attitude  of  Rationalism        .         .         .     164 

Lessing 165-169 

Rationalist  and  poet  at  variance 165 

Wolfenbiittel  Fragments 165 

Not  his  own  attitude 166 

Christianity  not  dependent  on  Scripture 168 

Kant 169-189 

Religion  cannot  depend  on  philology 169 

6 


xvm 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 

Influence  of  his  parentage 170 

Sought  to  combine  Newton  and  Rousseau 171 

Astronomy  and  his  theory  of  perception 172 

Mechanical  law  limited  to  the  phenomenal  world          .         .         .  174 

Moral  freedom  alone  touches  noumenal  world       ....  174 

Is  ground  of  reality 176 

Is  essence  of  our  personality             176 

Is  the  power  to  announce  for  ourselves  the  highest  law          .  177 

Beligion  within  the  Limits  of  Reason  Alone 177-189 

Issue  of  the  book 177 

Freedom  of  the  will : — 

The  starting-point 179 

Power  to   decide  between  the  maxim  of   self-love  and  the 

maxim  of  reverence  for  the  moral  law  ....  180 

Failure  through  self-deceit 180 

Man  created  to  be  good 181 

Highest  means  of  grace 181 

Not  reform  but  revolution 182 

Christianity  the  only  moral  religion 182 

Scripture  to  teach  the  religion  of  reason        .....  183 

Deduction  of  Idea  of  Son  of  God  and  of  Justification    .        .        .  183 

Idea  of  the  Church 184 

Ritual  and  moral  religion 185 

Two  opposite  criticisms 185 

Real  failure  negative  attitude 185 

Partly  from  attitude  towards  historical  religion     .         .         .  186 
But  lasting  influence  of  : — 

(1)  Idea  of  the  Kingdom  of  God 187 

(2)  Austere  scheme  of  morals 188 

Not  affected  by  doctrine  of  Development 188 


LECTURE   V 

Romanticism  and  Schleiermacher's  Speeches  on  RELioioy 

Problem  of  eighteenth  century:    the  individual;    of    nineteenth: 

individuality 193 

Kant's  warning  against  Herder  and  Jacobi 194 

Yet  Kant  helped  to  create  the  Romantic  Movement     .         .         .  196 

Idealism  and  Evolution 197 

Schelling,  Hegel,  Schleiermacher,  Darwin 198 

Pantheistic,  but  organic 200 

Historical  interest 200 


K.<if;-J^anj» 


.■.«tet^'-..j»«<»i»j- 


CONTENTS 


XIX 


PAGE 

Reaction  greatest  in  Germany 201 

Wahrheit  iind  IHchtung 201 

Bengel  and  the  Pietistic  revival 202 

Literary  and  artistic  revival 203 

Romanticism  applied  to  an  extreme  school  as  well  as  to  general 

movement 204 

Goethe  its  ideal 204 

Culture,  Spinoza  and  artistic  pantheism 205 

Schelling  gave  philosophical  form 206 

Contrast  with  Fichte 206 

Denial  of  Kant's  dualism 207 

Loss  and  gain 207 

Hegel  the  philosopher,  Schleiermacher  the  theologian         .        .  208 

SpeecJies  on  Religion 210-237 

Full  title  and  later  editions 210 

Wty  called  Speeclies 212 

Freedom  is  to  be  oneself.     Monologues 214 

Feeling  is  the  creative  power 216 

Compare  the  poetry  of  the  age 217 

Appeal  merely  to  culture 218 

Fluid  artistic  idea 221 

-Religion  fundamental  in  human  nature 222 

Neither  doctrine  nor  morals 223 

Cannot  be  taught 224 

Mediators 225 

Kant's  idea  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  with  Romantic  idea  of 

individuality 228 

Positive  religion 228 

Character  of  a  religion  determined  by  its  intuition        .         .  229 

Intuition  of  Judaism 229 

Christianity  distinctive 230 

Original  intuition 231 

Recognises  fairer  forms  and  its  own  transitoriness          .  231 

A  religion  must  be  social 232 

Church  Triumphant  and  Church  MUitant      ....  233 

Low  estimate  of  Visible  Church 233 

Defect   of   Romantic   conception — its    lack   of   regard    for   the 

individual   as   such 236 


XX  CONTENTS 

LECTUEE   VI 
The  Revolution  and  Newman's  Apologia 


PAGE 


French  Revolution  and  the  importance  of  society  .  .  .  .241 
Recognised  in  Schleiermacher's  Glaubenslehre  ..'.'.  242 
Same  influence  in  Hegel         ....  *    244 

Caused  a  religious  need  of  system !    244 

Task  to  account  for  the  negative 245 

For  both  Hegel  and  Schleiermacher  God  beyond  the  strife   .    245 

Hegel  finds  in  thought  the  key 247 

Negation  essential  to  process  of  thought         .         .         .        .248 
Interpretation  of  the  age,  and  necessity  of  form  and  sub- 
stance of  freedom 249 

Both  Hegel  and  Schleiermacher  disregard  will      .         .         .         .251 
Yet  division  appearing :  to  Hegel,  religion  is  philosophy  in  the 

making  ;  to  Schleiermacher,  an  original  feeling  .         .     252 

Hegel's  view  of  religion  as  doctrine  appealed  to  the  age       .        .     253 

Revolution  a  watershed 255 

German  High  Church  Movement 256 

English  Movement  and  Newman  ...  257 

"^Poiogia *.*.".".'.      258-275 

Tractarianism,  creative  influences  Liberalism  and  Romanticism      258 

Coleridge  and  German  thinking 269 

Newman's  religion  dogma 260 

Followed  sesthetic  intuition 261 

Via  Media  a,nd  Tracts  for  the  Times 264 

Roman  System 265 

Inconsistent  with  his  spiritual  experience      ....     266 

Atheism  and  infallibility 267 

Too  great  subtlety 267 

False  humility 269 

Criticism  : — 

(1)  Temptation  of  artistic  temperament ....     270 

(2)  Need  of  form  as  well  as  substance  of  freedom  .         .     272 

(3)  Need  of  history  before  a  philosophy  of  history  ,        .     273 
Positive  value 074 


LECTURE   VII 

The  Theory  op  Development  and  Baur's  Fiest  Three  Centuries 

High  Churchism  and  Higher  Criticism 279 

Inquiry  inevitable  from  first  attack  of  Deism       ..*..'!    279 
Rationalism  and  Criticism '.        '.        *     279 


CONTENTS  xxi 

PAGE 

Historical  impulse  of  Romanticism 281 

Sole  alternative — Newman's  view  of  humility 282 

Essay  on  tlie  Develoimient  of  Doctrine 282 

Never  read  Coleridge 283 

Letters  of  an  Inquiring  Sx^irit 283 

For  Newman  all  religion  authority 285 

Roman  System  legitimate  development  of  the  Apostolic       .        .  286 

Method  as  useful  for  Strauss  as  for  Newman        ....  289 

Debt  to  Hegel 289 

Hegel's  view  of  history 292 

Influence  through  the  Tiibingen  School 293 

Baur,  Critical  Investigations  regarding  the  Canonical  Gospels      .        .  295 
Four  methods  of  solving  problem  of  the  Gospels  : — 

(1)  Dogmatic — The  Fathers  and  Protestant  Harmonies         .  295 

(2)  Abstract-Critical — Eichhom  and  others    ....  295 

(3)  Negative-Critical — Strauss's  Life  of  Jesus        .        .        .  296 

(4)  Historical — Baur's  own  method 299 

Applied  by  Schwegler,  Post-Apostolic  Age         .        .        .  301 
Baur's  Church  History  of  the  First  Three  Centuries     .        .        .      302-310 

Applies  Hegelian  fonnula 303 

Shows  great  historic  movement 304 

Greatness  of  Jesus 306 

New  Testament  books  dated  anywhere  in  first  two  centuries        .  308 

Pauline  and  Apostolic  parties 309 

Catholic  Church  a  reconciliation 310 

Change  in  sentiment  of  rationality 310 

Pessimism 311 

Perfect  intellectual  and  moral  freedom  of  Jesus 311 

Ritschl's  Rise  of  tJie  Old  Catholic  Church 314-320 

Differences  practical  not  doctrinal  (1)  seen  by  the  situation  as 

Christ  left  it ;  (2)  by  the  later  history          ....  316 

Lapse  from  freedom  into  legalism 319 

Of  temporal  advantage 320 

Loisy — combines  Newman  and  Baur 320 

Person  of  Jesus  loses  meaning 322 

Idea  of  freedom  alone  gives  meaning  to  Christ  and  the  New  Testa- 
ment      322 


LECTURE  VIII 

The  Theology  op  Expebience  and  Ritschl's  Justification  and 
Beconcilia  tion 

Christianity  coercing  or  attracting 327 

Reconciliation  the  test 329 


xxii  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

English  theology — its  weakness  and  strength 330 

M'Leod  Campbell,  The  Nature  of  tlie  Atonement  ....  331 

Maurice,  Doctrine  of  Sacrifice 834 

Mozley,  University  Sermons 336 

Dale,  Lectures  on  the  Atonement 336 

English  and  German  thinking 338 

German  schools  of  theology  . 338 

Liberal  School 339-343 

Hegelians — orthodox  and  negative 339 

Biedermann,  Pfleiderer  and  Lipsius 340 

Kattenbusch's  criticism 341 

Orthodox  or  Confessional  School    ....  .       343-348 

Hengstenberg  and  Philippi 343 

Hofmann 344 

Frank 346 

Followed  a  revival  of  religion 347 

Mediating  School 348-353 

Name  and  position 348 

Inheritance  from  Schleiermacher 349 

Dorner     ...........  349 

Rothe 350 

Ritschl 353-381 

Of  the  Mediating  School 353 

Their  conception  of  the  Church  basis  of  his  theology     .         .  354 

Debt  to  Schleiermacher  and  the  Romantic  Movement  .         .  357 

But  change  of  emphasis 358 

Primacy  of  the  will : — 

(1)  Theory  of  knowledge 359 

(2)  Theory  of  religion 360 

Revelation  and  the  judgment  of  worth 362 

Personal  freedom  and  the  Personality  of  God         .         .         .  363 

Rejection  of  metaphysics 364 

Judgment  of  worth  in  history 365 

Uniqueness  of  revelation  in  Christ 366 

Progress  a  work  of  freedom 367 

Christian  Doctrine  of  Justification  and  Reconciliation   .        .      367-381 
Second  Volume  : — 
Christ  the  only  original  source  of  revelation,  and  Scripture 

only  necessary  to  knowing  Him 367 

Christ  Himself  a  subject  of  religion 369 

Christ's  death  and  His  relation  to  the  community         .        .  370 

Christ  and  the  Pharisees — their  ideas  of  righteousness           .  370 
His    leading    thought    obscured    but    not    absent    in    the 

Epistles 371 


CONTENTS 


XXIU 


Third  Volume : — 
Christ  Divine  as  revealing  Word  and  Lord  over  the  com- 
munity   372 

Reveals  God's  will  and  man's  task  in  the  Kingdom  of 

God 

In  respect  of  freedom,  Christianity  an  ellipse    with  two 
foci : — 

(1)  The  redemption  of  the  individual       .... 
Reconciliation  the  source  of  the  religious  sense  of 

freedom 

Accomplished  through  justification  . 
Demonstrated  in  a  practical  attitude 
Essence  faith  in  Providence 

(2)  The  Kingdom  of  God  .... 
Justification  and  attachment  to  the  community 

The  Kingdom  a  full  revelation  of  God 
The  Kingdom,  philosophy  and  the  Fathers 


374 


375 

376 
376 
377 
377 

378 
378 
379 
379 


LECTURE   IX 

Method  and  Results 

Ritschlianism  a  reaction  from  Romanticism  : — 

(1)  Carries  marks  of  what  it  opposes 

Fixity  of  physical  law 

Place  of  miracle 

Estimate  of  Christ's  worth 

Fluidity  of  moral  law 

Sin  and  pardon — love  and  justice 

Christ's  cosmic  significance     . 

(2)  The  swing  of  the  pendulum 
Right  opposition  to  pantheism  and  mj 

trust  of  intuition 
But  method  sums  up  long  discussion     , 

Inquiry  and  authority 

Ritschl  and  Newman 

The  individual  and  the  institution 

Freedom  a  basis  for  faith 
Last  two  centuries  emphasised  the  significance  of  freedom 
Its  absolute  distinctions  not  affected  by  evolution 

Absolute  distinction  in  morals 

Absolute  lines  in  history  .... 

Absolute  necessity  of  religion  .... 

Absolute  distinction  between  Christianity  and  other  religions 

Absolute  difference  between  Christ  and  other  men 


ysticism, 


wrong  dis 


386 
387 
387 
388 
389 
390 
391 
392 

392 
395 
395 
396 
398 
401 
403 
404 
405 
408 
410 
412 
413 


xxiv  CONTENTS 

PAGE 

Suggests  a  basis  for  principles  of  Criticism 414 

Shows  union  of  God's  power  and  love 415 

Assigns  its  right  place  to  the  Church 417 

Promises  a  philosophy  of  history 418 


NOTES 

I.  Pascal's  Wager  Argument 421 

II.  German  Theologians  and  Butler 424 

III.  The  Judgment  op  Worth 428 

IV.  Freedom  and  Socialism 436 

Index 4-37 

List  op  Kerr  Lectures 444 


LECTURE  I 

THE  EISE  OF  THE  PEOBLEM 


LECTURE  I 

THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

In  every  age  religious  thought  is  found  in  three 
forms — the  ore,  the  metal  and  the  current  coin. 
Only  as  current  coin  can  we  finally  test  its  value. 
Unless  it  can  be  changed  into  fidelity  and  patience, 
probity  and  gentleness;  unless  it  prove  itself  the 
faith  which  works  by  love,  and  the  hope  which  is 
strong  enough  to  toil  on  earth  because  it  breathes 
the  wide  air  of  heaven,  it  is  not  the  true  gold. 
Nor  can  we  be  discerners  of  the  metal  or  effective 
workers  in  the  mine  till  we  have  ourselves  learned 
the  value  of  religion  for  our  life's  task.  Our  systems 
are  imperfect  because  our  living  Christianity  is  im- 
perfect ;  and  the  hope  of  a  better  theology  lies 
where  Dale  put  it  when  he  said  :  "  We  must  all 
become  better  Christians,  before  we  can  hope  to 
see  great  theologians". 

Yet,  we  cannot  restrict  our  attention  to  the 
claims  of  practical  religion,  but  must  also  concern 
ourselves  with  what  I  have  called  religion  in  the 
metal.  By  that  I  mean  the  religious  ideas  which 
are,  as  it  were,  in  process  of  manufacture,  the  ideas 
which  pervade  our  best  literature  and  which  are 
agitated   by  the   earnest  men  who   think  on   the 

(3) 


4  THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

]3roblems  of  life.  This  is  of  all  carats,  and  an  im- 
portant part  of  the  work  of  a  religious  teacher  is  to 
learn  to  discriminate  the  best  and  refine  the  worst. 

But  the  coin  and  the  metal  must  in  the  last  issue 
be  smelted  out  of  the  ore,  and  the  religious  teacher 
has  not  fully  equipped  himself  till  he  has  penetrated 
into  the  deep  mines  where  it  is  quarried  amid  stress 
of  thought  and  action,  face  to  face  not  only  with 
the  conflicting  ideas  of  science,  philosophy  and  the- 
ology, but  also  with  the  blackest  sins  and  miseries 
of  our  humanity.  There  we  must  face  the  whole 
of  life,  however  disturbing  and  however  sad. 

Upon  this  last  task  1  assume  that  you  are  also 
willing  to  enter,  and  my  only  excuse  for  venturing 
so  far  beyond  my  reach  is  my  sense  of  the  import- 
ance for  your  life  work  of  attaining  early  some  idea 
of  how  it  fares  in  that  deepest  region  of  religious 
toil.  I  have  asked  nothing  less  than  what  I  take 
to  be  the  ultimate  question,  and  my  rashness,  I 
suppose,  can  only  be  defended  on  the  principle  that 
the  one  defeat  that  is  wholly  disgraceful,  is  to  be 
afraid  of  the  battle. 

The  ultimate  problem  of  at  least  the  last  two 
centuries  I  take  to  be  the  relation  of  Faith  and 
Freedom,  the  problem  of  how  Faith  is  to  be  absolute 
and  Freedom  absolute,  yet  both  one.  I  have  no 
logical  scheme  of  the  history  to  offer,  no  account  of 
uniform  progress.  I  cannot  even  see  that  every 
historical  movement  is  necessarily  to  be  interpreted 
as  progress.  The  idea  that  men  cannot  make 
mistakes  in  history  as  they  do  in  life,  deprives  both 
life  and  history  of  reality.     History  might  be  God's 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM  5 

education  of  the  race,  yet  an  important  part  of  it 
be  education  through  our  mistakes.  If  freedom  is 
a  reality,  the  only  way  of  enabling  mankind  ulti- 
mately to  choose  the  right  way  may  be  what  the 
Apostle  describes  as  shutting  them  up  to  dis- 
obedience— letting  them,  that  is,  find  by  experi- 
ence the  futility  of  the  wrong  way.  Only  the 
most  buoyant  optimism  could  describe  the  modern 
movement  as  the  uniform  progress  of  reason.  Im- 
portant issues  have  often  been  settled  by  nothing 
more  rational  than  fashion ;  and  what  we  loftily 
call  the  progress  of  civilisation  has  its  grimy  side 
of  poverty  and  vice,  and  its  deceptive  side  of  self- 
indulgence  and  moral  unreality.  Wherefore,  we 
must  always  be  prepared  to  listen  to  those  who 
regard  the  whole  process  as  mere  suicidal  revolt. 
This  interpretation  is  specially  applied  to  the  Refor- 
mation, which  is  charged  with  being  the  tap-root  of 
all  the  bitter  fruit  of  this  later  age.  From  it  came 
the  bold  freedom  of  inquiry  and  the  revolt  against 
authority  which,  we  are  told,  threatens  to  end  with 
making  freedom  everything  and  faith  nothing,  after 
which  freedom  also  will  be  swallowed  up  in  the 
abyss  of  anarchy. 

Neither  in  this  nor  in  any  other  matter  should 
we  settle  conclusions  before  inquiry,  but  it  must 
be  a  strange  idea  of  faith  that  invokes  it  at  the 
beginning  on  behalf  of  the  old  order.  Faith  in 
God's  presence  in  the  world  can  never  desire  to 
set  aside,  as  a  long  period  of  unrelieved  human 
error,  centuries  of  earnest  thought  and  endeavour, 
centuries  which  have  been  marked  by  a  great  growth 


6  THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

in  knowledge  and  a  great  transformation  in  society 
and  a  great  extension  of  man's  dominion  over  the 
whole  world.  It  might  be  necessary.  God's  ways 
are  long,  long  ways.  Nevertheless,  the  interest  of 
faith  must  be  on  the  side  of  discovering  some 
Divine  meaning  in  a  movement  so  much  imposed 
upon  man  by  the  dealings  of  Providence,  a  move- 
ment so  vast,  so  comprehensive  of  all  human 
aspirations,  so  directly  occupied  with  man's  whole 
religious  faith  and  activity.  If  it  is  all  calamitous 
human  error,  however  it  might  appear  to  God  with 
whom  a  thousand  years  are  as  one  day,  we,  left  in 
the  midst  of  the  fleeting  years,  could  only  feel  as  if 
God  had  forgotten  to  be  gracious. 

In  a  matter  of  this  kind  it  must  be  important 
to  discover  how  the  problem  first  arose,  for,  if  so 
vast  a  task,  involving  so  many  dubious  experiments, 
was  entered  on  wantonly,  at  the  bidding  of  man's 
restless  heart  and  not  at  the  call  of  Providence,  if 
it  came  merely  as  an  isolated  event  precipitated  by 
one  rebellious  monk,  it  could  more  easily  be  re- 
garded as  unqualified  calamity.  Beyond  question 
the  determining  event  was  the  Reformation,  for  it 
alone  set  up  the  distinction  which  ended  the  Middle 
Ages  and  created  the  Modern  Time — the  dis- 
tinction between  religion  and  the  Church.  This 
was  the  ultimate  meaning  of  its  insistence  on  justi- 
fication by  faith  alone  and  not  by  the  doctrines  or 
rites  of  the  Church. 

The  life  of  the  Middle  Ages  was  of  abundant 
variety — far  more  than  we  are  accustomed  to  think 
— but  all  its  thought  and  action  were  marked  by 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM  7 

the  absolute  confidence  with  which  it  identified 
religious  faith  with  the  Church's  creed  and  religious 
duty  with  the  Church's  requirements.  Of  this  fact 
the  assured  rationalism  of  the  Schoolmen  is  suffi- 
cient evidence.  So  absolutely  did  they  commit 
themselves  to  reason  in  the  perfect  confidence  that 
reason  and  the  Church,  being  from  one  source, 
must  be  in  entire  agreement,  that  Nominalism 
could  diligently  undermine  the  foundations  of  a 
sacramentarian  and  doctrinal  system  which  had  its 
basis  in  Realism,  without  dreaming  of  danger. 
There  was  the  buoyant  confidence  of  a  youth  who 
has  begun  to  inquire,  but  has  never  yet  thought  of 
questioning  his  father's  omniscient  wisdom  and 
absolute  goodness.  In  his  unconsciousness  he 
enjoys  a  sincerity  of  faith  and  a  reality  of  freedom 
which  are  of  great  value  for  his  education  and  which 
he  may  not  wilfully  destroy  ;  and  he  may  well  look 
back  with  regret  when  he  is  compelled  to  judge 
in  a  perplexing  life  by  the  sole  guidance  of  his  own 
conscience.  But  it  is,  nevertheless,  a  state  of  pupil- 
age which,  in  the  natural  course  of  things,  will 
inevitably  pass,  and  to  which,  once  he  has  left  it 
behind,  he  can  no  more  return  than  a  chicken  to  its 
shell.  In  the  same  way  we  also  can  regard  with 
gratitude  the  time  when  the  visible  Church  was  so 
entirely  identified  in  men's  minds  with  the  blessings 
of  religion  that  they  naturally  believed  no  salvation 
could  be  found  outside  her  organisation,  and  natur- 
ally thought  all  the  efficacy  of  Divine  grace  was 
enshrined  in  her  rites.  Nor  is  it  strange  that 
many,  in  the  turmoil  of  our  age,  look  back  with 


8  THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

a  sense  of  deep  loss  to  the  time  when  one  re- 
cognised Divine  authority  dominated  the  whole 
realm  of  thought  and  action,  when  science  was  her 
submissive  ally,  politics  her  humble  servant,  and 
earth  the  only  legitimate  bounds  of  her  dominion. 
We  understand  why  they  anathematise  all  the 
movements  and  all  the  persons  that  have  helped  to 
strip  of  her  glory  the  Bride  of  Christ,  even  while 
we  see  that,  if  these  movements  were  inevitable, 
it  is  a  foolish  sorrow.  That  it  is  a  foolish  sorrow, 
and  that  the  Reformation  was  a  necessary  crisis  in 
human  progress,  appear  from  the  influences  which 
prepared  for  it. 

1.  This  distinction  between  religion  and  the 
Church  always  existed  in  the  Church,  and  it  only 
needed  a  crisis  to  bring  it  out. 

For  centuries  the  Church  was  in  no  position  to 
cherish  the  thought  of  a  visible  dominion.  When 
this  dominion  did  come,  it  was  rather  forced  upon 
her  by  the  necessities  of  the  time  than  accepted  as 
a  requirement  of  the  religious  life.  Having  once 
entered  upon  the  career  of  a  great  world-power, 
however,  she  could  take  nothing  but  the  highest 
place.  A  world-power  with  a  right  to  the  obedi- 
ence of  the  heart  and  not  merely  to  certain  out- 
ward subjections,  is  necessarily  a  portent.  While 
so  much  in  the  Church  was  truly  religious  that  men 
thought  they  could  hardly  err  by  too  unquestioning 
a  submission,  the  distinction  between  the  heir  of 
imperial  Kome,  with  a  policy  guided  by  worldly 
astuteness,  and  the  invisible  Church,  the  heir  of  the 
self-sacrificing   lives  of  her  children,   was  seldom 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM  9 

consciously  drawn.  Yet  the  distinction  was  there, 
and  the  true  claim  of  the  Church  was  never  in  her 
great  organisation  or  her  completed  creed,  but  in 
the  heroism  which  made  men  not  count  their  lives 
dear  to  them  that  they  might  win  the  peoples  from 
idolatry  and  barbarism,  in  the  beautiful  ideal  of 
womanhood  created  anew  in  Christ  Jesus,  in  the 
piety  which  delivered  from  the  old  pagan  hardness 
of  feeling  and  gave  a  new  meaning  to  the  com- 
monest human  relationships  and  the  humblest 
duties,  in  the  tenderness  which  made  men  suc- 
courers  of  the  sick  and  the  outcast,  in  the  humanity 
which  made  them  accept  poverty  to  be  the  brethren 
of  the  poor  and  the  emancipators  of  the  slave,  and 
in  the  humility  which  made  them  the  true  pioneers 
of  all  progress  through  the  dignity  they  gave  to 
labour  by  engaging  themselves  in  menial  toils. 
Such  Christianity  sanctified  the  organisation  with 
which  it  was  connected,  but  could  never  be  entirely 
identified  with  it,  and  there  was  always  the  possi- 
bility that  some  day  the  two  might  stand  over 
against  each  other  in  emphatic  contrast.  When 
the  days  of  the  Church's  outward  glory  turned  out 
to  be  the  days  of  her  inward  decay,  this  distinction 
between  religion  and  the  Church  began  to  be  re- 
quired as  a  necessity  of  belief.  From  the  beginning 
of  the  twelfth  century  dim  questionings  were  heard. 
This  only  caused  the  authority  which  had  been  won, 
for  the  most  part  spiritually,  to  assert  itself  more 
and  more  materially.  Then  everywhere  the  dis- 
tinction began  to  be  drawn  between  what  the 
Church   was   and   what   she   should   be,   and   the 


10  THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

Reformation  only  needed  to  set  the  spark  to  this 
fuel. 

2.  This  distinction  between  religion  and  the 
Church  was  inevitably  brought  into  prominence  by 
the  development  of  the  Northern  nations. 

The  Western  Church,  even  in  her  best  days, 
never  embodied  more  than  the  spirit  of  the  Latin 
peoples.  The  spirit  of  nationality  in  the  Germanic 
races,  repressed  by  much  internal  strife,  awakened 
slowly,  but  was  all  the  more  characteristic  and  dis- 
tinct when  it  did  awake.  This  new  spirit  found  its 
best  spiritual  instincts  no  longer  on  the  side  of  the 
old  authority.  At  the  moment  when  the  Church, 
to  retain  her  power,  should  have  been  humblest 
and  purest,  she  was  proudest  and  most  corrupt. 
Viewed  in  the  light  of  this  new  interest,  she  ap- 
peared the  representative  of  an  alien  policy  and  of 
a  materialism  which  was  all  the  greater  offence  for 
bearing  the  name  of  religion  and  wearing  the  robe 
of  art.  The  actual  event  was  thus  only  the  falling 
of  the  wall  when  the  foundations  are  washed  away 
and  the  pressure  from  behind  has  become  irresistible. 

3.  Another  cause  which  emphasised  the  distinc- 
tion between  religion  and  the  Church  was  an  ex- 
tended knowledge  both  of  the  world  and  of  history. 

Travel  and  the  revival  of  learning  both  wrought 
for  a  larger  idea  of  the  world,  in  which  any  visible 
organisation  seemed  of  smaller  significance.  "  The 
foot  of  travel,"  as  Kipling  says,  "  let  out  the  stirrup- 
holes  of  belief."  The  Crusades  were  thus  at  once 
the  highest  mark  of  the  Church's  power  and  the 
commencement  of  its  decay.     Commerce  went  with 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM  11 

travel  and  involved  -  an  intercourse  with  men  of 
other  faiths  which  made  it  less  easy  to  believe  that 
God  had  limited  His  grace  to  one  institution.  And 
the  same  effect  was  produced  by  the  unveiled  glory 
of  the  ancient  literature.  The  result  was  a  human- 
ist, if  not  pagan,  temper  that  sought  wider  worlds 
and  sat  more  lightly  to  all  outward  restraints. 

Many,  however,  would  not  ascribe  this  new  era 
to  the  Reformation  but  to  the  growth  of  the  scien- 
tific idea.  The  distinguishing  mark  of  the  Modern 
Age  to  them  is  the  development  of  physical  science, 
and  they  would  ascribe  the  victory  over  the  Church's 
authority  in  thought  and  action  to  scientific,  not 
religious,  causes. 

Nor  can  it  be  denied  that  the  Church  has  been 
driven  by  science  from  many  an  outpost,  and  that  a 
vast  change  has  been  wrought  in  our  theological 
attitude  by  the  growth  of  our  conception  of  the 
universe  and  of  our  knowledge  of  the  laws  which 
govern  it.  From  the  early  view  of  the  world  as  a 
sort  of  Egyptian  temple  with  a  tank  on  the  roof  and 
a  flower-garden  above  the  tank,  the  Church  passed 
without  much  conflict  to  the  view  that  the  heavens 
are  circular,  transparent  spheres  turned  by  Divine 
power — an  idea  which  very  readily  took  the  con- 
crete form  of  an  angel  at  the  crank.  But  at  this 
point  the  Church,  having  meantime  perfected  her 
imperial  claim,  determined  to  stand,  and  we  see  the 
ecclesiastical  authorities  slowly  driven  backwards, 
contesting  every  foot  of  the  retreat,  their  carnal 
weapons  growing  sharper  as  their  arguments  grew 
weaker.     But   they  could  not  arrest  the   process 


12  THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

whereby  the  Law  of  Gravitation  replaced  the  toiling 
angels,  which,  if  God's  operation  in  Nature  is  only 
to  be  conceived  after  the  personal  and  direct  manner 
assumed  by  the  mediaeval  Church,  has,  as  Leibnitz 
said,  "robbed  the  Deity  of  some  of  His  most 
excellent  attributes ".  Heaven  is  no  longer  over 
our  heads  nor  hell  beneath  our  feet,  and  the  earth 
which  once  seemed  God's  only  care  is  dust  and 
"less  than  nothing"  amid  the  myriad  worlds.  Nor 
has  ecclesiastical  authority  succeeded  better  in  other 
spheres  of  science.  Geology  has  refused  to  remain 
stretched  on  the  "  Procrustean  bed  of  the  Penta- 
teuch". No  fulmination  has  availed  against  the 
idea  of  Evolution.  In  medicine,  once  the  Church's 
special  province,  evil  spirits  have  succumbed  to 
bacteria ;  and  in  meteorology  the  very  bells  baptised 
to  scare  the  demons  of  the  air  are  protected  by  the 
heretical  lightning  rod.  This,  it  is  argued,  was  the 
true  moving  force  in  emancipating  mankind  from 
outward  authorities,  and  not  the  Reformation  which 
itself  needed  to  be  reformed  by  this  power. 

Professor  Draper,  in  his  History  of  the  Conflict 
between  Religion  and  Science^  starts  with  the  con- 
tention that  religion  must,  in  its  very  nature,  be 
antagonistic  to  scientific  progress.  "A  Divine 
revelation  must  necessarily  be  intolerant  of  contra- 
diction ;  it  must  repudiate  all  improvement  in  itself, 
and  view  with  disdain  that  arising  from  the  pro- 
gressive intellectual  development  of  man."  ^  This 
view  of  God's  revelation,  as  something  entirely 
foreign   to  man,  announced   authoritatively  by   a 

1  P.  vi. 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM  13 

power  commissioned  for  that  purpose,  did,  of  course, 
prevail,  and  the  attitude  it  demanded  was  necessarily 
unquestioning  submission.  That  this  conception 
reappeared  in  the  Protestant  Church  and  allied 
itself,  generally  through  gross  misunderstanding  of 
Scripture,  with  what  has  proved  to  be  childish  and 
wrong,  is  equally  certain.  It  was  not  one  section 
of  the  Church  alone  that  attempted  to  "  sterilise 
science  by  theology,"  and,  even  to-day,  time  is  being 
spent  on  those  barren  comj^romises  which  have  been 
described  as  "mixing  up  more  or  less  of  science 
with  more  or  less  of  Scripture  and  producing  a 
result  more  or  less  absurd ". 

In  reply  it  might  be  argued  that  this  was  as 
much  due  to  an  illegitimate  scientific  as  to  an 
illegitimate  religious  dogmatism,  and  that  science 
has  enjoyed  liberty  to  grow  precisely  because  both 
science  and  religion  have  been  advancing  beyond 
that  attitude  of  intolerance. 

But  whatever  may  be  decided  regarding  ulti- 
mate causes,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  Re- 
formation abundantly  raised  questions  concerning 
freedom,  and  that  they  have  never  ceased  to  be 
asked  ever  since. 

First  of  all,  it  built  in  a  new  way  upon  the 
freedom  of  the  Christian  man.  According  to 
Luther's  tract,  Concerning  a  Christians  Freedom, 
union  with  Christ  means  a  faith  which  knows  all 
things  to  work  together  for  good,  so  that  we  are 
made  kings  and  priests  over  all  external  things,  and 
a  love  sufficient  by  itself  to  regulate  our  conduct 
towards  our  neighbour  without  error  and  without 


14  THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

restraint.  Amid  the  turmoil  which  arose  from  the 
half  liberty  of  imperfect  men,  even  Luther  was  not 
always  loyal  to  this  high  ideal,  and  Protestantism 
generally  turned  to  a  faith  easier  to  teach  and  an 
order  easier  to  enforce.  It  set  up  as  a  new  school 
of  correct  doctrine,  made  faith  acceptance  of  its 
system,  and  rested  order  on  the  old  type  of  sub- 
mission. Yet  in  the  darkest  days  there  was  a 
difference.  It  was  never  quite  forgotten  that 
Luther's  conception  of  the  freedom  of  the  children 
of  God  was  the  only  ultimate  basis  of  a  true  faith 
and  a  stable  spiritual  order. 

In  the  second  place,  the  Keformation  laid  new 
emphasis  upon  the  relation  of  this  freedom  to  God. 
This  took  the  strange  and,  it  might  seem,  contra- 
dictory form  of  denying  any  relation  of  freedom 
between  man  and  God.  It  is  the  fashion  to-day  to 
sum  up  this  attitude  as  Calvinism,  consider  it  apart 
from  the  conditions  which  brought  it  to  pass,  and 
bury  it  without  honour.  While  Calvin  may  have 
given  it  a  somewhat  different  intellectual  expres- 
sion, he  did  not,  in  holding  the  enslavement  of  the 
unregenerate  will,  differ  in  any  essential  respect 
from  the  other  Reformers.  No  writing  of  Calvin 
expresses  the  view  more  strongly  than  Luther's 
tract,  De  servo  Arbitrio.  The  problem  which  all 
sought  to  solve  was  how  to  lighten  the  burden  of 
freedom.  The  assertion  of  freedom  against  man 
only  made  plain  the  perilous  undertaking  of  walking 
alone,  only  showed  how  futile  freedom  would  be 
apart  from  God.  It  was  a  time  of  stress,  with  the 
vastest  issues  apparently  at  the  mercy  of   man's 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM  15 

wickedness  and  folly  ;  and  the  only  way  of  reaching 
any  sense  of  security  seemed  to  be  to  deny  man  any 
share  in  the  issue  and  ascribe  it  all  to  God.  That 
the  earliest  effect  of  freedom  should  be  this  doctrine 
of  the  enslavement  of  the  will  might  seem  contrary 
to  reason,  but  that  men  should  seek  relief  in  it  will 
never  be  strange  to  one  who  stands  under  the  stars 
and  thinks  of  infinity  and  eternity,  and  realises 
that  God  has  called  him  to  direct  his  course  in  the 
midst  of  this  terrible  vastness.  The  resort  to  this 
way  of  escape  will  be  easier  to  understand  when 
we  remember  how  long  the  Christian  world  had 
relied  upon  an  external  guidance  which  it  had 
taken  to  be  infallible.  Wherefore,  although  it  grows 
ever  clearer  that  the  denial  of  man's  share  is  no 
solution  but  rather  an  abandonment  of  the  problem, 
there  can  be  no  discussion  of  freedom  which  does 
not  start,  as  the  Reformers  did,  with  a  deep  sense 
of  its  overwhelming  burden. 

In  the  third  place,  the  Reformation  raised,  as 
it  had  not  been  raised  before,  the  question  of  the 
relation  of  freedom  to  society.  The  practical  work- 
ing out  of  the  problem  occupied  the  whole  of  the 
energies  of  the  next  two  centuries  ;  the  thinking 
out  of  it  has  not  been  fully  done  to  this  day.  From 
the  first  day  of  the  Reformation  it  became  a  vital 
question  how  one  who  was  called  to  the  liberty  of 
the  children  of  God  should  bear  himself  towards 
the  earthly  dominion  of  possibly  worldly  men. 
The  Reformation  was  a  social  force  of  the  first 
magnitude,  even  the  extreme  sects  which  repudi- 
ated   human    rule    being   in   search   of    a    higher 


16  THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

dominion.  A  double  impulse  made  itself  manifest. 
There  was  the  sacred  right  of  freedom,  higher  than 
life  itself,  and  there  was  also  a  new  sense  of  the 
sacredness  of  civil  society.  The  reconciliation  of 
these  two  must  ever  be  the  highest  task  of  a  free- 
dom which  would  exalt  both  man  and  all  his  re- 
lationships. Hence  there  has  sprung  from  this 
movement  not  only  civil  turmoil  but  a  new  civil 
order  settled  on  a  more  stable  basis  of  general 
liberty. 

In  the  fourth  place,  the  Reformation  raised  the 
question  of  the  relation  of  the  free  individual  to  the 
religious  society.  That  the  Reformers,  as  is  so 
frequently  asserted,  ignored  the  Church  and  went 
back  directly  to  the  Bible,  is  not  shown  either  by 
their  principles  or  their  practice.  To  Calvin,  as 
much  as  to  Augustine,  the  Church  is  our  mother. 
At  her  breasts  our  religious  life  is  nourished.  She 
instructs  us,  and  she  alone  provides  the  conditions 
in  which  our  spiritual  life  may  grow.  So  strong 
was  this  sense  of  the  importance  of  the  Church,  that 
the  tendency  was  rather  to  forget  that  she  did  not 
claim  the  old  infallibility,  and  could  not,  therefore, 
rule  after  the  old  fashion.  Yet,  even  with  this 
tendency,  there  went  the  knowledge  that  the  Church, 
which  is  our  mother,  is  something  higher  than  the 
organised  society,  and  that  her  true  succour  is 
something  more  than  word  and  sacrament. 

Finally,  the  Reformation  raised  the  question  of 
the  relation  of  the  religious  society  to  the  civil 
society.  Two  currents  of  thought  kept  continually 
crossing  each  other.    On  the  one  hand,  freedom  was 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM  17 

claimed  for  the  Christian  society,  and  on  the  other, 
the  Civil  society  was  regarded  as  an  essentially 
religious  order.  It  was,  therefore,  impossible  for 
the  Church  to  seek  to  exist  as  a  separate  order  in 
the  State,  as  the  Catholic  Church  had  done.  The 
method  adopted  was  no  final  solution,  any  more 
than  the  method  adopted  to  get  rid  of  the  burden 
of  freedom.  It  is,  however,  to  be  noted  that  every- 
where the  arrangement  was  followed  without  ques- 
tion, so  that,  in  some  practical  way,  it  must  have 
met  the  needs  of  the  time.  In  every  country 
where  Protestantism  succeeded,  it  took  the  form 
of  State  Churches.  The  intenser  the  religious  life, 
the  more  vigorously  it  flowed  in  that  channel. 
Political  expediency  no  doubt  was  far  too  promi- 
nent, but  an  arrangement  so  general  cannot  be  fully 
explained  either  by  accident  or  by  human  devices. 
The  problem  the  State  Church  sought  to  deal  with 
was  the  freedom  of  the  whole  life  of  the  Christian 
man.  That  seemed,  at  the  time,  to  carry  with  it 
an  intimate  relation  between  the  Church  and  the 
State.  The  defect  of  the  method  is  sufficiently 
apparent.  The  Church  has  been  ever  since  exposed 
to  the  danger  of  becoming  the  plaything  of  worldly 
politics,  and  the  method  of  religious  freedom  has 
been  corrupted  by  the  interference  of  civil  constraint. 
The  evil  consequences  should  not  hinder  us,  how- 
ever, from  recognising  the  first  significance  of  the 
union  as  an  attempt  to  embody  the  sacredness  of 
the  State  which  was  itself  an  embodiment  of  the 
sacredness  of  the  whole  of  life.  The  problem  still 
awaits  a  final  solution  which  shall  do  justice  to  all 


18  THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

the  interests  of  freedom,  one  that  needs  perhaps 
humbler  claims  on  the  part  of  the  State  as  much  as 
on  the  part  of  the  Church,  but,  with  all  its  defects, 
the  system  of  State  Churches  was  an  extension  of 
the  scope  of  religion  compared  with  the  previous 
division  between  the  State  and  a  foreign  dominion 
under  the  name  of  the  Church.  That  application 
of  religion  to  the  whole  of  life  a  freer  system  in  a 
freer  society  should  not  only  safeguard  but  carry 
forward. 

Another  effect  of  Protestantism,  almost  as  gen- 
eral, was  the  desire  to  simplify  worship.  This  is 
usually  looked  upon  as  a  purely  negative  movement. 
Partly,  it  is  explained  as  a  natural  consequence  of 
rejecting  the  papacy  :  the  elaborate  sacramentarian 
system  could  no  longer  be  maintained  after  its  roots 
had  been  cut.  Partly,  it  is  explained  as  mere  love 
of  nakedness.  It  was  resolved  to  eradicate  totally 
the  old  worship ;  nothing  connected  with  it  could 
be  any  more  tolerated  ;  the  love  for  mere  bareness 
grew  into  a  passion,  a  pure  fanaticism  of  baldness. 
But  in  all  other  matters  there  was  the  greatest  zeal 
to  preserve  everything  that  could  be  preserved. 
Doctrine  seemed,  at  first,  to  rest  as  solidly  as  ever 
on  the  old  Scholastic  basis,  and  there  was  certainly 
no  rejecting  for  the  mere  sake  of  rejection.  When 
studied  more  sympathetically,  it  becomes  apparent 
that  the  endeavour  after  a  simpler  worship  was  not 
a  negative  idea  at  all,  and  had  nothing  whatsoever 
to  do  with  the  rejection  of  beauty  in  any  form.  It 
was  an  attempt  to  solve  another  question,  one  that 
always   remains — the   relation  of  freedom  to  the 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM  19 

world.  Under  the  sense  of  the  significance  of 
freedom,  a  new  import  was  given  to  the  truth  that 
the  only  acceptable  worship  of  God  is  of  the  heart. 
The  intrusion  of  any  merely  material  attraction 
seemed  a  degradation  of  this  pure  service.  The 
place  of  the  world  did  not  seem  to  be  in  God's 
service,  but  under  the  feet  of  His  children,  for  their 
use  and  at  their  command.  Naturally  it  might 
seem  that  the  fairest  things  the  earth  affords  should 
be  employed  for  God's  worship,  just  as  the  best 
worldly  goods  should  naturally  seem  to  be  at  the 
service  of  His  children.  But  as  faith  teaches  us 
that  the  best  possession  is  to  be  lifted  above  de- 
pendence on  the  pleasant  things  of  life,  so  it  may 
teach  us  that  the  best  worship  is  to  penetrate  to 
that  region  where  the  things  of  sense  cannot 
accompany  us.  Freedom,  neither  in  life  nor  in 
worship,  should  be  dependent  upon  mere  material 
succour.  The  dififerent  interests  of  ritualism,  and 
puritanism  have  not  yet  been  reconciled,  and  the 
tendency  at  the  present  day  is  not  in  the  direction 
of  the  latter;  but  every  revival  of  the  sense  that 
man  appears  as  a  free  individual,  with  the  task  of 
mastering  the  attractions  of  life  lying  as  a  heavy 
burden  upon  his  soul,  before  a  God  who  is  Spirit, 
will  tend  to  make  much  symbol  and  ornament  a 
distraction  rather  than  a  help  to  worship,  and  there 
will  always  be  times  when,  under  a  sense  of  the 
significance  of  man's  spirit  and  God's,  men  return 
to  the  severest  simplicity.  The  older  form  of  reli- 
gion sought  the  same  victory  in  another  way.  A 
select  few  withdrew  from  the  world  and  maintained 


20  THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

for  the  Church  the  sense  of  living  above  the  world. 
But  w^here  the  burden  of  being  free  lies  upon  all, 
and  where  it  is  necessary  to  be  master  in  all  our 
household,  a  religion  that  says  to  the  world,  in  all 
its  forms,  stay  here  while  I  go  yonder  and  worship, 
alone  seems  to  accord  with  the  liberty  of  the  chil- 
dren of  God. 

In  all  this  it  is  apparent,  as  has  been  said,  that 
the  "  religious  life  of  the  Keformation  was  far  in 
advance  of  its  method".     Men  were  placed  in  a 
different  practical  relation  to  freedom,  so  that  they 
could  not  help  raising  the  questions  which  accom- 
pany it.     They  could  never  again  quite  forget  the 
distinction  between  religion  and  the  Church,  and 
with  that  went  a  new  moral  attitude.     The  author- 
ity of  the  Church  was  not  rejected  for  its  own  sake, 
but  in  the  interest  of  the  responsibility  of  personal 
freedom,  as  when  a  young  person  has  to  reject  the 
authority  of   a  parent  under  the  constraint  of  a 
higher   authority   in   his   own   heart.      Outwardly 
there  might  be  little  difference,  but  a  new  principle 
had  entered,  carrying  with  it  necessarily  a  different 
type  of  development.     Under  the  old  view,  life  was 
divided  into  two  departments,  one  in  which  a  man 
obeyed  the  guidance  of  another,  and  one  in  which 
he  was  free  to  follow  his  own  devices.     Responsi- 
bility and  freedom  divided  the  life  between  them — 
the  idea  of  freedom  being  liberty  to  please  oneself. 
But,  if  the  authority  rises  up  within,  a  man  never 
escapes  it,  and  he  must  then  make  both  responsi- 
bility and  independence  cover  the  whole  of  life. 
The  result  may  be  much  disturbance  and  sad  failure. 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM  21 

yet  we  recognise  in  the  individual  life  that,  till  this 
task  of  finding  our  freedom  not  outside  of  our  duty 
but  in  it  has  been  undertaken,  the  true  moral  life 
has  not  begun.  If,  then,  this  same  phase  should 
come  in  the  history  of  the  race,  if  it  should  come 
through  natural  growth  and  many  converging  in- 
fluences, however  great  be  the  difficulties  it  involves 
or  the  evils  it  may  bring  in  its  train,  it  is  impossible 
to  escape  the  impression  that  it  is  a  necessary  and, 
therefore,  a  Divine  stage  of  human  progress. 

Such  a  change  of  religious  attitude  cannot  be 
confined  to  any  part  of  life  that  we  might  define  as 
the  religious  sphere.  There  is  no  longer,  strictly 
speaking,  a  religious  and  a  secular  sphere.  There 
is  not  one  territory  in  which  a  man  obeys  God  and 
another  in  which  he  pleases  himself.  It  is  all  for 
faith  in  God,  and,  in  the  measure  man  is  what  he 
should  be,  it  is  all  for  his  own  freedom. 

Nothing  has  been  more  marked  in  the  whole 
movement  since  the  Reformation  than  the  process 
of  secularisation  which  has  extended  itself  to  the 
whole  of  life.  Not  only  in  thought  but  in  action 
large  territories  have  been  withdrawn  from  the  con- 
trol of  the  Church.  The  ecclesiastic  may  still  be 
mightier  in  politics  than  is  assumed,  but  the  theory 
at  least  is  in  the  direction  of  limiting  his  interfer- 
ence, and,  in  the  public  Ufe  of  the  community,  his 
help  is  accepted  in  the  capacity  of  a  citizen  not  of 
an  ecclesiastic.  This  process  is  even  forwarded  by 
many,  not  with  the  intention  of  eliminating  the 
sacred  from  life,  but  of  including  the  whole  of  life 
within  its  operation.     With  this  has  gone  another 


22  THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

phenomenon,  significant  of  all  the  rest — the  much 
slighter  bond  between  the  definitely  religious  life 
and  the  visible  ecclesiastical  organisation.  One  of 
two  things  it  must  prove.  Mankind  is  leaving 
school  either  from  disregard  to  learning,  or  from 
regard  to  life ;  either  to  forget  its  lessons,  or  to 
begin  rightly  to  understand  them  by  an  independent 
application  of  them  to  reality.  Towards  this  secu- 
larisation of  thought  and  action  every  religious 
teacher  must  determine  his  attitude,  for  of  the  fact 
there  can  be  no  dispute,  and  that  it  involves  im- 
portant issues  of  some  kind  can  hardly  be  ques- 
tioned. Is  it  religion  or  only  religious  observance 
that  is  at  stake  ;  the  Church's  spiritual  or  only  her 
temporal  dominion ;  the  power  of  godliness  to  con- 
trol life  or  only  the  power  of  the  clergy  to  control 
opinion  ? 

That  a  change  has  taken  place  which  has  been 
accompanied  by  great  evils,  it  were  vain  to  deny. 
There  is  no  place  here,  or,  for  that  matter,  any- 
where else  in  history  for  mere  effervescing  optimism. 
In  wide  spheres  of  society  there  has  been  entire 
forgetfulness  of  even  the  semblance  of  religion 
which  the  influence  of  one  undivided  organisation 
did  at  least  maintain.  More  discouraging  still  is 
the  spirit  of  easy  comfort  in  which  too  many  religious 
people  live,  and  the  standard  of  material  success 
too  largely  accepted  in  all  the  churches.  The  in- 
dividualism which  should  have  been  won  for 
individual  responsibility,  has  too  often  been  used 
for  individual  selfishness ;  and  what  men  boast  of 
as  freedom   has   too   often   been   mere   liberty  to 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM  23 

fight  for  one's  own  hand.  The  Reformation  was 
no  absolute  or  final  purification  of  the  Church. 
But  the  possibility  of  a  more  spiritual  faith  and  a 
new  growth  of  freedom  is  not  destroyed  because 
many  misuse  their  emancipation  and  reject  their 
higher  call.  How,  without  the  risk  of  such  loss,  is 
any  more  spiritual  faith  to  be  won  ?  An  authoritative 
Taith  auTEontatively  announced,  claiming  one  part 
of  our  life__f or  G od_and  leaving  the,  rest  as  a  con- 
cession to  ourselves,  might  preclud^_jiiariy_daugfirs, 
but  it  would  also  preclude  the  highest  moral  and 
spiritual  ^ccessr^  Instead  ofargiimg  with  Schanz, 
a  Roman  (JatTiolic  apologist,  that  faith  presupposes 
authority,  that  there  must  be  an  infallible  authority 
if  there  is  to  be  any  revelation  or  any  faith  in  the 
world,^  it  might  rather  be  argued  that  we  have, 
in  no  right  sense,  either  revelation  or  faith,  so  long 
as  any  human  voice  comes  between  us  and  God. 
The  idea  that  an  outward  infallible  authority  is 
necessary  for  faith,  presupposes  that  the  revelation 
of  God  is  a  thing  wholly  foreign  to  us.  That  means, 
in  the  last  issue,  an  unspiritual  trust,  for  ultimately 
our  belief  must  come  to  rest  on  the  material  guaran- 
tee. The  conditions  involved  in  the  absence  of 
such  a  guarantee  were  very  nobly  set  forth  by 
Principal  Rainy  in  the  crisis  of  his  church's  trial. 
"As  a  branch  of  the  Church  we  are  fallible  and 
may  go  wrong,  so  disastrously  wrong  as  to  become, 

1 A  Christian  Apology,  by  Paul  Schanz,  trans.  1892,  vol.  iii., 
p.  216.  The  whole  passage  is  a  very  instructive  example  of  how 
a  certain  view  of  the  absoluteness  of  truth  is  assumed,  and  then 
all  the  rest  deduced  as  necessary  postulate. 


24  THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

according  to  our  Confession,  no  church  but  a 
synagogue  of  Satan.  And  there  is  a  craving  in 
many  minds  for  something  like  a  fixed  external 
authority  to  ensure  our  fidelity  to  at  least  the 
essentials  of  the  faith.  There  is  no  such  authority 
and  no  such  security.  Our  only  security  against 
apostacy  is  to  be  sought  in  faith,  in  prayer,  in  the 
work  of  God,  in  the  presence  and  power  of  the 
Spirit,  in  the  maintenance  of  fellowship  with  our 
living  King.  That  is  true  of  churches  even  as  of 
individuals.  To  place  our  trust  elsewhere  is  itself 
an  apostacy."  ^  In  the  last  resort,  faith  in  a  material 
guarantee  is  not  faith.  As  Ritschl  says,  ''  Purely 
legal  treatment  of  matters  of  the  Church  and  the 
Confession  is  worldly,  and  worldly  is  unbelieving  ".^ 
Freedom  i%  therefore,  as  essential  for  true  faith 
as  faith  for  effective  freedom  ;  and,  for  the  sake  of 
both,  it  is  necessary  to  draw  even  more  clearly 
the  distinction  between  religion  and  what  Professor 
James  has  called  religion's  wicked  partner,  the 
spirit  of  dogmatic  dominion,  between  the  spirit 
which  loves  truth,  and  alone  has  been  a  martyr 
for  its  sake,  which  seeks  freedom,  and  alone  has 
suffered  to  win  it  for  the  world,  and  the  spirit  which 
would  measure  God's  rule  by  the  love  it  bears  to  its 
own.  If,  in  doing  so,  we  are  driven  to  the  idea  of 
a  Church  which  has  nothing  left  by  which  to  impose 
her  creed  but  truth  or  her  obedience  but  love,  we 
shall  only  reach  what  a  truly  sjiiritual  conception 
requires.      Then  we  may  discover  that  the  danger 

^  Speech  at  the  opening  of  the  Now  College,  1904. 
2  Gesammelte  Aufscitze,  Neue  Folge,  p.  10. 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM  25 

did  not  lie  in  larger  freedom,  but  in  the  mixture  of 
incompatible  methods  of  freedom  and  constraint. 
The  Church  may  be  shorn  of  her  outward  glory  ; 
but,  as  the  increase  of  her  outward  glory  in  the 
Middle  Ages  heralded  her  inward  corruption,  the 
diminishing  of  it  in  our  day  may  set  her  to  the 
true  task  of  the  Kingdom  of  God. 

More  and  more,  it  seems  to  me,  the  long 
struggle  has  made  it  plain  that  true  faith,  so  far 
from  being  in  hostility  to  freedom,  is  impossible 
without  it,  even  as  there  can  be  no  such  thing  as 
genuine  freedom  without  faith.  More  and  more, 
in  the  course  of  the  long  and  arduous  conflict,  it 
has  become  plain  that  freedom  is  the  fundamental 
spiritual  idea,  and  that  even  practically  it  can  only 
be  maintained  as  a  spiritual  idea.  Unless  we  can 
see  that  the  whole  mechanical  basis  of  life  is  only 
a  scaffolding  for  the  erection  of  the  higher  life  of 
freedom,  it  matters  not  what  authorities  we  set  up, 
we  have  no  ground  for  a  truly  spiritual  hope.  My 
aim  is  to  show  you  that,  alongside  of  the  develop- 
ment of  the  idea  of  a  system  of  law  enclosing  us 
round  in  its  great  mechanical  network,  there  has 
gone  a  development  of  the  idea  of  freedom  with  a 
more  conscious  realisation  of  the  great  issues  of 
faith  which  it  involves  ;  and  as  the  former  has  been 
tested  in  the  laboratory  of  science,  the  latter  has 
been  tested  in  the  great  laboratory  we  call  life. 

Large  questions  necessarily  rise  upon  us,  ques- 
tions of  the  freedom  of  the  will,  questions  of  man's 
final  authority  and  God's  final  revelation,  ques- 
tions of  man's  own  task  and  of  its  place  in  a  King- 


26  THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM 

dom  of  God.  To  give  an  account  of  so  large 
a  movement,  on  any  scale  tolerable  to  the  short- 
lived race  of  man,  would  demand  much  condensa- 
tion and  omission,  for  the  task  has  lain  as  a  heavy 
burden  upon  man,  especially  during  the  last  two 
centuries.  To  limit  ourselves  to  the  thinkers  is 
the  first  necessity,  not  that  they  alone,  or  even 
mainly,  have  carried  on  the  work.  Indeed,  it  is  a 
sad  hindrance  to  our  progress  that  thinking  has  to 
be  done  by  thinkers,  for  it  is  virile  action  and  not 
the  dust  of  books  that  makes  men.  Count  Tolstoi 
asks  why  we  should  go  to  the  thinker  at  all  on  a 
matter  of  this  kind,  seeing  he  openly  confesses  he 
has  not  found  the  secret  of  life.  But  it  is  some- 
thing, at  all  events,  to  find  one  who  knows  that  he 
does  not  know,  one  who  is  hungering  and  thirsting 
after  truth,  in  whose  company  we  may  some  day 
be  filled.  The  thinker  is  perhaps  rather  in  the 
position  of  the  fly  on  the  carriage  wheel,  doing  less 
to  advance  the  world  than  he  supposes.  Perhaps 
we  could  say  of  all  his  work  what  Ritschl  has  said 
of  the  Newer  Theology,  that  it  "is  rather  an  indi- 
cation than  a  cause  of  the  new  era  that  has  come 
upon  the  Church,"  ^  but  just  because  it  is  such  an 
indication,  just  because  it  has  the  whole  history 
behind  it,  it  serves  our  purpose. 

Even  thus  limited,  the  field  is  vast.  To  sum- 
marise in  such  a  way  as  to  degenerate  into  a 
catalogue  of  names  and  books  would  be  a  futile 
and  depressing  waste  of  time.  Nor  is  the  custom 
of  appraising  the  contribution  of  each  thinker  much 
1  Lehen,  vol.  i.,  p.  433. 


THE  RISE  OF  THE  PROBLEM  27 

more  profitable.  A  thinker  is  not  a  person  with  a 
bag  into  which  he  collects  so  many  ideas  from  other 
people  and  adds  so  many  more  of  his  own.  The 
real  interest  is  to  see  a  man's  attitude  towards  the 
great  elemental  truths,  to  see  what  interest  pre- 
ponderates for  him,  and  from  what  point  of  view 
he  regards  the  world.  It  is  not,  as  in  the  physical 
sciences,  an  account  of  adding  one  discovery  to 
another,  but  of  an  advance  in  conscious  grasp  of 
the  whole  bearings  of  the  problem  through  the 
continual  pressure  upon  it  of  thought  and  living 
interest.  This  feeling  of  life  is  the  difficult  and 
the  important  thing  to  retain.  But  as  the  thinkers 
reflect  the  movement,  certain  great  books  reflect 
the  thinkers,  and  these  I  propose  to  make  the 
centre  of  my  exposition.  The  result  ought  to  be 
to  preserve  some  more  living  interest  than  would 
otherwise  be  possible ;  and,  at  all  events,  the 
method  has  the  merit  of  introducing  you  to  really 
great  books,  a  literature  of  the  first  importance 
for  your  studies. 


LECTURE  II 

JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 


Luther,  Von  der  Freiheit  eines  Christenmenschen,  1520. 

Founding  of  the  Society  of  Jesus,  1534. 

Opening  of  the  Council  of  Trent,  1545. 

Montaigne,  Essais,  1580. 

Charron,  Traitd  de  la  Sagesse,  1601. 

Descartes,  Discours  de  la  Mt^thode,  1637. 

Jansenius,  Augustinus,  1640. 

Descartes,  Principia  Philosophies,  1644. 

Pascal,  Lettres  Provinciaks,  1656. 

Pascal,  Pensdes  (Port-Koyal  edition),  1669. 

Pascal,  Pens6es,  Eestored  text  (Faug6re),  1844. 

Pascal,  Pens6es  (Havet),  1852. 

Revocation  of  the  Edict  of  Nantes,  1685. 

Bossuet,  Histoire  dcs  Variatio7is  des  Eglises  Protestantes,  1688. 

Books  of  Eeference 

The  Benaissance  in  Italy,  J,  A.  Symonds.  A  History  of  the 
PajMcy,  Leopold  Ranke,  Eng.  trans.,  1851.  Franzosische 
Geschichte,  Leopold  Ranke,  1852.  Port-Boyal,  C.  A.  Sainte- 
Beuve,  3rd  ed.,  1867.  Geschichte  der  iieueren  Philosophic, 
Kuno  Fischer,  vol.  i.  Etudes  sur  Blaise  Pascal,  A.  Vinet, 
3rd  ed.  La  vraie  BcUgion  selon  Pascal,  SuUy-Prudhomme, 
1905.     Pascal,  Principal  TuUoch,  1878. 


LECTURE  II 

JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

Of  the  religious  life  of  the  Reformation,  which  was 
far  in  advance  of  its  method,  the  greatest  exposi- 
tion is  Luther's  work  l^efore  referred  to,  Concernmg 
a  Christian's  Freedom.  It  was  written  in  1520 
while  everything  was  still  in  solution,  and  was 
dedicated  to  Leo  X.  with  a  preface  expressing  the 
author's  willingness  to  do  everything  for  unity 
except  renounce  the  truth.  His  holiness  is  faith- 
fully dealt  with,  being  told  that  he  is  the  servant 
of  Christ's  servants  and,  more  than  any  other  man, 
in  a  most  perilous  position.  Yet  there  is  still  a 
fervent  hope  that  such  a  change  in  the  Church 
might  take  place  as  would  preserve  its  unity.  All 
that  is  needed  is  for  the  Pope  to  cease  to  regulate 
Scripture  interpretation  and  begin  to  be  regulated 
by  it.  "  I  cannot  bear  with  laws,"  Luther  cries, 
**  for  the  interpretation  of  the  Word  of  God,  since 
the  Word  of  God  which  teaches  liberty  in  all  things 
should  not  be  bound."  ^  To  be  a  Christian,  to  be 
justified,  and  to  be  free,  all  mean  the  same  thing. 
Faith   gives   liberty  precisely  because   it    justifies 

^  Luther's  Primary  Works,  trans.  Wace  and  Buchheim,  1896, 

p.  253. 

(31) 


32         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENS^ES 

without  law  or  works.  Faith  honours  God,  and 
is  honoured  by  Him  ;  it  unites  to  Christ,  and  is 
the  wedding  ring  whereby  we  share  His  righteous- 
ness and  He  shares  our  sins.  "  Thus  the  beUeving 
soul,  by  the  pledge  of  its  faith  in  Christ,  becomes 
free  from  all  sin,  fearless  of  death,  safe  from  hell, 
and  endued  with  the  eternal  righteousness,  life  and 
salvation  of  its  husband  Christ."  ^  Faith  is  the  only 
fulfilment  of  the  first  commandment,  and  thereby 
it  is  a  fulfilment  of  all  commandments  previous  to 
all  good  works.  By  this  relationship  to  Christ  we 
are  made  kings  and  priests.  Our  kingship  is  over 
all  things — God's  strength  being  so  perfected  in  our 
weakness,  that  we  can  turn  all  things  to  the  profit 
of  our  salvation ;  and  our  priesthood  is  the  right  to 
appear  before  God  for  ourselves  and  others  and  the 
ability  to  teach  one  another  mutually  the  things 
that  are  of  God.  "  Who  then  can  comprehend  the 
loftiness  of  that  Christian  dignity  which,  by  its 
royal  power,  rules  over  all  things,  even  over  death, 
life  and  sin,  and,  by  its  priestly  glory,  is  all  power- 
ful with  God  ? "  Did  this  relationship  depend  on 
good  works  we  should  at  once  lose  faith  and  all  its 
benefits,  and  good  works  would  be  impossible,  be- 
cause to  do  good  works  for  the  sake  of  being  justi- 
fied is  not  a  motive  that  can  make  them  good.  Good 
works  follow,  because  the  believer,  being  already 
justified,  can  act  from  disinterested  love  to  God's 
service,  without  looking  to  any  other  end  than  what 
is  well-pleasing  to  Him,  and  without  turning  his 
eyes  from  the  necessities  and   advantages  of  his 

1  P.  265. 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES         33 

neighbour.  And  at  the  same  time  that  a  man  is 
thus  provided  with  a  right  motive,  he  is  provided 
with  the  right  rule.  He  knows  for  what  end  and 
in  what  measure  he  ought  to  chasten  his  body,  and 
he  is  guided  by  love  in  all  his  relations  to  others. 
In  this  way  the  Christian  is  the  most  free  lord  of 
all  and  subject  to  none,  and  the  most  dutiful  ser- 
vant of  all  and  subject  to  every  one.  Even  his 
obedience  to  the  powers  that  be  is  out  of  gratui- 
tous love,  and  his  attention  to  religious  ceremonies 
has  the  same  origin,  for,  while  he  must  offend  hard- 
ened ceremonialists,  he  will,  out  of  regard  to  the 
simple,  attend  to  ceremonies.  "  In  brief,  as  poverty 
is  imperilled  amid  riches,  honesty  amid  business, 
purity  amid  pleasures,  so  is  justification  by  faith 
imperilled  amid  ceremonies."  But  as  we  must 
live  amid  the  other  perils,  so  we  must  live  amid 
ceremonies  ;  only  we  may  never  forget  that  cere- 
monies are  merely  scaffolding  and  not  building.^ 
This  relation  of  freedom  and  justification  is 
fundamental  to  our  question.  It  becomes  clearer 
that  the  essence  of  justification  is  Christian  free- 
dom, and  that  freedom  can  involve  nothing  less 
than  the  faith  which  does  not  fear  the  tyranny  of 
events,  and  the  love  which  delivers  from  the  sense 
that  duty  is  an  alien  burden.  By  this  freedom  also 
our  relation  to  the  organisation  is  regulated,  and 
so  obligation  and  freedom  are  made  one,  and  both 
cover  the  whole  of  life.  The  only  objection  that 
can  be  taken  is  to  the  failure  in  practice.  The 
ideal,  at  least,  is  of  Divine  loftiness. 

1  P.  291. 
3 


34         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENS^ES 

The  hope  of  maintaming  this  freedom  within 
the  fold  of  the  Catholic  Church  was  not  confined 
to  Luther  or  to  Protestants.  It  was  thought  to 
be  not  impossible  to  form  a  rational  popedom  on 
the  basis  of  justification  by  faith,  and  many  voices 
even  at  the  Council  of  Trent  protested  against  re- 
jecting a  truth  merely  because  Protestants  main- 
tained it.  The  chief  question  before  the  Council 
was  this  doctrine  of  justification,  and  the  issue 
behind  it  was  whether  the  Church  was  to  be  set 
above  religion  or  religion  above  the  Church.  The 
mere  fact  that  the  distinction  had  been  drawn 
altered  the  whole  moral  situation.  The  old  un- 
questioning acceptance  of  what  the  Church  said 
as  absolutely  true,  and  what  she  prescribed  as  all 
that  was  necessary  to  be  performed,  had  passed. 
Then,  what  good  men  had  done  in  simplicity, 
became  an  entirely  different  matter  when  done  of 
deliberate  purpose. 

The  significance  of  the  Society  of  Jesus  was 
that  it  embodied  that  deliberate  purpose.  The 
watchword  of  the  Jesuits  was  obedience,  even  as 
Luther's  was  freedom,  and  their  importance  for 
our  inquiry  consists  precisely  in  the  logical  consist- 
ency with  which  they  followed  out  that  principle. 
Obedience  to  the  institution  is  deliberately  put 
above  obedience  to  any  conceivable  personal  call. 
It  may  not  be  the  right  reading  of  their  constitution, 
which  understands  it  as  laying  down  that  the  com- 
mand of  a  superior  would  justify  even  deadly  sin, 
though  such  a  profound  scholar  of  the  subject  as 
Kanke  thinks  that  there  should  be  no  complaint  if 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENS^ES         35 

it  be  so  interpreted.^  But  the  negative  aspect  of 
the  matter  is  quite  enough.  The  whole  emphasis 
is  placed  on  the  command  of  the  superior,  and  no 
provision  is  made  for  calling  a  halt  and  revising 
the  command  in  the  court  of  one's  own  conscience. 
Each  one  is  to  be  borne  about  by  Divine  providence 
acting  through  his  superior,  "as  though  he  were  a 
corpse  ".  Obedience,  ex  hypothesi,  makes  righteous- 
ness. God  is  represented  in  His  Church,  the 
Church  is  represented  in  the  superior  ;  therefore 
obedience  to  the  superior  is  necessarily  obedience 
to  God.  The  working  out  of  so  direct  a  negative 
must  be  of  supreme  importance  for  our  inquiry. 

Like  Luther,  Ignatius  Loyola  passed  through  a 
great  spiritual  conflict.  To  Loyola  also  it  seemed 
as  if  his  life  had  been  one  continuous  course  of  sin. 
But  he  came  out  of  the  battle  on  the  other  side 
from  Luther.  Salvation  was  to  be  achieved  by  a 
kind  of  spiritual  knight-errantry,  with  confessions 
three  days  long  and  scourgings  three  times  a  day, 
and  with  obedience  to  the  word  of  order  like  a 
soldier  as  the  highest  duty.  Obedience  to  the  human 
head  of  the  Church  occupied  exactly  the  same  place 
with  Loyola  as  faith  in  the  Divine  Head  with 
Luther.  In  other  words,  as  definitely  as  the  Re- 
formation set  religion  above  the  Church,  the  Society 
of  Jesus  set  the  Church  above  religion.  Jesuitism, 
being  called  into  existence  to  fight  Protestantism, 
took  the  radical  course  of  utterly  repudiating  the 
whole  conception  of  Christian  freedom.      All  the 

1 A  History  of  the  Papacy,  Leopold  Eanke.  Eng.  trans.,  1851, 
p.  166,  note. 


36         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

rest  followed  from  that  principle.  It  was  bound  to 
divide  life  between  responsibility  and  independ- 
ence, between  obedience  to  the  commands  of  the 
Church  and  the  liberty  to  please  ourselves ;  and  it 
was  bound  to  set  up  moral  argumentation  between 
these  two  sides  of  life.  Hence  arose  what  has  been 
described  as  "  the  amazing  combination  of  the  en- 
thusiasm of  a  Don  Quixote  with  the  politics  of  a 
Macchiavelli ".  It  is  only  necessary  to  confer  the 
eternal  sanction  upon  the  service  of  a  visible  in- 
stitution, and  this  combination  must  follow.  An 
ascetic  conversion  then  calls  men  into  the  service 
of  an  institution  which  can  be  forwarded  mainly 
by  worldly  shrewdness,  and  piety  and  policy  are 
united  into  one. 

The  Jesuits  naturally  returned  to  the  doctrine 
of  the  Schoolmen,  that  the  soul,  invested  with 
grace,  merits  eternal  life,  and  that  we  are  justified 
when  Christ's  righteousness,  working  through  the 
Church,  produces  our  righteousness.  An  equally 
logical  deduction  from  their  principle  of  obedience 
was  the  Inquisition.  The  Jesuits  could  not  do 
anything  but  glory  in  the  fact  that  their  founder 
was  one  of  the  first  to  propose  that  it  be  revived 
and  its  scope  enlarged.  The  more  we  consider  the 
situation,  the  more  terrible  the  erection  of  such  an 
institution  at  such  a  time  appears.  A  great  many 
questions  were  in  solution,  a  great  many  earnest 
minds  were  revising  the  profoundest  doctrines  of 
Christianity,  a  great  many  faithful  members  of  the 
Church  were  seeking  to  find  room  for  a  larger  life 
within  her  fold.    These  inquirers  were  drowned  and 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES         37 

tortured  and  burned,  and  the  soul  which  lived  in 
their  books  was  even  more  ruthlessly  destroyed. 
But,  if  it  was  an  appalling,  it  was  also  a  logical, 
alternative  to  freedom.  If  salvation  depends  on 
obedience  to  the  institution  and  not  on  faith  in  the 
truth,  the  Inquisition  only  differed  from  other  com- 
pulsions in  its  thoroughness.  The  very  fact  that 
change  was  in  process,  was  the  justification  for 
striking.  Men  were  seeking  to  bring  the  doctrines 
of  the  New  Testament  and  the  Church  into  harmony. 
But  it  was  the  Church,  not  the  doctrines,  which 
they  proposed  to  change,  and,  as  the  Church  was 
taken  to  be  the  highest  Divine  authority,  that  was 
necessarily  wrong. 

The  immediate  success  of  the  Society  was  abun- 
dant. Men  devoted  in  life  and  death  to  an  object 
for  which  they  could  use  at  once  the  Infinite  sanction 
and  the  resources  of  worldly  shrewdness  were  likely 
to  succeed.  If  every  device  that  forwards  the 
Church  is  God's  reasonable  service,  if  it  is  wrong 
in  principle  to  take  up  any  position  from  which  we 
might  judge  the  ecclesiastical  institution,  if  every 
sentiment  of  clemency  is  not  virtue  but  rebellion 
against  the  Almighty,  men  who  at  once  cultivated 
their  individuality  and  thus  surrendered  it  could 
hardly  fail  to  have  success.  But,  if  we  are  dealing 
with  the  eternal  order,  immediate  success  can  never 
be  a  test  of  any  great  importance,  for,  regarding 
anything  eternal,  it  can  never  be  essential  that 
it  should  be  established  speedily.  A  more  funda- 
mental matter  is  whether  the  principle  is  right  or 
wrong,  for,  if  the  principle  is  wrong,  no  success  can 


38         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

avail  to  hinder  it  in  the  end  from  working  out  con- 
sequences entirely  contrary  to  its  original  purpose. 
All  who  start  from  a  wrong  principle  must  use 
means  which  they  hope  by  cleverness  to  make  their 
slaves,  but  which,  by  force  of  events,  ultimately 
become  their  masters.  The  Jesuits,  by  the  neces- 
sity of  their  position,  had  to  use,  as  their  chief 
instruments,  princes  who  were  eager  for  the  unity 
of  religion  only  for  the  sake  of  political  security. 
The  distinction  between  religion  and  the  Church 
was  thereby  displayed  after  a  fashion  which  showed 
how  the  two  could  be  worlds  apart.  These  princes 
were  faithful  servants  of  the  Church.  On  the 
Jesuit  hypothesis  that  was  the  more  important 
part.  But  when  the  demands  of  truth  and  purity, 
sincerity  and  humility  became  so  utterly  the  tithing 
of  anise  and  mint,  and  ecclesiastical  compliance  the 
weightier  matter  of  the  law,  the  hypothesis  was 
heavily  weighted.  Still  the  best  had  to  be  done 
that  could  be  done,  and  the  amazing  matters  of  the 
Jesuit  casuistry  ensued.  Moreover,  if  life  is  divided 
between  freedom  and  responsibility,  the  natural 
man  will  always  be  ready  to  move  the  boundaries 
of  responsibility  backwards,  and  the  best  way  to 
commend  to  him  the  claim  of  the  Church  will  be  to 
make  the  sphere  of  independence  as  large  as  pos- 
sible. That  task  followed  logically  from  the  pre- 
mises, for,  whenever  an  institution  is  set  above  the 
requirement  of  testing  itself  by  truth  and  righteous- 
ness, it  is  impossible  to  argue  consistently  to  any 
other  conclusion  than  that  adherence  to  it  is  to  be 
maintained  at  all  moral  sacrifices.     The  practical 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENS^ES         39 

result  must  be,  sooner  or  later,  to  erect  Pharisaism 
into  a  system.  Hence  the  necessity  of  such  a  device 
as  Prohabilism  to  bring  the  sense  of  guilt  within 
convenient  proportions.  Religion,  as  Protestantism 
understood  it,  says  Kuno  Fischer,  insisted  on  such 
a  weight  of  guilt  as  made  man  unfree,  a  slave  of 
his  self-love.  As  this  was  a  cardinal  matter  in 
Protestantism,  it  became  a  cardinal  matter  in  Jesuit- 
ism to  deny  it.^  But  there  was  more  than  this 
mere  opposition  to  the  foe.  To  have  been  required 
to  confess  their  friends  on  a  Protestant  understand- 
ing of  guilt,  would  have  been  ruin  to  all  their  en- 
deavours. To  make  their  idea  of  obedience  and 
freedom  work  at  all,  it  was  imperative  to  belittle 
the  idea  of  guilt. 

To  belittle  guilt  is  never  a  difficult  task.  As 
Fischer  says,  conscience  has  only  to  be  taught  to 
refine  and  it  ceases  to  judge.  The  instrument  for 
turning  scruples  of  conscience  into  problems  of 
conscience  was  the  doctrine  of  Probabilisin.  The 
calamitous  moral  issues  of  it  are  not  unknown. 
The  mildest  view  of  a  sin  taken  by  any  recognised 
teacher  could  be  made  the  standard  of  transgres- 
sion, and  the  whole  direction  of  thought  was  upon 
transgression,  not  upon  fulfilment.  Thus  what  ought 
to  have  been  the  high  task  of  fulfilling  the  complete 
demands  of  conscience,  became  the  poor  and  base 
task  of  satisfying  it  with  plausible  opinions  of 
other  people.  All  evil  was  held  to  be  venial  that 
was  not  done  with  the  deliberate  intention  of  being 
wicked,  with  a  perfect  consent  of  the  will,  and  on 
1  Geschichte  der  neueren  Philosophie,  vol.  i.,  p.  132  ff. 


40  JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

a  matter  of  grave  importance.  A  certain  measure 
of  truth  of  course  underlies  the  estimate.  Nothing 
but  deliberate  and  obdurate  wickedness  can  be  the 
sin  which  has  never  forgiveness.  But  the  moment 
man  begins  to  condone  a  sin  because  it  does  not 
fulfil  all  these  three  conditions  of  wickedness,  he  is 
in  peril  of  promoting  moral  dangers  of  the  gravest 
kind.  Few  wish  to  be  deliberately  wicked  :  if  they 
could  have  their  own  pleasure  without  being 
wicked  they  would  just  as  soon  be  good.  Few  do 
wrong  without  some  blinding  of  passion ;  it  is, 
however,  already  wrong  to  suffer  ourselves  to  be  so 
blinded.  No  sinner  is  inclined  to  think  his  own 
crime  a  matter  of  great  importance  ;  but  minimis- 
ing our  iniquities  is  the  commonest  form  of  self- 
deception.  Religion  and  the  natural  man  were, 
therefore,  marvellously  reconciled,  so  that  Escobar 
could  say  with  truth  that  now,  for  the  first  time,  it 
was  understood  how  Christ's  yoke  could  be  easy 
and  His  burden  light. 

The  picture  of  this  system  that  will  ever  remain, 
in  spite  of  everything  that  can  be  said,  is  Pascal's. 
Where  there  were  so  many  refinements,  he  may 
very  easily  have  misunderstood  some ;  in  the  heat 
of  controversy  and  with  the  sense  of  fighting  a 
whole  realm  of  insincerity,  he  may  occasionally 
have  urged  unfairly  the  advantage  conferred  upon 
him  by  genius  :  but  the  system  which  insists  on  less 
than  utter  sincerity  with  one's  own  soul  first  of  all, 
has  no  right  to  complain  of  the  unrivalled  irony 
and  noble  scorn  of  the  Promncial  Letters.  The 
fundamental  difference  in  Pascal  is  that  he  does 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES         41 

not  accept  the  Jesuit  exaltation  of  the  Church. 
'*  If  my  Letters  are  condemned  at  Rome,  that  which 
I  condemn  is  condemned  in  heaven  " — a  much  more 
important  and  apparently  a  quite  distinguishable 
tribunal.  "  The  Inquisition  and  the  Jesuit  Society 
are  the  two  plagues  of  the  truth  " — truth  apparently 
being  a  criterion  by  itself.  The  fundamental  moral 
error,  also,  he  recognises.  "  Know  then  that  their 
object  is  not  to  corrupt  morals.  That  is  not  their 
design.  But  it  has  not  been  sufficiently  their  one 
aim  to  reform  them."  And  he  recognises  why  they 
fail.  They  have  such  a  good  opinion  of  themselves 
that  they  believe  it  is  useful,  and  in  a  way  ne- 
cessary, for  the  good  of  religion  that  their  credit 
should  extend  everywhere,  and  that  they  should 
govern  all  consciences.  As  that  good  opinion  is 
not  confined  to  one  society,  no  organisation  is  safe 
without  a  standard  whereby  success  shall  be  mea- 
sured by  the  truth,  not  the  truth  by  success.  But 
that  standard  was  excluded  by  the  very  principle 
from  which  the  Jesuits  started,  and  it  always  is 
excluded  when  the  institution  is  first. 

A  different  point  of  view  from  the  casuist's 
is  quite  consciously  adopted  by  Pascal.  That  dif- 
ference affords  the  only  justification  for  the  one 
effective  reply  that  has  ever  been  given  to  him, 
which  is  to  call  him  le  grand  menteur.  Nothing 
shows  this  difference  better  than  the  example  ad- 
duced by  Sainte-Beuve.^  "  Now  look  at  this  in 
Filliucius,  who  is  one  of  those  four  and  twenty 
Jesuits  :  A  man  fatigues  himself  with  something 
^  Port-Boyal,  par  C.  A.  Sainte-Beuve,  1867,  vol.  iii.,  p.  123. 


42  JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

wicked  like  running  after  a  woman.  Is  lie  obliged 
to  fast  ?  By  no  means.  Only  if  he  fatigues  him- 
self expressly  for  the  purpose  of  being  dispensed 
from  fasting,  is  he  held  to  it."  Now  we  find  on 
examination  that  the  good  father  is  looking  at  the 
matter  purely  as  one  who  must  hear  confession 
and  assign  the  proper  exercises  of  penitence.  On 
that  basis  he  proceeds  to  distinguish.  If  one  fa- 
tigues himself  for  the  purpose  of  killing  his  enemy 
or  pursuing  a  mistress,  he  has  sinned.  But,  though 
it  has  been  in  sinning  that  he  has  fatigued  himself, 
he  is  all  the  same  to  have  the  exemption  that 
fatigue  gives  from  the  particular  penance  of  fasting. 
It  is  apparent  that  there  is  a  distinction  here,  but 
it  is  equally  apparent  that  it  is  a  distinction  morally 
ruinous  to  draw,  one  fitted  to  corrupt  all  clear  and 
straightforward  moral  judgment.  What  Pascal 
does  is  sim])ly  to  take  this  kind  of  casuistry  out  of 
the  confessional  and,  with  the  air  of  a  man  of  the 
world,  set  it  in  the  midst  of  life  ;  and  what  he 
meant  to  make  clear  was  that,  as  a  matter  of  fact, 
it  did  arrive  there,  to  the  corruption  of  the  whole 
moral  attitude  of  those  who  dealt  with  it. 

When  we  have  gone  so  far,  however,  the  argu- 
ment will  insist  on  travelling  farther  than  even 
Pascal  would  have  been  willing  to  follow  it.  It 
shows  the  danger  of  putting  moral  questions  at  all 
on  the  legal  basis  required  by  the  confessional, 
indeed,  on  any  other  basis  than  the  entire  satis- 
faction of  a  conscience  which  a  man  is  seeking  with 
all  his  power  to  enlighten.  It  shows  in  short  that 
the  fundamental  element  of  freedom,  that  a  man 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES         43 

should  be  his  own  moral  legislator,  is  also  a  funda- 
mental element  in  morals,  and  that  no  arrangement 
which  makes  the  basis  of  obligation  to  be  the  duty 
of  obeying  another,  can  be  prevented  from  becoming 
a  source  of  moral  corruption. 

So  long  as  there  was  only  Protestantism  with 
its  divisions  and  unsettled  problems  to  fight,  so 
long  as  there  was  a  definite  boundary  of  church 
against  church,  the  weakness  of  this  trust  in  the 
institution  was  not  fully  apparent.  Jesuitism,  as 
the  representative  of  this  position,  hit  the  level  of 
the  common  understanding  in  discussion  ;  main- 
tained a  type  of  zeal  easily  appreciated  ;  used 
learning,  yet  kept  it  in  leading-strings  ;  employed 
education  to  influence  deeply  each  new  generation  ; 
had  the  ear  of  princes  ;  controlled  the  vastest  poli- 
tical organisations.  But,  with  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury, its  foes  became  those  of  its  own  household  ; 
and  then  it  had  to  prove  itself,  as  every  institution 
in  the  end  must,  not  by  the  scope  of  its  operations, 
but  by  its  spirit.  On  the  one  hand,  it  met  ironical 
indifference,  and,  on  the  other,  whole-hearted  spirit- 
ual sincerity.  Which  was  more  deadly  ?  Was  it 
Montaigne  or  Pascal  ?  It  is  hard  to  say.  The 
overwhelming  calamity  was  to  meet  both.  First, 
under  worldly  influences,  the  old  Jesuit  warriors 
were  succeeded  by  intriguing  diplomatists  who,  at 
any  moral  sacrifice,  would  keep  the  ear  of  those 
who  seemed  likely  to  serve  their  ends.  Then, 
when  this  corruption  had  taken  place,  there  arose 
beside  them  the  Jansenists  who  insisted  above 
everything  on  great  moral  austerity. 


44         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENS^ES 

With  the  rise  of  a  worldly  sceptical  literature 
our  problem  takes  a  new  aspect,  the  aspect  which 
specially  concerns  us.  We  wish  to  know,  either 
what  defence  we  have  to  give  in  that  open  court 
for  the  ideal  of  freedom  we  seek  and  the  faith 
by  which  we  seek  it,  or  what  right  we  have 
to  refuse  to  plead  before  it.  This  literature  de- 
stroyed Scholasticism,  and  so  broke  down  all  the 
old  recognised  boundaries.  It  insisted  on  the  whole 
subject  being  discussed  in  the  common  human 
speech,  and  according  to  the  accepted  conditions  of 
argument.  Thus  what  had  formerly  been  mere 
jousting  in  the  lists,  became  a  life  and  death  con- 
flict in  the  open  field. 

In  France  this  literature  was  already  appearing 
before  the  close  of  the  sixteenth  century,  but  it 
was  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century  before 
its  full  effect  became  apparent.  That  was  the  great 
psychological  moment  when  our  problem  came  upon 
man  with  its  full  force,  a  moment  which  is  always 
of  supreme  importance.  Like  the  first  visit  to 
a  foreign  country,  it  is  always  accompanied  by  a 
vividness  of  impression  and  clearness  of  intuition 
which  can  never  again  be  repeated,  and  which  the 
patient  investigation  of  years  may  only  confirm. 

The  long  religious  wars  which  the  Jesuits  had 
mainly  brought  about  had  succeeded  in  their 
object.  The  Protestants  had  been  crushed,  and 
France  had  been  kept  a  Catholic  country.  But 
these  very  wars  had  created  a  spirit  of  indifference 
to  all  religious  distinctions.  A  few  sought  earnestly 
to  get  behind  the  division,  but  most  followed  Mon- 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES         45 

taigne  in  seeking  the  peace  of  indifference.  The 
desire  arose  to  have  done  with  the  rehgion  of  all 
churches  and  find  some  simple  beliefs  in  which  all 
could  agree.  The  most  systematic  attempt  to  give 
this  desire  form  is  Charron's  De  la  Sagesse,  wherein 
is  set  forth  a  natural  religion  which  consists  mainly 
in  giving  to  each  one  his  due  and  guarding  for  each 
one  his  rank.  But  Charron,  except  for  this  less 
disguised  and  more  systematic  statement,  is  only  a 
less  interesting  reproduction  of  his  friend  Montaigne. 
The  favourite  author  of  Shakespeare  and  Pascal 
can  have  been  no  common  man.  For  both  the 
cause  of  interest  in  him  was  the  same.  They 
found  in  the  abundant  talk  about  himself,  not  the 
Sieur  Montaigne  only,  but,  as  Sainte-Beuve  says, 
the  natural  man.  To  Pascal's  Jansenist  friends  he 
stood  for  nature  without  grace.  They  merely  saw 
the  man  who,  on  pretence  of  setting  religion  too 
high  to  be  discussed,  managed  to  ignore  it.  They 
did  not  take  very  seriously  his  assurance  that  he 
sought  to  adhere  to  a  simple  belief  that  had  been 
undisturbed  by  philosophising,  for  every  word  in 
the  Essays  seemed  to  show  his  poor  success.  They 
would  not  have  dreamt  of  writing  as  others  did  of 
his  Catholicism,  being  of  Sainte-Beuve's  opinion 
that  it  is  of  little  avail  to  prove  a  man  to  be  a 
Catholic  at  the  expense  of  showing  that  he  is  hardly 
a  Christian.  Montaigne  is  not  concerned  about 
placing  life  on  any  ultimate  basis.  "If  my  health 
smiles  on  me  and  the  day  is  clear,  I  am  a  worthy 
person."  From  embarrassing  ideas  he  carefully  rids 
himself,  but,  as  his  only  real  belief  is  in  youth,  he 


46         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

cannot  get  rid  of  the  very  embarrassing  conviction 
that  it  is  a  stuff  that  will  not  last.  Meantime  the 
agony  of  life  is  to  be  touched  as  lightly  as  may  be, 
all  his  smiling  and  insinuating  talk  being  only,  as 
he  expresses  it,  ''to  turf  the  grave".  But  Pascal, 
with  the  instinct  of  genius,  could  recognise  his  ally 
as  well  as  his  foe.  To  M.  de  Saci,  who  hinted 
that  time  had  better  have  been  spent  on  Augustine 
than  on  Montaigne,  Pascal  replied  :  **  I  acknow- 
ledge, Monsieur,  that  I  cannot  see  without  joy 
haughty  reason  so  invincibly  worsted  with  its  own 
arms  ". 

The  Jesuits'  view  of  things,  and  much  else  be- 
sides, was  dismissed,  not  with  argument,  but  with 
light  raillery.  With  Thomas  Aquinas  as  authority, 
they  had  settled  the  solid  argumentative  certainties 
regarding  God  and  His  will  and  His  Church  upon 
which  outward  compulsion  could  reasonably  follow. 
Scholasticism,  in  the  last  issue,  is  the  only  intellect- 
ual basis  upon  which  bounds  can  be  set  to  freedom, 
and  now  Scholasticism  was  not  argued  with,  but, 
with  an  easy  and  laughing  grace,  bowed  to  the 
door.  Man  was  shown  to  be  a  marvellously  poor 
creature  to  be  so  confident,  and  this  institution  of 
his  a  small  affair  in  the  wide  circuit  of  the  heavens. 
Montaigne  might  still  make  an  edifying  departure 
in  the  arms  of  the  Catholic  Church,  but  if  the  task 
of  reconciling  the  Christian  with  the  Catholic  in 
princes  carried  away  by  their  lust  and  hatreds 
had  been  great,  the  task  of  i-econciling  the  Christian 
with  the  Catholic  in  one  carried  away  by  his 
humour  was  harder  still,  es2:)ecially  as  the  recon- 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES         47 

ciliation  also  might  only  seem  part  of  the  tariff 
of  humbug  necessary  to  pay  for  a  quiet  life. 

The  Jansenists  also  opposed  the  Scholastic 
spirit.  That  was  one  point  of  agreement  with 
Montaigne.  They  also  found  strange  dark  things 
in  the  heart  of  man  and  abundant  perplexity  and 
weakness.  That  was  another.  But  in  temper 
they  were  at  the  opposite  pole.  Montaigne  smiled  ; 
they  sighed. 

From  Jansen,  Bishop  of  Ypres,  the  party  de- 
rived its  name.  Yet  his  only  connection  with  it 
was  through  a  friend  and  a  book.  The  friend  was 
M.  de  Saint-Cyran,  the  real  founder  of  the  move- 
ment, and  the  book  a  Latin  treatise  on  Augustine's 
doctrine  of  grace.  Even  Sainte-Beuve  admits  that 
to  say  he  has  read  the  Augtistmus  might  seem  too 
large  a  boast,  and  only  claims  to  have  toiled,  in 
many  senses,  in  many  pages. ^  No  wonder,  there- 
fore, that  after  five  propositions  had  been  extracted 
out  of  it  as  the  quintessence  of  its  heresy,  it  was 
still  dubious  whether  even  the  Pope  knew  enough 
to  decide  whether  they  were  there  or  not.  The 
Jesuits,  to  whom  the  book  was  merely  Calvin 
recooked,  recognised  an  enemy  while  it  was  yet  in 
the  press.  When  they  failed  to  strangle  it  at  its 
birth,  they  proceeded  to  employ  all  the  machinery 
of  intrigue  and  violence  to  obtain  the  condemna- 
tion of  the  five  propositions  at  Rome  and  to  sup- 
press all  its  adherents  in  France.  They  at  once 
succeeded  in  the  former  object,  and  they  ultimately 
succeeded  in  the  latter,  but  they  destroyed  tliem- 

1  Port-Boyal,  vol.  ii.,  p.  97. 


48         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENS^ES 

selves  in  the  process.  The  very  thing  they  always 
underestimated,  proved  too  strong  for  them.  They 
believed  in  the  organisation  ;  they  thought  it  could 
always  override  the  individual ;  and  it  was  the  in- 
dividual that  overthrew  them. 

The  Augustinus  was  one  of  those  books  which, 
through  the  few  who  read  it  intensely,  influence 
many  widely.  Some  traces  of  Calvin  might  be 
hard  to  deny,  but  the  offence  was  not  in  going 
back  to  Calvin.  It  was  in  going  back  to  the  human 
soul.  First  of  all,  Jansen  sought  to  get  behind 
Scholasticism  to  Augustine.  No  saint,  he  thought 
with  his  friend  Saint- Cyran,  reasoned  so  much  on 
the  things  of  God  as  St.  Thomas.  From  his  day 
theology  had  been  too  much  at  the  mercy  of  system. 
To  escape  this  danger,  it  is  necessary  to  go  back  to 
the  sources.  As  the  pure  tradition  of  early  Chris- 
tianity reached  perfection  in  Augustine,  a  place 
of  prominence  is  assigned  him.  Yet  the  value  of 
the  book  as  an  exposition  of  Augustine  does  not 
concern  us,  for  that  was  not  its  power.  Its  real 
power  came  from  a  living  sense  of  the  weakness 
and  sinfulness  of  the  human  heart  and  the  need 
for  a  new  life  cleansed  and  nourished  by  God's 
grace.  We  are  not  even  very  much  concerned  to 
know  whether  the  famous  five  propositions  are 
justly  drawn  from  it  or  not.  Where  the  question 
is  man's  will  and  God's  grace,  propositions  can 
easily  be  drawn  on  either  side  worthy  of  condem- 
nation. But  Jansen  has  the  merit  of  going  behind 
these  questions  into  that  region  where — to  quote 
Sainte-Beuve,  who  has  said  so  many  good  things  on 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES         49 

the  subject,  once  more — "with  Augustine  and  all 
who  speak  of  the  children  of  God,  we  comprehend 
only  what  we  believe,  which  means  only  what  we 
love,  which  means  only  what  we  practice  ".^  The 
quarrel  with  the  Jesuits  was  not  a  mere  difference 
of  opinion  on  the  question  of  the  freedom  of  the 
will.  They  believed  in  salvation  by  institution. 
Jansen  believed  in  salvation  by  regeneration.  Jan- 
sen,  working  in  a  totally  different  stratum  of  human 
nature,  has  a  totally  different  idea  of  what  is  meant 
by  being  made  free.  So  superficial  had  the  problem 
become  for  the  Jesuits  that  even  St.  Thomas  was 
too  profound  for  them,  and  they  thought  a  man 
could  not  only  do  right,  but  be  right  of  himself. 
As  virtue  to  the  Jesuit  was  obedience  to  a  rule, 
that  view  of  freedom  was  credible  ;  to  the  Jan- 
senist,  for  whom  virtue  was  the  love  of  God,  it  was 
incredible.  To  the  Jesuit  God  always  wrought 
from  without ;  to  the  Jansenist,  as  Saint-Cyran 
said :  "  When  God  means  to  deliver  a  soul.  He 
begins  internally".  Neither  Jansen  nor  his  fol- 
lowers attained  the  freedom  depicted  by  Luther. 
They  saw  that  obligation  must  reach  out  to  the 
whole  of  life,  but  they  thought  it  could  be  done 
by  making  the  rule  of  the  Church  at  once  more 
spiritual  and  more  austere.  A  man  was  still  to 
submit  all  his  thought  and  action  to  his  father 
confessor  as  one  charged  to  conduct  his  soul.  That 
faith  should  make  us  free  and  love  be  an  altogether 
sufficient  rule,  they  could  not  wholly  receive.  But 
if  they  did  not  see  clearly  that  the  task  of  being 

^Port-Boyal,  vol.  ii.,  p.  123. 
4 


50         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

free  must  reach  out  over  the  whole  of  life,  they  at 
least  saw  that  it  must  reach  up  as  high  as  heaven. 

The  issue  of  Jansenism  was  Pascal ;  the  issue 
of  Jesuitism  was  Descartes  on  the  one  hand,  and 
Bossuet  on  the  other. 

If  the  errors  of  a  system  only  fully  appear  when 
they  mislead  a  naturally  generous  and  good  man, 
Bossuet  is  the  heaviest  of  all  indictments  against 
Jesuitism.  He  was  brought  up  in  the  Jesuit 
schools,  and  the  effect  of  his  training  never  left 
him.  What  it  did  for  him  may  be  expressed  in 
a  word.  It  made  him  seek  triumph,  not  truth  ; 
it  made  him  a  rhetorician,  not  an  orator ;  a 
triumphing  controversialist,  not  a  thinker.  The 
deepest  things  appear  to  him  mere  tricks  of  debate, 
and  he  is  always  ready  to  gain  a  verdict  by  brow- 
beating the  defendant.  The  great  truth  at  which 
his  Protestant  opponents  Claude  and  Jurieu  had 
arrived — that  no  religion  is  so  pure  as  to  be 
without  a  human  element,  or  so  base  as  to  be 
without  a  Divine — he  takes  to  be  a  mere  trick  of 
defeated  controversialists,  having  no  result  except 
to  give  Christ  a  kingdom,  like  Satan's,  divided 
against  itself.  He  clenches  the  argument  with 
what  he  regards  as  a  rediictio  ad  ahsiirdum  of  the 
whole  position.  "  No  one  has  ever  believed  or 
thought  that  an  idolator  could  be  saved  under 
pretext  of  good  faith.  An  error  so  gross,  an 
impiety  so  manifest,  cannot  consist  with  a  good 
conscience."^  And  nothing,  of  course,  can  be 
plainer,  if  the  Church  is  above  religion.     Salvation 

1  Histoire  des  Variations,  Book  xv.,  lix. 


JESmTISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENS^ES         51 

can,  in  that  case,  only  be  an  affair  of  sameness  of 
creed  and  surrender  to  religious  institutions. 

But,  in  that  case  also,  force  is  the  final  alter- 
native to  freedom.  If  the  Church  is  above  religion, 
manifestly  the  religious  duties  of  sincerity,  humility 
and  faithfulness  are  of  less  consequence  than  the 
ecclesiastical  duty  of  conformity.  If  the  heart's 
consent  is  not  essential,  force  is  a  remedy,  even  a 
necessary  remedy.  This  issue  Bossuet  expresses 
in  the  loftiest  language  human  speech  is  capable 
of,  in  his  panegyric  of  Louis  XIV.  for  the  Revo- 
cation of  the  Edict  of  Nantes.  It  is  found  in  the 
Funeral  Oration  of  M.  le  Tellier : — 

"  Let  us  not  cease  to  publish  the  miracle  of 
our  days  :  let  us  hand  on  the  tale  to  future  ages. 
Take  your  sacred  pens,  ye  who  compose  the  annals 
of  the  Gospel,  swift  instruments  of  a  ready  writer 
and  of  a  diligent  hand  :  haste  to  place  Louis  among 
the  Constantines  and  the  Theodosiuses."  After 
quoting  Zozomen,  he  resumes  :  "  That,  sirs,  is  what 
our  fathers  admired  in  the  first  ages  of  the  Church. 
But  our  fathers  never  saw,  as  we  have,  an  in- 
veterate heresy  fall  at  a  blow — the  erring  flocks 
return  in  crowds,  our  churches  too  small  to  receive 
them,  their  false  pastors  forsaking  them  without 
even  waiting  for  the  order,  happy  to  have  their 
banishment  alleged  as  an  excuse  :  everything  quiet 
in  this  great  movement :  the  universe  astonished 
to  see  in  an  event  so  new  the  mark  the  most 
assured  as  of  the  fairest  usage  of  authority  ;  and 
the  merit  of  the  prince  more  recognised  than  his 
authority.     Touched   by  marvels   so   great,  let  us 


52         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

expand  our  hearts  over  the  piety  of  Louis.  liaise 
to  the  skies  your  acclamations,  and  let  us  say  to 
this  new  Constantine,  this  new  Theodosius,  this 
new  Charlemagne,"  etc. 

All  the  more  manifestly,  because  of  the  good- 
ness of  the  heart  it  corrupted,  this  calling  of  good 
evil  and  evil  good,  of  humble  godliness  crime  and 
gilded  vice  piety,  this  old  sin  against  the  Holy 
Ghost  was  the  fruit  of  the  principle  of  setting 
the  Church  consciously  and  deliberately  above  the 
religion  of  the  heart. 

The  immediate  result  was  a  development  of 
society  in  the  court  of  Louis  XIV.,  which  is  only 
described,  not  satirised,  in  the  account  of  Louis' 
way  of  obeying  the  exhortation  of  his  confessor 
not  to  continue  in  sin  : — 

Je  change  la  Valli^re, 
Et  prends  la  Montespan. 

A  more  than  pagan  denial  of  Christian  humility 
was  enabled  to  justify  itself,  not  on  the  mere  ground 
of  the  natural  depravity  of  the  human  heart,  but 
on  the  ground  of  the  old  French  nobleman,  that 
God  would  think  twice  before  condemninoj  a  man 
of  his  quality. 

The  result  was  not  confined  to  France,  but 
spread  over  all  the  courts  of  Europe,  till  the  atmo- 
sphere of  courts  became,  as  never  before  or  since, 
the  poison  of  the  intellectual  and  spiritual  life 
throughout  the  whole  eighteenth  century.  The 
influence  of  Protestantism  went  into  Catholicism 
through  the  spirit  and  created  the  Counter-reforma- 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENS^ES         53 

tion,  but  it  returned  through  the  flesh  and  was 
fashioned  into  the  mocking  formalism  which  in  the 
end  came  to  regard  Christianity  as  a  necessary 
dekision  for  the  regulation  of  the  vulgar.  In 
France,  where  this  league  between  Christianity 
and  the  world,  the  devil  and  the  flesh  was  specially 
close,  the  result  was  indeed  a  peace  of  submission, 
instead  of  a  strife  of  parties,  but  it  was  at  the  cost 
of  a  growing  absolutism  which  hated,  as  its  natural 
foe,  every  element  of  freedom.  Hence  the  next 
word  to  be  spoken  for  freedom  in  France  was  not 
in  the  serious  tones  of  a  religious  need,  but  in  the 
mockery  of  Voltaire  and  then  in  the  blood  of  the 
Kevolution.^ 

But  every  alternative  to  freedom  is  in  danger, 
not  only  of  being  pushed  to  the  utmost  extreme  of 
violence,  but  also  of  nourishing  in  its  bosom  the 
utmost  extreme  of  opinion.  It  is  equally  significant 
that  another  joupil  of  the  Jesuit  schools  was  Renee 
Descartes,  the  founder  of  modern  philosophy. 

As  the  Jesuits  dealt  with  morals,  so  they  dealt 
with  learning.  It  was  cultivated  and  used  precisely 
to  the  point  where  it  forwarded  their  object  of  re- 
storing the  authority  of  the  Church,  and  no  farther. 
Their  constant  study  was  how  to  place  the  intellect 

1  "  The  destruction  of  the  most  solid,  the  most  modest,  the 
most  virtuous,  the  most  generally  enlightened  element  in  the 
French  nation,  prepared  the  way  for  the  inevitable  degradation 
of  the  national  character,  and  the  last  bulwark  was  removed 
that  might  have  broken  the  force  of  that  torrent  of  scepticism 
and  vice  which,  a  century  later,  laid  prostrate,  in  merited  ruin, 
both  the  altar  and  the  throne  "  (Lecky,  History  of  England  in 
the  Eighteenth  Century,  vol.  i.,  p.  235). 


54         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENS^ES 

on  the  loftiest  pedestal,  yet  keep  it  in  subjection. 
Such  a  system  fashions  the  multitude  to  its  fancy, 
but  is  always  in  danger  of  creating  the  opposite 
impulse  in  the  occasional  rare  spirit.  The  robust 
boys  who  can  be  afoot  in  the  early  morning,  to  be 
drilled  in  religious  exercises  and  mental  disciplines, 
are  easily  managed.  The  danger  is  in  the  one  deli- 
cate boy  who  has  to  lie  in  bed  and  think.  In  him 
the  system  merely  creates  a  deep  impression  of  the 
unreality  of  all  that  passes  for  knowledge.  From 
it  Descartes  goes  out  into  the  world,  not  drilled 
into  believing  as  he  is  told  in  order  to  know,  but 
with  a  deep  sense  that  nothing  can  be  known  till 
everything  has  been  radically  doubted.  In  every 
branch  of  knowledge  except  mathematics  Descar- 
tes found  something  less  than  whole-hearted  sin- 
cerity with  oneself,  with  the  result  of  making  the 
love  of  such  sincerity  the  passion  of  a  lifetime,  and 
trust  in  the  method  of  mathematics  as  the  key  to 
the  universe  little  short  of  an  idolatry.  This  earnest 
love  of  truth  influenced  the  whole  eighteenth  cen- 
tury for  good,  and  gave  to  its  inquiries,  in  spite  of 
their  limitations,  an  abiding  value  ;  and  this  idolatry 
of  the  mathematical  method  was  the  chief  cause  of 
these  limitations.  To  understand  the  eighteenth 
century  we  must  never  forget  that  it  was  the  age  of 
the  mighty  triumphs  of  mathematics  in  astronomy, 
the  age  that  culminated  in  Newton,  and  that  from 
Descartes,  himself  a  discoverer  in  this  region,  on- 
wards, it  sought  in  the  mathematical  method  a 
guide  to  all  the  labyrinth  of  the  universe. 

Like  the  mathematician,  Descartes  begins  by 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES         55 

doubting  everything  except  what  is  self-evident. 
Everything  can  be  doubted  till  he  comes  to  his 
own  existence  as  a  thinking  being.  When  he 
comes  to  examine  this  proposition,  ''  /  think,  there- 
fore I  am,''  he  finds  that  it  is  forced  upon  him  by 
two  qualities — clearness  and  distifictness.  By  dis- 
tinct he  means  capable  of  standing  by  itself.  For 
example,  the  knowledge  of  the  external  world  is 
not  distinct  as  the  knowledge  of  our  own  thought 
is,  for  it  is  made  up  of  a  mixture  of  impressions, 
and  might  be  the  work  of  a  deceiving  spirit.  To 
attain  distinctness,  therefore,  we  require  to  dis- 
tinguish, to  eliminate,  and  that  means  to  think. 
Reasoned  thought  is  thus  the  standard  of  truth. 
It  must  first  set  a  conception  by  itself  and  see  if  it 
is  clear  and  distinct  in  itself,  incapable  of  deriving 
further  confirmation  from  anything  else.  Then  it 
is  a  first  principle  or  postulate  or  innate  idea, 
from  the  basis  of  which  knowledge  is  to  be  built 
up  by  rigid  deduction. 

As  we  cannot  trust  our  impressions  of  the  out- 
side world,  we  must  look  wholly  to  the  mind  itself. 
There  we  find  two  clear  and  distinct  ideas.  The 
first  is  the  idea  of  Cause  with  the  certainty  that  it 
cannot  be  less  than  its  effects.  The  second  is  the 
idea  of  a  Perfect  Being.  Putting  both  together,  we 
see  plainly  that  the  cause  of  the  idea  of  a  Perfect 
Being  cannot  be  anything  so  inadequate  as  our 
imperfect  selves.  An  idea  so  much  above  our- 
selves requires  the  existence  of  a  Perfect  Being.  It 
must  be  His  sign  manual  on  His  creature.  In  that 
case  we  have  a  guarantee  that  our  senses  do  not 


56         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENS^ES 

delude  us.  Nay  the  only  difficulty  is  to  explain 
how  we  should  ever  in  anything  be  in  error.  That 
also  Descartes  answers  very  simply.  God  has  made 
the  will  free.  That  also  is  a  perfection  in  God. 
But  man  should  use  it  to  suspend  judgment  till 
the  mind  has  finished  its  investigations,  when  God 
would  not  deny  it  truth.  As  the  will  fails  in  this 
patience,  it,  and  not  God,  is  the  cause  of  error. 

In  all  this  we  have  the  forerunner  of  the 
eighteenth  century.  We  have  here  the  demon- 
strative method  and  the  purely  argumentative  at- 
mosphere. Clarke  and  his  successors  in  England, 
and  the  theologians  of  the  Aufkkirung  in  Germany, 
do  little  more  than  elaborate  his  argument  and 
set  it  in  a  still  colder  light  of  the  understanding, 
by  obscuring  more  and  more  the  fact  that  the  real 
source  of  this  idea  of  a  Perfect  Being  is  not  an 
abstraction  of  the  intellect,  but  our  religious  and 
moral  ideals  and  aspirations.  No  real  change  took 
place  till,  after  a  century,  Kant  insisted  on  the 
autonomy  of  conscience  as  directly  as  Descartes 
had  insisted  on  the  autonomy  of  the  understanding. 

But  Descartes  was  a  legitimate  product  of  the 
Jesuit  schools  otherwise  than  merely  negatively. 
They  provided  everything  but  the  appeal  to  ex- 
perience in  his  argument  for  God;  they  taught 
the  easy  and  superficial  view  of  the  freedom  of 
the  will;  they  helped  to  create  in  his  mind  that 
entire  separation  between  the  moral  and  religious 
life  and  religious  truth,  which  made  it  possible  to 
trust  so  wholly  to  mathematical  demonstration  ;  and 
they  helped  to  create  the  individualistic  atmosphere 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES         57 

in  which  the  whole  argument  moves,  that  individual- 
istic atmosphere  which  is  such  a  prominent  char- 
acteristic of  the  eighteenth  century. 

But  how,  it  may  be  asked,  can  Jesuitism  be 
described  as  individualistic  ?  No  society  ever  sub- 
ordinated more  utterly  the  individual  to  the  com- 
munity. Here  we  must  distinguish,  for  the  word 
hidividimlism  is  constantly  used  in  two  different  and 
even  opposite  senses,  and,  by  constant  interchange 
of  meanings,  remarkable  arguments  are  evolved. 
In  the  one  case  individualism  means  freedom  from 
an  outside  authority ;  in  the  other  the  absence  of 
inward  ties  to  other  persons.  In  the  first  case  it 
is  used  in  what  we  might  call  a  political  sense ;  in 
the  latter  in  a  psychological  or  moral  sense.  So 
far  are  they  from  being  identical  that  it  is  possible, 
on  the  one  hand,  to  maintain  that  there  should  be 
no  interference  from  without  because  man  has  a 
higher  link  with  other  men  within,  and,  on  the 
other,  that  a  firm  hand  of  authority  is  needed  be- 
cause otherwise  men  are  mere  selfish  units.  It  is 
in  this  last  sense  that  the  Jesuit  teaching  has  been 
described  as  the  most  individualistic  known  to  his- 
tory. It  assumed  that  man  was  to  be  governed 
wholly  by  self-interest,  that  he  was  a  unit  linked 
to  God  and  man  only  by  outward  ties.  Hence  the 
importance  it  attached  to  the  Church,  for  if  there 
is  no  inward  tie,  the  institution  is  vital.  For  keep- 
ing peas  together  the  bag  is  an  absolute  necessity. 

In  scarcely  any  other  atmosphere  could  Des- 
cartes so  easily  have  set  the  fashion  of  ignoring  the 
whole  moral  issues,  and  of  assuming  that  the  only 


58         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

way  in  which  the  will  can  introduce  error  is  by  pre- 
cipitating the  deduction.  In  what  other  atmo- 
sphere could  he  have  continued  to  be  the  simple 
French  gentleman,  obedient  to  the  Church  of  his 
fathers,  and  willing  to  make  any  sacrifice  to  avoid 
commotions,  concerned,  as  he  said,  only  to  recon- 
struct his  own  intellectual  house,  unconcerned  about 
the  rest  of  the  street,  while  becoming  the  most  re- 
volutionary force  in  Europe  ?  If  Bossuet  stands 
for  the  process  that  hardened  the  shell  of  the  ex- 
plosive, Descartes  stands  for  the  process  that 
made  the  powder. 

The  significance  of  Pascal,  the  associate  of  the 
Jansenists,  the  chief  opponent  of  the  Jesuits,  lies 
in  his  refusal  to  take  either  way. 

When  Bossuet  was  thundering  acclamation  of 
autocratic  devotion  to  the  Church,  there  were  calm 
sayings  like  these  in  the  writings  of  Pascal.  "By 
force  and  threats,  not  religion,  but  only  terror  is 
implanted."  "  The  only  way  of  not  making  the 
cross  of  Christ  of  none  effect  is,  in  self-abasement, 
to  offer  ourselves  to  the  inspirations  which  alone 
can  produce  the  true  and  salutary  effect."  *'  Jesus 
Christ  came  in  the  order  which  is  above  power  and 
above  intellect — the  order  of  love."  "True  Jews 
and  true  Christians  have  only  one  religion — simply 
the  love  of  God."  In  comparison  with  the  truth 
and  fine  simplicity  of  such  sayings,  Bossuet's  pane- 
gyric seems  not  only  retrograde,  but  of  a  debased 
flunkeyism,  the  antipodes  of  the  realm  of  freedom. 

The  smallness  of  Pascal's  respect  for  Descartes 
is,  in  Cousin's  eyes,  a  high  act  of  intellectual  revolt, 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PEN8EES         59 

a  complete  proof  that  he  was  in  philosophy  an  utter 
sceptic,  who,  hopeless  of  attaining  an  intelligent 
religion,  rushed  into  the  arms  of  the  Church. 
Doubt  regarding  the  final  efficacy  of  philosophical 
arguments  in  our  day  has  become  a  smaller  crime, 
and  a  man  would  not  be  regarded  as  an  incurable 
sceptic  because  he  thought  that  the  mathematical 
method  of  Descartes  would  require  omniscience  to 
apply.  "  To  a  mathematical  method,"  says  Pascal, 
'*  no  human  science  can  adhere.  St.  Thomas  him- 
self has  not  adhered  to  it.  Mathematics  alone 
does,  and  it  is  useless  in  its  depth.  Do  not  I 
believe  that  I  am  nothing  ?  Do  I  believe  that  I  am 
God  ?  "  The  necessary  humility  of  an  erring  and 
finite  creature  reaching  up  to  things  infinite  and 
eternal,  Descartes  forgot.  Consequently  he  thought 
he  could  sell  out  all  that  man  had  acquired  through 
long  and  varied  experience,  and  purchase  it  back 
with  logical  deductions.  Pascal,  on  the  other  hand, 
saw  that  we  are  scarce  rich  enough  to  maintain 
ourselves  with  all  our  belongings.  Descartes  sought 
truth,  as  it  were,  at  the  bottom  of  our  experience  ; 
Pascal  thought  we  could  barely  attain  it  at  the  top. 
Men  still  seek  God,  in  Descartes'  way,  in  the 
largest  generalities,  but  it  is  gradually  being  seen 
that  Pascal  was  right  in  insisting  that  the  very  con- 
ditions Descartes  sought  to  eliminate  are  the  things 
most  essential  to  the  problem.  The  whole  of  human 
nature,  Pascal  saw,  was  involved,  and,  in  particular, 
the  will  and  the  character.  Many  elements  besides 
intellectual  clearness  have  to  be  considered. 
"  There  is  enough  light  for  those  who  desire  to 


60         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

know,  and  obscurity  for  those  who  have  the  con- 
trary disposition.  There  is  clearness  enough  to  en- 
lighten the  elect,  and  obscurity  enough  to  humble 
them.  There  is  obscurity  enough  to  reject  the 
blind,  and  clearness  enough  to  condemn  and  render 
them  without  excuse.  God  would  rather  dispose 
the  will  than  the  intellect,  and  the  perfect  clearness 
which  might  serve  the  intellect  would  harm  the 
will." 

The  defence  of  religion  which  neglects  nothing 
but  religion  itself  only  amazes  him.  "  I  admire 
with  what  hardihood  those  persons  undertake  to 
speak  of  God,  in  addressing  their  discourse  to  the 
irreligious.  Their  first  chapter  is  to  prove  the 
Divinity  by  the  works  of  Nature.  I  should  not  be 
astonished  at  their  enterprise,  if  they  addressed 
their  discourse  to  believers,  for  it  is  certain  that 
those  who  have  faith  alive  in  their  hearts  see 
directly  that  all  that  is  is  no  other  than  the  work 
of  the  God  they  adore.  But  for  those  in  whom 
this  light  is  extinct  and  in  whom  it  is  intended  to 
be  rekindled,  those  persons  destitute  of  faith  and 
of  grace,  who,  investigating  with  all  the  light  they 
have  all  they  see  in  Nature  that  could  lead  them 
to  this  knowledge,  find  only  obscurity  and  darkness 
— to  say  to  them  that  they  have  only  to  regard  the 
smallest  thing  around  them  and  they  will  see  God 
manifest,  and  to  give  them  as  proof  of  this  great 
and  important  subject  the  course  of  the  moon  and 
of  the  planets,  and  to  pretend  to  have  ended  the 
proof  with  such  a  discourse,  is  only  to  give  them 
reason  to  believe  that  the  proofs  of  our  religion  are 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENS^ES         61 

very  weak  ;  and  I  see,  by  reason  and  by  experience, 
that  nothing  is  better  fitted  to  arouse  in  them  con- 
tempt." 

The  real  significance  of  Descartes  was  that  he 
saw  clearly  the  impossibility  of  finding  any  basis 
for  truth  except  in  man  himself.  His  error  was 
in  thinking  that  that  restricted  us  to  the  under- 
standing. Pascal  also  recognised  the  necessity  of 
starting  with  man,  not  with  an  institution.  He 
founded  apologetics,  as  Vinet  says,  on  the  moral 
sense  and  on  the  needs  of  man.^  The  ultimate 
standard  is  ourselves,  but  it  is  ourselves  in  all  our 
reach,  in  all  we  feel  as  well  as  all  we  think,  in  all 
we  have  attained,  as  well  as  in  the  bare  faculty  of 
following  a  deduction. 

Pascal's  historical  arguments,  being  made  with- 
out knowledge  of  modern  critical  inquiries,  are 
usually  passed  over  as  obsolete.  Nevertheless, 
they  are  not  unimportant  for  his  outlook  upon 
life.  The  very  thing  that  made  Descartes  such  a 
power  in  the  next  century,  was  his  utter  disregard 
to  history.  Man's  business  was  to  reason,  as  if 
he  had  dropped  from  the  skies.  Man  for  Pascal, 
on  the  other  hand,  has  a  continual  background  of 
history,  wherein  appears  something  of  a  Divine 
preparation.  "  How  beautiful  it  is  to  see  with 
the  eyes  of  faith,  Darius  and  Cyrus,  Alexander, 
the  Komans,  Pompey  and  Herod  acting,  without 
knowing  it,  for  the  glory  of  the  Gospel."  Christ 
is  of  such  supreme  significance  to  him,  just  because 
He  sums  up  all  the  best  that  has  come  to  him 

^Etudes  sur  Blaise  Pascal,  3rd  ed.,  p.  1. 


62         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

from  the  past.  Yet  it  is  not  antiquity  that  is  the 
basis  of  faith,  for  if  so,  he  says,  the  ancient  world 
would  have  been  without  faith.  ''  However  much 
something  may  be  the  rule  of  your  belief,  you  may 
not  believe  anything  without  putting  yourself,  as 
it  were,  in  the  position  of  not  having  heard  it. 
It  is  the  consent  of  yourself  to  yourself,  and  the 
steadfast  voice  of  your  reason,  and  not  another's, 
which  should  make  you  believe."  That  is  surely 
nearer  a  true  method  than  Descartes'  impossible 
attempt  to  jump  off  his  own  shadow.  By  every- 
thing that  is  great  in  us,  we  must  never  rest  short 
of  truth ;  but,  by  everything  that  is  small  in  us,  we 
must  seek  truth,  not  by  large  schemes  of  demon- 
strating the  order  of  the  universe,  but  by  setting 
wide  every  window  of  the  soul  to  every  ray  of 
light. 

No  book  of  modern  times  bears  so  distinctly 
the  stamp  of  spiritual  genius  as  Pascal's  Pensees. 
Its  intuition  of  truth  is  so  immediate  that  it  never 
can  be  a  relic  of  dead  controversies,  but  must  al- 
ways remain  an  enduring  utterance  of  the  human 
heart.  It  consists  of  the  jottings  of  ten  years  of 
broken  health ;  and  perhaps  it  fits  every  age  the 
better  that  Pascal  did  not  live  to  adapt  it  to  his 
own.  His  friends  spent  seven  years  adapting  it, 
softening  its  colours  and  taming  its  daring,  before 
venturing  to  bring  it  to  the  light  of  day.  Con- 
sidering how  ready  the  world  was  to  find  heresy  in 
their  most  harmless  utterance,  we  cannot  blame 
the  good  men,  but  Pascal's  superiority  to  his  age  is 
only  fully  apparent  when  we  see  him  in  a  modern 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENS^ES         63 

edition,  such  as  Faugere's  or  Havet's,  recovered 
out  of  the  original  manuscript,  and  freed  from 
colourless  alterations  and  explanations. 

At  the  same  time  the  historical  position  of  the 
book  gives  it  an  additional  value.  Along  with 
the  Provincial  Letters  it  remains  out  of  many  tomes 
the  only  enduring  monument  of  Jansenism.  That 
singular  position  between  Romanism  and  Pro- 
testantism, though  it  is  always  tending  to  recur 
and  though  it  may  some  day  be  of  vital  importance 
for  the  Christian  Church,  has  never,  except  in 
Jansenism,  reached  deliberate  utterance.  The 
brain  and  heart  of  it  were  a  remarkable  band  of 
men  known  as  the  Associates  of  the  Port  Royal. 
Port  Royal  in  the  Fields  was  a  monastic  institution, 
lying  some  eighteen  miles  west  of  Paris ;  and 
through  his  sister,  one  of  the  nuns,  Pascal  was 
introduced  to  the  Associates,  with  whom  after- 
wards he  maintained  close  fellowship,  although  he 
never  actually  became  one  of  their  number.  Jan- 
senism was  marked  by  a  certain  Protestant  freedom 
of  thought  set  in  a  whole-hearted  devotion  to  the 
Roman  discipline ;  and  Pascal  was  both  the  freest 
and  the  most  devoted.  The  limitation  imposed 
upon  him  by  the  position  is  plain.  In  his  view  of 
God  he  never  quite  arrived  at  inward  freedom. 
God  is  less  than  a  Father  to  him ;  He  is  only  a 
Father  Confessor.  You  must  recall  what  was 
meant  by  being  a  conductor  of  souls  among  the 
Jansenists.  He  took  over  the  whole  guidance  of 
life,  avoiding  any  appeal  to  the  reason  that  might 
encourage    pride,    and   planning   out   a   discipline 


64         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

which  derived  its  force  from  its  very  arbitrariness. 
Something  of  that  hardness,  of  that  arbitrariness, 
something  less  than  a  justice  longing  to  be  under- 
stood and  a  love  longing  for  response,  apj^ears  in 
Pascal's  whole  thought  of  God.  God  is  conceived 
as  the  supreme  Conductor  of  souls.  No  doubt  the 
conception  includes  a  truth.  We  do  not  conduct 
souls,  precisely  because  we  think  it  is  God's  work 
and  can  be  only  His  work.  Yet  the  glorious  liberty 
of  the  children  of  God  requires  a  more  Divine,  be- 
cause more  human,  idea  of  the  Father  of  our  spirits. 
This  conception  of  God  appears  in  Pascal's  attitude 
towards  Christian  doctrines  as  mysteries.  The  sole 
key  he  finds  for  them  is  that  at  some  point  we  dis- 
cover they  are  necessary  explanations  of  our  dis- 
cipline. The  most  pronounced  instance  of  this  is 
his  account  of  Original  Sin.  "  What  could  be  more 
contrary  to  the  rules  of  our  miserable  justice  than 
to  condemn  eternally  an  infant  incapable  of  willing, 
for  a  sin  in  which  he  seems  to  have  had  so  small 
a  part  that  it  was  committed  six  thousand  years 
before  he  came  into  being  ?  Yet  man  is  more  incon- 
ceivable without  that  mystery  than  that  mystery  is 
inconceivable  to  man."  "  The  rules  of  our  miserable 
justice  "  may  be  poor,  but  they  are  all  we  have,  and 
we  should  be  hopelessly  bewildered  if  God  set  them 
at  nought  in  this  way.  Nevertheless,  under  the 
annihilating  exposition,  we  can  trace  this  idea  of 
God  as  the  Conductor  of  souls  who  has  more  reason 
on  His  side  than  appears. 

The  same  conception  of  God  lies  at  the  root  of 
Pascal's  own  austerities.     To  the  philosophers  of 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES         65 

the  eighteenth  century  in  France  these  follies  were 
an  unspeakable  consolation.  When  they  could  not 
dispute  the  force  of  his  writings,  they  could  recall 
his  accident  on  the  Pont  Neuf  and  the  gulf  which 
afterwards  he  thought  he  saw  open  at  his  side,  and 
they  could  point  to  his  severity  with  himself  and 
say  the  balance  of  his  mind  had  been  destroyed. 
Vinet,  who  so  loves  Pascal  that  he  understands  him 
as  no  one  else  does,  defends  even  his  austerities. 
They  filled,  he  says,  to  that  great  mind,  amid  his 
intellectual  triumphs,  the  place  of  the  slave  who 
stood  behind  the  car  of  the  conqueror  shouting, 
''Remember  that  thou  too  art  but  a  man  ".  ^  It  is 
better,  however,  to  admit  that  they  belong  to  Pas- 
cal's limitation,  and  to  set  against  them  the  many 
noble  sayings  which  show  that  he  was  on  the  way 
to  emancipation.  "If  we  shock  the  principles  of 
reason,  our  religion  will  be  absurd  and  ridiculous." 
"  God's  way  is  to  put  religion  into  the  mind  by 
reason  and  into  the  heart  by  grace."  Surely  the 
** rules  of  our  miserable  justice"  are  as  good  for 
this  purpose  as  the  rules  of  our  miserable  logic ! 
Or  take  any  of  his  noble  statements  of  a  providence 
so  wise  and  loving  as  to  require  no  arbitrary  crea- 
tion of  austerities  for  ourselves.  '*  I  live  meantime 
with  joy,  be  it  in  the  blessings  God  is  pleased  to 
give  me,  be  it  in  the  ills  He  sends  for  my  good,  and 
which  by  His  example  He  teaches  me  to  bear." 
That  at  least  is  the  practical  attitude  in  which  faith 
and  freedom  are  at  one. 

But  excess  of  austerity  in  the  author  can  never 
1  Etudes  suf  Blaise  Pascal,  p.  7. 


66         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

be  a  just  cause  for  detracting  from  what  he  says 
that  is  noble  and  true.     The  person  worth  hearing 
on  religion  must  be  the  religious  person,  and  even 
a  mistaken  devotion   is   at   least   proof   that   the 
devotion   exists.      It   is  Pascal's   high   distinction 
among  religious  thinkers  that  he  never  lapses  into 
a  mere  intellectual  discussion,  but  always  speaks 
from  a  faith  that  is  backed    by  his  whole  heart's 
devotion.     He  never  wraps  himself  in  a  professional 
garment,  either  philosophical  or  theological,  but  is 
always  a  man  speaking  of  man's  highest  concern. 
The  clearest  evidence  of  this  is  his  style.     "  When 
we  see  a  natural  style,"  he  says,  "  we  are  astonished 
and  charmed,  for  we  expected  to  see  an  author 
and  we   find   a   man."      Perhaps  human  thought 
never   passed  through  a  more  luminous  medium. 
The  glow  of  emotion  is  its  only  ornament^  and 
naturalness  its  chief  perfection.     Emphatically  we 
meet  a  man.     Principal  Tulloch,  with  his  eye  too 
much  on  the  "  plaster  saint "  which  his  sister  and 
his  friends  made  of  him  after  he  was  dead,  thinks 
Pascal  rather  to   be  admired  than  to   be  loved.^ 
But  that  perfect  sincerity  and  fine  reserve,   that 
delicate  wit  and  subtle  irony,  that  lightning  swift- 
ness   and   sureness    of    phrase,   speak   of  human 
nature,  speak  to  the  same  effect  as  the  Discourse 
on  Love,  the  lofty  purity  of  which  only  shows  more 
clearly  that  it  is  no  sexless,  Platonic  discussion. 
It  is  a  religious  man,  then,  we   meet  in  Pascal, 
none  the  less  a  man  because  the  love  of  religion 
burns   in  him   as   the  highest  passion ;   and  that 
1  Vinet,  p.  206.  ^  Pascal,  p.  102. 


it 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PEN8EES         67 

ought  to  be  a  prime  condition  for  the  discussion 
of  our  question.  Abstractness  and  professionalism 
are  the  two  implacable  foes  of  reality. 

His  latest  commentator  grumbles  because  Pascal 
has  not  more  of  the  satisfied  density  of  other 
people.^  The  multitude,  he  thinks,  are  quite  right 
not  to  be  too  sensitive  and  to  distract  themselves 
by  rushing  after  practical  affairs.  On  the  same 
principle  the  dull  prose  of  the  multitude  could  be 
defended  against  the  splendid  utterance  of  the 
poet  ;  but,  in  that  case,  one  should  let  literary 
criticism  alone.  Precisely  because  Pascal  has  a 
sense  of  the  eternal  significance  of  things  he 
deserves  our  attention.  We  all  have  a  kind  of 
faith  which  comes  from  living  in  a  narrow  circle, 
and  a  kind  of  freedom  which  comes  from  bustling 
round  in  our  parochial  interests  ;  but  we  want  to 
know  how  it  fares  out  in  the  infinite  and  the 
eternal.  This  it  is  that  makes  the  cry,  "  The 
eternal  silence  of  these  infinite  spaces  terrifies  me," 
find  an  echo  in  the  hearts  even  of  the  unthinking. 

Pascal's  relation  to  Jansenism  also  puts  him  in 
a  position  of  great  interest  in  relation  to  the 
Church.  In  this  discussion  regarding  faith  and 
freedom  it  is  constantly  assumed  that  no  man  can 
occupy  an  unbiassed  position  for  studying  it,  if  he 
has  any  recognised  relation  to  the  Christian  society. 
But  if,  as  is  universally  admitted  and  as  all  the 
religions  of  the  world  attest,  religion  is  a  social 
power,  if  faith  is  something  which  unites  us  in  a 

1  La  vraie  Beligio?i  selon  Pascal,  par  Sully- Prudhomme, 
1905,  p.  55. 


68         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

common  bond,  and  freedom  is  the  highest  form  of 
association,  to  stand  in  so  isolated  a  position  must 
be  to  stand  outside  the  conditions  of  the  inquiry. 
Life  is  not  to  be  studied  in  a  vacuum,  but  in  the 
conditions  which  nourish  it.  Yet  it  does  not  follow 
that  we  must  go  from  one  extreme  to  the  other, 
and  that  the  most  advantageous  position  is  to  be 
swallowed  up  uncritically  in  the  largest  organisa- 
tion, so  that  we  accept  it  unquestioned  as  the 
embodiment  of  all  perfection.  Some  position  that 
allows  us  to  feel  what  the  religious  society  stands 
for,  even  while  we  recognise  that  it  should  stand 
for  something  still  higher,  some  singular  and  unique 
position,  it  may  be,  that  rouses  us  out  of  our  un- 
thinking allegiance,  might  afford  the  most  profitable 
experiment.  This  singular  position  the  Jansenists 
occupied.  Their  ecclesiastical  views,  like  many 
before  and  since,  were  determined  by  the  situation. 
The  PojDe  condemned  certain  propositions  out  of 
Jansen.  The  Jansenists  concurred  in  the  condem- 
nation of  the  propositions,  but  held  that  the  cu?'ia 
had  been  misinformed  on  the  facts,  for  the  pro- 
positions did  not  exist  in  Jansen's  work.  On  the 
question  of  doctrine  they  allowed  the  Pope  to  be 
an  authority,  but  on  the  question  of  fact  they  held 
themselves  entitled  to  maintain  what  they  called 
"  a  respectful  silence  ".  Pascal,  as  a  scientist  and 
a  layman,  was  least  tolerant  of  any  appearance  of 
giving  way,  yet  he  continued  to  be  a  devout  son 
of  the  Church,  with  a  submission  both  to  her  creed 
and  her  discipline  amazing  in  one  so  free. 

The  restrictions  this  position  imposed  on  Pascal 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES         69 

are  evident.  They  set  limits  to  his  inquiry,  which 
his  own  method  soon  went  beyond.  He  accepted, 
j^ractically  without  question,  the  Church's  presenta- 
tion of  Christianity  and  the  Church's  attestation 
of  the  sacred  writings.  If  the  true  act  of  faith  is 
to  accept  authoritative  tradition,  these  things  are 
received  simply  ;  but  if  the  right  definition  of  faith 
is  "  God  sensible  to  the  heart,"  they  remain  to  be 
investigated  on  that  basis.  This  the  next  age 
speedily  found. 

But  these  were  largely  the  limits  of  the  time, 
and  the  freedom  was  Pascal's  own  interpretation  of 
the  position  in  which  he  found  himself.  The  Pope 
is  chief,  he  says,  but  the  danger  of  his  position  is 
so  great  that  to  him  the  precept,  not  to  be  as  the 
rulers  of  this  world  (a  condition  on  which  we 
might  all  bear  with  him),  specially  applies.  All 
the  bishops  and  the  Pope  to  boot  were  wrong,  while 
Athanasius  was  right.  "  The  persons  who  have 
both  zeal  and  knowledge  are  excommunicated  by 
the  Church,  yet  serve  the  Church.  The  true  name 
for  the  history  of  the  Church,  nevertheless,  is  the 
history  of  truth.  Truth  is  clear  enough  for  man's 
moral  needs  in  having  the  visible  marks  of  being 
conserved  in  one  Church  and  one  Visible  Assembly, 
but  it  would  be  too  clear  if  there  were  only  one 
sentiment  in  the  Church.  The  test  of  truth  is 
what  has  always  been,  and  that  is  the  religion  which 
abides,  though  it  is  contrary  to  nature,  to  common 
sense  and  to  our  own  pleasures." 

That  argument  calls  aloud  to  be  carried  farther. 
One  Church  and  one  Visible  Assembly  is  precisely 


70         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSiSS 

the  kind  of  material  argument  which  is  too  clear, 
precisely  the  argument  which  is  as  valid  for  the 
saint  as  for  the  sinner.  Truth  is  clear  enough  for 
the  souls  akin  to  it  in  the  one  Church  of  the  faith- 
ful, which  has  in  it  the  life  the  world's  gospel  never 
could  sustain,  and  which  has  had  it  in  every  age. 
Even  bitter  opposition  by  the  visible  organisation 
to  the  champions  of  the  truth  will  not  hinder  the 
True  Church  from  being  the  heir  of  their  labours, 
or  her  history  from  being  the  history  of  the  truth. 
Thus  Pascal's  half-way  house  can  only  be  a  halt- 
ing-place. Nevertheless  it  is  like  a  great  scientific 
experiment  to  see  the  question  approached  from 
this  point  of  view.  Nor  is  the  patient  endeavour 
of  the  Jansenists,  in  which  Pascal  shared,  to  main- 
tain the  truth  they  believed  in  the  teeth  of  the 
condemnation  of  Rome,  along  with  the  determina- 
tion not  to  be  cut  off  from  what  was  to  them  the 
embodiment  of  the  one  Church  in  time,  without  its 
pathos  and  perhaps  its  lesson.  An  endeavour  in 
some  form  after  a  Holy  Catholic  Church  must  be 
an  essential  to  all  faith  in  God  and  all  true  freedom 
in  life,  and  we  should  all  appeal  from  the  Pope  ill 
informed  to  the  Pope  better  informed,  from  every 
sincere  form  of  Christianity,  for  that  matter  from 
every  sincere  form  of  religion  ill  informed,  to  the 
same  power  better  informed. 

But  the  real  value  of  the  position  was  the  way 
it  threw  Pascal  back  on  a  living  experience  of 
the  grace  of  Christ.  It  is  Christ,  not  the  Church, 
that  is  the  last  court  of  appeal ;  and  it  is  not  the 
Christ  of  the  Church,  but  the  Christ  of  living  faith 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES         71 

and  of  the  Gospels,  the  Christ  who  is  God's 
answer  to  the  enigma  of  life.  Towards  Him  the 
heart  goes  out  and  finds  its  emancipation  ;  and  that 
is  the  note  which  makes  the  Pensees  of  such  high 
significance  for  our  inquiry. 

That  God  exists  as  a  necessary  Being,  Pascal  is 
willing  to  admit,  but  the  fact  is  of  no  religious 
significance,  at  least  by  itself.  It  is  not  a  necessary 
Being  whom  it  profits  to  know,  but  the  God  who 
meets  our  need.  This  need  we  only  know  when 
we  know  our  own  sinfulness.  God  we  may  know 
and  not  our  need ;  our  need  we  may  know  and  not 
God.  But  we  cannot  know  God  in  Christ  without 
knowing  both  God  and  our  own  need.  This  response 
to  our  need,  this  unveiling  of  a  man  to  himself  and 
healing  of  the  wounds  laid  bare,  is  the  true  proof 
of  Christianity.  External  proofs  it  may  have  which 
may  be  submitted  in  the  hope  that  God  will  use 
them  to  touch  the  heart,  "  but  that  religion  so  great 
in  miracles,  so  great  in  science,  after  it  has  displayed 
all  its  miracles  and  all  its  wisdom,  rejects  it  all  and 
says,  she  has  neither  wisdom  nor  signs  but  the 
Cross  and  folly  ".  There  are  external  proofs,  how- 
ever, clear  enough  to  those  who  attend  to  them. 
Prophecy  is  a  standing  miracle,  and  miracle  a  dis- 
pensation necessary  while  God  is  fulfilling  miracle. 

By  reason  Pascal  means  reasoning — the  kind  of 
exercise  of  the  understanding  used  by  Descartes. 
Its  full  force  he  recognised.  "  Reason  commands 
us  much  more  imperiously  than  a  master ;  for,  in 
disobeying  the  latter,  one  is  unhappy,  and,  in  dis- 
obeying the  former,  one  is  an  ass."     But  he  sees, 


72         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

what  the  eighteenth  century  never  saw,  that  argu- 
ment cannot  reach  the  deepest  reality  of  religion. 
You  cannot  arrive  at  that  point  of  logic  where  you 
can  say,  as  you  could  with  a  proposition  in  geo- 
metry, you  must  accept  this  conclusion,  if  you  are 
to  continue  to  be  considered  a  man  of  sense.  "  God, 
who  disposes  all  things  with  gentleness,  puts  re- 
ligion into  the  intellect  by  reason  and  into  the 
heart  by  grace,"  but  it  is  the  heart  that  is  important. 
Faith  is  ''God  sensible  to  the  heart".  The  heart 
with  Pascal  stands  for  more  than  feeling.  It  in- 
cludes all  the  higher  faculties  of  intuition,  all  that 
goes  beyond  argument.  ''It  is  as  unreasonable  for 
the  reason  to  demand  of  the  heart  proofs  for  its 
first  2^1'inciples,  as  for  the  heart  to  demand  of  the 
reason  sentiment  for  its  propositions."  The  Dog- 
matist affirms  everything  by  reasoning,  and  the 
Pyrrhonist  denies  everything  by  the  same  process. 
The  Sceptic  wins  in  argument ;  but  when  he  is 
done,  Nature  confounds  him. 

Truth,  therefore,  in  the  last  issue  is  something 
which  appeals  to  the  whole  man  ;  and  the  important 
thing  to  know  is  the  total  height  and  depth  of  that 
complicated  nature.  This  is  the  point  to  which 
Pascal  devotes  all  the  strength  and  all  the  subtlety 
of  his  genius.  The  common,  dull  way  is  to  strike 
an  average  of  human  nature,  to  set  the  strong 
against  the  weak,  the  bad  against  the  good,  and 
find  nothing  very  remarkable  either  way.  It  is  a 
process  that  saves  many  questions,  but,  then,  it  is 
by  these  questions  that  knowledge  grows.  The 
ordinary   person,    for  example,   strikes   a  kind   of 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES         73 

working  average  between  boiling  and  freezing 
water,  and  regards  the  habit  of  water  to  go  into 
steam  at  one  end  and  into  ice  at  the  other  as  the 
eccentricity  of  a  useful  liquid.  But  it  is  precisely 
to  these  extremes  that  the  scientist  gives  his  atten- 
tion, and  it  is  by  that  attention  he  discovers  very 
wonderful  properties.  With  a  similar  concentra- 
tion Pascal  studies  human  nature.  He  looks  at 
the  extremes  of  wisdom  and  folly,  of  evil  and  good, 
and  he  seeks  to  understand  man  by  means  of  them. 
The  result  in  his  eyes  is  not  a  colourless  average, 
but  a  very  marvellous  combination  of  opposites. 

Consider,  for  example,  what  strange  elements 
are  combined  in  the  love  of  esteem.  Nothing 
satisfies  like  the  approval  of  others,  and  nothing 
could  testify  to  a  higher  regard  for  the  soul  of 
man  ;  yet  this  is  accompanied  by  a  hypocrisy  which 
proves  the  worthlessness  of  our  own  proper  being 
and  our  own  disregard  for  ourselves.  Or  take 
again  the  pursuit  of  happiness.  Reason  proclaims 
in  the  plainest  language  that  happiness  can  only  be 
found  within.  Yet  man's  practice  is  in  direct  op- 
position. He  demands  happiness  from  everybody 
and  everything  except  from  himself  and  from  his 
own  soul's  well-being. 

But  the  point  upon  which  Pascal  dwells  most 
is  man's  love  of  truth  and  his  need  of  it ;  while  all 
his  researches  only  prove  his  failure  to  find  it. 
"  Truly  to  philosophise,  is  to  make  mockery  of 
philosophy."  This  has  been  called  his  scepticism, 
and  the  disciple  of  Montaigne  is  not  altogether 
hidden.     Opinion,  not  reason,  governs  the  world. 


74         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

The  present  in  which  we  live  is  always  either  bur- 
densome or  fleeting,  so  that  what  we  look  to  is 
always  in  the  future.  Laws  of  nature  doubtless 
exist,  but  the  corrupt  reason  has  corrupted  all. 
There  is  the  ridiculous  justice  which  a  river  bounds, 
and  the  ridiculous  truth  which  is  error  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Pyrenees.  Reason  is  duped  by  feeling, 
disturbed  by  ridicule,  distracted  by  trivialities,  kept 
in  leading-strings  by  will,  at  the  mercy  of  self- 
interest.  What  are  our  principles  of  nature  but 
principles  of  custom  ?  And  as  custom  is  second 
nature,  perhaps  nature  is  only  first  custom.  A 
consistent  dream  would  be  indistinguishable  from 
life.  Perhaps  we  have  not  even  all  the  same 
dream.  To  know  anything  fully,  we  should  know 
it  in  its  relation  both  to  the  infinitely  great  and 
the  infinitely  little — in  all  its  parts,  that  is,  and  all 
its  relations — and  we  can  know  neither.  As  all 
our  knowledge  depends  on  the  union  of  soul  and 
body,  we  might  expect  to  know  that  best,  and  we 
know  it  least.  Xot  thought  but  the  absence  of 
thought  is  man's  sole  remedy.  Hence  he  distracts 
himself  and  calls  it  serious  employment.  The 
proper  study  of  mankind  is  man,  but  no  study 
is  less  popular,  for  none  is  less  consistent  with 
being  at  ease. 

Man's  practical  doings  show  the  same  absurdity. 
If  opinion  is  queen,  force  is  tyrant  of  the  world. 
Where  that  comes  short  it  must  be  eked  out  with 
humbug  [grimace).  For  want  of  a  better  working 
rule  people  have  to  put  up  with  it.  Suppose  pre- 
cedence were  made  dependent  on  ability,  who  is 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES         75 

to  decide  ?  But  I  give  way  at  once  when  I,  who 
have  only  one  lackey,  see  another  with  four.  Hence 
the  use  of  square  caps  and  robes  four  times  too 
large.  Even  foppery  is  a  way  of  showing  power, 
proving  that  many  people  work  for  us. 

But  this  is  only  one  side,  and  the  other  is 
equally  marvellous.  Man  is  poor,  miserably  poor, 
but  it  is  the  poverty  of  a  nobleman.  The  earth 
is  a  speck  in  the  solar  system,  the  sun  a  speck 
amid  the  stars,  all  visible  creation  nothing  in  the 
ample  bosom  of  nature  ;  the  centre  of  infinity  is 
everywhere  and  the  circumference  nowhere  ;  and 
there  is  another  world  as  amazing  in  its  smallness 
as  this  is  in  its  largeness.  Yet  there  is  a  higher 
order  of  greatness  in  which  man  has  his  place. 
"  Man  is  only  a  reed,  the  weakest  in  nature,  but 
he  is  a  thinking  reed.  It  needs  no  universe,  but 
only  a  vapour  or  a  drop  of  w^ater  to  kill  him  ;  but 
when  the  universe  crushes  him,  man  is  still  more 
noble  than  that  which  kills  him,  because  he  knows 
that  he  dies  ;  while  of  the  advantage  which  the 
universe  has  over  him  it  knows  nothing.  All  our 
dignity,  then,  consists  in  thought.  From  thence 
our  gain  must  come,  not  from  space  and  time  which 
we  cannot  fill.  Let  us  toil  then  to  think  well. 
There  you  have  the  principle  of  morals."  "  What 
a  chimera  then  is  man  !  Judge  of  all  things, 
foolish  worm  of  the  earth  ;  repository  of  truth, 
sink  of  dubiety  and  error  ;  the  glory  and  the 
off-scourings  of  the  universe  !  " 

The  supreme  proof  of  Christianity  is  that  it 
meets  the  whole  of  this  strange  nature,  its  greatness 


76         JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENSEES 

and  its  smallness.  The  conception  of  evolution 
had  not  yet  stirred  men's  minds  ;  consequently 
the  whole  emphasis  is  placed  on  the  Fall.  "  The 
religion  which  has  always  been  on  the  earth  is 
that  religion  which  consists  in  believing  that  man 
has  fallen  from  an  estate  of  glory  and  of  communion 
with  God  into  an  estate  of  sadness,  of  penitence 
and  of  remoteness  from  God,  but  that,  after  this 
life,  we  shall  be  restored  by  a  Messiah  who  is  to 
come."  But  whether  we  explain  the  strangely 
opposite  nature  of  man,  as  Pascal  does,  wholly 
from  the  past,  as  the  fruit  of  a  calamity  which  has 
cast  man  down  from  his  high  estate,  while  leaving 
in  him  relics  of  his  greatness ;  or,  as  the  evolu- 
tionist does,  wholly  from  the  future,  as  the  struggle 
of  the  spiritual  man  that  shall  be  with  the  physical 
man  out  of  which  he  has  risen  ;  or  whether  we 
combine  both  and  ascribe  it  to  a  progress  made 
broken  and  erratic  by  some  calamity  that  has 
fallen  by  the  way,  the  facts  should  be  faced,  not 
diluted  and  not  toned  down.  Superficiality  is 
the  ruin  of  all  serious  inquiry,  and  the  theory 
which  jjresupposes  a  superficial  reading  of  the 
facts  should  already  stand  condemned.  The  crux 
of  this  problem  of  faith  and  freedom  is  always 
here.  Mix  the  facts  well  together  and  then  take 
a  cross-section,  and  nothing  remains  to  be  ex- 
plained. Faith  is  easily  accounted  for  by  a  number 
of  very  mingled  reasons,  and  freedom  is  a  working 
combination  of  expediency  and  better  motives.  But 
if  man  is  this  extraordinarily  contrasted  being, 
touching  the  clod  with  one  hand  and  the  eternal 


JESUITISM  AND  PASCAL'S  PENS^ES         77 

laws  of  truth  and  righteousness  with  the  other,  the 
problem  becomes  at  once  of  amazing  difficulty 
and  of  amazing  importance. 

Nor  can  Pascal's  method  be  wrong.  Whatever 
explains  this  enigma  and  enables  us  to  deal  with 
it  must  be  of  God.  And  it  must  be  of  God  in 
the  way  of  setting  us  free.  It  aj^peals  not  to 
intellectual  ability  which  few  may  have,  but  to 
aspirations  which  all  should  cherish.  It  fulfils  the 
condition  of  the  true  religion,  that  "  it  should  be 
in  a  position  to  prove  itself  to  the  heart,"  that  it 
should  be  in  a  position  to  leave  those  who  have  it 
"  only  by  sentiment  of  the  heart,  blessed  and  well- 
persuaded  ".  Hence  we  have  in  Pascal  something 
of  the  right  attitude,  however  much  we  may  fail 
to  find  the  ultimate  solution.  We  have  a  sense 
that  religion  seeks  not  the  submission  of  the  mind 
but  the  homage  of  the  heart.  As  Vinet  beauti- 
fully puts  it,  Pascal  did  not  make  the  defence 
of  Christianity  a  citadel  but  a  temple.^  To  effect 
that  adequately  is  the  problem,  for  faith  shut  up 
in  a  citadel  will  always  be  unhappy  and  unfruitful, 
and  freedom  will  always  be  outside  and  at  enmity. 

iP.  18. 


LECTURE  III 

ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLEK'S  ANALOGY 


Herbert,  De  Veritate,  1634. 

Herbert,  De  Beligione  Gentilium,  1645,  pub.  1663. 

Hobbes,  Leviathan,  1651. 

Blount,  Life  of  Ajjollonius  of  Tyana,  1680. 

Newton,  Principia,  1687. 

Locke,  Letter  on  Toleration,  1689-92. 

Locke,  Essay  on  the  Human  Understanding,  1690. 

Locke,  Essay  on  the  Beasonableness  of  Christianity,  1695. 

Toland,  Christianity  not  Mysterious,  1696. 

Leslie,  Short  and  Easy  Method  loith  the  Deists,  1697. 

Shaftesbury,  Characteristics,  collected,  1711. 

Collins,  A  Discourse  of  Free-Tlwiking,  1713. 

Sherlock,  Use  and  hitent  of  Projjhecy,  1725. 

Butler,  Sermons,  1726,  2nd  ed.,  with  preface,  1729. 

Collins,  Scheme  of  Literal  Prophecy,  1727. 

Woolston,  A  Discourse  on  the  Miracles  of  Our  Saviour,  1727-30. 

Sherlock,  Trial  of  Witnesses,  1729. 

Lardner,  Credibility  of  the  Gospel  History,  1727-43. 

Tindal,  Christianity  as  Old  as  Creation,  1730. 

Butler,  Analogy,  1736. 

Books  of  Reference 

A  Vieio  of  the  Principal  Deistical  Writers,  Leland,  1754.  Ges- 
chichte  des  englischen  Deismus,  G.  V.  Lechler,  1841.  Eng- 
lish Thought  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  Sir  Leslie  Stephen, 
1902.  Unbelief  i7i  the  Eighteenth  Century,  John  Cairns, 
1881.  Types  of  Ethical  Theory,  James  Martineau,  1885. 
English  Apologetic  Theology,  F.  W.  Macran,  1905.  Studies 
Subsidiary  to  the  Works  of  Bishop  Butler,  W.  E.  Gladstone, 
1896.  A  History  of  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century, 
"W.  E.  H.  Lecky,  1897.  History  of  Bationalism,  W.  E. 
H.  Lecky,  1890.  English  Literature  and  Society  in  the 
Eighteenth  Century,  Sir  Leslie  Stephen,  1904.  Hobbes, 
Sir  Leslie  Stephen,  1904. 


LECTURE  III 

ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

With  the  Continental  Wars  and  the  intermeddling 
policy  of  James  I.  a  new  cosmopolitan  spirit  grew 
up  in  England.  From  that  time  to  the  Kevolution 
French  influence,  in  particular,  profoundly  affected 
English  thinking. 

Lord  Herbert  of  Cherbury,  the  first,  as  Leland 
puts  it,  to  form  Deism  into  a  system,^  was  one  of 
the  earliest  to  come  under  it.  Reversing  the  usual 
order  of  men's  lives,  he  spent  youth  in  study  and 
domesticity,  manhood  and  age  in  travel  and  turmoil. 
He  fought  in  the  Dutch  wars,  sought  adventures 
in  Italy,  and  had  such  knowledge  of  France  as  to 
be  appointed  French  ambassador.  Though  his 
sword  was  as  restless  in  its  sheath  as  an  insect's 
sting,  his  piety  was  sincere ;  and  though  resolute 
not  to  be  outshone  in  pomp  among  the  great,  his 
chosen  associates  in  Paris  were  the  learned.  Among 
these  learned  friends  were  men  already  weary  of 
the  bitter  strife  between  Catholic  and  Huguenot, 
who  thought  a  truth  might  be  found  which  was 
indifferent  to  the  contentions  of  both.  It  was 
the  claim  of  opposing  religious  parties  to  have  so 

1  A  Vieio  of  the  PriTicipal  Deistical  Writers,  vol.  i.,  p.  3. 
(81)  6 


l(i>l?>5 


82    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

exclusive  possession  of  truth  as  to  commit  their 
opponents  to  eternal  damnation  that  drove  him,  he 
says,  first  to  prayer,  then  to  study,  and  finally  to 
the  task  of  thinking  out  the  problem  for  himself. 

Even  in  his  History/  of  Henry  VIII.  there  is  a 
marked  bias  against  all  who,  by  standing  upon 
theological  punctilios,  had  hindered  the  work  of 
peace,  and  practically  nothing  is  said  of  the  root 
upon  which  all  the  strife  grew  and  which  was 
planted  in  Henry's  time — the  difference  between 
the  king's  and  the  people's  Reformation.  But  his 
views  are  most  fully  set  forth  in  two  Latin  works, 
De  Veritate,  published  in  1624,  and  De  Religione 
Gentilium,  published  after  his  death  in  1663. 

There  are  according  to  Herbert  five  notitlw 
communes,  common  characters  inscribed  by  the 
hand  of  God  on  man's  heart,  which  form  the  essence 
of  all  religion.  (1)  There  is  a  God  ;  (2)  He  should 
be  worshipped ;  (3)  virtue  and  piety  are  the  chief 
parts  of  Divine  worship ;  (4)  sins  are  to  be  re- 
pented of  and  turned  from  ;  (5)  the  Divine  good- 
ness rewards  and  punishes  in  this  life  and  after  it. 
With  this  religion  men  began.  Priests  first  cor- 
rupted it.  The  task  of  Christianity  was  to  restore 
it ;  but  priests  continued  their  jDernicious  work 
and  corrupted  Christianity.  Here  we  have  the 
family  characteristics  of  Deism.  The  significance 
of  Positive  religion  is  found  in  general  principles 
believed  to  be  common  to  the  race,  while  all  the 
rest  is  ascribed  to  priestcraft.  Rarely  did  a  word 
afford  more  mental  satisfaction  than  priestcraft. 
Vafrities  et  Vecordia  Sacerdotum  amply  accounted 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  83 

for  every  conceivable  error  and  superstition,  so 
that  the  world  was  comfortably  divided  into  two 
hemispheres — one  containing  a  man's  own  views 
and  the  other  the  slimy  progeny  of  priestcraft. 

To  associate  this  ideal  of  freedom,  with  its  air 
of  a  man  of  the  world,  with  George  Fox  may 
seem  the  height  of  absurdity.  Yet  the  doctrine 
of  the  inward  light  is  only  a  more  religious  phase 
of  the  same  desire  to  find  one's  own  authority  within. 
Fanaticism  is  still  a  word  like  priestcraft,  saving 
much  inquiry  and  allowing  j^eople  like  Quakers 
and  Levellers  to  be  ignored  as  mere  historical 
vermin.  To  suggest  gratitude  towards  men  who 
dared  the  singularity  necessary  for  being  pioneers 
in  the  great  warfare  for  the  right  of  each  man  to  call 
his  soul  his  own,  would  still  require  some  courage. 
Nevertheless,  this  is  how  their  work  impresses  a 
learned  and  judicious  outsider  like  Lechler.  "  The 
movements  of  sects  and  parties  in  England,  in  the 
middle  of  the  sixteenth  century,  form  a  regular 
series,  linked  together  by  the  common  endeavour 
after  religious  independence  and  freedom.  There 
appears  in  these  parties  an  ever  bolder,  more  self- 
conscious,  more  concentrated  independence  of  spirit, 
which,  indeed,  passed  through  an  extravagant,  a 
partially  fanatic  phase,  but  not  without  indication 
of  outgrowing  it."  ^ 

The  great  struggle  of  the  Civil  War  profoundly 
influenced  men,  and  not  all  in  one  direction.  It 
forced    them    back   upon   first   principles,  and   it 

^  Geschichte  des  englischen  Deisnms,  p.  66. 


84    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

created  a  wider  horizon.  The  humblest  felt  that 
the  eyes  of  Europe  were  upon  them.  For  some 
there  was  the  education  of  large  policies  and 
unwonted  power ;  for  others  the  education  of 
wandering  as  exiles  in  foreign  lands.  In  con- 
sequence, it  was  nearly  as  great  an  intellectual 
as  a  political  crisis. 

The  ultimate  effect  was  to  increase  greatly  the 
influence  of  France.  This  becomes  apparent  even 
before  the  Restoration  in  Hobbes,  who,  after  Lord 
Herbert,  was  the  most  cosmopolitan  of  English- 
men. For  years  he  lived  in  France  amid  the  same 
circle  of  friends  as  Descartes,  and  it  was  to  his 
judgment  that  Descartes  submitted  his  Meditations. 
Mersenne  the  Jesuit  introduced  them,  and  this 
association  with  Mersenne  cannot  be  too  carefully 
remembered,  for  Hobbes's  system  is  simply  secular 
Jesuitism.  It  preaches  the  same  individualism, 
and  with  the  same  object  of  showing  that,  as  the 
organised  society  is  the  only  bond,  it  must  be 
absolute.  He  also  preaches  the  Jesuit  morals, 
dividing  life  by  a  broad  line  between  obligation 
and  the  liberty  to  please  ourselves,  and  developing 
a  markedly  materialistic  casuistry  of  his  own. 

Leviathan  :  or  the  Matte?',  Form  and  Power  of  a 
Commonwealth,  Ecdesiastical  and  Civil,  published  in 
1651,  deserves  the  attention  which  every  clear, 
full  and  consequent  statement  of  a  false  principle 
deserves.  It  is  a  whole-hearted  assertion  that 
civil  order  requires  the  abdication  of  the  right 
ever  to  judge  in  our  own  case  against  the  ruler. 
Only  by  absolutism  can  the  safety  of  society  be 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  85 

secured,  so  that  the  notion  of  a  man's  duty  to 
follow  his  own  faith  and  assert  his  own  freedom 
is  the  only  really  ruinous  folly  that  can  take 
possession  of  mankind.  As  this  is  the  exact 
opposite  of  what  seems  to  me  to  be  the  purport 
of  these  centuries  of  struggle  and  inquiry,  it  is 
well  to  hear  the  other  side,  especially  as  there  is 
often  no  argument  so  convincing  against  a  position 
as  the  arguments  for  it.  Not  in  rather  befogged 
Latin  like  Lord  Herbert,  but  in  the  pithiest, 
clearest,  most  forcible  English,  Hobbes  expresses 
himself.  He  brings  forth  a  claim  which  long  im- 
posed by  wearing  a  paraphernalia  of  words  as  well 
as  of  attire,  and  presents  it  dressed  only  in  the 
working-clothes  of  a  plain,  vigorous  English.  His 
scorn  of  the  phraseology  of  the  Schools  and  his 
style  of  the  plain  daylight  should  not  be  forgotten 
among  his  services  to  mankind,  for  when  a  man 
attempts  to  prove  the  ideas  of  an  Oriental  potentate 
by  the  Baconian  method  in  plain  English,  his  real 
influence  is  not  likely  to  be  what  he  intends. 

Hobbes's  ideal  of  reasoning  is  as  mathematical 
as  Descartes'.  Reasoning  is  simply  a  matter  of 
adding  and  subtracting,  which  being  done  with 
well-defined  terms  must  give  a  precise  result. 
"  Geometry  is  the  only  science  which  God  has 
been  pleased  hitherto  to  bestow  upon  mankind," 
and  knowledge  of  the  mathematical  type  is  what 
is  required  of  a  philosopher,  "  that  is  to  say,  of 
him  that  pretends  to  reasoning  ".  Geometry  is  the 
exact  antithesis  to  the  philosophy  of  the  Schools, 
being  "  subservient  to  nothing  but  rigid  truth  ". 


86    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

His  conception  of  man's  actions  also  is  based 
purely  on  the  conception  of  force.  What  man  will 
do  is  a  pure  question  of  dynamics.  Freedom  is 
merely  a  convenient  word,  for  the  whole  series  is  a 
chain,  the  first  link  of  which  is  in  the  hand  of  God. 
Man's  actions  are  simply  the  resultant  of  the  forces 
that  bear  upon  him,  his  course  being  taken  purely 
by  what  he  conceives  to  be  his  own  selfish  interest 
at  the  time.  In  every  case  to  gain  some  good  for 
himself  is  "of  every  man's  will  the  proper  object". 
There  is  no  decent  veiling  of  unblushing  Utili- 
tarianism. "  Honour  consisteth  in  the  opinion  of 
power."  Hobbes's  idea  is  that  man  wears  honour 
somewhat  as  a  beast  carries  horns,  to  create  in 
others  a  dread  of  his  resources  of  self-defence. 
Yet,  useful  as  the  weapon  is,  men  will,  at  a  pinch, 
"rather  hazard  their  honour  which  may  be  salved 
with  an  excuse,  than  their  lives  for  which  no  salve 
is  sufficient " ;  and  his  whole  argument  assumes 
that  to  be  the  act  of  a  reasonable  man.  To  act 
reasonably  means  to  act  on  a  right  understanding 
of  our  own  interests,  and  that  not,  as  in  modern 
Utilitarianism,  refined  away  into  higher  joys,  but 
with  the  one  clear  standard  of  saving  our  skin.  A 
man  is  benevolent  "to  deliver  his  mind  from  the 
pain  of  compassion,"  a  feeling  which  arises  from 
imagining  ourselves  in  the  like  case.  Justice  is  to 
perform  covenants  undertaken,  but  it  would  mean 
nothing  without  "  some  power  to  compel  men 
equally  to  the  performance  of  their  covenants  by 
the  terror  of  some  punishment  greater  than  the 
benefit  they  expect  from  the  breach  of  their  coven- 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  87 

ant ".  Not  to  do  to  others  what  we  would  not  have 
them  do  to  us,  is  laid  down  as  the  fundamental  law 
of  nature ;  but  the  sanction  is  that,  if  we  do  not, 
we  may  expect  to  be  repaid  in  kind,  and  the  real 
fundamental  law  of  nature  is  to  look  after  our- 
selves. One  of  Hobbes's  chief  arguments  against 
rebellion  is  that  life  is  too  short  for  the  insurgent 
himself  to  reap  the  benefit  of  his  risk ;  while  the 
great  argument  for  a  social  order  is  that  it  is  the 
only  way  of  keeping  anything  where  every  one  else 
is  wanting  everything. 

The  struggle  for  existence  is  as  fundamental  to 
Hobbes  as  to  Darwin.  The  natural  state  of  man  is 
to  fight  for  his  own  hand,  to  strike  before  he  is 
struck,  and  to  keep  his  teeth  in  evidence.  Out  of 
this  helium  omnimn  contra  omnes  man  is  glad  to  be 
delivered  at  the  expense  of  giving  up  his  own  rights 
on  condition  that  others  do  the  same.  This  com- 
pact or  covenant  is  the  basis  of  all  civil  government. 
Considering,  if  I  might  so  express  it,  out  of  what  a 
nest  of  jackals  he  escapes,  man  should  never  look 
back  upon  his  bargain,  but  do  everything  to  make 
the  only  authority  which  can  keep  the  peace  abso- 
lute and  unquestioned.  Whether  this  sovereignty 
is  democracy,  aristocracy  or  monarchy  matters 
little,  so  long  as  it  is  strong  enough.  "For  forms 
of  government "  Hobbes  also  would  "  let  fools  con- 
test," but  he  holds  the  form  that  is  most  submitted 
to,  not  that  is  best  administered,  the  best.  Absolute 
it  must  be  in  every  sphere.  No  man  can  regulate 
action  who  does  not  regulate  opinion,  ''for  it  is 
evident  to  the  meanest  capacity  that  men's  actions 


88    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

are  derived  from  the  opinions  they  have  of  the  good 
or  evil  which  from  those  actions  redound  mito 
themselves  ".  This  regulation  is  particularly  neces- 
sary for  religious  opinion,  for  how  could  the  calam- 
ities "  of  confusion  and  civil  war "  be  avoided,  if 
higher  awards  than  life  and  death  were  in  the  hands 
of  any  other  than  the  ruler  ?  Besides,  religion  rests 
upon  the  ruler.  God  Himself  is  simply  the  big 
Potentate,  and  is  honoured  on  that  account  alone ; 
and  the  sovereign  is  His  representative,  and  in  His 
representative  God  is  honoured.  "Seeing  the 
commonwealth  is  one  person,  it  ought  to  exhibit  to 
God  but  one  worship,"  and  that  only  the  sovereign 
can  regulate.  Moreover,  without  the  sovereign, 
the  Scripture  is  merely  a  book  of  good  advice,  for 
he  only  can  publish  it  in  a  way  to  make  it  a  com- 
pulsory law. 

Just  two  forces  oppose  this  absolute  rule — 
those  who  fall  back  on  conscience,  and  those  who 
fall  back  on  the  Pope. 

The  case  of  the  former,  on  the  whole,  causes 
Hobbes  more  trouble.  It  is  inconvenient  that  some 
have  suffered  even  martyrdom  rather  than  obey 
the  civil  ruler.  But  that  is  only  admirable  in  the 
apostles  who  had  a  special  commission.  For  the 
rest  of  us,  if  the  sovereign  makes  us  do  wrong,  it  is 
his  look-out,  not  ours.  Christ  also  inconveniently 
said,  "  if  any  man  deny  Me  ".  But  that  also  was 
for  special  people  at  special  times.  Even  to  worship 
an  idol  at  the  command  of  the  ruler  would  not  be 
wrong,  for  it  would  be  the  prince  not  the  subject  who 
made  the  graven  image.     Of  course  opinion  cannot 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  89 

be  bound,  but  the  subject's  highest  duty  is  to  bow 
in  the  house  of  Rimmon.  Only  two  things  are 
necessary  for  salvation — faith  and  obedience.  That 
Jesus  is  the  Christ,  the  King  who  is  to  reign,  is 
the  only  necessary  article  of  faith,  and,  as  that  con- 
cerns the  future,  it  need  not  bring  us  into  conflict 
with  anything  in  the  present.  As  for  obedience, 
the  whole  decalogue  can  be  applied  to  God's 
earthly  representative. 

The  claim  of  the  Papacy  to  interfere  with  the 
civil  sovereign  rests  on  one  fundamental  error,  the 
confusion  of  the  present  Church  with  the  Kingdom 
of  God.  The  Kingdom  of  God  is  a  real,  a  material 
kingdom  to  be  established  here  upon  earth,  with 
rule  by  covenant  between  ruler  and  subject,  like 
any  other  kingdom  ;  but  Christ  did  not  come  to 
establish  it,  else  He  would  have  given  the  necessary 
power,  but  only  to  prepare  for  it,  which  is  to  be 
done  by  persuasion.  "  Our  Saviour  and  His 
Apostles  left  us  not  new  laws  to  oblige  us  in  this 
world,  but  new  doctrines  to  prepare  us  for  the 
next."  Only  in  the  hands  of  the  legislator  can 
they  become  obligatory  canons,  which  apparently, 
like  Erasmus's  satire  on  Pojoe  Julius,  is  a  mighty 
improvement. 

The  true  significance  of  the  book  is  in  the  vigour 
with  which  it  raises  the  great  question  whether  the 
last  word  belongs  to  an  order  within  or  to  the  order 
without,  and  in  the  relentless  logic  with  which  it 
accepts  the  position  that  man  has  no  freedom 
within  and  none  without  except  for  self-destruc- 
tion.    Henceforward  the   business   of  theologians 


90    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

and  moralists  was  either  to  build  on  Hobbes  or 
to  answer  him.  The  positive  elements  in  him — 
his  care  not  to  throw  "atoms  of  Scripture  as  sand 
in  })eople's  eyes,"  his  attempt  to  read  in  Scripture 
one  unceasing  Divine  purpose,  his  distinction  be- 
tween a  Kingdom  of  Persuasion  and  a  Kingdom  of 
Compulsion,  his  reduction  of  the  essentials  of  faith 
to  the  one  belief  in  Jesus  as  the  Messiah — were 
original  and  important.  Nor  has  his  doctrine  of 
government  by  covenant  had  justice  done  to  it,  for 
it  marks  the  transition  from  a  merely  traditional 
acceptance  to  a  historical  investigation  of  institu- 
tions, a  necessary  presupposition  to  this  day  for 
estimating  their  present  use,  as  distinct  from  their 
origin.  Nevertheless,  Hobbes's  supreme  value  is 
still  negative,  showing  to  what  a  dead  world  of 
Oriental  despotism  we  should  s})eedily  return,  if 
the  ultimate  basis  of  freedom  should  ever  cease  to 
be  the  high  Christian  demand  by  which  alone  it 
can  be  maintained  either  for  a  man's  own  soul  or 
for  his  country — let  a  man  deny  himself. 

With  the  Restoration  French  infinence  became 
entirely  dominant,  and,  at  the  same  time,  the  ec- 
clesiastical situation  resembled  the  situation  in 
France.  The  Church  of  England,  amid  a  society 
growing  in  contempt  for  all  aspects  of  religion,  and 
with  the  heavy  task  on  her  hands  of  approving  of 
the  monarch  whom  she  acknowledged  as  her  head, 
engaged  herself  in  the  enterprise  of  making  every 
one  conform  to  her  ordinances.  Naturally  the 
*'  legitimate  criticism  which  in  the  organised  Church 
was  suppressed,  broke  out  as  the  disease  of  seep- 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  91 

ticism  ".  Except  in  the  writings  of  Charles  Blount 
it  was  not  publicly  expressed,  and  even  there  it  was 
only  by  way  of  sneer  and  suggestion.  By  hints  in  a 
translation  of  the  Life  of  ApoUonlm  0/  Tyana  Blount 
indicated  so  plainly  that  the  Christian  miracles  were 
on  a  level  with  that  worthy's  impostures  that  his 
book  was  suppressed.  But  the  scoffing  attribution 
of  all  religion  to  man's  baseness  and  folly  in  his 
other  writings  was  less  easy  to  extinguish  and 
equally  dangerous.  This  was  the  first  definite 
attack  on  revelation,  and  it  derived  its  force,  not 
from  itself,  but  from  being  an  indication  of  the  far 
more  dangerous  attack  which  was  expressed  in 
life,  not  in  writing. 

To  the  danger  of  this  practical  infidelity  which 
lived  as  if  God  were  dead,  the  Church,  however, 
remained  blind,  for  that  only  questioned  religion, 
whereas  the  expression  of  doubt  questioned  the 
position  of  the  Church.  Her  position  could  only 
be  justified  by  a  quite  unquestioned  basis  of  fact. 
Men  have,  indeed,  died  for  moral  certainties  who 
would  have  sacrificed  nothing  for  logical  demon- 
strations ;  but  on  a  moral  certainty  it  cannot  be 
taken  for  granted  that  the  majority  are  right,  and 
that  the  few  who  oppose  the  current  convictions 
are  candidates  either  for  Bridewell  or  Bedlam,  for 
in  moral  certainties  there  are  all  degrees,  and  the 
few  may  be  precisely  those  who  see  deepest.  On 
a  moral  certainty,  however  strong,  you  cannot 
proceed  with  such  material  arguments  as  Test  Acts 
and  Five  Mile  Acts.  The  rationale  of  such  doings 
ought  to  be  a  foundation  of  demonstrated  fact  so 


92    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

clear  and  solid  that  nothing  but  wilful  folly  could 
remain  unconvinced.  It  must  be  of  the  kind  that 
puts  freedom  in  the  same  relation  to  the  accepted 
faith,  as  to  the  fact,  say,  that  fire  burns. 

The  kind  of  faith  on  which  the  Church  pro- 
ceeded is  set  forth  by  the  High  Churchman  who 
almost  alone  had  courage  both  to  rebuke  James  II. 
when  he  was  in  power,  and  to  follow  him  when  he 
went  into  exile.  Charles  Leslie's  Short  and  Easy 
Methixl  with  the  Deists  was  called  forth  by  Blount's 
attack.  In  Leslie's  view  nothing  but  the  worst 
motives  and  the  most  sophistical  reasoning  could 
lead  any  one  to  breathe  a  doubt  of  the  absolutely 
sure  grounds  of  the  Church's  faith.  For  such  ma- 
levolent persons  he  argues  the  worst  consequences 
both  in  this  world  and  the  next.  The  shortness 
and  ease  of  his  method  is  no  idle  boast.  By  four 
marks  the  religions  of  Moses  and  of  Christ  are 
demonstrated  to  be  true.  Is  it  not  wholly  irra- 
tional to  question  actions  (1)  which  could  be  seen 
and  heard,  (2)  which  were  done  publicly  in  the 
face  of  the  world,  (3)  which  were  commemorated  by 
public  monuments  and  observances,  (4)  which  had 
observances  and  monuments  instituted  regarding 
them  at  the  very  time  ?  Take  the  twelve  stones 
which  commemorated  the  crossing  of  Jordan.  It 
is  easy  to  see  how,  if  they  were  set  up  at  the  time, 
the  story  connected  with  them  could  be  handed  on 
from  father  to  son.  But  who  can  imagine  any  one 
setting  up  these  stones  at  a  later  date  and  getting 
people  to  credit  this  tale  about  them,  or  even 
inventing  and  circulating  such  a  story  about  stones 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  93 

already  in  existence  ?  Could  any  one  persuade  us 
that  Stonehenge  was  set  up  by  Hercules  ?  Then, 
could  he  have  a  law-book  written  and  the  people 
persuaded  to  accept  it  as  ancient,  and  the  Parlia- 
ment made  to  enjoin  that  it  be  taught  to  the 
children  ?  Let  any  Deist  reply  whether  that  could 
come  to  pass,  or  "  whether,  if  I  or  any  other  should 
insist  upon  it,  we  should  not,  instead  of  being 
believed,  be  sent  to  Bedlam "  ?  That,  of  course, 
is  the  point  where  force  has  a  right  to  interfere, 
where  it  is  a  clear  choice  between  belief  and  the 
lunatic  asylum. 

What  is  written  from  the  mouth  of  God,  Leslie 
continues,  cannot,  as  in  common  histories,  be  in 
part  accepted  and  in  part  rejected.  It  must  be 
accepted  as  one  infallible  revelation  upon  one 
absolute  proof.  This  proof  is  afforded  us  in  the 
unbroken  succession  of  the  Christian  priesthood 
and  the  Christian  sacraments.  "  The  devil  has 
been  most  busy  and  bent  his  greatest  force  in  all 
ages  against  the  priesthood,  knowing  that,  if  that 
goes  down,  all  goes  with  it."^  "And  let  us  con- 
sider and  honour  the  priesthood,  sacraments  and 
other  public  institutions  of  Christ,  not  only  as  a 
means  of  grace  and  helps  to  devotion,  but  as  the 
great  evidence  of  the  Christian  religion."^ 

Persons  vaguely  described  as  "  certain  Dis- 
senters," dimly  suspecting  the  method,  urged  that 
too  little  stress  was  laid  on  the  witness  borne 
to  Scripture  by  its  own  merits.  To  this  objection 
Leslie  replies  that  the  Deist  would  not  acknowledge 
1  Works,  vol.  i.,  p.  48.         ^  p_  49 


94    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

and  perhaps  could  not  understand  that  method. 
Here,  Sir  Leslie  Stephen  thinks,  Leslie  accepts  the 
right  conditions  of  the  controversy  with  a  courage 
worthy  of  his  career/  But,  in  arguing  with  a 
blind  man  about  sight,  it  is  an  excessive  concession 
to  agree  to  omit  all  references  to  the  main  fact — 
sight  itself  ;  and  it  is  an  equally  excessive  conces- 
sion to  agree  to  omit  from  a  discussion  of  religion 
all  reference  to  the  experience  of  religion  itself. 
What  Leslie  has  the  courage  of  is  not  so  much  his 
Christianity  as  his  High  Churchism.  A  religion 
which  works  with  sacramental  tests  and  like 
material  persuasives,  must  not  fall  back  on  such 
an  argument  for  Scripture  as  its  own  merits,  but 
must  abide  by  arguments  which  leave  the  man  who 
rejects  them  the  delicate  option  between  being 
knave  or  fool. 

In  judging  the  Church  at  this  time,  her  deadness 
on  the  one  hand  and  her  persecuting  spirit  on  the 
other,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  she  thought 
she  possessed  this  kind  of  foundation  for  her  belief. 
She  thought  she  had  the  right  to  expect  the  agree- 
ment all  sensible  people  have  in  the  things  they 
cannot  avoid  seeing,  and,  naturally,  if  one  could 
walk  so  surely  by  sight,  faith  was  apt  to  appear 
superfluous.  But,  while  this  explains  how  men 
of  sense  and  honour  could  act  as  they  did,  it  also 
shows  that  absolute  certainty  could  be  entrusted 
only  to  absolute  wisdom  and  goodness,  and  that  it 
was  necessary  these  external  securities  should  be 
rudely  shaken.  That  troublesome  questions  were 
1  English  Thought  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  p.  197. 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  95 

being  raised,  Leslie  himself  is  proof,  for  an  argu- 
ment of  the  kind  he  set  forth  is  mightiest  when  it 
can  be  quietly  taken  for  granted.  To  defend  the 
undeniable  is  a  grave  admission  that  denial  has 
touched  us.  Nor  are  these  views  of  "  certain 
Dissenters  "  unimportant,  for,  while  the  Dissenter 
laid  almost  as  much  stress  on  the  external  evidence 
as  the  Churchman,  he  was  made  to  realise  daily 
that  a  religious  certainty  which  has  no  necessary 
dependence  on  personal  faith,  but  is  exactly  like 
any  other  certainty  of  fact,  puts  the  minority  in 
the  difficult  position  of  claiming  to  judge  on  a  type 
of  evidence  regarding  which  the  majority,  rightly 
or  wrongly,  have  decided,  even  to  the  extent  of 
putting  the  minority  in  strait-jackets,  that  they  are 
the  only  valid  court  of  appeal. 

The  dissatisfaction  with  this  comfortable  type  of 
argument  first  appears  in  a  new  desire  to  learn  the 
extent  of  human  knowledge.  The  account  Locke 
gives  of  the  origin  of  his  Essay  on  the  Human  Under- 
standing is  characteristic  of  the  time.  A  dozen 
years  had  passed  from  the  Restoration.  Five  or 
six  friends  were  met  in  his  chamber.  A  discussion 
arose  on  the  principles  of  morality  and  revealed 
religion.  ''  After  we  had  a  while  puzzled  our- 
selves, without  coming  any  nearer  a  resolution  of 
the  doubts  which  perplexed  us,  it  came  into  my 
thoughts  that  we  took  a  wrong  course  ;  and  that, 
before  we  set  ourselves  upon  inquiries  of  that 
nature,  it  was  necessary  to  examine  our  own  abili- 
ties and  see  what  objects  our  understandings  were 
or  were  not  fitted  to  deal  with.     This  I  proposed 


96     ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

to  the  company,  who  all  readily  assented."  The 
Essay,  Locke  adds,  thus  begun  by  chance,  was 
continued  by  entreaty.^ 

The  historian  of  philosophy  is  often  puzzled  to 
understand  the  influence  of  the  Essay,  because  he 
forgets  this  relation  to  the  vital  religious  interests 
of  the  time.  It  dealt  with  no  merely  academic 
problem,  and  it  spoke  in  a  way  suited  to  the 
temper  of  the  age.  Its  broad  conclusion  that  the 
material  of  all  thought  is  provided  by  the  five  senses, 
that  thought  itself  is  a  process  of  argumentation, 
that  there  are  no  innate  ideas,  but  that  God,  the 
world  and  the  soul  are  inferences  from  observed 
facts,  and  that  this  process  should  be  conducted 
in  a  detached  frame  of  mind,  to  which  enthusiasm 
is  the  deadly  sin,  seemed  to  promise  a  sure  protec- 
tion against  the  prejudices  which,  men  had  suddenly 
become  intensely  aware,  determined  a  large  part  of 
their  convictions.  To  start  with  self-evident  facts 
and  self-evident  postulates  and  proceed  by  mathe- 
matically correct  deductions,  moreover,  seemed  to 
promise  the  same  results  in  religion  as  it  had  ac- 
complished in  physical  science.  The  ideal  of  all 
reasoned  conclusions  was  the  Law  of  Gravitation. 
As  every  thinker  in  the  nineteenth  century  had  the 
Law  of  Development  looming  somewhere  on  the 
horizon  of  his  thought,  the  eighteenth  century 
thinker  had  the  Law  of  Gravitation.  Greater  even 
than  the  influence  of  Darwin's  Origin  of  Species 
was  the  influence  of  Newton's  Principia.  After 
two  centuries  of   familiarity  the  stupendous  dis- 

'^lAfe  oj  Locke,,  by  J,  R.  Foxe  Bourne,  1876,  vol.  ii.,  p.  87. 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  97 

covery  still  staggers  our  imagination  and  dwarfs 
our  individuality.  But  within  a  century  from  the 
time  men  first  realised  that  this  earth  is  a  mere 
whirling  sand-grain  in  space,  the  whole  scheme  of 
the  vast  worlds  was  displayed,  governed  to  its  re- 
motest boundaries  by  one  simple  mathematical 
order.  Is  it  strange,  then,  that  the  discovery 
determined  the  method  in  all  departments  of 
thought,  and  that  the  mathematical  standard, 
already  so  much  exalted,  seemed  the  only  key  to 
the  universe  ? 

In  religion,  above  all,  this  self-acting  Law  of 
Gravitation  was  sought.  Books  like  Clarke's  Boi/le 
Lecture,  which  demonstrated  the  Being  and  Attri- 
butes of  God  and  linked  the  Unchangeable  Obligations 
oj  Natural  Religion  with  the  Truth  and  Certainty 
of  the  Christian  Religion,  pursued  the  Newtonian 
ideal  in  Locke's  temper.  Less  was  attempted  to 
be  proved,  but  it  was  hoped  to  prove  it  with  even 
more  than  the  old  absoluteness  and  on  grounds 
still  purely  intellectual. 

Though  it  was  intellectual,  not  merely  moral,  cer- 
tainty men  sought,  the  new  type  of  argument 
turned  largely  on  morals.  Hence  came  the  second 
intellectual  interest  of  the  time — the  eager  and 
extended  inquiry  into  the  basis  of  morals.  The 
old  Scholastic  question.  Whether  a  thing  is 
right  because  God  appoints  it,  or  He  appoints  it 
because  it  is  right,  returned,  but,  now  that  there 
was  no  absolute  external  authority  to  make  the 
decision  a  matter  of  indifference,  with  more  vital 

issues.     Some  things,  it  was  clear,  no  power   on 

7 


98     ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

earth  could  make  us  believe  were  from  God,  while, 
on  the  other  hand,  some  things  were  easily  accepted 
as  Divine.  How  was  this  determined  ?  Was  the 
criterion  what  is  useful  or  what  is  reasonable  ;  or 
had  right  some  special  standard  of  its  own  ? 

To  show  the  wrong  issues  to  which  the  defenders 
of  Christianity  were  committing  themselves,  they 
proceeded  to  link  Orthodoxy  with  Utilitarianism. 
To  base  conscience  on  reason  seemed  to  them  to 
supplant  the  sanctions  of  religion ;  whereas,  if  the 
requirement  were  universal  benevolence,  and  its 
only  sanction  personal  well-being,  a  God  with 
heaven  and  hell  at  His  disposal  was  clearly  the  only 
link  between  the  two  with  the  power  to  impose 
the  infinite  obligation  duty  requires.  Paley,  who 
was  no  original  thinker  but  an  admirable  expounder 
of  his  predecessors,  sums  up  this  type  of  reasoning 
with  his  usual  compact  lucidity,  when  he  defines 
morality  as  "  doing  good  to  mankind,  in  obedience 
to  the  will  of  God,  and  for  the  sake  of  everlasting 
happiness ".  In  this  scheme  revelation  had  room 
made  for  it,  its  concern  being  that  immortality 
which  is  the  sole  infinite  enforcement  of  our  present 
obligations. 

Shaftesbury  complains  that  so  much  was  made 
of  the  reward  of  virtue  as  to  leave  no  virtue  to  be 
rewarded ;  and  even  before  him  it  was  plain  that 
to  do  a  deed  purely  for  our  own  happiness  is  pre- 
cisely the  thing  which  would  prevent  the  most 
heroic  act  from  being  virtuous.  Moreover,  though 
there  might  be  reasonable  confidence  that  men 
would  be  happy  if  they  did  God's  will,  they  could 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  99 

not  discover  God's  will  merely  by  wishing  to  be 
happy.  God's  will,  therefore,  must  be  determined 
in  some  other  way.  Guided  by  Grotius,  who  was 
a  great  influence  in  English  thought  at  this  time, 
thinkers  turned  to  the  idea  of  a  law  of  nature. 
Cudworth  sought  to  find  it  in  reason,  seeking  there 
an  "  Eternal  and  Inmmtable  Morality,''  independent 
of  all  wills  human  and  Divine.  Locke,  though  he 
falls  back  on  the  will  and  power  of  the  Lawgiver 
for  the  sanction,  thinks  morality  could  be  deduced 
with  mathematical  certainty  from  the  relation  of 
independent  but  associated  beings  to  a  supreme 
Being,  infinite  in  power,  benevolence  and  wisdom.^ 
Clarke  would  establish  moral  truth  so  as  to  make  it 
as  irrational  to  reject  right  in  acting  as  truth  in 
reasoning,  but  he  also  sees  that  to  limit  the  argu- 
ment to  time  is  to  shirk  the  problem.  Yet  he 
knows  not  how  to  bring  these  two  sides  together, 
which  is  better,  however,  than  purchasing  consist- 
ency at  the  expense  of  seeing  only  one. 

But  the  writer  who  chiefly  concerns  us  is 
Shaftesbury.  Morality  and  religion,  he  affirms, 
have  spheres  of  their  own,  and  the  sense  of  right 
and  wrong  is  "  a  first  principle  in  our  constitution 
and  make ".  The  right  ground  of  virtue  is  "the 
generous  admiration  and  love  of  it".  It  is  an 
artistic  joy,  **  a  natural  joy  in  the  contemplation  of 
these  numbers,  that  harmony,  proportion  and  con- 
cord which  supports  the  universal  nature  ".  In  this 
proportion  of  sentiment  the  true  joy  in  life  consists, 
and  it  would  be  the  state  of  nature  were  men  un- 
1  Essay  on  the  Human  Understanding,  ch.  ii.,  sec.  18. 


100    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

prejudiced  by  vicious  education.  "Therefore,  if 
you  dislike  the  word  innate,  let  us  change  it,  if 
you  will,  for  instinct,  and  call  instinct  that  which 
nature  teaches,  exclusive  of  art,  culture  and  dis- 
cipline." What  makes  us  happy  is  not  to  follow 
any  selfish  interest,  but  "  to  act  according  to  nature 
and  the  economy  of  the  species  ". 

Such  an  attitude,  it  was  said,  made  a  future  life 
less  than  necessary.  Yet  why,  he  replies,  for 
exalting  virtue  merely,  should  I  be  deemed  an 
enemy  of  a  future  state ?  ''By  building  a  future 
on  the  ruins  of  virtue,  religion  in  general  and  the 
cause  of  the  Deity  is  betrayed,  and,  by  making 
rewards  and  punishments  the  principal  motives  to 
duty,  the  greatest  Christian  principle,  that  of  love, 
is  rejected  and  exposed."  Yet  it  would  not  be  a 
support  to  "the  generous  admiration  and  love  of 
virtue  "  to  suppose  that  "  there  is  neither  goodness 
nor  beauty  in  the  whole  itself " — one  of  many 
hints  that  remind  us  of  Spinoza — and  there  is 
abundant  proof  for  believing  in  a  "  coherent  system 
of  things  ".  The  proof,  however,  is  not  miracle  but 
"  that  admirable  simplicity  of  order  from  whence 
the  one  infinite  and  perfect  principle  is  known  ". 
Foolish  people  think  the  "  world  an  accident  if 
it  proceeds  in  course,  but  an  effect  of  wisdom  if 
it  run  mad  ". 

Here  we  have  the  forerunner  both  of  Rousseau 
and  Kant,  of  the  State  of  Nature  and  the  A  ntonomy 
of  Conscience,  with  something  less  Rationalistic  and 
more  Romantic  than  anything  else  to  be  found  in 
the  age. 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  101 

Yet  Shaftesbury  only  succeeded  by  carrying  the 
temper  of  his  age  a  little  farther  than  other  people. 
Even  the  weary  trick  of  triple  synonym,  which 
makes  the  Characteristics  such  dull  reading,  suited 
a  taste  trained  by  the  periods  of  the  Coffee-house 
oracle.  It  even  helped  to  set  the  standard  of 
literary  taste  which  regarded  poetry  as  epigram 
quotable  with  effect  in  that  intellectual  inner 
sanctuary.  To  Shaftesbury's  shallow,  pseudo-clas- 
sical creed  to  perpetrate  ten  monosyllables  in 
succession  was  a  high  offence.  His  appeal  to 
nature  turns  out  to  be  an  appeal  to  the  gentlemen 
of  fashion,  whom  he  defines  as  "those  to  whom  a 
natural  good  genius  or  the  force  of  good  education 
has  given  a  sense  of  what  is  naturally  graceful  and 
becoming ".  "I  am  writing  to  you,"  he  says  in 
his  Essay  on  the  Freedom  of  Wit  and  Humour, 
"  only  in  defence  of  the  liberty  of  the  club."  It 
is  a  blessed  age  in  which  imposture  can  be  sharply 
inspected  and  wittily  ridiculed.  Every  one  has 
learned  the  force  of  ridicule,  even  the  theologian, 
though  he  has  the  bad  taste  to  bring  the  executioner 
on  the  stage  with  the  Merry  Andrew.  But  for 
these  "gladiatorial  penmen"  it  would  be  easier 
to  keep  in  the  good-humour  necessary  for  right 
apprehensions  of  the  Supreme  Being.  There  are 
so  many  arguments  to  persuade  a  man  in  good- 
humour  that,  in  the  main,  all  things  are  kindly 
and  well  disposed,  that  only  ill-humour  seems  to 
account  for  atheism,  and  certainly  nothing  else 
could  "persuade  us  of  sullenness  or  sourness  in 
the  Supreme  Manager".     Indeed   humour  is  the 


102    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

test  of  all  truth,  for  the  irrational  alone  is  the 
ridiculous.  In  all  this  we  have  the  Coffee-house 
standard  of  freedom  and  the  faith  it  rests  on, 
which  is  briefly  comprehended  in  this  confession, 
"  Be  a  gentleman  and  believe  that  God's  a  gentle- 
man ". 

To  this  easy  optimism,  which  thinks  the  world 
is  a  very  good  place  if  one  will  only  develop  a 
taste  for  things  moral  as  well  as  things  material, 
such  a  matter  as  a  scheme  of  reconciliation  with 
God  is  a  mere  example  of  bad  taste.  Like  every 
good  ruler,  God  likes  His  subjects  to  recognise 
His  efforts  for  their  benefit,  but,  like  any  large- 
minded  person,  it  does  not  annoy  Him  very  much 
even  if  they  do  not.  This  ease  in  Zion,  along  with 
the  hints  he  occasionally  drops  that  some  things 
in  Christianity  are  far  from  suiting  his  taste,  was 
not  counterbalanced  by  his  assurance  that  he  sub- 
mitted "  most  willingly  and  with  full  trust  to  the 
opinions  by  law  estabUshed,"  ^  and  he  is  always 
recognised  by  his  age  as  one  of  the  chief  pillars 
of  Deism. 

Deism  started  with  the  great  advantage  that  it 
seemed  to  stand  for  liberty  while  the  defenders  of 
Christianity  had  suffered  themselves  to  be  driven 
into  the  position  in  which  they  are  its  worst  enemies, 
the  position  of  arguing  that  the  rejection  of  the 
wrong  kind  of  freedom  involves  hostility  to  all 
freedom  whatsoever.  Shaftesbury,  whose  love  of 
freedom  never  wavered,  complains  that  they  at- 
tempt to  bring  the  thought  of  liberty  into  disgrace 

1  Characteristics,  ed.  by  J.  M.  Robertson,  1900,  vol.  ii.,  p.  352. 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  103 

by  ''confounding  licentiousness  in  morals  with 
liberty  in  thought  and  action".  "They  refine  on 
selfishness  and  explode  generosity,"  and,  as  people 
born  in  slavery,  they  admire  their  condition  and 
begin  "to  think  short". 

Hence  Deism  was  from  the  first  closely  as- 
sociated with  the  Kevolution.  As  early  as  1696 
a  pamphlet  entitled  An  Account  of  the  Growth  of 
Deism  in  England,  draws  attention  to  this  associa- 
tion. From  the  days  of  Archbishop  Laud,  it  says, 
the  travelled  person  could  see  that,  at  home  as  well 
as  abroad,  the  question  at  stake  was  not  religion 
but  power,  and  proceeded  to  argue  that,  if  the 
ancient  clergy  were  equally  possessed  by  the  spirit 
of  pride,  corruption  may  have  prevailed  from  the 
beginning.  This  prejudice,  it  continues,  was  in- 
creased by  the  Kevolution,  for,  though  a  form  of 
toleration  was  admitted,  no  man  was  allowed  to 
occupy  a  position  of  trust  unless  he  had  a  "  con- 
science by  Law  Established  ".  And  at  the  same 
time  that  men  were  qualifying  at  their  altars  to  be 
"  bumbails,  keep  gaming-houses  and  sell  ale,"  the 
clergy,  who  had  preached,  as  the  very  mark  of  the 
apostolicity  of  their  church,  the  divine  right  of 
kings,  were  diligently  trimming  their  sails  between 
"  the  divinely  rightful  King  James  "  and  the  "  de 
facto  King  William  and  Queen  Mary  ".  Nor  does 
the  reply  ^  attempt  to  rebut  the  facts,  but  only  says 
it  is  very  wrong  that  Christianity  should  suff'er  for 
its  defenders,  and  that  the  writer  has  a  wicked  bias 

^  Beflexions  wpon  a  PamjMet  mtituled  An  Account  of  the 
Groivth  of  Deism  in  England,  1696. 


104    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

against  the  clergy,  and  that  there  were  other  reasons 
for  Deism,  especially  the  corruption  of  manners  and 
the  reading  of  Hobbes  and  Spinoza. 

That  also  was  true.  The  fire  had  been  long 
hidden  and  the  Revolution  only  gave  it  the  wind 
of  free  speech.  Nay  there  was  more  than  free 
speech.  The  society  of  the  Coffee-houses  ruled 
public  opinion,  and  its  sceptical  wit  tended  to  make 
speech  freer  than  thought.  If  the  Deist  was  usually 
too  poor  and  despised  himself  to  belong  to  it,  yet, 
like  the  other  writers  of  the  time,  he  aspired  to 
address  it.  The  society  which  set  the  intellectual 
fashion  of  the  time,  may  not  have  been  either  very 
large  or  very  learned,  but  every  man  in  it  considered 
himself  a  judge  of  all  ideas  and  expected  to  have 
them  set  before  him  in  the  speech  of  every  day. 
The  paraphernalia  of  classical  learning  and  Scho- 
lastic distinctions  had  to  be  abandoned,  and  the 
speaker  on  religion,  as  on  other  topics,  had  to 
follow  the  example  of  Tillotson  who,  as  Sir  Leslie 
Stephen  says,  assumed  his  hearers  to  be  "  not  '  pas- 
sive buckets  to  be  pumped  into,'  but  reasonable 
men  who  had  a  right  to  be  critics  as  well  as  dis- 
ciples".^ "Notional  divinity,"  even  among  the 
most  orthodox,  came  into  disrepute,  and  to  the 
disaffected  any  mysterious  doctrine  seemed  "a, 
trick  in  all  churches  to  take  away  the  use  of  men's 
reasons  and  so  to  enslave  them  ". 

Though  Locke  repudiated  the  connection,  the 
Deists  all  built  on  his  foundation. 

1  English  Literature  and  Society  in  the  Eighteenth  Century, 
p.  60. 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  105 

In  his  Essai/  on  Toleration,  written  in  Holland 
the  year  before  the  Eevolution,  Locke  completed 
the  work  of  Milton  and  Jeremy  Taylor.  The  very 
doctrine  which  Bossuet  had  said  no  one  could  be- 
lieve or  think  with  good  faith,  that  sincerity,  where 
ignorance  made  right  doctrine  impossible,  might 
merit  the  Divine  approval,  he  openly  maintained. 
Toleration  he  esteems  "  the  chief  characteristical 
mark  of  the  true  Church".  Persecution  is  a  bid 
for  power,  for,  if  it  were  sincere,  it  would  correct 
its  friends  rather  than  assail  its  foes.  That  is  to 
say,  it  would  have  dealt  with  Charles  XL,  not  with 
the  Dissenter. 

Still  more  perfectly  he  illustrates  the  temper 
of  the  time  in  his  Essay  on  the  Reasonableness  of 
Christiamty,  God  is  there  shown  to  have  acted 
in  a  sensible,  business-like  manner,  and  Christ  to 
be  the  incarnation  of  the  Divine  commonsense. 
Though  Christ  does  in  the  end  suffer  death,  He 
keeps  discreetly  out  of  trouble  as  long  as  He  can. 
In  everything  He  acts  on  prudential  principles. 
For  example.  He  chooses  poor,  uneducated  men 
for  disciples,  not  because  of  any  undeveloped  spirit- 
ual greatness  in  them,  but  for  the  politic  reason 
that  more  learned,  professional  people  would  have 
been  less  docile,  more  inquisitive,  apter  to  precipi- 
tate events. 

The  age  to  which  Locke  thus  spoke  was  no  age 
of  the  prophets.  A  writer  like  Pascal  would  have 
spoken  to  it  in  an  unknown  tongue.  What  could 
not  be  tabulated  and  argued  upon  was  disregarded. 
But  this  very  isolation  of  the  purely  rational  aspect 


106     ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

of  religion  helped  to  deliver  it  from  debasing  allian- 
ces. "  If,"  says  Locke,  "  upon  a  fair  and  unpreju- 
diced examination,  thou  findest  I  have  mistaken  the 
sense  and  tenour  of  the  Gospel,  I  beseech  thee,  as  a 
true  Christian,  in  the  Spirit  of  the  Gospel  (which  is 
that  of  charity)  and  in  the  words  of  sobriety,  set  me 
right  in  the  doctrine  of  salvation."  There  is  a  time 
to  speak  in  the  words  of  sobriety,  as  well  as  a  time 
to  speak  with  warmth  and  zeal.  Religion  is  a  fact 
of  experience,  not  a  deduction  from  abstract  prin- 
ciples. And  experience  is  always  individual,  char- 
acteristic, varied,  while  reason  clips  into  uniformity 
and  mediocrity.  But  the  more  vivid  the  experience, 
the  greater  the  danger  that  it  will  extend  itself  by 
alien  associations.  Of  all  emotions  the  religious 
emotions  are  most  in  danger,  just  because  they 
are  most  intense  and  touch  life  at  most  points. 
And  in  life,  as  in  law,  divorce  can  only  be  effected 
by  a  formal  and  hard  inquiry,  not  always  sparing  of 
the  sanctities  and  always  chilling  to  the  affections. 
"  The  writers  and  wranglers  in  religion,"  Locke 
sums  up  in  his  Essaij  cm  the  Reasonahleness  ofChris- 
tianity,  "  fill  it  with  niceties  and  dress  it  up  with 
notions  which  they  make  necessary  and  fundamental 
parts  of  it ;  as  if  there  were  no  way  into  the  Church 
except  through  the  academy  or  lyceum."  In  this 
they  differ  from  the  all-merciful  God,  '*  who  seems 
herein  to  have  consulted  the  poor  of  this  world  and 
the  bulk  of  mankind  ".  But  the  all-merciful  God 
has  His  own  way  of  doing  things,  and  He  used 
"  the  writers  and  wranglers  in  religion  "  in  that  age 
at  least  to  undo  a  great  part  of  their  own  work. 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  107 

Deism,  being  of  all  aspects  of  thought  most 
entirely  committed  to  the  spirit  of  the  age,  de- 
manded a  simple  and  lucid  scheme  of  things  on  the 
model  of  the  Law  of  Gravitation,  a  sort  of  straight 
corridor  through  life,  expressed  in  straightforward 
English  and  defended  by  arguments  acknowledged 
by  sensible  but  not  very  religious  people.  Histori- 
cal investigation,  moreover,  had  begun,  but  there 
was  no  sense  of  any  progress  in  history,  and  the 
Deists  were  in  the  most  pronounced  degree  histo- 
rians without  historical  outlook.  The  Scriptures, 
though  contained  in  ancient  documents,  were  con- 
sidered simply  as  a  Divine  deliverance  which  might 
equally  well  have  been  the  product  of  any  age. 
This  want  of  historical  perspective  was  a  great 
limitation,  but  it  is  a  limitation  worth  studying 
in  an  age  like  ours,  when  the  question  of  origin 
has  overshadowed  every  other  intellectual  interest, 
and  when  we  can  find  so  many  reasons  in  history  for 
everything,  that  we  can  hardly  call  any  extreme 
definitely  good  or  bad,  but  maintain  a  kind  of  intel- 
lectual caravanserai  where  everything  finds  entrance 
and  nothing  entertainment. 

The  determination  to  be  satisfied  with  nothing 
short  of  a  perfectly  comprehensible  scheme  of 
things  is  first  fully  expressed  by  Toland.  Junius 
Janus  or,  as  he  is  usually  called,  John  Toland 
was  a  professed  follower  of  Locke.  Locke's  Rea- 
sonable7iess  of  Christianity  ajipeared  in  1695  and 
Toland's  Christianity  not  Mysterious  in  1696.  There 
is  a  dash  of  Celtic  fire  in  the  book  very  grateful  to 
the  reader  of  that  vigorous  but  not  inspiriting  litera- 


108     ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

ture.  An  undignified,  besmirched  figure,  walking 
the  miry  way  of  begging-letter  mendicancy,  and 
diving  occasionally  into  the  still  slimier  underground 
workings  of  the  political  spy,  poor  Toland  yet  has 
something  of  the  quality  of  the  publican  and  the 
harlot  which  is  akin  to  the  Kingdom  of  God.  But 
this  only  renders  more  marked  his  severe  limitation 
of  experience  to  what  could  be  learned  by  the 
five  senses,  stated  in  general  propositions,  brought 
together  in  comparison,  and  finally  comprehended 
in  one  definite  proposition. 

He  will  hold  nothing  as  an  article  of  his  religion 
but  what  the  highest  evidence  has  forced  upon 
him,  and  he  sees  no  difference  between  Popish 
infallibility  and  being  obliged  to  acquiesce  in  the 
decisions  of  fallible  Protestants.  Nor  does  he 
find  any  authority  in  the  Ancient  Fathers  "who 
thought  as  little  of  becoming  a  rule  of  faith  to 
their  posterity  as  we  to  ours  ".  Reason  is  the  only 
foundation,  so  there  can  be  no  doctrine  either 
contrary  to  reason  or  above  it.  Only  by  some 
extraordinary  way  could  anything  above  reason 
be  learned,  and  it  would  be  incommunicable  to 
others.  This  might,  of  course,  be  precisely  what 
religion  is — a  peculiar  experience  incommunicable 
except  to  a  like  experience — but,  as  it  was  univers- 
ally granted  that  the  existence  and  nature  of  God 
were  demonstrable  by  reason,  and  that  all  reli- 
gious beliefs  were  deductions  of  reason,  Toland  does 
not  contemplate  such  a  contingency.  That  being- 
admitted,  he  is  manifestly  right,  for  a  doctrine 
reason    can    demonstrate    and    state   in    abstract 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY   109 

propositions,  but  cannot  understand,  is  a  manifest 
absurdity. 

In  view  of  this  position,  there  was  just  one 
great  question.  How  was  revelation  related  to 
this  religion  of  reason  ? 

To  Toland  revelation  is  simply  "  a  mean  of 
information  ".  Its  worth  therefore  consists  in  the 
plainness  with  which  this  information  is  given. 
That  it  was  meant  to  be  given  plainly  is  manifest, 
he  says,  from  the  abundant  appeals  to  reason  in 
Scripture,  and  because  the  language  of  Scripture 
was  evidently  meant  to  be  understood  by  the 
common  people.  God  might,  of  course,  have  re- 
quired the  consent  of  His  creatures  to  what  they 
did  not  understand,  but  ''to  act  so  tyrannically 
only  becomes  the  devil ".  The  real  source  of 
religious  mysteries  has  not  been  Christianity. 
They  were  introduced  from  Judaism  and  Pagan- 
ism. "There  is  nothing  so  naturally  opposite  as 
ceremony  and  Christianity,  and  the  large  share  of 
the  establishment  of  mysteries  is  due  to  ceremonies." 
"  I  acknowledge  no  orthodoxy  but  the  truth,  and 
I  am  sure  wherever  the  truth  is,  there  must  be 
also  the  Church."  "  I  am  therefore  for  giving  no 
quarter  to  error  under  any  pretence."  And  does 
not  all  profit  of  deeper  inquiry  lie  beyond  that 
resolve  ? 

His  conception  of  revelation  is  practically  the 
same  as  Locke's.  Revelation,  Locke  argues,  was 
added  to  the  light  of  reason,  because  without  it, 
though  "  the  rational  and  thinking  part  of  mankind  " 
might  have  managed  fairly  well,  ordinary  mortals 


110     ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

were  in  need  of  the  miracles  of  Christ  to  be  a  help- 
ful working  evidence  of  the  "  one,  supreme,  invisible 
God ".  As  well  expect  to  have  all  the  day  lab- 
ourers and  tradesmen,  the  spinsters  and  dairymaids 
perfect  mathematicians  as  to  have  them  perfect  in 
ethics  by  way  of  a  code  reasoned  and  demon- 
strated. A  code  embodied  in  a  Person,  however, 
is  plain  to  all.  To  this  must  be  added  the  help 
revelation  gives  to  a  pure  and  spiritual  worship,  a 
clearer  belief  in  the  resurrection  and  the  assurance 
of  Divine  help — for  a  revelation  has  to  aid  in  prac- 
tice as  well  as  instruct  in  knowledge.^  That  may 
be  taken  not  only  as  a  statement  of  Locke's  own 
view,  but  as  the  generally  accepted  view  of  the 
people  who  wrote  on  religious  subjects  on  both 
sides  of  the  controversy. 

If,  then,  revelation  is  simply  a  mean  of  informa- 
tion on  the  one  hand,  and  some  help  to  right  prac- 
tice on  the  other,  there  is  nothing  to  hinder  us 
thinking  freely  about  it  and  every  other  subject. 
This  was  the  drift  of  A  Discourse  of  Free-think- 
ing by  Anthony  Collins  which  appeared  in  1713. 
He  opposes  vigorously  the  idea  of  salvation  by 
right  doctrine.  The  whole  crime  of  man  with 
regard  to  opinion  is  in  not  thinking  freely.  As 
well  have  a  confession  of  faith  for  sight  as  for 
belief.  Seeing  our  carnal  eyesight  might  deceive, 
should  we  not  trust  the  authority  of  "those  men 
who  have  pensions  and  salaries  on  purpose  to  study 
these  things  "  ?  "  Let  any  man  lay  down  a  rule  to 
prevent  diversity  of  opinions  which  will  not  be  as 
1  Beasonableness  of  Christianity. 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  111 

fertile  of  diversity  of  opinions  as  Free-thinking  ;  or, 
if  it  prevent  Free-thinking,  will  not  be  a  remedy 
worse  than  the  disease,  and  I  will  yield  up  the 
question,"  ^  All  the  people  with  whom  it  is  any 
credit  to  be  associated — Solomon  and  the  prophets 
along  with  the  rest — were  great  Free-thinkers,  and, 
if  they  had  a  bad  time  in  their  own  day,  CoUins 
thinks  they  would  have  had  a  worse  in  his.  The 
prophets  were  Free-thinkers  while  Judaism  was 
simply  a  religion  of  priests  and  institutions.  The 
Christian  priests  like  their  Jewish  predecessors  are 
in  league  against  Free-thought  and  for  the  same 
selfish  reasons.  Wherefore,  the  untrustworthiness 
of  the  priestly  class,  as  well  as  differences  of  doc- 
trine, canon  and  text,  requires  free  inquiry.  The 
clergy  do  not,  he  complains,  study  divinity  properly 
so  called,  but  only  how  to  maintain  a  certain  system 
of  divinity— a  reproach  perhaps  not  yet  wholly 
taken  away. 

Toland,  in  discussing  the  Eikon  Basilike,  had 
said  that,  if  in  that  late  and  learned  age  it  could 
be  palmed  off  successfully  as  a  work  of  Charles  I. , 
it  was  easy  to  see  how  in  less  critical  times  pieces 
could  be  issued,  if  there  were  any  end  to  be  served, 
"  under  the  names  of  Christ  and  His  Apostles  and 
other  great  persons".^  He  afterwards  explained'^ 
that  he  only  meant  pieces  outside  of  Scripture,  but 
any  one  could  extend  the  application.  Collins 
drops  hints  that  it  is  hard  to  tell,  at  this  date,  what 
was  written,  and  in  his  Scheme  of  Literal  Prophecy 

1  P.  101.        2  j^ifQ  qJ  Milton,  1761,  p.  77. 
^Amyntor,  p.  161  f. 


112     ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

he  went  farther.  The  evidence  of  prophecy,  he 
thought,  might  not  be  very  convincing  even  if  we 
did  know  the  text.  In  order  to  get  a  prophecy  to 
fit  the  event  it  is  supposed  to  predict,  it  must,  he 
says,  be  allegorised,  and  he  leaves  it  to  be  inferred 
that  what  requires  such  treatment  means  nothing. 
To  this  book,  published  in  1727,  replies  rapidly  mul- 
tiplied. Mostly,  they  took  it  for  granted  that  the 
orthodox  position  could  be  maintained  by  answering 
a  few  manifest  objections.  But  Sherlock's  Use  and 
Intent  of  Prophecy  recognises  the  large  question  at 
issue  and  deals  with  it  from  a  new  point  of  view, 
showing  more  historical  perspective  than  almost 
anything  else  in  the  age.  The  primary  task  of  the 
proj)hets  was,  he  argued,  to  keep  alive  the  spiritual 
hopes  of  their  own  age,  not  to  furnish  arguments  to 
ours.  Religion  has  always  subsisted  upon  the  same 
principles  of  faith,  but  what  at  first  were  obscure 
and  general  hopes  were  gradually  unfolded,  till  the 
days  came  when  God  called  men  into  the  full  light 
of  the  Gospel.  The  Law  of  Moses  is  to  be  looked 
upon  simply  as  a  method  whereby  God  works  to- 
ward the  general  restoration  of  mankind,  and  pro- 
phecy is  part  of  that  scheme.  To  this  end  temporal 
and  spiritual  deliverances  had  to  be  mingled,  that 
the  more  exalted  hopes  might  be  sustained  by 
nearer  blessings.  Under  such  a  scheme  it  is  not 
to  be  expected  that  every  word  should  bear  its 
ultimate  meaning  on  its  face,  and  it  is  enough  if, 
when  the  fulfilment  comes,  we  see  that  the  claim 
that  the  Scriptures  testify  of  Christ  is  true. 

No  Deist  has  anything  of  this  historical  per- 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  113 

spective,  and  the  nerve  and  sinew  of  all  Tindal's 
argument  is  in  the  utter  absence  of  it.  Christianity 
as  old  as  Creation,  m^  the  Gospel  a  Republication  of 
the  Religion  of  Nature  appeared  in  1730,  when  Tin- 
dal  had  arrived  at  the  age  when,  as  Johnson 
thought,  it  was  time  to  give  up  religious  discussion 
and  be  in  earnest,  having  passed  the  allotted  span. 
Tindal's  book  also  is  largely  negative,  but,  more 
than  any  other  book  of  the  time,  it  attempts  a 
constructive  Deism. 

He  lays  it  down  as  a  self-evident  proposition 
that,  as  God  is  perfect.  He  must  have  given  all 
men  the  perfect  means  of  pleasing  Him.  Locke 
only  argued  that  God  will  be  pleased  with  the  ser- 
vice which  He  has  put  men  in  a  position  to  render ; 
but  Tindal  holds  that  nothing  else  will  accord  with 
God's  perfection  than  to  have  put  every  man  in  the 
position  of  rendering  the  perfect  service.  God 
must  from  the  beginning  have  made  the  perfect 
religion  perfectly  known  to  every  person.  It  must, 
therefore,  be  wholly  discoverable  by  reason,  for 
"  the  use  of  the  reason  is  the  only  thing  for  which 
all  men  are  responsible  ".  As  God  requires  nothing 
except  what  makes  for  the  happiness  of  His  crea- 
tures, there  is  no  difficulty,  for  man  cannot  mistake 
what  is  good  for  himself  and  what  a  benevolent 
Father  would  wish  him  to  do  to  others.  *'  The  prin- 
ciple from  which  all  human  happiness  flows,  is  the 
desire  of  happiness  " — apparently  our  own.  It  is  the 
only  innate  principle.  Yet  religion  is  everywhere  and 
always  "  a  constant  disposition  of  mind  to  do  all  the 
good  we  can,"  the  Deity  having  implanted  in  our 


114    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

mind  "  a  tendency  to  be  kind  and  beneficent  to  one 
another  ".  Apparently  the  link  of  union  is  that  to 
follow  the  tendency  makes  us  happy,  it  being  no 
drawback  if  these  "  seeds  of  benevolence "  are 
supported  by  prudence  and  love  of  approbation/ 
With  such  a  regular  and  easy  Deity,  a  revelation 
can  have  nothing  to  do  either  with  reconciliation  or 
with  special  commands.  As  God  cannot  be  injured. 
He  cannot  want  rej)aration.  He  "is  the  best 
natured  mind  in  the  world".  And  if  there  were 
new  truths  without  foundation  in  reason,  and  men 
were  to  be  "damned  for  mistaken  opinions"  on 
such  matters,  they  would  merely  be  worse  off  for  a 
revelation  than  they  were  before.  Against  such  a 
revelation  of  special  commands  Tindal  urges  that 
we  could  not  be  sure  of  even  the  letter  of  it,  seeing 
it  comes  through  a  dead  language  and  with  a  vast 
variety  of  readings ;  that,  if  we  had  not  already 
a  perfect  revelation  of  reason  with  which  to  com- 
pare it,  there  is  no  absurdity  we  could  not  take  out 
of  the  letter ;  that  the  language  of  Scripture  is 
totally  lacking  in  legal  precision ;  and  that,  in  any 
case,  it  is  pernicious  where  the  infinite  sanction  is 
set  on  anything  that  is  not  of  eternal  significance, 
such  as  ceremonies  or  merely  formal  opinions. 
Kevelation  at  best  could  only  come  under  the  head 
of  probability,  a  probability  which  weakens  with 
each  remove,  and  which  time  alone  would  suffice 
to  wear  out ;  while  seeing  they  are  in  the  hands  of 
an  interested  caste,  "pious  fraud  leaves  every 
document  of  the  Church  doubtful".     Not  because 

1  P.  16. 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  U5 

it  is  miraculous,  but  because  it  is  rational,  are  we 
to  receive  the  Gospel,  for  nothing  but  reasoning 
can  improve  the  reason,  and  even  the  Holy  Ghost 
can  do  no  more  than  propose  arguments  to  con- 
vince the  understanding.  Wherefore,  the  only  way 
to  reach  pure  Christianity  is  '*not  to  admit  any- 
thing but  what  our  reasons  tell  us  is  worthy  to 
have  God  for  its  author".  The  only  alternative 
to  that  method  is  for  the  religion  of  the  laity  to 
consist  in  believing  their  priests,  a  class  of  persons 
who  "are  bound  to  maintain  the  religion  that 
maintains  them ".  Christianity  is  simply  a  re- 
publication of  the  law  of  nature  which  all  know, 
but  to  which  all  do  not  pay  heed.  Christ  carefully 
distinguished  this  purpose  by  proclaiming  that  He 
came  not  for  the  righteous,  thereby  asserting  that 
there  were  righteous  who  had  no  need  of  Him, 
and  by  selecting  His  disciples  from  the  ranks  of 
the  wickedest  persons.  For  respectable  English 
people,  however,  Christianity  is  apparently  quite 
useless,  their  sound  common  sense  being  rather 
disturbed  by  the  "  elevated  romantic  "  Eastern  style, 
while  the  general  principle  that  "  actions  that  tend 
to  promote  happiness  are  always  good,"  is  guidance 
sufficient.^ 

The  misunderstanding  of  Christianity  is  gross 
even  for  the  age,  and  the  general  scheme  is,  in 
Butler's  words,  "  a  futile,  imaginary  model  of  a 
world".  Tindal's  argument  against  Leslie's  posi- 
tion, that  it  would  make  the  introduction  of  error 
at   any   time   an   impossibility,    could    be    turned 

1  Pp.  311-12. 


116    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

against  his  own  with  even  greater  force,  for,  if  it 
is  impossible  that  God  should  ever  deal  with 
anything  less  than  perfection,  no  defect  should 
ever  have  appeared  in  the  world  at  all. 

Yet,  if  God  cannot  speak  otherwise  than  infal- 
libly, and  if  He  must  provide  a  religion  which 
here  and  now  determines  each  man's  destiny  for 
heaven  or  hell,  every  man  ought  to  possess  it.  It 
is  much  more  convincing  to  argue  with  Tindal 
that  every  man  must  be  infallibly  instructed,  than 
to  argue  with  Newman  that  one  person,  whom 
millions  never  heard  of,  must  be.  Hence  no  reply 
of  any  ability  attempted  any  more  to  defend  Leslie's 
position  that  the  Scriptures  are  God's  infallible 
law-book,  guaranteed  by  the  outward  institution 
and  the  priesthood,  but  all  recognised  that  it  is 
more  reverent,  as  well  as  more  historical,  first  to 
ascertain  the  facts  and  then  to  build  on  them. 

In  this  inquiry  the  whole  temper  of  the  age 
brought  the  question  of  miracle  into  prominence. 
This  temper  made  the  question  of  miracle  both 
difficult  and  important.  It  would  have  nothing 
but  miraculous  proof  of  a  miraculous  revelation  ; 
yet  it  was  little  sensitive  to  the  unusual.  With 
its  unhistorical  outlook  upon  the  past  it  saw  no 
other  means  of  securing  its  treasure  but  miracle,  no 
other  means  by  which  its  beliefs  could  be  imposed 
upon  the  most  enlightened  age  of  the  world ; 
yet  to  admit  any  Divine  preference  for  the  first 
century  over  the  eighteenth,  and  for  a  miserable 
little  country  like  Judea  over  England,  the  home 
of  enlightenment  and  liberty,  seemed  an  absurdity. 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  117 

Then,  behind  all  men's  sense  of  God's  ways,  lay 
the  idea  of  the  vast  machine  governed  by  the 
Law  of  Gravitation.  None  escaped  it,  orthodox 
or  heterodox.  The  world  was  thought  of  as  a 
great  watch.  Herbert  uses  the  illustration  and 
so  does  Butler,  while  Paley's  use  of  it  afterwards 
only  shows  how  fully  it  expressed  men's  thoughts. 
The  one  question  remaining  was  whether,  in  this 
great  watch  of  the  universe,  God  had  reserved  to 
Himself  the  right  to  touch  the  regulator.  In  that 
possibility,  both  God's  providence  and  man's  free- 
dom seemed  to  be  involved.  Miracle  was  the  one 
proclamation  that  God  actively  and  immediately 
concerned  Himself  with  man's  affairs,  the  one  loop- 
hole for  prayer  or  any  spontaneous  utterance  of 
piety,  the  one  sky-light  out  of  the  mechanical 
prison-house. 

The  issue  was  definitely  raised  by  Thomas 
Woolston  in  A  Discourse  on  the  Miracles  of  Our 
Saviour,  which  appeared  as  pamphlets  between 
1727  and  1730.  He  treated  all  the  miraculous 
narratives  as  allegorical.  Every  one  was  aware, 
however,  that  the  whole  controversy  from  the 
beginning  had  more  or  less  to  do  with  this  ques- 
tion of  miracle. 

Granted,  as  the  age  generally  granted,  that 
reason  was  the  sole  guide  to  truth,  and  that  the 
sole  method  of  reason  was  argument,  three  lines 
of  reply  were  possible.  The  first  was  to  take  the 
strongest  and  most  important  instance  of  miracle, 
and  decide  the  issues  upon  it.  The  best  known 
and  ablest  reply  of  this  nature  was  Sherlock's  Trial 


118    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

of  the  Witnesses  of  the  Reswrection  of  Christ,  which 
Sir  Leslie  Stephen  describes  as  the  concentrated 
essence  of  eighteenth  century  theology/  The  sec- 
ond method  was  to  discuss  the  general  reliability 
of  the  whole  record.  This  Lardner  did  in  his 
long  and  learned  treatise  on  The  Credibility  of  the 
Gospels,  a  work  which  may  be  said  to  have  laid 
the  foundation  of  all  critical  study  of  the  New 
Testament.  The  third  method  was  to  view  the 
whole  broad  scheme,  not  only  of  revelation,  but 
of  nature.  That  was  the  task  Butler  set  himself 
in  the  Analogy,  published  in  1736. 

In  his  treatment  of  details  of  the  argument 
Butler  is  by  no  means  pre-eminent.  His  view  of 
prophecy  is  not  as  historical  as  Sherlock's,  nor  is 
his  defence  of  miracle  as  well  concentrated  on  the 
main  issue.  He  is  also  farthest  away  from  what 
the  age  thought  was  obligatory — such  an  apologetic 
as  would  put  Christianity  on  the  lowest  possible 
intellectual  franchise.  Quite  frankly  Butler  set  up 
a  defence  which  required  all  a  man's  heart  and 
soul  and  mind,  and  did  not  guarantee  him  finality 
even  then.  But  herein  the  significance  of  Butler 
appears,  for,  in  the  last  resort,  it  is  not  upon  intel- 
lectual, but  upon  spiritual  issues  that  he  depends. 
What  he  offers  is  what  the  Germans  call  a  Welt- 
anschanung,  a  presentation  of  Christianity  as  a 
View  of  the  World,  to  which  we  attain  by  making 
conscience  the  measure  of  our  good.  At  bottom 
he  does  not  think  that  any  man  can  be  argued  into 
religion  ;  and  his  true  purpose  is  not  to  convince 

^English  Thought  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  i.,  p.  243. 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY   119 

but  to  convert  his  opponent.  Argument  is  only  to 
remove  the  obstacles  which  hinder  this  conversion. 
This  attitude,  which  is  Butler's  lasting  claim  to 
esteem,  also  assured  his  neglect  in  his  own  age. 
Sir  James  Mackintosh  wonders  at  the  smallness 
of  his  immediate  influence  and  ascribes  it  to  his 
style,  saying,  "  No  thinker  so  great  was  ever  so 
bad  a  writer  ".  Apparently  the  critic  had  not 
read  Kant,  and,  comparisons  apart,  while  Butler 
cannot  be  read  without  unwavering  attention,  the 
difficulty  is  not  caused  by  any  confusion  of  ex- 
pression, but  only  by  weight  of  thought  and 
excessive  anxiety  to  attain  precision.  The  style  is 
characteristic  both  of  the  man  and  of  his  mission. 
On  such  a  high  theme  he  felt  that  every  writer 
and  every  reader  should  be  prepared  to  weigh  the 
truth  with  diligence  and  care.  Wherefore,  the  only 
eloquence  he  permits  himself  is  when  he  appeals 
for  this  high  seriousness  of  attention.  To  set  one- 
self to  convince  the  Coffee-house  oracle,  to  provide 
a  reply  clear  and  swiftly  conclusive,  a  reply  capable 
of  being  stated  in  debate  and  bandied  in  argument, 
was  in  his  eyes  the  way  not  to  arrive  at  truth. 
Religion  has  to  do  with  conduct,  and  regarding 
conduct  there  is  nothing  reason  requires  more 
than  a  sense  of  its  importance.  No  one  ought 
to  determine  his  conduct  except  upon  the  whole 
consideration  of  the  case,  which  is  what  those  who 
treat  things  in  a  short  and  lively  manner,  parti- 
cularly in  conversation,  are  sure  to  miss.  Hence 
the  significance  of  Butler's  constant  repetition  of 
the  phrase,  tqmn  tlie  ivhole.     It  is  a  standing  pro- 


120    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

test  against  the  finality  of  the  judgment  of  the 
town  wit,  whom  he  describes  as  judging  without 
thinking  and  censuring  without  judging,  and  then 
confirming  himself  in  error  by  dealing  in  ridicule. 
^'  Weak  men  are  often  deceived  by  others,  and 
ludicrous  men  by  themselves."  Even  demonstra- 
tion would  not  alter  the  behaviour  of  those  whose 
answer  is  "Ridicule,  unanswerable  ridicule".  And 
behaviour  is  the  great  matter.  The  important 
matter  for  us  is  not  what  light  we  have,  but  how 
we  use  it.  The  very  reason  why  God  appears 
not  to  have  given  us  more  light  is  that  the  task 
of  acquitting  ourselves  in  the  great  duty  of  walking 
with  little  light  and  seeking  more  is  one  of  the 
chief  parts  of  our  present  discipline.  For  such 
light  as  we  have  or  may  have  we  are  responsible, 
and  not  for  more.  We  cannot,  with  Tindal,  main- 
tain that  God  is  bound  to  give  man  anything  ;  all 
we  can  maintain  is  that  He  is  bound  to  be  fair 
according  to  what  He  has  given.  Hence,  if  the 
study  of  any  evidence,  historical  or  other,  is  within 
our  reach,  we  may  not  settle  the  matter  by  indo- 
lently saying,  "  There  are  so  many  principles  from 
whence  men  are  liable  to  be  deceived  themselves 
and  disposed  to  deceive  others,"  which  is  at  once 
an  admirable  summary  of  Hume's  argument  against 
the  possibility  of  proving  a  miracle,  and  a  reply  to 
it  by  anticipation.  If  we  acknowledge  the  credulity 
of  mankind,  Butler  adds,  we  should  also  acknow- 
ledge their  suspicion,  especially  regarding  things 
that  put  them  to  trouble  and  disturb  their  temporal 
interests. 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  121 

Into  this  state  of  probation  regarding  truth 
every  degree  of  probability  at  once  puts  us.  Every 
degree  of  probability,  being  joined  with  a  con- 
sideration of  the  importance  of  the  subject,  requires 
a  dutiful  regard  to  religion  in  all  our  behaviour. 
Yet  this  regard  is  not  to  restrict,  but  to  urge 
inquiry.  To  be  biassed  in  our  inquiries  by  a 
sense  of  the  greatness  of  the  issue  "  is  a  prejudice 
as  much  as  anything  else  ".  But  a  religious  attitude 
of  reverence,  attention,  moral  uprightness  is  the  ne- 
cessary condition  for  understanding  the  importance 
of  the  subject  and  for  appreciating  its  evidence. 
This  being  granted,  it  will  not  be  astonishing  that 
God  should  put  it  upon  us  to  consider  the  whole 
outlook  upon  life,  and  to  regard  the  Scriptures  as 
a  whole  as  a  view  of  the  world  as  God's  world,  and 
not  merely  to  understand  one  or  two  pointed  and 
pithy  arguments. 

Though  there  is  here  a  great  change  of  attitude 
towards  reason,  Butler  insists  on  reason  not  less 
than  others.  "  The  proper  motives  to  religion  are 
the  proper  proofs  of  it  from  our  moral  nature  and 
from  the  confirmation  of  the  dictates  of  reason  by 
revelation."  *'I  express  myself,"  he  further  says, 
"with  caution,  lest  I  should  be  mistaken  to  vilify 
reason,  which  is  indeed  the  only  faculty  we  have 
wherewith  to  judge  concerning  anything,  even 
revelation  itself."  We  are  to  inquire  into  the 
evidences  of  religion  after  the  manner  they  are  put 
before  us  "in  Christian  countries  of  liberty  ".  The 
Church,  though  Butler  assigns  it  a  high  place  as  the 
Christian  society,  is  not  an  external  authority,  even 


122     ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

in  Leslie's  sense.  "Of  this  Church  all  persons 
scattered  all  over  the  world,  who  live  in  accordance 
with  Christ's  laws,  are  members."  The  whole  con- 
sequences of  freedom,  intellectual  and  practical, 
Butler  accepts.  "From  our  original  constitution 
and  that  of  the  world  we  are  plainly  trusted  with 
ourselves."  The  basis  of  all  religion  is  individual 
responsibility.  He  does,  indeed,  profess  to  argue 
without  assuming  the  freedom  of  the  will,  but  he 
can  do  so  because  "  the  constitution  of  the  present 
world  and  the  condition  in  which  we  are  actually 
placed,  is  as  if  we  were  free,"  because,  whatever  it 
be  in  speculation,  as  a  practical  doctrine,  necessity 
is  false.  Indeed,  the  whole  pith  and  marrow  of 
Butler's  argument  depends  on  the  conviction  not 
only  that  we  are  free,  but  that  God  has  put  it 
upon  us  to  exercise  our  freedom. 

We  are  an  inferior  part  of  creation  apparently 
in  a  state  of  degradation.  Man  might  have  been 
free  without  sinning,  but  apparently,  in  Butler's 
view,  he  could  not  be  free  without  the  possibility 
of  sin.  Hence  freedom  is  a  genuine  option  be- 
tween good  and  evil,  the  great  option  by  which  the 
habits  of  the  soul  are  built  up.  For  both  time  and 
eternity  God  puts  it  upon  us  to  attain  victory  over 
ourselves.  The  relation  of  our  present  discipline 
to  our  future  security  Butler  speaks  of  as  involving 
us  in  mere  possibilities ;  but  this  is  evidently  to  be 
taken  with  his  whole  view  that  all  our  destiny  is 
built  upon  freedom  and  responsibility.  There  may, 
he  says,  be  no  trial  in  a  future  life,  but  a  disposi- 
tion won   through  trial  may  be  essential  to   our 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  123 

blessedness.  Virtuous  habits  may  be  our  needed 
security,  not  only  in  this  world  but  the  next.  If 
affections  remain  in  a  future  state,  acquired  habits 
of  virtue  and  self-government  may  be  necessary  for 
the  regulation  of  them.  All  finite  beings  may  have 
their  security,  in  part  at  least,  from  having  had  a 
sense  of  the  evil  of  sin  formed  in  a  state  of  proba- 
tion. Now  that  suggestion  is  not  only  interest- 
ing in  itself,  it  is  not  only  what  the  Apostle  may 
have  meant  by  "  attaining  to  the  resurrection  from 
the  dead,"  but  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance  for 
showing  Butler's  view.  It  shows  how  much  man's 
freedom  and  responsibility  were  realities  to  him 
and  how  entirely  in  his  view  every  high  issue  in 
time  and  eternity  depends  on  them. 

Butler  thus  agreed  with  his  age  in  regarding 
freedom  as  man's  universal  and  supreme  birthright, 
but  he  differed  entirely  in  his  conception  of  what 
freedom  involved.  Freedom,  in  his  eyes,  is  no 
longer  mere  absence  of  restraint  and  the  right  to 
be  indifferent  to  everything  that  does  not  absolutely 
knock  us  down  with  argument.  It  is  a  high  and 
solemn  and  vast  responsibility,  the  great  task  of 
governing  our  own  nature  as  a  constitution  or 
state  in  the  midst  of  the  big  world  which  is  also 
a  constitution  or  state.  Man  is  a  mariner  upon 
a  great  and  storm-swept  sea,  with  the  task  on  his 
hands  not  to  jettison  his  cargo,  but  to  bring  it 
through  rock  and  tempest  safe  to  port.  Freedom 
is  a  necessity  for  the  task,  but  it  is  freedom  to 
follow  every  ray  of  light  that  may  guide  him  in 
so  great  a  task  upon  so  vast  a  scene. 


124    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

The  exceeding  perplexity  of  our  way  and  our 
great  ignorance  Butler  often  dwells  on.  Let  us 
by  all  means  follow  reason,  but  "  let  not  such  poor 
creatures  as  we  are  go  on  objecting  against  an 
infinite  scheme,  that  we  do  not  see  the  necessity  or 
usefulness  of  all  its  parts,  and  call  this  reasoning  ". 
A  man  has  little  pretence  to  reason  at  all  who  is  not 
aware  that  in  matters  of  speculation  we  are  all  chil- 
dren. The  unsatisfactory  nature  of  the  evidence 
with  which  we  are  obliged  to  take  up,  even  in  the 
daily  course  of  life,  is  "  scarce  to  be  expressed  ". 

Butler,  too,  was  impressed  by  the  great  scientific 
idea  of  the  age,  not,  however,  by  the  mere  wonder 
of  the  corridor  shown  straight  and  clear  by 
Newton's  discovery,  but  by  the  suggestion  it 
gives  of  a  house  of  endless  possibilities,  a  house, 
moreover,  of  which  our  own  little  dwelling  can 
only  be  understood  as  a  part.  When  all  else 
leaves  him  placid,  Tindal's  omniscience  in  this 
dog-hole  of  a  world,  which  may  yet  be  the  ante- 
room of  Eternity  and  Infinity,  stirs  his  contempt. 
"  To  us  probability  is  the  very  guide  of  life,"  and 
that  not  to  satisfy  our  curiosity  but  only  to  afford 
us  practical  guidance.  The  most  we  can  do  is  to 
"  discern  the  tendencies  of  things  upon  the  whole  ". 
To  attempt  like  Descartes  to  "  build  a  world  upon 
hypothesis  "  is  quite  beyond  our  faculties. 

Thus  after  many  years  Butler  takes  up  Pascal's 
word  against  the  hope  of  finding  our  way  through 
this  great  world  by  mathematical  demonstration  as 
the  only  guide  of  life  ;  and  he  takes  it  up  again  in 
the  same  interest,  the  interest  of  a  practical  faith. 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  125 

There  is  even  an  advance  upon  Pascal,  for  this  limita- 
tion of  our  knowledge  is  set  forth  not  as  mere  restric- 
tion of  our  intelligence,  but  as  also  a  necessary  and 
important  part  of  our  moral  discipline.  So  import- 
ant is  this  moral  view  of  our  ignorance  that  Butler's 
argument  would  have  very  little  force  without  it. 

The  full  title  of  his  book  explains  what  this 
argument  is.  It  is  The  Analog^/  of  Religion  Natural 
and  Revealed  to  the  Constitution  and  Course  of 
Nature.  One  thing  only  is  to  be  taken  for  granted 
— an  intelligent  Author  of  Nature  and  a  natural 
Governor  of  the  World.  This  Butler  is  supposed 
to  assume,  because  the  Deists  conceded  as  much  ; 
and  he  is  supposed  to  be  refuted  by  denying  that 
we  know  anything  about  such  a  Being.  But 
Butler  only  means  to  assume  that  experience  is 
one  rational  scheme  which  may  be  argued  upon, 
an  assumption  without  which  no  discussion  of  the 
ultimate  meaning  of  things  can  proceed.  On  this 
basis  of  the  unity  of  experience  he  then  proceeds 
to  compare  what  ''  religion  teaches  us  to  believe 
and  expect "  with  the  "  known  constitution  and 
course  of  things,"  to  see  if  both  can  be  traced  up 
"  into  the  same  general  laws  and  resolved  into  the 
same  principles  of  Divine  conduct ".  This  purpose 
is  totally  misrepresented  in  saying  that  Butler 
seeks  to  show  that  religion  is  true  because  nature 
presents  the  same  difficulties,  so  that,  instead  of 
lightening  the  task  of  accepting  revelation,  he 
merely  burdens  the  task  of  believing  in  Providence. 
Besides  it  is  said.  What  is  the  use  of  revelation  at 
all  if  it  does  not  clear  up  the  difficulties  of  nature  ? 


126    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

To  this  Butler  would  reply  that  revelation  is 
given  to  afford  us  light  and  succour,  but  certainly 
not  to  abolish  the  limits  of  our  knowledge  which 
are  essential  to  our  spiritual  discipline  and  which 
the  wisdom  of  God,  having  once  set,  will  not  re- 
move as  long  as  the  requirement  is  not  altered. 
As  these  limitations  are  conditions  of  our  proba- 
tion as  much  as,  and  to  some  men  more  than,  our 
temptations,  we  should,  if  religion  is  a  reality,  ex- 
pect in  life  and  in  revelation  the  same  discipline  of 
probability  at  the  same  points,  the  roads  showing 
at  the  same  summits  and  dipping  at  the  same 
valleys,  the  whole  being  one  divinely  appointed 
probation  and  discipline. 

Under  the  guidance  of  conscience  we  may 
know  God's  end,  but  we  can  be  "  no  sort  of  judges 
what  are  the  necessary  means  of  accomplishing  it ". 
God  does  not  dispense  His  gifts  according  to  our 
notion  of  the  advantage  and  consequence  they 
would  be  to  us.  The  very  things  objected  against 
may  be  the  very  best  means  for  accomplishing  the 
very  best  ends  :  and  their  appearing  foolishness  to 
us  is  no  presumption  against  them.  On  the  con- 
trary, if  they  mark  the  whole  scheme  both  of  nature 
and  grace,  we  have  a  right  to  conclude  that  they 
are  necessary,  and  that  it  is  only  our  impatience 
and  ignorance  that  find  fault.  For  example,  if 
every  kind  of  progress  starts  in  one  place  and  pro- 
pagates itself  from  point  to  point,  and  always  on 
the  condition  of  one  teaching  another,  it  is  plain 
that  there  must  be  some  good  reason  for  such  a 
method,  a  reason  requiring  that  it  should  also  be 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  127 

the  method  of  God's  revelation.  Nothing,  therefore, 
but  omniscience  could  justify  Tindal  in  maintaining 
that  God  must  reveal  Himself  perfectly  to  every  one 
in  every  place  at  all  times.  If  a  revelation  is  not 
evident  to  every  one  without  trouble  or  difficulty, 
that  is  only  in  accordance  with  the  general  conduct 
of  nature  which  is  "not  to  save  us  trouble  or 
danger,  but  to  make  us  capable  of  going  through 
them  and  to  put  it  upon  us  to  do  so  ". 

This  being  so,  there  is  "an  absolute  and  formal 
obligation  in  point  of  prudence  and  interest  to  act 
even  upon  a  low  degree  of  probability,  and  most  of 
all  in  questions  of  great  importance  ".  To  misunder- 
standing of  this  position  Butler  constantly  exposes 
himself  by  his  cold  and  guarded  expression  and  his 
negative  way  of  arguing.  His  doctrine  of  proba- 
bility seems  then  only  to  mean  that  religion  and 
everything  else  are  very  doubtful,  but  that,  as  Eter- 
nity is  a  high  venture,  a  prudent  man  would  stake 
on  it.  But  prudence  and  interest  in  Butler's  eyes 
include  high  issues  of  spiritual  wisdom  and  profit ; 
while  the  first  purpose  of  the  uncertainty  of  our  own 
foresight  is  to  drive  us  back  upon  the  only  thing 
that  is  certain,  the  guidance  of  conscience.  Amid 
all  the  doubt,  there  is  "an  absolute  and  formal 
obligation  ".  It  is  to  look  after  one's  own  interest. 
It  is  an  absolute  and  formal  obligation  to  prudence. 
But  a  prudence  which  has  such  an  authority  to  go 
upon  is  not  mere  expediency.  It  is  a  prudence 
which  interprets  itself  by  conscience.  That  is  the 
foundation-stone  of  Butler's  system.  Self-love  is  to 
be  interpreted  hy  conscience,  not  conscience  by  self-love. 


128    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

The  soul  is  a  constitution  or  state.  All  im- 
pulses in  human  nature  are  right  and  useful  in  their 
due  subjection.  There  are,  however,  only  two  re- 
gulative principles,  both  principles  of  reflection.^ 
They  are  self-love  and  conscience.  Self-love,  as  a 
principle  of  reflection,  is  so  far  from  being  identical 
with  the  passions,  that  the  passions  unregulated 
are  at  least  as  antagonistic  to  the  individual's  true 
interest  as  to  the  well-being  of  others.  Self-love, 
thus  understood,  is  not  inferior  even  to  conscience. 
Not  even  conscience  could  reasonably  command  us 
to  do  what  was  plainly  and  ultimately  contrary  to 
self-love.  But  no  foresight  can  tell  us  certainly 
what  will  be  for  our  good  upon  the  whole.  On  the 
other  hand  conscience  speaks  with  absolute  author- 
ity. Not  to  approve  of  virtue  is  impossible,  while 
no  one  could  be  sure  even  for  this  life,  much  less  for 
that  which  is  to  come,  that  vice  could  ever  conduce 
to  his  good.  The  supremacy  of  conscience  is  here- 
in apparent  that  we  can  determine  by  reference  to 
it  alone  what  the  economy  of  man's  nature  requires. 
"  Had  it  strength  as  it  has  right ;  had  it  power  as  it 
has  manifest  authority,  it  would  absolutely  govern 
the  world."  ^  It  is  not  resolvable  either  into  self- 
love  or  benevolence,  as  it  determines  both  true  self- 
love  and  true  benevolence,  and  "  everything  is  what 
it  is  and  not  another  thing,"  ^  which  is  a  very  im- 
portant principle. 

This  moral  certainty,  then,  is  the  basis  upon 
which  all  the  probabilities  which  guide  us  should 

^  Preface  to  Sermons.         ^  Sermon  II. 
^  Preface  to  Sermons. 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  129 

be  built.  But  this  probability  with  its  basis  of 
moral  certainty  is,  for  all  practical  purposes,  what 
we  call  faith.  The  Apostle  no  doubt  expresses 
himself  better  when  he  prays  that  our  love  may 
increase  in  wisdom  and  practical  discrimination, 
that  we  may  discern  the  things  that  excel.  Yet 
there  is  some  advantage  also  in  having  the  same 
thing  said  in  Butler's  dry  way,  in  having  it  urged 
that  in  matters  of  the  greatest  importance  we 
must  act  on  the  lowest  degree  of  probability.  Life, 
to  our  author,  is  a  great  and  dark  affair,  with  little 
guidance  in  it  but  the  call  of  duty,  wherein  a 
great  charge  which  is  to  prove  us  has  been  com- 
mitted to  our  care,  involving  the  necessity  of  fol- 
lowing aims  the  ultimate  goal  of  which  we  cannot 
see,  and  of  facing  duties  the  full  reason  for  which 
lies  in  other  spheres.  Hence  it  is  necessary  to 
follow  every  ray  of  light,  discern  things  even  dimly 
excelling,  choose  the  path  even  slightly  tending 
upwards.  If  this  solemn  task  of  governing  our 
own  nature  as  a  constitution  or  state  in  the  midst 
of  the  big  world  which  is  also  a  constitution  or 
state  involves  infinite  and  eternal  relations,  then 
instead  of  being  ready  to  reject  everything  that 
does  not  absolutely  overwhelm  us  with  demonstra- 
tion, we  should  be  glad  to  get  light  enough  in  any 
way  for  the  practical  business  of  life ;  while  to 
forsake  for  our  own  foresight  the  only  sure  guid- 
ance we  have,  which  is  conscience,  is  sheer  madness. 
This  guidance  of  conscience  is  the  real  key  to 
the  meaning  of  life.  What  shows  us  that  we  are 
in  a  state  of  probation  is  our  moral  task.     What 

9 


130     ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

proves  that  virtue  must  be  the. happiness  and  vice 
the  misery  of  every  creature,  is  that  our  whole 
nature  leads  us  to  ascribe  all  moral  perfection  to  God. 
That  is  the  real  basis  of  religion,  and  the  argument 
from  analogy  is  not  another  proof,  but  only  a  way 
of  removing  certain  intellectual  difficulties  which 
hinder  the  natural  development  of  the  moral  con- 
victions. Our  sole  guide  in  interpreting  the  Divine 
meaning  of  life  is  the  moral  tendencies  of  things, 
less  what  actually  happens  than  what  conscience 
requires  to  happen.  We  thereby  arrive  at  natural 
religion,  the  essence  of  which  is  that  we  are  now 
in  a  state  of  probation,  so  that  the  full  issues  of 
our  present  life  are  explicable  only  by  another  and 
a  greater. 

Had  there  never  been  any  deviation  from  the 
path  of  right,  this  religion  might  have  sufficed  ;  but 
to  say  that  revelation  is  now  a  thing  superfluous 
is  "to  talk  quite  wildly  and  at  random".  Possibly 
even  natural  religion  is  revealed  religion,  whether 
it  could  have  been  thought  out  being  very  doubt- 
ful ;  and,  in  any  case,  considering  the  corruption 
amid  which  we  live,  to  have  it  republished  and  con- 
firmed, and  to  have  some  "  external  institution  of 
it "  to  carry  forward  its  work  in  the  world  is  a  very 
practical  and  urgent  necessity.  A  miraculous  con- 
firmation of  natural  religion,  whatever  speculative 
difficulties  may  be  raised  against  it,  is  of  undeniable 
practical  value,  while  the  Christian  society  inter- 
preted, as  every  Divine  work  should  be,  by  what  it 
would  accomplish  if  man  did  his  part,  is  a  very 
urgent  practical  requirement. 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  131 

Besides  thus  enforcing  natural  religion,  revela- 
tion makes  known  relations  which  involve  special 
injunctions.  But  here  Butler  of  all  men  seems  to 
lay  himself  open  to  an  objection.  If  another  au- 
thority besides  conscience  is  set  up  which  can  give 
commands  of  God,  conscience  is  no  longer  the  one 
absolute  authority  in  the  soul.  To  this  Butler 
would  reply  that  neither  revelation  nor  anything 
else  could  reveal  a  duty  that  was  not  enforced  by 
conscience.  If  anything  were  revealed  merely  as  a 
command  of  God,  had  it  no  other  reason  either  for 
or  against  it,  we  should  make  conscience  of  obeying 
it  because  of  God's  goodness  and  wisdom  and  our 
relation  to  them.  But  such  commands  God  does 
not  seem  to  require,  as  "  the  reasons  of  the  practical 
precepts  of  Christianity  are  all  manifest ".  Revela- 
tion involves  new  duties  only  as  all  widening  of 
our  horizon  does.  The  revelation  of  the  Son  as 
our  Mediator  and  the  Spirit  as  our  Sanctifier  in- 
volves our  duty  to  them  as  naturally  as  good- will 
is  involved  in  our  knowledge  of  our  fellowman. 

In  explaining  the  work  of  Christ  and  the  Holy 
Spirit,  Butler  is  careful  to  guard  this  central  au- 
thority of  conscience  and  the  responsibilities  of 
our  own  individuality.  It  is  because  our  freedom 
makes  sin  such  a  terrible  reality  that  such  a  work 
is  required.  "  Consider  what  it  is  for  us  creatures, 
moral  agents,  presumptuously  to  introduce  that 
confusion  and  misery  into  the  Kingdom  of  God, 
which  mankind  have  in  fact  introduced."  Again, 
the  help  that  is  given  us  is  of  the  same  kind  of  in- 
terposition and  assistance  as  is  given  by  our  fellows. 


132    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

the  same  kind  of  self-sacrifice  from  others  which 
is  of  such  manifest  vahie  in  doing  away  with  the 
effects  of  evil  in  life,  and  which  does  not  interfere 
with,  but  rather  enforce,  our  personal  responsibility. 

To  Butler's  whole  scheme  of  thousrht  two  ob- 
jections  are  usually  taken,  Jlrst,  that  he  deifies 
conscience  and,  second,  that  he  ends  in  pessimism, 
not  in  faith. 

His  doctrine  of  the  absolute  authority  of  con- 
science is  supposed  to  be  answered  by  the  Theory 
of  Evolution.  But  Butler  would  probably  have 
made  no  difficulty  about  acknowledging  the  evolu- 
tion of  conscience.  No  one  in  the  century  came 
nearer  the  idea.  He  acknowledges  that  there  are 
perhaps  creatures,  not  yet  arrived  at  the  moral 
stage,  that  may  be  on  the  way  to  it ;  that  in  in- 
fancy we  ourselves  were  not  consciously  moral 
beings ;  and  that  even  now  our  moral  understand- 
ings may  be  impaired  and  perverted.  Conscience 
he  defines  as  a  moral  approving  and  disapproving 
faculty,  and  all  he  needs  to  maintain  is  that,  so  far 
as  it  is  discerned,  the  distinction  between  right  and 
wrong  is  absolute,  not  being  dependent  upon  man's 
convenience  but  upon  the  ultimate  meaning  of  the 
world. 

Butler  started  out  to  prove  that  the  easy  optim- 
ism of  the  Deist  was  absolutely  apart  from  the 
realities  of  life.  We  know  God's  end,  but  the 
thing  we  are  perfect  children  in  estimating  is 
God's  way.  The  foolishness  of  blaming  God's  ways 
came,  Butler  says,  from  the  foolish  ease  with  which 
men  thought  to  praise  them.     To  have  shown  this 


ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY  133 

was  no  unimportant  service,  for  nothing  is  farther 

from  true  faith  than  easy-going  confidence.     Faith 

surmounts  difficulties  ;    it  does  not  ignore  them. 

Being  occupied  in  this  task,  Butler  is  not  always 

careful  to  shun  the  appearance  of  pessimism,  and 

he  never  blinks  the  sternest  facts  of  life.      And 

religion  cannot  be  a  necessity  till  we  cease  to  be 

satisfied  with  things  as  they  are.      If  we  got  a 

quite  adequate  belief  in  providence  from  life,  we 

should  never  need  faith.      Butler,  of  course,  can 

be  answered  by  the  scepticism  which  says,  unless 

I  can  see,  I  will  not  believe,  the  scepticism  which 

doubts  the  ultimate  rationality  of  things  and  denies 

the  possibility  of  freedom.     But  granting  that  life 

has  a  meaning  and  freedom  a  reality,  he  does  not 

merely  load  the  belief  in  God  with 

The  heavy  and  the  weary  weight 
Of  all  this  unintelligible  world, 

but  he  loads  it  with  the  weight  of  a  great  concep- 
tion of  a  spiritual  discipline,  designed  not  for  the 
ease,  but  for  the  victory  of  God's  children — a  view 
the  final  test  of  which  cannot  be  argument,  but  life. 
Yet  Butler's  is  not  altogether  the  faith  that  sets 
us  free.  The  easy  optimistic  view  of  providence 
as  a  truth  of  natural  religion  which  so  largely  satis- 
fied his  age,  is,  he  argued,  totally  inadequate  in 
view  of  the  stern  realities  of  life  and  the  awful 
possibilities  of  moral  failure.  To  walk  in  freedom 
meant  for  him  to  walk  a  dim  and  perilous  way, 
where  the  mists  gather  and  the  precipices  yawn. 
And  if  man  walks  alone,  how  else  can  he  walk 
except  with  guarded  and  hesitating  steps  ?     What 


134    ENGLISH  DEISM  AND  BUTLER'S  ANALOGY 

can  freedom  mean  to  weak  and  erring  man  except 
an  overwhelming  responsibility  and  terrible  pos- 
sibilities of  failure  ?  Hence  there  is  in  Butler 
something  akin  to  what  we  saw  in  Pascal.  To 
Pascal  God  remained  less  than  a  Father,  being 
only  a  Father  Confessor.  To  Butler  God  also 
remained  somewhat  less  than  a  Father,  having  in 
Him  always  something  of  the  household  disciplina- 
rian. In  this  Butler  comes  short  of  the  glorious 
liberty  of  the  children  of  God,  very  much  short  of 
the  joyous  confidence  and  security  of  the  Ai)ostles. 
He  never  turns  his  eyes  from  the  hope  of  the  glory 
of  God,  but  he  cannot  be  said  to  rejoice  in  it.  He 
found  out  the  error  of  his  time,  he  saw  that  a  joy- 
ous belief  in  providence  could  never  be  an  easy 
optimistic  truth  of  natural  religion  :  but  he  did  not 
see  that,  if  there  is  any  work  of  reconciliation,  this 
joyous  belief  must  be  the  essence  of  it,  seeing  that 
a  reconciliation  with  God  must  be  a  reconciliation 
with  all  God's  appointments  for  us.  The  belief 
that  freedom  could  be  perfect  without  such  a  work 
had  been  the  chief  reason  why  redemption  had 
been  deemed  a  superfluity  by  so  many,  and  the 
theologians,  who  comfortably  acquiesced,  confirmed 
the  error.  Butler  helped  to  destroy  that  delusion, 
but  he  was  unable  to  restore  the  conception  of 
reconciliation  to  its  place,  because  he  did  not  see 
its  bearing  upon  the  joy  and  peace  so  much  needed 
when  man  is  so  small  and  the  world  so  wide,  when 
attainment  is  so  far  away  and  failure  so  near  at 
hand. 


LECTURE  IV 

RATIONALISM   AND   KANT'S    RELIGION  WITHIN 
THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE 


Oxford  Methodism,  1729-35. 

Voltaire,  Lettres  Philosophiques  sur  Us  Anglais,  1733. 

Hume,  Treatise  on  Hioman  Nature,  1740. 

Hume,  Essay  on  Miracles,  1748. 

Voltaire,  Candide,  1759. 

Eousseau,  Contrat  Social,  1762. 

Eousseau,  Emile,  1764. 

Encyclopedie,  1751-65. 

Semler,  Abhandlung  vonfreier  Untersuchung  des  Kanon,  1771  ff. 

Wolfenbilttel  Fragments,  1774-78. 

Lessing,  Erziehung  des  Menschengeschlechts,  1780. 

Kant,  Kritik  der  reinen  Vernunft,  1781. 

Kant,  Die  Beligion  innerhalb  der  Grenzen  der  blossen  Vernunft, 

1793. 
Paley,  Evidences,  1794. 

Books  of  Reference 

Essays  :  Voltaire  and  Diderot,  Thomas  Carlyle,  ed.  1857.  Botis- 
seau,  John  Morley,  1876.  Geschichte  der  yrotestantischen 
TJieologie,  Gustav  Frank,  dritter  Theil,  1875.  Lessing  wid 
Semler,  Leopold  Zscharnack,  1905.  The  Development  from 
Kant  to  Hegel,  loith  Chapters  on  the  Philosophy  of  Religion, 
A.  Seth  (A.  Pringle-Pattison),  1882.  Kant,  Fr.  Paulsen, 
1898.  Kant,  Kuno  Fischer,  4te  Auf.,  1898.  Die  Beligion 
unserer  Klassiher,  Sell,  1904. 


LECTURE  IV 

EATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION  WITHIN  THE 
LIMITS  OF  BEASON  ALONE 

Butler's  influence  is  very  difficult  to  trace  in  tlie 
succeeding  age.  As  has  been  shown,  the  explana- 
tion is  not  his  style.  Pascal's  influence  is  equally 
difficult  to  trace,  yet  no  man's  style  was  ever 
more  pellucid.  The  reason  in  both  cases  was  the 
same.  Men  sought  an  easier  way.  When  life  is 
regarded  as  the  supreme  experiment  in  faith,  as 
both  required,  the  millennium  will  be  arriving. 

The  accepted  defender  of  Christianity  in  Eng- 
land came  to  be  Paley,  not  Butler.  Paley's  merit 
lay  in  using  the  work  of  his  predecessors,  and  so 
using  it  that  with  unparalleled  success  he  accom- 
plished their  endeavour  to  put  Christianity  on  a  low 
intellectual  franchise,  to  make  its  credentials  plain 
to  the  meanest  capacities.  He  was  the  embodiment 
of  the  century's  lucid  common  sense  ;  and  he  shows 
very  clearly  what  the  long  debate  had  accomplished. 
The  stress  of  the  argument  for  miracle  had  come 
to  be  laid  on  the  Resurrection  of  Christ,  on  the 
uniqueness  of  the  Subject  of  it  and  the  uniqueness 
of  the  witnesses  to  it.  The  attack  on  priestcraft 
had  so  far  succeeded  that  the  very  force  of  the 

defence  depended  on  the  difference  between  the 

(137) 


138      RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

position  of  the  Apostles  and  that  of  any  modern 
representative  of  Christianity,  while  the  canon  of 
Scripture  was  found  valid  just  because  it  was 
not  collected  by  ecclesiastical  decree  but  by  the 
Christian  people  for  their  use  to  edification.  The 
appeal  was  no  more  to  the  institution,  but  to  the 
individual,  above  all  to  that  sense  of  sincerity  upon 
which  the  ordinary  reader  of  the  Gospels  had  been 
accustomed  to  proceed  before  inquiry.  And  this 
triumph  at  least  must  be  conceded  to  Paley.  Up 
to  his  day,  deliberate  fraud  was  the  common,  as 
it  is  certainly  the  complete,  explanation  of  every- 
thing exceptional.  Since  his  time  no  one  has 
seriously  doubted  the  good  faith  of  the  Apostles. 

Yet  Paley  still  uses,  as  has  been  said,  every 
argument  for  religion  except  religion  itself,  seeking 
to  prove  and  impose  a  religion,  otherwise  external 
and  alien,  as  the  will  of  a  God  who,  as  Locke 
says,  "  sees  men  in  the  dark,  has  in  His  hands 
rewards  and  punishments  and  power  enough  to 
call  to  account  the  proudest  offender  ". 

But  though  he  is  still  under  the  Catholic  idea 
of  faith  as  the  acceptance  of  revealed  propositions 
on  an  external  voucher  only,  and  though  he 
believes  in  God  as  the  Supreme  Mechanician,  and 
in  virtue  as  ''  doing  good  to  mankind  in  obedience 
to  the  will  of  God  and  for  the  sake  of  everlasting 
happiness,"  and  though  he  would  perhaps  have 
agreed  with  Warburton  that  the  necessity  of 
miracles  was  past  because  "  now  the  profession 
of  the  Christian  faith  is  attended  with  ease  and 
honour,"  Paley   shows   a   tolerance   of   difference. 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE    139 

a  power  of  distinguishing  between  the  essential 
and  non-essential,  and  a  recognition  that  the  true 
effects  of  Christianity  are  to  be  looked  for  in 
humble  lives,  which  are  no  unworthy  fruits  of  a 
long  discussion.  In  short  the  distinction  set  up  at 
the  Reformation  between  religion  and  the  Church 
is  by  Paley  wholly  justified. 

The  two  men,  however,  who  pointed  to  a  new 
era  were  Hume  and  Wesley. 

What  even  Paley's  argument  could  not  do,  the 
Evangelical  Movement  did  ;  it  made  Christianity 
level  with  man  as  man.  And  what  no  theology 
could  do,  it  did  ;  it  created  a  relation  to  God 
which  actually  did  set  men  free  in  the  midst  of 
this  big  world,  men,  moreover,  upon  whom  the 
battle  of  life  pressed  most  heavily.  The  belief  in 
Providence,  which  had  been  merely  the  comfortable 
assumption  of  persons  in  health  and  prosperity  who 
had  no  intention  of  taking  life  otherwise  than 
easily,  became  the  triumphant  assurance  that  could 
be  victorious  over  all  external  conditions.  Though, 
in  Wesley's  own  day,  the  thinkers  lived  immune 
from  its  contagion,  they  could  not  for  ever  ignore 
a  faith  which  had  such  vital  consequences  for 
practical  freedom. 

Hume  would  only  have  been  tolerable  to  Wes- 
ley because  the  great  Evangelical  leader  never 
despaired  of  a  convert ;  and  the  thing  which  per- 
haps not  merely  Hume  himself  but  his  philosophy 
most  needed  was  some  kind  of  conversion.  Berke- 
ley, following  Locke's  limitation  of  knowledge  to 
ideas  of  sensation  and  reflection,  had  denied  the 


140      RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

existence  of  matter.  Not  because  of  any  doubt  of 
the  external  order,  but  the  more  reasonably  to  ex- 
plain it,  Berkeley  replaced  inert  matter  by  active 
mind — our  only  experience  of  ultimate  reality  be- 
ing our  own  self-consciousness.  Hume  accepted 
Berkeley's  rejection  of  matter  as  a  hypothesis  which 
explained  nothing,  but  he  also  proceeded  to  reject 
mind  as  equally  superfluous.  That  we  cannot  help 
having  an  idea  of  self  as  an  indivisible  and  iden- 
tical principle,  he  does  not  deny  ;  but  it  is  a  fiction 
of  the  imagination,  and  all  we  really  know  is  an 
ever-changing  series  of  sensations  and  less  vivid 
copies  of  them  called  ideas.  In  this  experience 
the  only  order  is  customary  succession.  Even  the 
law  of  cause  and  effect  is  merely  the  belief,  due 
to  repeated  succession  in  the  same  order,  that  it 
will  so  happen  again. 

This  philosophy  awoke  a  great  many  people 
besides  Kant  from  their  dogmatic  slumber.  Many 
answers  were  given  to  it,  mostly  of  the  nature  of 
an  appeal  to  common  sense.  Plainly  it  left  no 
reality  either  in  freedom  or  faith.  Gradually,  how- 
ever, it  became  apparent  that  this  result  was  arrived 
at  by  putting  the  cart  before  the  horse,  by  thinking 
we  reached  practice  from  theory,  not  theory  from 
practice.  What  this  philosophy  wanted  was  not 
a  new  intellectual  but  a  new  ethical  import.  If 
the  feeling  of  identity  and  causality  is  transferred 
from  man  himself  into  experience,  manifestly  the 
amount  of  reality  in  the  transference  depends  on 
whether  man  has  any  task  to  perform  in  the  world 
which  proves  that  he  is  the  same  man  and  that  the 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE    141 

world  is  a  sphere  for  carrying  out  the  same  task. 
If  freedom  and  man's  moral  tasks  are  realities,  the 
things  above  all  else  that  we  cannot  question  are 
identity  and  causality,  and  the  thing  that  most  mani- 
festly appears  in  this  flow  of  experience,  giving  it 
unity,  is  that  moral  purpose  which  men  know  as  the 
Kingdom  of  God. 

But  the  things  that  cannot  be  shaken  did  not 
at  first  appear ;  and  men  who  had  laboriously  tried 
to  put  faith  first  and  hang  freedom  on  it,  only 
saw  in  Hume  the  most  trenchant  sceptic  the  world 
had  produced.  Thus  he  remained  the  rock  of 
offence  for  the  rest  of  the  century,  and  as  such 
was  one  of  the  mightiest  powers  in  it  not  only  for 
destruction  but  for  a  new  creation. 

The  influence  of  English  Deism  passed  into 
France  chiefly  through  Voltaire.  An  exile  from 
his  native  land,  he  found  a  home  in  England.  There 
he  learned  to  admire  Newton,  Locke,  Shaftesbury, 
Bolingbroke  and  Pope— a  noteworthy  list.  The 
supreme  treasures  with  which  he  returned  were 
the  P^'incipia  and  the  Characteristics.  "  It  is 
known,  for  instance,"  says  Carlyle,  "  that  he  under- 
stood Newton  when  no  other  man  in  France  under- 
stood him  ;  indeed,  his  countrymen  may  call  Voltaire 
the  discoverer  of  intellectual  England."  ^  This  man, 
whom  Carlyle  calls  the  Grand  Persifleur,  partly 
created  and  wholly  embodied  the  spirit  of  the  age. 
He  was  the  Apostle  of  Reason — all  things  not 
forthwith  arguable  being  folly,  the  Father  of  Sound 
Philosophy — of  the  cheerfully  utilitarian  and  merely 

^  Essays,  vol.  ii.,  p.  39. 


142      RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

earthly  kind,  the  Universal  Genius — the  forerunner 
of  all  them  who  make  encyclopaedias.  Mockery 
was  his  charter  of  freedom  in  this  great  and  per- 
plexing world — a  freedom  in  its  way  of  conse- 
quence, for  to  sit  in  the  chair  of  the  scorner  is  an 
assured  way  of  being  at  ease  in  Zion— and  an  im- 
portant change  of  outlook  followed  when  that  per- 
siflage grew  manifestly  inadequate  to  life  and  the 
needs  of  man. 

Besides  interest  in  English  thinkers,  two  things 
recur  with  amazing  regularity  in  the  French  writers 
of  the  Deistic  and  Atheistic  class.  They  have 
passed  through  the  Jesuit  Schools  ;  and  they  are 
mathematicians  and  adorers  of  the  law  of  gravita- 
tion. By  these  two  influences  their  thought  was 
largely  determined.  What  Carlyle  says  of  Voltaire 
might  be  said  of  them  all.  History  is  but  '*a  poor 
wearisome  debating-club  dispute,  spun  through  ten 
centuries  between  the  Encyclopedle  and  the  Sorbonne. 
Wisdom  or  folly,  nobleness  or  baseness,  are  merely 
superstitious  or  unbelieving  ;  God's  Universe  is 
merely  a  larger  patrimony  of  St.  Peter,  from  which 
it  were  well  and  pleasant  to  hunt  out  the  Pope."  ^ 

But  the  influence  of  their  Jesuit  training  did  not 
end  in  mere  antagonism  to  the  Church.  It  was 
with  the  Jesuit  externality  that  these  men  judged 
morals,  and  above  all  with  the  Jesuit  leniency  and 
readiness  to  grant  absolution.  Then,  a  philosopher, 
like  a  king,  being  due  the  compensation  of  con- 
siderable licence,  it  was  easy  to  talk  of  the  loftiest 
virtues  without  practising  even  the  lowliest.    From 

^  Essays,  vol.  ii.,  p.  15. 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE    143 

the  Jesuit  Schools  also  they  brought  the  idea  that 
man  is  a  creature  of  outward  influences,  plastic  as 
clay  in  the  hand  of  the  educator.  Perhaps,  too, 
they  were  confirmed  in  their  idolatry  of  the  argu- 
mentative faculty,  for  where  religious  instruction  is 
merely  scholastic  and  morals  merely  didactic,  with- 
out any  reaching  of  faith  and  aspiration  back 
towards  ultimate  grounds  of  truth  and  conscience, 
argument  has  everything  at  its  mercy.  This  same 
lack  of  ultimate  grounds  in  faith  and  conscience, 
moreover,  left  them  utterly  the  slaves  of  a  great 
mathematical  formula,  there  being  no  basis  for  a 
higher  and  more  spiritual  science  which  might  set 
them  free. 

Mr.  Morley  notes  a  difference  between  Kousseau 
and  the  leaders  of  thought  who  had  been  trained 
in  the  Jesuit  Schools.  The  deeper  element  in 
Rousseau  sprang  from  being  a  "  citizen  of  Geneva 
with  this  unseen  fibre  of  Calvinistic  veneration  and 
austerity  strong  and  vigorous  within  him  ".^  Hence 
there  was  in  him  a  passion  for  freedom  of  a  wider 
reach,  an  enthusiasm  only  the  disintegrating  ele- 
ments of  which  could  be  assimilated  by  a  Catholic 
country  like  France.  *'  In  no  country  has  the 
power  of  collective  organisation  been  so  pressed 
and  exalted  as  in  revolutionised  France,  and  in  no 
country  has  the  free  life  of  the  individual  been 
made  to  count  for  so  little."  ^ 

Man  was  to  the  Encyclopsedists  infinitely  per- 
fectible only  because  he  was  absolutely  plastic, 
because  they  took  care  not  to  set  infinite  perfection 

1  Bousseau,  vol.  i.,  p.  191.        ^  p_  223. 


144      RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

too  high,  and  because  they  believed  their  own 
enlightenment  to  be  the  dawn  of  a  golden  age  of 
dictionaries,  in  which  no  superstition  could  live  and 
no  foolish  idealism  distract  men  from  the  main 
business  of  being  happy  and  learning  from  the 
Enlightened. 

This  philosophy  of  life,  this  faith  by  which  men 
thought  they  could  attain  the  golden  age  of  free- 
dom, in  comparison  with  which  all  unhappy  earlier 
epochs  had  been  in  bondage  to  foolish  reverences, 
flourished  and  only  could  flourish  in  a  false  atmos- 
phere of  social  and  literary  clubs,  with  a  suggestion 
of  courtiers  and  even  of  royalties  in  the  back- 
ground. To  have  touched  mother  earth  would  not 
have  been  life  but  death  to  it. 

This  touching  of  earth  did  befall  it,  after  a 
fashion,  by  the  Atheism  in  which  it  landed. 
Though  the  poorest  of  mechanical  conceptions  of 
things,  it  proved  a  way  of  issuing  out  of  that  society 
candle-light  in  which  alone  such  easy  optimism  re- 
garding human  nature  and  human  knowledge  and 
possession  can  satisfy  a  mortal  travelling  betwixt 
life  and  death.  It  was  perhaps  the  only  way,  in 
this  direct  line  of  descent  from  Descartes,  in  which 
the  understanding  was  the  sole  court  of  appeal,  and 
clearness  of  order  and  rapid  precision  of  view  the 
ultimate  test  of  reaching  reality.  Even  for  the  grand 
Persifleur  himself  it  was  surely  a  gain  in  serious- 
ness that  the  old  Hebrew  problem  came  upon  him 
in  the  end,  that  the  tabernacles  of  robbers  prosper 
and  the  blood  of  the  saints  is  shed  like  water  round 
about  Jerusalem,  the  problem  which  took  the  new 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE    145 

form,  "  People  are  engulfed  at  Lisbon,  while  they 
dance  at  Paris".  With  gratuitous  grossness,  but 
with  abundant  point  and  vigour,  his  novel,  Candide, 
raised  the  same  question.  The  book  is  of  some  im- 
portance, because  in  Voltaire's  sense  of  goodness, 
as  cheap  kindness,  there  is  most  certainly  not  a  good 
God  on  the  throne  of  the  universe,  and  only  when 
such  a  belief  was  radically  doubted,  only  when  the 
God  of  modern  comfort  and  respectability  was 
fundamentally  denied,  was  the  easy,  carpet  slippers 
and  dressing-gown  idea  of  freedom  found  inade- 
quate to  the  needs  of  life. 

Nevertheless,  it  shows  something  less  than  dis- 
ciimination  on  Mr.  Morley's  part  when  he  contrasts 
this  recognition  by  Voltaire  of  defects  in  his  Deity 
with  Rousseau's  defence  of  his,  when  he  contrasts 
Candide  with  the  Confession  of  a  Savoyard  Vicar, 
as  showing  more  openness  of  mind.^  Rousseau, 
though  somewhat  of  a  Magdalene  with  the  seven 
devils  not  very  well  cast  out  of  him,  presupposed 
very  different  conditions  for  understanding  the 
ways  of  God  from  Voltaire.  His  exaltation  of  the 
state  of  nature  is  not  history  but  dogma.  It  is 
his  own  mythology  of  the  Fall.  Its  point  is  not 
that  the  past  was  ever  perfect,  but  that  the  present 
is  abundantly  remote  from  perfection  ;  that  some 
kind  of  reconciliation  and  amending  and  healing  is 
much  needed  before  any  kind  of  right  understand- 
ing of  God's  ways  can  be  looked  for.  That  involved 
a  very  different  way  of  looking  for  deliverance  from 
Voltaire's,  and  pointed  clearly  to  a  new  age. 

^  Rousseau,  vol.  i.,  p.  309  ff. 
10 


146      RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

Moreover,  Rousseau,  though  he  never  learned 
that  the  foundation  of  all  is  ''Let  a  man  deny 
himself,"  had  a  heart  for  nature  and  for  human 
nature.  It  was  after  all  only  the  conventions  and 
trappings  of  human  nature  that  were  thought  so 
perfectible,  and  Kousseau,  the  prodigal  too  fre- 
quently among  the  swine,  had  a  heart  for  others 
as  well  as  himself  who  had  not  bread  enough  and 
to  spare,  and  for  the  things  of  the  heart,  in  spite 
of  sentiment,  and  of  the  home,  in  spite  of  criminal 
abandonment  of  his  children. 

These  French  influences,  owing  to  the  political 
situation  of  the  time,  passed  at  once  into  Germany 
undiluted.  The  Thirty  Years'  War  left  Germany 
broken  up  into  small  principalities,  much  subject 
to  foreign  interference,  and  scarcely  even  in  name 
bound  together  by  the  tie  of  the  Empire.  The 
material  resources  had  been  so  wasted  that  the 
country  was  left  miserably  poor,  and  the  mere 
task  of  recuperation  exhausted  all  energies,  without 
leaving  any  to  spare  for  things  so  disturbing  as  in- 
tellectual and  religious  discussion.  For  a  hundred 
years  from  the  Peace  of  Westphalia  in  1648,  this 
slow  process  of  recovery  went  on.  Owing  to  the 
political  situation,  a  patriotic  German  feeling  was 
impossible,  and  French  influence  became  dominant 
in  what  society  and  literature  were  able  to  exist. 
In  literature  the  great  ambition  was  to  be  classical, 
the  model  being  the  French  drama.  That  belonged 
also  to  the  desire  for  order  and  regularity.  But, 
most  of  all,  this  tendency  appears  in  the  prevailing 
theological  temper.     Nowhere  had  the  theology  of 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE    147 

the  Reformation  become  more  scholastic  than  in 
Germany.  The  tendency,  which  had  begun  with 
Melanchthon,  to  turn  the  whole  task  of  theology 
into  accurate  formulation  of  accepted  positions, 
naturally  grew  strong  in  such  an  age.  Bahrdt 
describes  himself  as  becoming  a  pillar  of  orthodoxy 
merely  by  getting  up  his  father's  lectures  ;  while 
Goethe  speaks  of  the  national  religion  in  which 
he  was  trained  as  only  a  kind  of  dry  morals,  a 
stirring  exposition  of  which  was  not  thought  of. 

The  first  result  of  a  new  intellectual  movement 
was  naturally  in  the  circumstances  a  mere  unquali- 
fied claim  for  a  liberty,  upon  which  neither  social 
nor  religious  ties  put  much  restraint. 

What  Collins  had  called  Free-thinking,  the  Ger- 
mans called  Aufkldrung.  So  great  did  its  power 
become  that  the  latter  half  of  the  eighteenth 
century  is  known  as  the  period  of  the  Aufkldrung. 
The  word  is  sometimes  translated  Illuminism.  En- 
lightenment would  be  simpler  and  more  suggestive. 
A  still  nearer  equivalent,  not  for  the  word,  but  for 
what  was  intended  by  it,  is  Emanci'pation.  Its  ideal 
was  an  intellect  emancipated  from  all  traditional 
authority,  able  and  willing  to  test  all  conclusions, 
but,  like  our  own  word  Free-thought,  it  came  in 
practice  to  indicate  a  spirit  of  negation  and  shallow 
confidence,  rather  than  the  spirit  of  true  and 
serious  liberty.  At  the  same  time  no  movement 
of  the  century  shows  more  clearly  how  necessary 
a  purely  rational  phase  is  for  human  progress. 

Kant,  whose  active  life  exactly  covers  the 
period,  has  a  short  paper  entitled,  An  Ansiver  to 


148      RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

the  Qaestion  :  What  is  Aufkldrung.  Anfkldrung 
lie  defines  as  the  advance  of  man  from  self-caused 
pupilage,  its  motto  being  sapere  mide.  Pupilage, 
he  says,  is  the  inability  to  use  our  own  understand- 
ings without  another  person's  guidance,  and  it  is 
self-caused  when  it  is  due,  not  to  want  of  under- 
standing, but  to  want  of  resolution  and  courage  to 
use  it.  The  comfort  of  having  our  thinking  done 
for  us  is  great,  and  few  care  to  face  the  falls  men 
must  encounter  if  they  would  walk  alone.  In  the 
emancipation  of  a  people  the  great  difficulty  is  to 
avoid  revolution,  which  usually  accomplishes  only 
a  change  of  yoke,  without  reforming  men's  ways  of 
thinking.  The  great  object  is  to  attain  a  slow  and 
steady  advance  ;  and,  for  that,  nothing  is  needed 
except  freedom  to  use  the  reason  in  every  direction. 
There,  however,  is  the  difficulty.  The  military 
officer  says,  "  Reason  not,  but  drill "  ;  the  revenue 
officer,  *'  Reason  not,  but  pay "  ;  the  parson, 
"  Reason  not,  but  believe  ".  Only  one  master  says, 
"Reason  as  much  as  you  will  and  on  what  you 
will,  only  obey". 

By  this  master  Kant  meant  the  Great  Frederick, 
and  no  more  characteristic  product  of  the  age  of 
emancipated  intellect  could  have  been  found,  had 
he  not  on  one  point  departed  from  the  type.  He 
refused  to  accept  the  prevailing  enthusiasm  for  the 
goodness  of  the  human  heart,  knowing,  as  he  de- 
clared, "  the  cursed  breed  too  well ".  As  it  was 
Frederick's  firm  determination  to  allow  every  one 
to  save  his  soul  after  his  own  fashion,  and  with 
a  gay,  if  not  a  godly,  gladness  to  suffer  fools,  every 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE   149 

type  of  thinking  enjoyed  under  his  rule  the  utmost 
liberty  of  expression. 

In  accordance  with  Frederick's  motto,  "  Reason 
but  obey,"  Kant  argues  that  the  public  use  of  the 
reason  must  be  left  entirely  free,  while  the  private 
use  of  it  may  have  to  be  subjected  to  restrictions/ 
That  is  to  say,  a  man  should  be  allowed  to  publish 
any  opinion  whatsoever,  though  in  the  discharge  of 
his  civic  duty  he  must  speak  and  act  according  to 
his  undertaking.  An  officer  writing  on  military 
affairs  should  criticise  everything  that  is  wrong ; 
an  officer  under  command  should  hold  his  tongue 
and  obey.  So  also  with  the  cleric.  As  a  good 
citizen  he  catechises  and  preaches  according  to 
the  standards,  as  he  undertook  to  do  ;  as  a  scholar 
he  is  free,  nay  bound,  to  discuss  defects  and  errors 
in  the  Creed,  and  to  suggest  improvements.  A 
creed  is  to  Kant  merely  a  kind  of  government 
protection  to  the  public.  As  with  all  other  public 
legislation,  the  person  appointed  to  carry  it  out 
should  act  in  accordance  with  it  so  long  as  it  is 
in  force,  but,  just  because  he  is  most  familiar  with 
it,  he  is  best  able  to  criticise  and  correct  it. 

So  important  is  this  aspect  of  freedom  for  Kant 
that,  though  his  political  theory  was  democratic 
and  republican,  he  argues  elsewhere  that,  under 
the  despotism  of  Frederick,  greater  practical  liberty 
was  enjoyed  than  under  an  English  parliament, 
which  the  King  could  purchase  with  money — an 
estimate  which  Lessing,  who  had  a  nearer  view  of 
the  Prussian  rule,  is  far  from  endorsing. 

1  Kant's  Werke,  1838,  p.  113. 


150      RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

This  interest  in  merely  intellectual  freedom  was 
characteristic  of  the  whole  age.  The  middle  class, 
who  provided  the  thinkers,  had  no  place  in  the 
public  life.  The  crown  lands  provided  the  public 
revenues ;  the  crown  officials  ruled  all  the  depart- 
ments of  state ;  the  army  drew  its  officers  from  the 
aristocracy  and  its  privates  from  the  peasantry. 
Public  duty  was  a  mere  commission  from  the  prince 
and  public  spirit  could  scarcely  exist.  The  upper 
classes  would  rather  have  been  citizens  of  France 
than  of  Germany,  and  the  educated  middle  class 
were  content  with  nothing  short  of  being  citizens 
of  the  world.  The  result  was  an  amazing  intel- 
lectual activity  which  was  ready  to  embark  with 
theory  on  any  voyage  of  discovery,  unhampered 
by  questions  regarding  the  practical  consequences. 
This  indifference  to  the  consequences  was  further 
encouraged  by  the  moral  corruj^tion  which  spread 
from  the  Frenchified  courts.  It  was  the  same  kind 
of  influence  as  entered  England  at  an  earlier  period 
with  the  Restoration  ;  but,  the  courts  being  many 
in  Germany  and  the  territories  small,  the  evil  was 
planted  more  in  the  heart  of  the  people,  and  went, 
therefore,  deeper  into  society,  affecting  not  only 
the  aristocracy  but  the  middle  class.  In  these 
small  courts  where  what  Carlyle  calls  a  "strum- 
petocracy  "  lived  on  the  hire  of  the  peasant  sold  to 
be  a  mercenary  to  the  alien,  the  shallowest  and  most 
mocking  Deism  and  Atheism  found  a  congenial  soil. 
There  it  existed  very  much  as  in  France,  except 
that  the  taste  it  appealed  to  was  ruder  than  under 
the  immediate  shadow  of  the  Bourbons. 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE    151 

But  the  German  cannot  long  continue  without 
reflecting  on  his  ways.  His  native  constitution 
and  Protestant  training  drive  him  back  ultimately 
upon  first  principles.  He  began,  therefore,  to 
fashion  more  compactly  a  natural  religion,  begin- 
ning with  Tindal's  conception  of  a  religion  always 
and  everywhere  revealed  directly  in  human  nature. 
It  was  a  time  of  cosmopolitan  abstractions,  so  that 
natural  religion  was  at  once  a  man's  charter  as  a 
citizen  of  the  world  and  as  judge  of  all  things  in  it. 
Unqualified  independence  of  judgment  summed  up 
the  conception  of  enlightened  freedom,  and  the 
faith  on  which  the  scheme  rested  was,  in  the  main, 
the  good-nature  of  the  Deity. 

Among  writers  a  most  characteristic  representa- 
tive of  this  phase  was  Nicolai,  but,  as  a  publisher 
and  editor  of  journals,  his  chief  interest  is  his  con- 
nection with  other  people.  Bahrdt,  in  his  Auto- 
biography,^ has  left  the  liveliest  picture  of  what 
he  took  to  be  himself,  but  he  is  rather  a  caricature 
than  a  portrait  of  the  movement.  Yet  the  exag- 
gerations of  a  caricature  also  have  their  uses,  if 
studied  with  discrimination.  Aufkldrung  is  for 
Bahrdt  almost  the  only  sacred  word  in  the  language. 
He  takes  a  giant  stride  in  it  when  he  is  stirred  "  to 
believe  absolutely  nothing  more  than  what  he  could 
readily  prove  from  reason  and  Scripture  and  force 
upon  the  subtlest  doubter,"^  and  he  attains  per- 
fection  when   he   reaches   the   point   of   omitting 

^Dr.    Carl   Frederick   Bahrdt's  Geschichte  Seines  Lebens, 
Seiner  Mehiungen  und  SchicJcsale.     Berlin,  1791. 
2  Theil  2,  210. 


152      RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

Scripture.  For  a  theological  professor,  preacher 
and  church  superintendent,  that  must  be  considered 
fair  progress,  and  the  wonderful  thing  is  not  his 
persecutions  of  which  he  boasts,  but  the  tolerance 
of  him  for  which  he  is  by  no  means  grateful.  Had 
he  only  exercised  the  sole  virtue  he  really  believed 
in,  which  was  prudence,  it  would  almost  seem  as 
if  neither  negation  nor  bad  behaviour  would  have 
driven  him  from  office.  So  much  was  decency  the 
main  consideration  that  a  charge  of  fatalism  and 
blank  atheism  against  Schulz,  who  first  opened 
Bahrdt's  eyes,  was  regarded  as  gravely  intensified 
in  that  the  preaching  of  them  was  done  without  a 
wig.^  After  his  reason  had  happily  expelled  for 
Bahrdt  the  doctrines  of  the  Trinity,  the  Atonement, 
Supernatural  Grace,  Original  Sin,  Eternal  Punish- 
ment, he  betook  himself  to  morality  and  sound 
philosophy.  A  morality  solely  designed  to  make 
men  happy  became  his  chief  theme.  He  could 
make  a  whole  series  of  sermons  on  the  influence 
of  one  moral  requirement  on  all  parts  of  human 
duty.  He  sought  to  heal  men's  sins  by  what  he 
calls  the  natural  way,  apparently  the  way  of  prov- 
ing honesty  the  best  policy.  The  essence  of  his 
teaching  was  "a  quite  special  providence".  We 
are  so  built  that  we  cannot  help  being  happy  when 
we  see  others  happy,  and  so  is  God.  Jesus  he 
finds  the  pattern  of  sound  thinking  and  goodness 
of  heart.  He  founded  not  a  church  but  a  secret 
society  to  hand  on  the  truths  oppressed  by  priests 

1 G.   Frank,  Geschichte  der  protestantischen  Theologie,  iii., 
p.  149. 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE    153 

and  temple  clerics.  "From  true  prudence  and 
pastoral  wisdom,"  He  did  not  attack  but  under- 
mined popular  errors.  Thus  He  never  denied  the 
silly  doctrine  of  Original  Sin,  but  He  showed  the 
capacity  of  human  nature  for  moral  excellence.  In 
theory  Bahrdt  follows  this  excellent  example,  but 
his  experience  of  the  individual  specimens  of  man- 
kind, he  thinks,  might  have  turned  him  into  a 
devil.  This  optimism  in  general  and  pessimism  in 
particular  is  a  feature  of  the  movement. 

A  higher  type  was  Basedow,  the  founder  of  the 
Philanthropin  schools.  Father  Basedow  Goethe 
describes  as  a  man  of  restless  energy  both  in 
thought  and  action,  with  a  mind  turned  in  upon 
itself ;  and  Bahrdt  describes  him  as  pacing  up  and 
down  the  room  saying,  '*  Dear  Bahrdt,  if  you  are 
the  man  who  genuinely  seeks  the  good,  I  will  en- 
tirely pour  my  spirit  into  you,  for  I  have  ideas 
which  hitherto  no  man  has  ever  had  ".^  Even  Goethe 
was  offended  by  the  virulence  with  which  he  would 
in  any  society  attack  the  doctrine  of  the  Trinity — 
that  doctrine  containing  for  Goethe  some  right 
understanding  of  the  Divine  mysteries. 

All  the  conventions  of  the  past  were  to  be 
pulled  down  and  a  new  building  erected  from  the 
foundation.  Education  after  the  type  of  Rousseau's 
Emile  was  to  make  a  new  race.  Human  nature, 
uncorrupted  by  bad  education,  was  unspeakably 
good  and,  built  up  by  good  education,  was  infinitely 
perfectible.  This  new  school  which  was  to  fashion 
the  new  humanity,  was  called  the  Philanthropirmm. 

1  Leben,  Theil  4,  p.  34. 


154      RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

In  it  the  children  were  above  everything  else  to 
have  a  good  time,  that  human  nature  might  blossom 
in  the  sunshine.  Only  with  knowledge  profitable 
for  this  life  were  they  to  be  troubled,  and  even  that 
mild  pill  was  to  be  well  sugared.  The  practical 
result  was  such  that  Herder  said  he  would  not  send 
a  calf  to  be  educated  on  this  sublime  system.  Yet, 
however  much  of  a  travesty  it  may  have  been,  there 
was  behind  the  attempt  a  right  idea  of  education 
which  has  not  been  unfruitful.  The  same  thing 
perhaps  could  be  said  of  the  whole  age.  It  ex- 
aggerated, and  yet  it  claimed  for  all  humanity  a 
freedom  which  was  its  due.  But  the  only  faith 
upon  which  this  idea  of  freedom  rested,  was  that 
man  is  bound  to  receive  as  true  everything  essential 
to  human  felicity.  This  covers,  as  Basedow  argued, 
a  belief  in  God,  providence  and  immortality,  since 
without  them  felicity  there  could  be  none.^ 

To  follow  nature  did  not  mean  to  follow  what  is 
living,  varied  and  concrete,  but,  as  history  was  only 
a  long  record  of  the  perversion  of  simple  truth,  and 
as  dependence  on  it  was  only  prejudice  and  bigotry, 
true  human  nature  had  to  be  evolved  out  of  the 
inner  consciousness.  Nature  to  them  was  precisely 
what  Butler  had  called  *'a  futile  imaginary  model 
of  a  world,"  which  in  practice  means  a  world  into 
which  we  can  read  our  own  dulness.  Commonplace 
was  glorified,  and  the  high  court  of  appeal  was 
found  in  what  was  adoringly  called  •*  the  sound 
understanding  ".  By  a  more  sentimental  way,  the 
English  temper  of  the  age  was  reached — unimagina- 

^  G.  Frank,  Geschichte,  iii.,  15. 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE    155 

tive,  utilitarian,  argumentative.  Paley's  definition 
of  morals  as  "  doing  good  to  mankind,  in  obedience 
to  the  will  of  God  and  for  the  sake  of  everlasting 
happiness,"  summed  up  the  whole  ethic  of  the 
Popular  Philosophy  as  much  in  Germany  as  in  Eng- 
land. Kindly  good  sense  is  the  sum  of  private 
duty.  The  justice  which  regulates  our  duty  to 
others  is  defined  as  "  wisdom  united  to  goodness  ". 
Church  and  State  were  erected  as  useful  institutions, 
as  sensible  arrangements  in  the  circumstances. 

Mendelssohn,  the  most  popular  of  the  Popular 
Philosophers,  argues  that  when  man  realises  that  he 
can  as  little  perform  his  duty  towards  himself  and 
towards  his  Creator,  as  towards  his  neighbour,  in 
solitude,  he  can  no  longer  remain  alone  without 
a  sense  of  misery.  "  He  must,  therefore,  leave 
solitude  and  unite  with  his  fellows  in  society,  in 
order,  by  mutual  help,  to  satisfy  their  needs  and, 
through  common  intercourse,  to  further  their  com- 
mon good.  This  common  good  includes  the  pre- 
sent as  well  as  the  future,  the  spiritual  as  well  as 
the  earthly — one  inseparable  from  the  other.  With- 
out fulfilling  our  obhgations,  neither  here  nor  there, 
neither  on  earth  nor  in  heaven,  is  felicity  to  be  ex- 
pected." ^  In  a  sensible,  reflective  way  society  erects 
institutions  to  govern  the  actions  and  educate  the 
thinking.  And,  seeing  that  man's  duties  refer  to 
his  Creator  as  well  as  to  his  neighbour,  he  needs  a 
Church  as  well  as  a  State. 

By  the  same  method  as  the  Popular  Philos- 
ophy explained  life,  morals,  government,  religion, 

^  Jerusalem,  p.  17. 


156       RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

it  proved  the  sole  objects  of  its  faith — God, 
Providence,  ImmortaHty.  In  his  Morgenstunden 
Mendelssohn  sets  up  against  Kant  the  familiar 
arguments  for  a  Necessary  Being  who  from  the 
nature  of  the  case  must  exist,  and  an  All-perfect 
Being  who  must  include  reality  among  His  other 
perfections,  with  an  easy  confidence  in  their  utter 
sufficiency  which  goes  far  to  justify  Kant's  sum- 
mary dismissal  of  them  as  sophisms  of  the  reason. 
Upon  similar  comprehensive  grounds,  the  Popular 
Philosophy  defended  the  hope  of  Immortality.  It 
had  one  real  basis  of  all  its  convictions — precisely 
that  easy  belief  in  providence  which  Butler  had 
exposed. 

Ritschl  finds  in  this  central  position  assigned 
to  the  belief  in  providence  the  essential  truth  of 
the  movement,  but  in  the  basis  sought  for  it  its 
proton  pseudos.  "  When  the  theology  of  the  Auf- 
klilnmg  renounced  dogma  in  order  to  set  the  moral 
character  of  Christianity  in  a  clear  light,  it  kept 
its  foot  on  faith  in  providence  as  the  distinctive 
religious  function."  That  is  right,  he  holds,  but 
the  belief  that  providence  is  a  truth  of  natural 
religion  he  thinks  a  fundamental  error,  no  less 
calamitous  because  it  had  already  found  footing  in 
the  Orthodox  Creed.  "  Let  the  error  once  enter 
that  the  love  of  God  is  a  truth  of  natural  religion, 
and  that  it  no  longer  needs  to  be  put  in  connection 
with  reconciliation,  and  there  immediately  follows 
a  difference  in  the  feeling  of  self-surrender  to 
God's  will.  It  is  no  longer  the  energetic  and 
brave  feeling   that  neither  life  nor  death,  neither 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE    157 

things  present  nor  things  to  come,  can  shake  the 
believer,  but  it  is  small,  soft,  sentimental.  It  is 
then  landed  in  the  Old  Testament  difficulty  about 
the  difference  between  worth  and  happiness,  and 
can  only  solve  it  by  the  postulate  of  compensation 
in  another  world,  whereas  the  Christian  conscious- 
ness of  reconciliation  overcomes  it  in  every  moment 
of  the  present."  ^ 

It  is  easy  to  be  unjust  to  the  movement  and 
to  regard  its  glaring  idiosyncrasies  as  its  sole 
characteristics.  As  Gustav  Frank  puts  it,  it  was 
"  the  enthronement  of  subjectivity  "."  That  could 
not  fail  to  be  one-sided  and  extreme,  yet  it  is 
always  a  necessary  stage  on  the  way  to  true  free- 
dom. Its  goal,  perhaps  its  natural  goal,  was  the 
Revolution ;  but  there  also  lay  its  justification, 
for,  if  man  fell  back  upon  himself,  it  was  because 
there  was  so  much  authority  which  denied  him  his 
birthright.  Christianity,  no  doubt,  was  travestied. 
Jesus,  it  was  said,  preached  only  this  moral  reli- 
gion. Did  He  or  His  disciples  seem  to  favour  a 
more  positive  tyj^e  of  religion,  they  were  accommo- 
dating their  teaching  to  their  time.  By  this  prin- 
ciple of  Accommodation  everything  inconvenient 
was  explained  away,  and  the  principle  was  exten- 
sively used  even  in  the  most  serious  exposition  of 
Scripture.  Nevertheless,  something  was  accom- 
plished for  that  freedom  of  faith  which  is  essential 
to  a  true  understanding  of  Christianity.     The  great 

'^Die  Chris tliche  Lehre  von  der  Bechtfertigung  und  Versoh- 
nung,  vol.  iii.,  p.  179. 

2  Geschichte,  vol.  iii.,  p.  3. 


158      RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

truth  that  religion,  and  especially  the  religion  of 
Jesus  Christ,  rejects  compulsion  and  requires  a 
faith  and  a  life  was  accentuated.  "  Religion  knows 
no  doing  without  intention,  no  work  without  spirit, 
no  conformity  of  action  without  conformity  of 
mind.  Religious  doing  without  religious  thinking 
is  empty  puppet  show,  not  Divine  service.  That 
must  come  by  itself  from  the  spirit  and  not  be 
bought  by  reward  or  compelled  by  penalty."^ 
These  things  were  seen  before  by  men  of  reli- 
gious genius  like  Pascal,  but  now  they  were  forced 
upon  the  general  mind. 

Beside  this  popular  Rationalism,  and  running 
as  a  separate  stream,  was  an  ecclesiastical  and  theolo- 
gical Rationalism.  Indeed  the  strict  application  of 
the  word  is  not  to  the  Aufkldrung  of  society  and 
periodical  literature,  but  to  the  more  earnest  phase 
of  it  in  the  university  and  the  pulpit.  This  type  of 
religious  thought  was  dominant  all  over  Germany 
at  the  close  of  the  eighteenth  century  and  the  begin- 
ning of  the  nineteenth.  Its  effective  creed  was  simply 
the  old  Deist  Trinity — God,  Virtue,  Immortality.  Its 
distinguishing  characteristic,  however,  was  its  rela- 
tion to  the  faith  and  the  doctrines  of  the  Church. 
Instead  of  opposing  the  doctrines  and  scriptures  of 
the  Church,  it  set  to  work  to  distil  out  of  them  its 
own  faith,  and  only  its  own  faith.  This  quint- 
essence alone  was  thought  worth  keeping. 

With  the  spread  of  this  Rationalism  a  kind  of 
spiritual  blight  passed  over  Germany.  It  was 
found  in  pulpits  all  over  the  land  uttering  cold 

1  Mendelssohn,  Jerusalem,  p.  27. 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE   159 

moral  platitudes  and  indulging  in  exegetical  feats 
which  first  aroused  wonder,  then  ridicule.  The 
method  afforded  a  vast  field  for  ingenious  dulness. 
To  prophesy  (weissar/en)  was  to  say  something  wise. 
To  walk  on  the  sea  was  a  colloquial  way  of  saying 
Christ  walked  on  the  shore.  The  five  thousand 
were  fed  by  the  contagion  of  a  good  example  induc- 
ing people  to  pass  round  their  luncheon  baskets. 
And  the  homily  was  worthy  of  the  exegesis,  as 
when  the  early  walk  of  the  women  to  the  tomb  was 
used  to  point  the  moral  of  early  rising.  Common 
Rationalism,  ratiojiaiiwius  vulgaris,  thus  grew  to 
be  a  term  of  reproach  and  ridicule.  Yet  it  must  not 
be  forgotten  that  these  absurdities  accompanied  a 
great  phase  of  thought  which  was  not  gone  back 
from,  but  gone  through  with.  It  was  the  work  of 
Kationalism  that  made  Rationalism  in  the  end  seem 
so  poor  and  mean  ;  for  Rationalism  had  a  van  as 
well  as  camp  followers,  and  it  is  by  its  van  that  an 
army  should  be  judged. 

The  chief  seat  of  this  serious  and  learned  Ra- 
tionalism was  the  universities,  where  it  was  not  in- 
fluenced by  French  but  by  English  Deism.  '*  The 
French  Deist,"  says  a  writer  of  the  time,  ''gives  a 
swift  outline  of  his  principles,  skips  over  the  ques- 
tion at  issue  and  makes  mockery  of  the  whole 
business,  as  if  he  had  demonstrated  his  assertions 
to  the  bottom."  Voltaire,  he  adds,  "  wrote  not  for 
the  learned.  He  wrote  for  the  unlearned — for 
women-folk,  for  princes  and  shop-assistants — hence 
he  won  so  many  proselytes  of  unbelief."^     With 

^  Zschamack,  Lessing  und  Semler,  1905,  p.  43. 


160      RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

this  type  German  professors  had  nothing  in  com- 
mon. Most  of  them  had  travelled  towards  their 
position  by  way  of  Pietism  and  Wolffs  philoso- 
phy. Pietism,  while  cultivating  a  disregard  for 
the  accepted  doctrinal  system,  had  impressed  them, 
in  a  way  not  to  be  shaken  off,  with  the  power  and 
importance  of  religion.  The  Wolffian  philosophy 
had  reduced  everything  to  logical  deductions,  and 
left  no  basis  for  anything  deeper  except  an  alien 
Divine  word,  but  it  insisted  that  men  should  be 
serious  and  argue  from  a  system  of  things. 

Light,  therefore,  was  chiefly  sought  in  the  Eng- 
lish thinkers.  Baumgarten  in  Halle  was  at  once 
Wolff's  most  famous  disciple  among  the  theologians 
and  the  first  authority  on  English  religious  con- 
troversy. English  theology  was  in  Germany  in 
those  days  what  German  theology  is  in  England 
to-day.  Baumgarten  alone  seems  to  have  reviewed 
almost  every  Deist  and  Apologetic  work  in  our 
lano-uao^e.  The  translation  of  Sherlock's  Trial  of 
Witnesses  reached  thirteen  editions.  The  many 
volumes  of  works  like  Lardner's  Credihility  of  the 
Gospels  did  not  prevent  them  being  translated  and 
widely  read.  The  name  that  is  most  singularly 
absent  is  Butler's.  Because  he  is  little  mentioned, 
it  is  taken  for  granted  that  he  had  little  influence. 
But  the  deepest  influences  often  travel  by  the  most 
circuitous  channels.  Schleiermacher's  chief  work, 
for  example,  is  not  translated  into  English  to  this 
day,  and  references  to  him  in  earlier  decades  are 
few,  but  there  has  been  no  more  potent  influence 
in  English  religious  thought  for  nearly  a  century. 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE  161 

In  the  same  way  Butler's  name  is  difficult  to  find 
in  any  German  account  of  the  period,  but  his  in- 
fluence is  by  no  means  difficult  to  trace.  Does 
any  one  suppose,  for  example,  that  Baumgarten 
is  independent  of  Butler  when  he  announces  the 
following  view  of  revelation  :  "  All  that  God  makes 
known  to  us  through  the  natural  revelation.  He 
must  also  acknowledge  and  confirm  in  a  nearer, 
an  immediate  revelation,  though  in  the  nearer  re- 
velation more  is  contained  than  in  the  other  "  ?  ^  This 
again  became  the  basis  of  the  Rationalist  conception 
of  revelation  accepted  by  Semler,  Lessing  and  Kant 
— that  it  is  simply  an  earlier  and  easier  way  of 
learning  the  truths  of  reason.  This  connection 
between  Butler  and  Kant  confirms  the  view  which 
on  general  grounds  it  would  be  difficult  to  escape, 
that  the  true  forerunner  of  the  Categorical  Impera- 
tive is,  by  however  indirect  a  way,  Butler's  doctrine 
of  conscience.  Hume  and  Shaftesbury  and  Hutche- 
son  and  many  other  English  writers  Kant  read. 
Butler  he  may  not  have  read.  But  it  is  one  of  the 
lessons  of  our  study  that  the  influence  of  a  great 
thought,  once  it  is  put  forth  in  the  world,  is  not 
confined  to  its  direct  channels.  That  Butler's  doc- 
trine of  ProhahUity  had  anything  to  do  with  Kant's 
assertion  of  the  Practical  Reason  as  the  faculty  of 
ultimate  reality,  admits  of  more  doubt,  but  at  least 
we  can  say  that  it  was  nearer  akin  to  Kant's  thought 
than  anything  else  then  existing  in  the  world. 

The  predominating  interest  of  the  time,  however, 
was  directed  toward  the  English  External  Argu- 

1  Zscharnack,  p.  228. 
11 


162     RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

ment  and  the  questions  regarding  Scripture  which 
it  had  raised.  On  it  Semler,  the  pupil  of  Baum- 
garten,  fed  his  critical  spirit.  And  Semler  we  may 
take  as  the  most  influential  representative  of  serious 
and  learned  Eationalism.  His  piety  was  sincere,  if 
vague  ;  and  his  learning  vast,  if  chaotic.  The  ruins 
of  an  enthusiastic  Pietism  and  the  substructures 
of  a  dry  and  negative  Rationalism  abutted  on  one 
another,  by  which  combination  in  him  Semler  did 
much  to  give  its  character  to  the  later  Rationalism. 
The  English  writers,  he  saw,  did  not  go  to  the 
root  of  the  matter.  They  discussed  what  they  took 
the  state  of  things  in  ancient  times  to  have  been, 
but  neither  orthodox  nor  heterodox  investigated 
what  they  actually  were.  It  is  easy  to  argue,  he 
says,  what  codex  and  canon  must  have  been,  "but 
out  of  our  thoughts  that  history  comes  not". 
Thereupon  he  laid  down  the  distinction  which  has 
been  fundamental  in  Criticism  ever  since,  that  the 
Bible  is  not  to  be  taken  as  a  whole,  but  that  each 
document  is  to  be  judged  by  itself  both  in  respect 
of  worth  and  of  authenticity.  The  sole  test  of  in- 
spiration, for  him,  was  worth  for  religious  instruc- 
tion. This  is  not  decided  by  the  canon,  which  is 
merely  a  collection  for  the  use  of  the  public  insti- 
tution of  the  Church.  For  private  use  the  worth 
of  the  books  is  vastly  different.  "I  have  not 
straightway  held  all  books  of  the  Old  and  New 
Testament  equally  indispensable  for  collecting 
rightly  and  completely  the  fundamental  truths  of 
our  Christian  personal  religion.  They  may  all  be 
useful  for  many  Christians,  but  there  is  no  Chris- 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE  163 

tian  doctrine  which  all  Christians  must  deduce 
from  all  books  of  the  Old  and  New  Testaments."^ 

This  is  but  a  narrow  Rationalist  view  of  the  Bible 
as  a  primer  of  certain  moral  and  religious  truths, 
but  it  also  ends  that  kind  of  attack  on  Christianity 
which  Carlyle  describes  as  Voltaire's  whole  stock- 
in-trade.  "That  the  Sacred  Books  could  be  aught 
else  but  a  Bank-of-Faith  Bill  for  such  and  such 
quantity  of  enjoyment,  payable  at  sight  in  the 
other  world,  value  received ;  which  bill  became 
waste  paper,  the  stamp  being  questioned — that  the 
Christian  religion  could  have  any  deeper  founda- 
tion than  Books,  and  all  Revelations  and  authentic 
traditions  were  but  a  subsidiary  matter,  were  but 
as  the  light  whereby  that  Divine  writing  was  to  be 
read  ;  nothing  of  this  seems  to  have,  even  in  the 
faintest  manner,  occurred  to  him."^ 

History,  nevertheless,  remained  for  Semler,  not 
an  inquiry  into  the  sources  of  things  whereby  we 
might  penetrate  a  little  deeper  into  their  meaning, 
but  a  kind  of  pruning-shears  for  cutting  away  pre- 
judices and  superfluities  from  the  abstract  truth. 
His  penetration  was  in  no  way  equal  to  his  erudi- 
tion. In  the  back  of  his  mind  he  still  thought 
religion  should  have  been  written  on  the  skies,  so 
that  he  ever  returned  to  Cosmopolitanism  as  the 
ultimate  test  of  truth.  Hence  he  could  see  nothing 
in  the  Old  Testament  but  a  national  book  of  the 
Jews  which  had  become  connected  with  Christi- 
anity through  Christ  and  the  Apostles  using  it  in 

1  Semler's  Lehensheschreihung ,  ii.,  135. 
?  Carlyle,  Essays,  ii.,  47. 


164     RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

making  converts  from  Judaism.  This  was  merely 
an  accommodation  to  the  time  on  their  part.  Nor  is 
this  accommodation  absent  from  the  New  Testa- 
ment itself.  It  also  "  Judaises,"  as,  for  example, 
in  its  recognition  of  the  taste  for  miracle.  Paul's 
letters,  not  being  abstract  expositions,  from  the 
nature  of  the  case  state  truth  accommodated  to 
the  readers.  Much  of  this  accommodation  involved 
a  necessary  consideration  which  still  requires  to  be 
practised  ;  but  Church  History  is  full  of  a  worse 
kind,  designed  to  "■  keep  the  great  mass  in  ignor- 
ance and  make  it  easy  for  Church  leaders  to  choose 
for  their  business  quite  other  matters  than  faithful 
persistent  instruction  for  ever  greater  welfare".^ 
Yet  we  are  to  do  a  little  accommodation  also  to- 
wards this  same  public  institution  of  the  Church, 
for,  while  every  man's  private  religion  is  to  be 
absolutely  free,  the  regulations  which,  though  it 
should  have  been  the  people,  the  princes  have  laid 
down  for  the  Church,  are  to  be  carefully  regarded. 
There  you  have  the  typical  mental  and  moral 
attitude  of  Rationalism.  It  does  not  break  with 
Scripture,  but  reads  its  own  abstract  beliefs  into  it. 
Everything  local  and  particular,  which  means  every- 
thing living  and  concrete,  it  puts  aside  ;  yet  the 
Church  as  a  useful  educational  institution  is  not  to 
be  disturbed  any  more  than  necessary.  Its  idea  of 
freedom  is  the  ordinary  idea  of  the  Aujkldrung 
as  absence  of  constraint,  and  its  chief  abhorrence 
is  the  obligation  of  creeds,  what  it  calls  Zwangs- 
theologie.     Nevertheless,  it  begins  to  be  hampered 

^  Zscharnack,  p.  183,  from  Kirchengeschichte,  vol.  i.,  p.  10. 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE  165 

by  problems  of  life  and  action,  and  is  being  made 
to  realise  that  it  needs  a  deeper  idea  of  freedom 
and  something  more  to  base  it  on  than  an  easy 
belief  in  providence. 

A  still  more  interesting  figure  is  Lessing.  Being 
a  man  of  the  world  and  a  man  of  learning,  both 
streams  of  Rationalism  are  united  in  him  along 
with  waters  from  a  higher  source  than  either. 
In  no  man  are  all  the  varied  influences  of  that 
transitional  time  in  more  active  fermentation.  To 
his  M'mna  von  Barnhelm  Goethe  ascribes  the  first 
clear  vision  of  a  higher,  more  significant  world 
in  literature — a  world  of  living  men.^  Hence  the 
Rationalist  in  Lessing  which  reduced  everything 
to  abstractions  of  the  understanding,  and  the  poet 
which  found  all  reality  in  the  living  and  the  con- 
crete, are  in  perpetual  warfare.  The  one  fire 
which  burned  in  him  with  unquenchable  flame 
was  the  search  after  truth.  It  afforded  him  a  joy 
for  which,  he  thought,  not  even  the  secure  posses- 
sion of  truth  would  compensate  him.  To  this  eager- 
ness to  give  truth  a  free  field  and  no  favour  is  to 
be  ascribed  his  publication  of  what  is  known  as 
the  Wolfenbilttel  Fragments.  To  others  his  action 
seemed  a  case  of  setting  the  house  on  fire  to 
keep  the  fire  brigade  alert,  but  to  that  charge  he 
replied  that  doubts  are  always  most  dangerous  in 
the  dark,  and  that  it  is  a  praiseworthy  endeavour 
to  try  to  bring  every  birth  of  the  human  spirit  into 
the  foundling  hospital  of  the  printing-house. 

The  Fragments  which  Lessing  professed  to  have 

^  Au&  Meinem  Lebeji,  Th.  ii.,  Bk.  7. 


166     RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

found  among  the  manuscripts  of  the  Wolfenbuttel 
Library,  of  which  he  was  librarian,  were  in  reality 
extracts  from  a  work  by  Reimarus,  a  teacher  in 
Hamburg,  who  had  died  a  few  years  before  in  the 
odour  of  sanctity.  The  whole  work  Reimarus  had 
entitled  Apology  or  Defence  for  the  Rational  Wor- 
shippers of  God.  It  maintained  an  ordinary  but 
extremely  outspoken  form  of  Deism  with  the  usual 
objections  to  a  revelation  at  any  particular  time 
and  in  any  particular  place,  the  usual  bias  against 
Judaism  and  the  Old  Testament,  and  more  than 
the  usual  amount  of  fraud  attributed  to  Christ 
and  His  Apostles.  All  the  real  truths  of  religion 
were  said  to  spring  from  the  ideas  of  God  and 
Divine  things,  inborn  in  the  soul,  and  a  Revelation 
was  thought  impossible,  untrue,  useless,  immoral. 
Worldly  dominion  is  apparently  the  only  origin  of 
the  positive  religions — even  Christ's  main  object 
having  been  the  establishment  of  an  earthly  king- 
dom. Wherefore,  in  the  name  of  religion  itself,  the 
fall  of  Christianity  is  to  be  predicted  and  pursued. 
The  sensation  caused  by  the  appearance  of  this 
work  was  due  as  much  to  the  editor  as  to  the 
work  itself.  Yet  Lessing  would  only  have  endorsed 
his  author's  views  in  a  very  small  degree.  He 
looked,  indeed,  for  a  third  dispensation  as  much 
greater  than  Christianity  as  Christianity  had  been 
greater  than  Judaism,  and  he  held  the  Bible  a  primer 
of  religion,  possibly  as  useful  because  of  what  was 
read  into  it  as  because  of  what  was  found  in  it. 
But  Christianity  had  struck  its  roots  too  deep  in 
his  life  to  be  eradicated  after  the  absolute  fashion 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE  167 

of  the  Fragments.  Partly  the  learned  piety  of  his 
father's  home  was  still  the  deepest  influence  in  his 
life  ;  partly  he  felt  that  Christianity  was  the  greatest 
of  historical  growths  and  that  history  alone  was 
the  source  of  living  reality.  The  idea  of  history 
as  the  development,  not  only  of  man's  outward 
life,  but  of  his  inward  nature  and  deepest  sym- 
pathies, was  growing  clear  to  him.  Religion  was 
to  him  the  education  through  which  the  human 
race  was  passing,  an  education  in  which  particular 
and  local  beginnings  are  necessary.  Of  all  poor 
ways  of  understanding  a  thing  so  great,  mockery, 
he  felt,  was  the  worst.  "  God  has  His  hand  in 
the  game,  all  except  our  errors,"  and  the  error  of 
the  scorner  is  the  worst. 

Sometimes  he  speaks  out  of  the  bosom  of  the 
abstractest  Rationalism,  and  sometimes  as  an  en- 
lightened Christian.  ''The  theologians,"  Nicolai 
tells  him,  "  believe  that  you  have  become  a  free- 
thinker and  the  free-thinkers  that  you  have  become 
a  theologian."  *'  The  restless  zeal,"  says  Herrmann, 
"  which  makes  the  appearance  of  this  man  so 
worthy  of  regard,  and  which  at  the  same  time  stirs 
such  painful  sympathy,  springs  from  unsolved  re- 
ligious problems.  He  suffers  heavily  under  the 
historical  burden  of  the  positive  religions,  yet  can- 
not escape  the  feeling  that  in  this  historical  growth, 
in  Christianity,  the  life-nerve  of  humanity  lies 
hidden."  ^  The  Christianity  of  the  Gospels,  Les- 
sing  feels,  has  blood  in  its  veins  which  never  throbs 

^  W.  Herrmann,  Warum  hedarf  unser  Glauhe  geschichtlicher 
Thatsachen,  p.  13. 


168     RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

in  the  pale  ghost  of  Rational  Religion,  though,  in 
the  last  issue,  he  himself  seems  to  have  no  better 
belief.  "  The  more  convincingly,"  he  writes  a 
friend,  *'  one  party  would  convince  me  of  Chris- 
tianity, the  more  I  doubt ;  the  more  wantonly  and 
triumphantly  the  other  would  trample  it  to  the 
ground,  the  more  I  feel  inclined  to  uphold  it,  at 
least  in  my  heart."  In  the  Christian  doctrines, 
too,  he  finds  profound  meanings,  whereas  in  the 
system  of  the  Rational  Theologians  he  finds  neither 
Christianity  nor  reason. 

Yet  the  authority  of  a  historical  religion  can  in  no 
way  be  made  to  agree  with  his  just  and  necessary 
freedom.  His  first  difficulty  is  with  the  Scriptures. 
Though  the  New  Testament  has  enlightened  the 
human  understanding  more  than  all  other  books, 
Christianity  existed  before  the  New  Testament 
was  written,  and  is  still  independent  of  it.  Religion 
is  not  true  because  the  Apostles  taught  it,  but  they 
taught  it  because  it  is  true.  Now  as  then,  it  lives 
in  the  community  and  is  discernible  by  its  inner 
truth.  A  revealed  religion  cannot  be  so  devoid  of 
inward  marks  as  to  be  dependent  upon  a  book. 
It  is  not  a  medicine  to  be  swallowed,  package  and 
all.  Far  more  than  belongs  to  religion  is  found  in 
the  Bible,  and  it  is  pure  hypothesis  that  it  is  all 
infallible.  "  Thou,  Luther  !  Great  misunderstood 
man !  Thou  hast  freed  us  from  the  yoke  of  Tradi- 
tion ;  who  will  free  us  from  the  yoke  of  the 
Letter  ? "  Yet  Lessing's  only  way  of  escape  seems 
to  be  to  look  upon  the  Bible  as  a  sort  of  handbook 
for  teaching  man  to  find  certain  abstract  truths 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE  169 

which  only  his  reason  can  prove.  History,  he  feels, 
is  the  account  of  the  education  of  the  human  race, 
and  the  religious  development  is  the  centre  of  the 
process,  yet  he  knows  not  what  to  do  with  a  his- 
torical religion.  "  Contingent  truths  of  history 
can  never  prove  eternal  truths  of  reason.  That  is 
the  ugly,  wide  ditch  over  which  I  cannot  get,  oft 
and  earnestly  as  I  spring."  Wherefore,  he  is  forced 
to  fall  back  upon  the  position  that  revelation  is  just, 
like  other  education,  a  way  of  teaching  us  more 
easily  and  effectively  what  in  time  we  might  have 
learned  ourselves. 

The  same  difficulty  presents  itself  with  equal 
force  to  Kant.  "  If  religion  is  in  the  position  that 
critical  knowledge  of  the  ancient  tongues — philo- 
logical and  antiquarian  learning — is  the  bed-rock 
of  it,  the  Oriental  scholar  can  drag  the  Orthodox 
whither  he  will ;  they  dare  not  cheep,  for  in  what, 
according  to  their  own  confession,  is  the  proof,  they 
cannot  measure  themselves  with  him,  and  shiver- 
ingly  behold  a  Michaelis  smelt  their  ancient  treasure 
and  stamp  it  with  another  form." 

In  Kant  also  the  spirits  of  two  ages  were  in 
conflict,  and  the  eighteenth  century  summed  up  its 
highest  results  in  him  as  in  no  other  man.  As  a 
consequence  the  new  generation  of  thinkers  found 
in  him  their  necessary  starting-point.  Of  him  Les- 
sing's  favourite  saying  from  Leibnitz  is  pre-eminently 
true,  that  the  philosophical  sects  are  nearly  all 
right  in  what  they  affirm  but  not  in  what  they  deny. 
No  man  is  greater  within  his  own  limits  than  Kant, 
but  the  limits  of   few  great   men   have   been   so 


170     RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

severely  set.  Yet  that  also  belonged  to  his  equip- 
ment, for  in  that  wide-spreading,  encyclopaedic  age, 
such  limitation  made  for  power. 

Education  and  nature  combined  to  fashion  him 
a  man  sternly  self-controlled,  able  and  willing  to 
regulate  according  to  rule  every  detail  of  life. 
No  man  had  more  of  the  spirit  of  the  age,  but,  hav- 
ing come  from  a  lower  stratum  in  society  than 
most  of  the  other  thinkers  of  the  century,  and  hav- 
ing lived  in  closer  contact  with  the  stern  realities, 
he  had  less  of  its  fashion.  That  blessed  deliverance 
he  owed  largely  to  the  home  of  the  harness-maker 
where  the  struggle  with  a  hard  world  did  not  admit 
of  the  consolations  upon  which  a  more  leisured 
class  rested  its  easy  optimism.  There  religion  was 
the  sole  presupposition  of  dignity  and  freedom, 
Pietism  being  delivered  from  its  painful  inward 
groping  by  the  high  task  of  owning  nothing  and 
owing  nothing.  That  task  of  mastering  life  as  it 
were  with  the  bare  hands,  which  is  the  natural 
human  condition,  the  man  of  the  world  is  apt  to 
forget.  Paulsen  draws  attention  to  the  influence 
upon  German  thought  of  the  many  leaders  it  has 
drawn  from  the  class  of  the  handworkers,  from 
Melanchthon — he  might  have  said  from  Luther — 
down.  They  may  have  been  limited ;  they  were 
perhaps  dully  professorial ;  they  could  not  express 
themselves  as  men  of  the  world  like  Hume  and 
Voltaire,  but  they  had  the  supreme  advantage  of 
having  mixed  with  people  "  to  whom  religion  was 
personally  the  greatest  question  of  life  "} 

1  Fr.  Paulsen,  Kant,  1898,  p.  26, 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE  171 

That  was  the  blood  in  Kant  which  responded  so 
warmly  to  Rousseau.  *'By  disposition,"  he  says 
of  himself,  ''  I  am  an  inquirer.  I  feel  all  the  thirst 
for  knowledge  and  eager  unrest  to  advance  it,  and 
contentment  at  progress  in  it.  There  was  a  time 
when  I  believed  that  that  could  make  up  the 
honour  of  mankind,  and  I  despised  the  multitude 
who  knew  nothing.  Rousseau  corrected  me.  This 
dazzling  predominance  disajopeared  and  I  learned 
to  honour  man  :  and  I  should  find  myself  more  use- 
less than  the  common  toiler,  did  I  not  believe  that 
this  study  could  impart  worth  to  others  and  restore 
the  rights  of  humanity."  ^  In  this  interest  in  man 
as  man  Kant  was  not  altogether  different  from  his 
age,  for  perhaps  no  century  has  done  more  than  the 
eighteenth  for  the  emancipation  of  the  individual  as 
such.  But  its  faith  was  in  knowledge  and  its  hope 
in  simplifying  and  popularising  it,  whereas  Kant 
learned  to  look  for  the  freedom  and  dignity  of  man 
in  deeper  matters  than  intellectual  attainments  or 
any  kind  of  outward  situation. 

Nor  was  any  one  more  under  the  influence  of  the 
great  intellectual  idea  of  the  century  than  Kant — 
but  again  with  a  difference.  Newton  and  Rousseau 
he  names  together  in  a  way  which  shows  that  he 
himself  was  quite  aware  out  of  what  strands  his 
philosophy  was  woven.  The  passage  is  of  the 
utmost  significance  for  understanding  Kant's  rela- 
tion to  his  age.  "  Newton  saw  order  and  regularity 
combined  with  greater  simplicity,  where  before 
him  disorder  and  ill-assorted  multifariousness  were 

IK.  Fischer,  Kant,  4  Auf.,  1898,  i.,  254. 


172     RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

found.  Since  then  the  comets  run  in  geometric 
courses.  Rousseau  first  discovered  under  the 
multifariousness  of  accepted  human  fashions  the 
deep  hidden  nature  of  man  and  the  veiled  law 
by  the  observance  of  which  Providence  will  be 
justified." ' 

To  combine  Newton  and  Rousseau  was  Kant's 
problem.  On  the  one  hand  he  sought  a  world  in 
which  the  law  of  gravitation  would  run  absolutely, 
and  on  the  other  a  world  in  which  the  moral  law 
would  run  equally  absolutely.  The  Law  of  Gravita- 
tion in  particular  is  at  the  heart  of  his  whole  theory. 
He  seeks,  as  it  were,  so  to  extend  the  mechanical 
idea  into  the  realm  of  spirit  as  to  prove  that  the 
mind  is  also  a  planet  moving  in  its  own  orbit, 
under  its  own  and  not  under  alien  law. 

Kant  was  a  great  astronomer  as  well  as  a  great 
philosopher,  and  two  objects  alone,  he  says,  awoke 
his  supreme  reverence — the  starry  heavens  above 
and  the  moral  law  within.  One  of  his  earliest  at- 
tempts at  authorship  was  an  explanation  of  the 
origin  of  the  planets  by  the  laws  of  motion,  by  what 
is  now  known  as  the  Nebular  Theory,  and  his  theory 
of  perception  is  simply  a  Nebular  Theory  of  Know- 
ledge. First  of  all,  in  order  to  explain  how  mathe- 
matical formulae,  which  are  only  of  the  mind,  should 
not  only  be  emiMrically  applicable  but  be  neces- 
sarily valid  in  experience,  he  regarded  space  and 
time,  to  which  they  apply,  as  not  external  realities 
but  forms  of  the  mind,  as  the  mind's  necessary 
ways  of  arranging  its  perceptions.     Instead  of  the 

1  Kuno  Fischer,  p.  248. 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE  173 

old  explanation  that  "  God  geometrises,"  he  argued 
that  the  perceiving  mind  geometrises.  The  mate- 
rials of  knowledge  are  mere  multifarious  sense 
impressions,  the  manifold  of  sense,  which  Kant 
conceives  as  a  mere  haze  of  nebulous  atoms  which, 
as  they  float  into  the  circle  of  attraction,  are,  by 
the  mere  force  of  the  laws  of  reason,  rotated,  as  it 
were,  into  an  ordered  knowledge.  Nothing  could 
be  more  in  the  spirit  of  the  eighteenth  century, 
yet  nothing  could  be  more  fatal  to  its  reliance  upon 
the  definite  unit  known  as  the  sound  understanding. 
Mathematical  law,  moreover,  which  had  so  long 
seemed  to  imprison  the  human  spirit,  is  now  used 
to  emancipate  it.  No  man  was  more  under  the 
power  of  the  mathematical  method  than  Kant.  In 
his  two  great  Critiques  he  forced  his  thought  into 
a  kind  of  quasi-mathematical  form  in  which  it  fits 
like  fingers  in  thumb-screws.  But  in  thus  following 
the  spirit  of  the  eighteenth  century,  he  passes  into 
another  world.  He  fixes  upon  the  necessary  nature 
of  mathematical  knowledge.  Only  what  the  mind 
itself  determines  can,  he  argues,  be  thus  certain 
before  all  experience  of  its  application.  Wherefore, 
the  rules  of  mathematics  are  forms  of  our  experi- 
ence, i.e.,  ways  in  which  we  must  receive  it.  Time 
and  space  to  which  they  apply  are  not  forms  of 
reality  but  only  forms  of  perception,  forms  in  which 
we  must  arrange  our  sense  impressions.  But  in 
that  case  mathematical  law  does  not  lead  us  out  to 
overwhelming  vastness  so  much  as  it  leads  us  back 
to  the  overwhelming  significance  of  the  thinking 
mind.     Thus  the  mechanical   idea  which   had   so 


174     RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

long  imprisoned  the  spirit,  becomes  itself  a  spiritual 
phenomenon. 

Mechanical  law,  moreover,  being  only  a  way  of 
ordering  our  experience,  is  not  valid  beyond  pheno- 
mena. It  can  have  no  validity  for  the  Noumenal 
World,  the  Thing-in-Itself,  the  ultimate  reality. 
The  very  necessity  which  makes  such  a  law  as 
causality  apply  to  all  phenomena,  to  all  things  as 
we  know  them,  proves  that  it  depends  on  our  way 
of  receiving  knowledge,  and,  for  that  very  reason, 
proves  that  it  is  not  applicable  beyond.  Its  abso- 
luteness within  its  limits  and  its  severe  restriction 
to  these  limits  go  together.  Beyond  these  limits 
no  thinking  can  advance,  for  the  simple  reason 
that  the  minute  we  begin  to  use  the  understanding 
the  forms  of  the  understanding  are  imposed  upon 
us,  but  when  we  find  in  practice  that  the  moral  law 
is  a  law  of  freedom,  we  have  no  right  to  reject  free- 
dom because  of  forms  which  have  no  application  in 
that  deeper  region. 

Here,  then,  we  have  two  worlds,  one  a  pheno- 
menal world,  a  world  as  we  know  it,  the  other  a 
noumenal  world,  a  world  we  only  touch  by  the 
exercise  of  our  moral  freedom.  In  working  out 
this  idea  of  freedom,  Kant  is  also  under  the  influ- 
ence of  Newton,  even  while  he  struggles  to  get 
beyond  him.  The  moral  law  he  conceives  also  as  a 
sort  of  law  of  gravitation.  The  moral  law  is  the 
law  of  reason,  and  reason  is  for  Kant  the  abstract, 
uniform  element  in  life.  So  much  is  this  the  case 
that  he  makes  the  sole  test  of  a  moral  law  its  fit- 
ness to  be  universally  applicable,     To  every  man  it 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE  175 

is  the  same  categorical  imperative.  Under  it,  dif- 
ferences of  character  can  only  mean  imperfections 
of  obedience.  It  is  a  moral  law  of  gravitation,  the 
sole  difference  being  that  the  planet  has  the  know- 
ledge of  its  course  and  the  choice  of  moving  in  it. 
It  is  the  Newtonian  law  of  the  Intelligible  World. 
All  this  is  essentially  of  the  eighteenth  century. 
The  same  is  true  of  the  idea  of  freedom  that  went 
with  it.  The  essence  of  it  was  absence  of  interfer- 
ence from  without — heteronomy,  the  acceptance  of 
any  other  controlling  force  but  the  moral  reason, 
being  the  source  oi^  all  evil. 

But  herein  lies  the  merit  of  the  whole  system. 
Kant  did  not  retreat ;  he  went  forward.  He  did 
not  reject  the  great  scientific  idea  of  the  century ; 
he  advanced  through  it  into  another  realm.  For 
this  realm  he  has  several  names,  none  of  them 
perfect.  His  favourite  phrase  is  the  Intelligible 
World  as  opposed  to  the  Phenomenal.  That  is 
less  misleading  than  the  Thing-in-Itself.  The 
Thing-in-Itself  is  too  readily  taken  to  be  a  mere 
physical  something  unknown  lying  behind  experi- 
ence. What  Kant  meant  was  a  world  of  spiritual 
realities,  a  Divine  End  of  the  world,  a  Moral 
Governor,  a  free  and  responsible  immortal  spirit. 

Such  a  world  is  needed  by  reason,  for  we  must 
proceed  on  the  supposition  of  a  thinking  subject 
and  an  ordered  world  ;  but,  so  far  as  mere  thinking 
is  concerned,  we  cannot  get  outside  of  our  thought 
to  prove  that  these  ideas  of  reason  are  more  than 
forms  of  thought  like  space  or  time,  more  than 
ways   of   imposing   unity  upon   experience.     Our 


176     RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

ultimate  ground  is  not  any  argument  reason  can 
compass,  nor  any  insight  it  can  soar  to  above  argu- 
ment, but  a  necessity  of  the  practical  reason,  some- 
thing we  must  live  and  act  by.  Yet  this  practical 
necessity  gives  reality  to  all  our  thinking  as  well  as 
all  our  acting,  and  freedom  is  the  ground  of  reality 
even  for  the  speculative  reason.  Without  it  ex- 
perience would  be  a  mere  variety  show. 

Freedom  is  the  essence  of  our  personality.  To 
act  freely,  not  as  the  plaything  of  impulses,  but 
according  to  an  idea  of  law  which  our  own  reason 
has  laid  down  for  us,  is  to  be  a  person,  not  a 
thing,  is  to  rise  into  the  realm  of  absolute  pur- 
poses. It  involves  that  a  man  should  be  treated  as 
an  end  in  himself,  that  the  world  should  be  a  sphere 
fitted  for  him  as  a  moral  agent,  that  there  should 
be  a  moral  government  and  therefore  a  moral 
Governor,  and  that  there  should  be  scope  for  moral 
action,  and  therefore  immortality.  All  this,  Kant 
argues,  follows  from  the  demand  that  man  should 
act  solely  from  reverence  for  the  moral  law.  That 
is  the  sole  ground  of  faith ;  and  it  is  faith,  not 
knowledge,  that  deals  with  ultimate  reality. 

Here,  then,  we  have  two  realms,  each  governed 
by  a  law  capable  of  being  reduced  to  Newtonian 
simplicity  and  completeness.  The  moral  Law,  the 
Newtonian  Law  of  the  Intelligible  World,  has  just 
two  marks,  universality  and  necessity.  It  must  be 
capable  of  being  a  universal  law,  and  it  has  the 
binding  force  of  a  law  of  nature  for  the  moral  will. 
The  planet  in  this  higher  world  announces  its 
course  and  has  the  choice  of  obedience,  but  the 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE  177 

moral  law  as  absolutely  prescribes  its  course.  This 
legislative  power,  which  Kant  calls  the  autonomy 
of  the  will,  is  fundamental.  Independence  is  an 
essential  of  morality.  "  A  man's  conduct  is  moral, 
only  if  he  does  what  he  sets  before  himself  as  being 
unconditionally  necessary."  ^  This  position  follows 
from  Butler's  maxim  that,  "  if  conscience  had  might 
as  it  has  right,  it  would  absolutely  govern  the  world," 
for,  in  that  case,  conscience  must  stand  wholly  upon 
its  right.  But  then  independence  becomes  the 
highest  obligation.  Freedom  is  not  the  superficial 
idea  of  doing  what  we  like,  but  the  power  of  an- 
nouncing the  highest  law  for  our  own  guidance. 
Nor  is  the  sphere  of  freedom  the  play-room  allowed 
to  us  after  God  is  satisfied,  but  it  is  the  whole  circle 
of  life  in  which  the  voice  of  reason  in  our  hearts 
ought  to  be  the  voice  of  God.  Freedom  becomes 
the  basis  of  all  worth  in  human  nature,  the  sole 
way  of  lifting  ourselves  into  the  region  of  things 
eternal,  and  even  of  using  this  visible  world  for  its 
final  end.  Not  knowledge  which  is  only  acquisi- 
tion, but  wisdom  which  is  ourselves,  is  the  final 
security  of  life. 

This  exclusive  place  of  conscience  or  the  Prac- 
tical Reason  is  emphasised  in  the  title  of  Kant's 
work  on  religion — Religion  within  the  Limits  of 
Reason  Alone.  In  the  earlier  days  of  the  Auf kid- 
rung  that  would  have  meant  within  the  limits  of 
argument  alone,  but  Kant  means  within  the  limits 
of  conscience  alone. 

The  issue  of  the  book  drew  down,  if  ever  an 

^  W.  Herrmann,  Faith  and  Morals,  Eng.  trans.,  p.  364. 

12 


178     RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

event  did,  the  irony  of  the  gods.  The  great  Fre- 
derick was  dead,  and  his  nephew,  Frederick  William 
III.,  reigned  in  his  stead.  Open  profligacy  did  not 
hinder  him  from  regarding  himself  as  a  pillar  of 
orthodoxy,  nor  the  maddest  fanning  of  the  flame 
from  thinking  himself  called  to  quench  the  fires  of 
the  French  Revolution.  By  this  paragon  the  aged 
sage  and,  in  his  own  dry  way,  the  saint  of  Konigs- 
berg  was  treated  to  a  severe  spiritual  admonition 
for  his  dangerous  tendencies ;  the  man  who  spent 
a  laborious  life  teaching  the  age  the  eternal  order 
of  personal  duty  was  rebuked  by  the  crude  youth 
whose  ill-considered  fits  of  repression  were  as  oil 
poured  upon  the  furnace  of  revolt.  The  absurdity 
of  making  visible  authority  the  pillar  of  the  world 
could  go  no  farther.  But  the  orthodoxy  of  word 
has  ever  esteemed  itself  a  greater  security  than  the 
orthodoxy  of  spirit  and  action. 

The  book  was  partly  issued  in  1792.  After 
being  suppressed  by  the  censorship  in  Berlin,  it  was 
issued  complete  with  the  imprimatur  of  the  Uni- 
versity of  Konigsberg  in  1793.  Kant  then  received 
his  sovereign's  rebuke,  and,  as  "  your  Majesty's 
most  loyal  subject,"  promised  to  hold  his  peace  on 
the  subject  of  religion.  Had  it  not  been  thought 
that  Kant's  style  was  a  sufficient  guarantee  against 
corrupting  an  ignorant  public,  the  book  might,  in 
that  age  of  violent  reaction,  have  met  even  a  worse 
fate.  The  confidence  was  reasonable.  Though  it 
is  not  stretched  upon  the  quasi-mathematical  rack 
upon  which  Kant  usually  tortured  his  thought,  it 
wanders   somewhat  like  a  river  in  the  fens,  now 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE  179 

deep  with  profound  thinking,  now  merely  muddy 
with  confused  expression. 

The  basis  of  everything  is  the  autonomy  of  the 
Practical  Reason.  There  is,  therefore,  no  room 
for  any  authority  but  conscience.  As  a  result, 
Kant  concludes  that  the  sum  and  substance  of 
religion  is  morality. 

The  starting-point  is  the  freedom  of  the  will. 
The  will  is  free  because  it  acts  at  all  times  on  what 
Kant  calls  a  maxim,  that  is,  a  deliberate  principle 
of  action.  His  commentator  Kirchmann  takes 
this  to  mean  that  a  man  cannot  be  bad  without 
deliberately  resolving  to  be  bad,  which  he  justly 
considers  nonsense.^  But  natural  impulses  do  not 
directly  override  the  will.  When  a  man  commits 
adultery,  it  is  not  a  case  of  the  impulses  of  the  flesh 
proving  stronger  than  the  restraining  impulses  of 
decency,  self-respect  and  fear  of  consequences. 
But  the  moral  law  says :  Reverence  your  own 
person  and  treat  other  persons  as  moral  beings  and 
not  as  mere  instruments  of  your  pleasure.  Before 
a  man  can  sin  in  face  of  that  command,  he  must 
in  some  way  accept  self-love  as  a  rule  of  action. 
The  final  decision  lies  between  that  maxim  and  the 
maxim  of  duty  resting  exclusively  on  reverence  for 
the  moral  law.  Thus,  to  disobey  is,  in  a  sense,  as 
much  an  act  of  reason  as  to  obey.  Wherefore,  the 
springs  of  moral  and  immoral  action  alike  lie  not  in 
the  impulses,  but  in  the  mysterious  sources  of  the 
will.     Freedom,  then,  is  the  power  to  make  the 

^  H.  V.  Kirchmann,  Erlduterungen  zu  Kant's  Beligion,  etc., 
2  Auf.,  1900,  p.  15  f. 


180     RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

moral  law  our  law,  to  follow  reverence  whatever 
attraction  there  may  be  of  pleasure  or  whatever  re- 
pulsion of  fear.  A  man,  in  short,  is  free,  because 
he  can  do  what  he  ought. 

There  is,  thus,  in  every  action  the  difference 
between  walking  by  the  maxim  of  self-love  and 
walking  by  the  maxim  of  reverence  for  the  moral 
law,  so  that  good  and  evil  are  not  divided  as  heaven 
and  earth  merely,  but,  as  Christianity  rightly  divides 
them,  as  heaven  and  hell.  To  regard  man  as  half 
good  and  half  bad  destroys  the  security  and  definite- 
ness  of  all  moral  principle.  In  the  judgment  of 
reason  the  moral  law  stands  entirely  by  itself,  and 
to  oppose  any  other  maxim  to  it  shows  a  corruption 
deep  in  the  sources  of  the  personality. 

Evil  thus  lies  in  something  which  is  before  any 
action ;  yet,  as  it  cannot  operate  without  our  choice, 
as,  in  the  last  resort,  it  must  be  a  free  choice  for 
which  we  are  responsible,  it  is  obligatory  to  alter 
it ;  and  what  is  obligatory  must  be  possible.  The 
real  hindrance  is  the  deceitfulness  of  the  heart,  and 
neither  force  of  impulse  nor  defect  of  conscience. 
The  heart  is  satisfied  with  action  and  heedless  of 
the  disposition  which  alone  gives  it  worth,  and 
ascribes  to  itself  the  merit  due  only  to  fortune. 
This  self-deceit  is  the  foul  blot  on  our  race,  disturb- 
ing the  moral  judgment  and  confusing  the  sense  of 
merit  and  demerit.  Wherefore,  the  Scriptures 
rightly  ascribe  the  origin  of  evil  to  sin,  to  trans- 
gression of  the  moral  law  as  a  commandment  of 
God;  and  rightly  describe  the  process  by  calling 
the  originator  of  it  a  liar  from  the  beginning. 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE  181 

Man  is  not  created  good,  but  to  be  good ;  and 
this  end  is  to  be  sought  by  what  Kant  calls  "  the 
moral  ascetic,"  by  which  he  means  the  discipline 
of  the  free,  though  corrupt  will. 

As  man's  whole  worth  rests  on  his  power  to 
obey  the  moral  law,  his  highest  means  of  grace  is 
to  contemplate  with  admiration  this  moral  endow- 
ment which  makes  us,  who  are  so  dependent  upon 
nature,  disregard  nature  and  life  itself,  and  which 
allows  reason  mightily  to  command  without  pro- 
mise and  without  threat.  To  awake  enthusiasm 
by  this  contemplation  is  the  truly  moral  means  of 
confirming  men  in  good. 

In  this  scheme  the  supernatural,  in  the  ordinary 
sense,  has  no  place.  Every  wise  man,  Kant  thinks, 
admits  the  possibility  of  miracle,  but  proceeds  in 
action  as  if  everything  depended  on  himself. 
Prayer  should  do  no  more  than  ask  conformity  to 
God's  will ;  and  even  such  prayer  a  good  man 
might  not  practise.  The  whole  religion  of  ritual 
and  outward  worship  is  an  attempt  to  gain  God's 
favour  as  if  He  were  a  mere  human  superior  suscep- 
tible of  being  influenced  by  praise  or  persuasion  ; 
whereas  God  is  only  pleased  when  men  are  morally 
good.  God's  succour,  no  doubt,  is  a  reality,  but  it 
is  outside  of  our  experience  ;  and  to  be  always  ex- 
pecting a  work  of  grace  to  do  what  we  must  do 
ourselves,  if  it  is  to  have  any  merit,  is  a  hurtful 
moral  attitude.  Our  sole  task  is  to  make  ourselves 
worthy  of  the  Divine  succour  by  following  after 
goodness. 

Yet  the  difficulties  which  grace  has  been  wanted 


182     RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

to  meet  are  boldly  faced.  Kant  has  a  deep  sense 
of  the  failure  of  man  to  rise  at  any  time  to  the  just 
demand,  to  be  holy  as  our  Father  in  Heaven  is 
holy,  of  the  need  of  a  blessed  assurance  of  perse- 
verance in  good,  and,  above  all,  of  the  difficulty  of 
being  delivered  from  a  guilt  once  incurred,  seeing 
that  no  future  obedience  can  ever  do  more  than 
satisfy  its  own  obligation.  How  a  man,  he  says, 
can  make  himself  good  is  beyond  our  knowing. 
As,  however,  the  command  to  make  ourselves  better 
men  continues,  the  task  must  be  possible,  even 
though  it  be  only  by  way  of  making  ourselves  re- 
ceptive for  higher  succour.  Gradual  reformation 
cannot  work  the  renewal.  A  revolution  is  re- 
quired, a  complete  change  of  mind,  a  kind  of  new 
birth,  a  new  creation,  a  complete  transition  from 
the  maxim  of  self-love  to  the  maxim  of  holiness. 
That  being  accomplished,  a  man  is — so  far  at  least 
as  his  principle  is  concerned — a  subject  susceptible 
of  good ;  and  though  attainment  still  needs  long 
progress  in  the  narrow  way,  in  the  eyes  of  God 
who  sees  the  endless  progress  as  a  unity,  he  may 
even  now  be  pleasing  as,  in  a  sense,  a  good  man. 

The  only  religion  of  any  significance  for  this 
task  is  Christianity.  All  other  religions  are  merely 
ritual  :  Christianity  is  the  only  moral  religion.  As 
the  founder  of  the  first  true  Church,  Jesus  is  to  be 
honoured  as  a  teacher  who  taught  publicly  a  pure, 
penetrating,  simple  religion  in  face  of  a  burdensome 
ecclesiastical  faith.  The  Gospels  are  the  highest 
embodiment  of  this  pure  and  simj^le  religion.  Yet, 
they  and  all  positive  religion  are  only  useful  be- 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE  183 

cause  man's  thought  is  sensuous  and  limited.  If 
all  men  were  philosophers,  able  to  see  that  the 
essence  of  religion  is  to  receive  the  moral  law  as 
the  command  of  God — to  see,  that  is,  that  the 
moral  law  is  the  law  of  the  universe  as  well  as 
our  law,  and  that  we  are  not  asked  to  act  justly 
except  in  a  just  world — the  utility  of  outside  aids 
would  be  past.  Revelation  is  possible,  but  only  of 
things  which  men  are  capable  of  knowing  by  their 
own  reason,  though  not  so  early  and  not  so  well, 
and  which,  once  known,  must  rest  on  their  moral 
not  their  historical  evidence.  Otherwise  we  should, 
in  Kant's  view,  have  a  competing  authority  with 
conscience. 

What  the  Scriptures  should  be  used  to  teach  is 
this  religion  of  reason,  the  meaning  of  which  ap- 
pears in  the  Idea  of  the  Son  of  God  and  the  Deduc- 
tion  of  the  Idea  of  Justificatioyi. 

The  Son  of  God  is  humanity  in  its  moral  per- 
fection, an  ideal  humanity,  which  is  the  only  worthy 
Divine  goal  of  creation,  proceeds  from  God's  nature, 
is  in  God  from  all  eternity,  the  image  of  God's 
glory,  a  begotten  son  not  a  created  thing.  In  such 
an  ideal  God  has  loved  the  world,  and  only  by 
acceptance  of  it  can  we  be  children  of  God.  Not 
having  ourselves  created  it,  and  not  knowing  how 
human  nature  could  be  capable  of  it,  we  say  that 
this  pattern  descended  from  heaven ;  and,  if  we 
represent  such  a  divinely  disposed  man  as  holy 
and  not  deserving  of  the  suffering  which,  never- 
theless, he  accepts  for  the  world's  good,  we  can 
speak  of  his  life  as  a  state  of  humiliation  of  the  Son 


184     RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

of  God.  Though  the  ultimate  quality  of  any  good 
act  is  what  is  unseen  and  impossible  to  exemplify,  a 
truly  good  man  who  had  descended,  as  it  were,  from 
heaven  to  earth,  and  through  teaching,  conduct  and 
endurance,  gave  the  example  of  a  man  well-pleasing 
to  God,  would  accomplish  an  incalculably  great 
good  in  the  world,  effecting,  so  far  as  outward 
experience  can  go,  a  revolution  in  the  human  race. 
Next,  we  have  the  deduction  of  the  Idea  of 
the  Church.  In  the  very  idea  of  reason,  every 
race  of  rational  beings  is  designed  for  the  common 
aim  of  forwarding  the  highest  as  a  common  good. 
The  basis  of  an  ethical  commonwealth  cannot  be 
an  outward  bond,  or  it  would  cease  to  be  ethical. 
The  ultimate  basis  is  the  moral  order.  Religion  is 
obedience  to  the  moral  law  as  a  command  of  God. 
As  God's  command  it  has  unity  of  purpose,  a  goal 
we  can  call  the  Kingdom  of  God.  Through  man's 
shortcoming,  however,  visible  churches  become  ne- 
cessary, and  we  should  work  continually  for  their 
improvement.  Though  the  claim  of  any  visible 
organisation  to  be  divinely  constituted  is  baseless 
and  oppressive,  a  church  agreeing  with  moral  re- 
ligion and  in  advance  of  public  progress  may  well 
be  a  Divine  institution.  Solemnities  and  observ- 
ances, though  no  service  of  God,  may,  in  their 
place,  be  a  temporary  education  for  the  true  re- 
ligion. The  Kingdom  of  God,  nevertheless,  only 
arrives  when  the  faith  of  the  churches  is  changed 
into  the  pure  religious  faith  which  rests  neither 
on  fear  nor  on  favour,  but  simply  on  the  assur- 
ance of  good  to  all  who  do  good. 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE  185 

The  history  of  the  church  is  the  history  of  the 
conflict  between  ritual  and  moral  religion.  The 
triumph  of  the  ritual  idea,  of  the  belief  that  God  is 
pleased  with  pious  trifling,  is  the  moral  death  of 
reason.  The  cleric  is  thereby  exalted  to  an  au- 
thority which  needs  not  to  convince  but  only  to 
command.  He  becomes  so  strong  that  the  State 
is  tempted  to  accept  his  assistance.  Then,  from 
this  dominion  over  men's  minds,  the  Church  comes 
to  rule  the  State.  The  result  is  a  habituation  to 
hypocrisy  which  undermines  the  fidelity  and  up- 
rightness of  the  subject.  As  with  all  wrong  prin- 
ciples, the  opposite  is  accomplished  from  what  was 
intended.  Unless  duty  is  first  and  religion  built 
upon  it,  unless  we  trust  in  God's  grace  because  we 
obey  God's  command,  we  worship  not  a  God  but 
an  idol. 

Two  apparently  opposite  criticisms  are  usually 
urged  against  this  position.  First,  that  to  act 
morally  is  to  do  what  we  do  not  like.  That  is  per- 
haps less  destructive  criticism  than  it  seems,  for  to 
act  morally  is  certainly  to  have  strong  distrust  of 
acting  according  to  our  liking.  The  other  is  that 
Kant  also  arrives  finally  at  happiness  as  the  end 
of  morals,  seeing  his  belief  in  God  rests  simply  on 
the  need  to  make  the  moral  man  blessed.  But  it 
is  one  thing  to  base  our  belief  in  blessedness  on 
morals  and  another  thing  to  base  our  belief  in 
morals  on  blessedness  ;  one  thing  to  believe  that 
the  world  is  in  the  last  issue  just,  and  another 
thing  to  believe  that  justice  is  simply  a  weighing 
up  of  happiness. 


186     RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

The  real  failure  is  Kant's  wholly  negative  atti- 
tude. He  has  only  one  rule  for  all  and  can  only 
hold  differences  of  character  to  be  defects  in  obed- 
ience. Even  that  rule  operates  in  the  void.  Wis- 
dom begins  and  also  ends  with  the  fear  of  the  Lord, 
and  has  no  way  of  going  on  to  the  love  which  casts 
out  fear.  There  is  a  failure  to  realise  how  much 
freedom  in  this  big  world  needs  a  free  relation  to 
God  as  well  as  to  one's  own  soul.  Hence  the  par- 
simonious conception  of  worship  and  grace.  Kant 
is  like  an  Egyptian  fellah  with  a  vast  ditch  before 
him,  objecting  to  the  rising  of  the  Nile  because 
it  would  deprive  him  of  the  credit  of  filling  it 
with  his  shadoof.  He  will  have  no  gospel,  and 
no  scheme  of  morals  ever  stood  in  more  need  of 
one.  His  yoke  is  not  easy  and  his  burden  is  not 
light.  Though  he  shared  with  his  age  the  con- 
ception of  Judaism  as  a  religion  of  mere  ceremonies 
and  rewards,  there  is  nothing  he  stood  nearer  than 
the  religion  of  the  great  prophets.  Wherefore,  in 
spite  of  the  emphasis  he  laid  on  freedom,  he  cannot 
make  man  free,  but  rather  discloses  the  need  of  a 
religion  above  this  morality  to  raise  men  to  the 
glorious  liberty  of  the  children  of  God. 

Kant's  failure  is  at  least  partly  accounted  for 
by  his  attitude  towards  historical  religion.  It  is 
in  his  eyes  a  useful  kind  of  nursery  governess  for 
the  true  moral  religion,  but  to  rest  upon  it  is  "  the 
superstition  of  mixing  matters  of  ancient  fact  which 
the  most  frivolous  may  know,  with  the  true  rational 
moral  faith  which  only  the  good  can  cherish". 
History  may,  however,  have  a  different  significance, 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE  187 

even  on  Kant's  own  view  that  faith  is  simply  faith 
in  goodness,  faith  that  the  world  is  directed  by  a 
good  holy  will,  faith  that  all  things  thereby  serve 
the  ends  of  goodness,  so  that  the  acts  which  to  us 
are  separate  acts  of  obedience  to  the  moral  law 
are  all  directed  to  the  one  end  of  the  Kingdom  of 
God.  On  that  view  it  must  be  of  supreme  import- 
ance to  work  in  the  light  of  faith,  for  we  thereby  find 
unity  and  freedom  in  our  relation  to  the  moral  law. 
For  that  faith  history  must  be  of  supreme  signifi- 
cance, seeing  the  Kingdom  of  God  is  the  final  goal 
of  history.  If  the  good  will  is  distinct  from  all 
other  things  in  the  world  in  being  absolutely  good, 
none  of  its  acts  can  grow  old.  If  we  have  in  free- 
dom an  absolute  of  action,  we  must  have  in  the 
work  of  freedom  an  absolute  of  history — something 
of  the  eternal  foundation  not  of  an  earthly  but  of 
a  heavenly  kingdom.  Thus  we  are  delivered  from 
Lessing's  difficulty  that  we  cannot  build  eternal 
truths  of  reason  upon  contingent  truths  of  history, 
for  what  we  build  upon  history  is  a  fact,  the  great 
fact  which  sums  up  all  history.  Moreover,  we  have 
a  history  which  the  frivolous  cannot  know,  a  history 
which  has  no  meaning  except  for  those  who  are 
seeking  to  accomplish  the  victory  of  freedom  in  the 
earth. 

But  if  Kant  did  not  see  this  himself,  he  taught 
others.  Nothing  did  more  to  restore  historical 
religion  to  its  true  place  than  the  prominence  which 
Kant  gave  to  the  idea  of  the  Kingdom  of  God,  and 
the  security  with  which  he  based  it  on  the  eternal 
element   in   human   nature.      This   work   he   still 


188     RATIONALISM  AND  KANT'S  RELIGION 

further  advanced  by  his  profound  interpretation  of 
Scripture  doctrines.  He  was  a  Nationalist,  the 
prophet  indeed  of  the  later  Rationalism,  and  his 
creed  still  ended  in  the  Deist  Trinity — God,  virtue, 
immortality  ;  but  it  vt^as  a  Rationalism  earnest  and 
profound,  a  Rationalism  which  had  dug  its  trenches 
deep  and  wide  and  only  needed  the  rain  from  heaven 
to  fill  them. 

Most  of  all,  this  task  was  achieved  by  his 
austere  and  lofty  scheme  of  morals.  The  effect 
of  it  was  the  greater  for  the  contrast  with  the  shal- 
low utilitarian  views  of  human  duty  and  the  shallow 
optimistic  views  of  human  nature  resulting  from 
them  which  prevailed  in  the  age.  If  all  profounder 
views  of  human  nature  rest  upon  profounder  views 
of  human  duty,  Kant,  were  that  his  whole  contri- 
bution, would  have  to  be  reckoned  among  the 
greatest  of  religious  forces.  The  new  and  Divine 
order  which  men  had  so  long  been  struggling  to 
understand,  the  order  of  men  self-ruled,  the  order 
in  which  Education,  Church  and  State  are  mere 
revolutionary  forces  unless  they  acknowledge  man's 
free  activity  and  treat  him  not  as  a  mere  means  in 
the  hand  of  the  ruler  but  as  an  end  in  himself, 
found  in  him  large  and  noble  exposition.  That 
view  of  man  which  regards  the  wise  poor  man  and 
not  the  rich  instructed  man  as  the  bed-rock  of  a 
stable  society,  found  in  him  a  defence  which  the 
next  century  only  poorly  maintained. 

The  absolute  distinction  upon  which  Kant  based 
all  his  teaching  has  been  blurred  and  toned  down 
by  misapplication  of  the  doctrine  of  Development. 


WITHIN  THE  LIMITS  OF  REASON  ALONE  189 

But,  as  Kant  himself  argued,  an  absolute  distinc- 
tion is  not  affected  by  the  fact  that  it  comes  slowly 
to  recognition.  It  is  not  by  a  Physics  of  Ethics 
but  by  a  Metaphysics,  not  by  an  account  of  how 
morals  come  to  realisation  in  the  world,  but  by  an 
account  of  what  they  ought  to  be  though  no  mortal 
had  attained,  that  we  must  rule  our  action.  Kant 
was  ready  to  admit  the  possibility  of  evolution,  and 
to  him  it  did  not  seem  to  affect  in  any  way  the 
absolute  claims  of  the  moral  reason,  a  truth  which, 
if  we  could  recover  it,  would  be  iron  in  the  blood 
of  our  age. 


LECTURE  V 

EOMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIEEMACHER'S 
SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION 


Lessiug,  Minna  von  Barnhelm,  1767. 

Herder,  Vom  Geist  Hebrdischer  Poesie,  1782-83. 

Goethe,  Goetz  von  Berlichingen,  1773. 

Goethe,  Faust,  First  Part,  1769-1808. 

Fichte,  Versuch  einer  Kritik  aller  Offenbarung,  1791. 

ScheUing,  Vom  Icli  als  Princip  der  Philosophie,  1795. 

Schleiermacher,  Beden  fiber  die  Beligion,  1799. 

Schleiermacher,  Monologen,  1800. 

Hegel,  Wissenschaft  der  Logik,  1812-16. 

Books  of  Refeeekce 

Geschichte  der  protestantischen  Theologie,  Dritter  Theil,  Gustav 
Frank,  1875.  Geschichte  und  Kritik  der  neueren  Theologie, 
Fr.  H.  E.  von  Frank,  1898.  History  of  Gerynan  Theology 
in  the  Nineteenth  Century,  Fr,  Lichtenberger,  trans,  and  ed. 
by  W.  Hastie,  1889.  The  Development  of  Theology  in 
Germany  since  Kant,  and  in  England  since  1826,  0.  Pfleid- 
erer,  1890.  ChristentMim  ^md  moderne  Weltanschauung, 
Fr.  Ehrenfeuchter,  1876.  Beden  uber  die  Beligion,  ed.  G. 
Ch.  Bernard  Piinjer,  1879.  Schleiermacher,  On  Beligion : 
Speeches  to  its  Cultured  Despisers,  trans.  1893.  Von 
Schleiermacher  zu  Bitschl,  Kattenbusch.  Leben  Schleier- 
macher's,  Dilthey,  1870.  Discussions  of  the  Beden  by  A. 
Eitschl,  Otto  Ritschl,  Lipsius,  Lemme.  The  Logic  of  Hegel, 
W.  Wallace,  2nd  ed.,  1892-94. 


LECTURE  V 

KOMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIEEMACHER'S  SPEECHES 
ON  RELIGION 

The  distinction  between  the  eighteenth  century 
and  the  nineteenth  has  been  drawn  in  many  ways, 
but  nothing  shows  it  more  clearly  than  the  differ- 
ence in  their  ideals  of  freedom.  The  eighteenth 
century  was  occupied  with  the  problem  of  the  indi- 
vidual ;  the  nineteenth  with  the  problem  of  indi- 
viduality. It  was  man  as  man  that  concerned  the 
eighteenth  century  thinker.  He  sought  a  religious 
truth  that  should  have  one  appeal  and  a  moral 
duty  that  should  have  one  command,  his  sole 
problem  being  to  find  the  law  of  man's  orbit. 

In  one  sense  the  question  of  the  eighteenth 
century  was  greater  and  more  fundamental  than 
the  question  of  the  nineteenth.  To  be  able  to  re- 
gard all  individuals  alike  and  to  find  man's  dignity 
not  in  his  opulence  of  nature  but  in  his  common 
humanity,  is  a  fundamental  moral  and  religious 
requirement.  The  foundation  of  all  liberty  is  re- 
gard for  the  individual  conscience  and  for  the  faith 
which  is  truly  an  expression  of  the  personal  need. 
Moreover,  this  regard  for  the  individual  is  the  only 
secure  foundation  for  a  human  society  that  is  to  be 

based  on  a  more   stable  condition  than  outward 

(193)  13 


194     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

compulsion.  The  ultimate  test  of  a  social  order  is 
its  regard  for  the  rights  and  duties  of  the  individual 
as  such.  The  century,  therefore,  wrought  an  im- 
mense work  for  human  freedom  and  ultimately  for 
social  security — a  work  which  has  been  persistently 
undervalued. 

That  this  appreciation  should  have  been  lacking 
in  the  nineteenth  century  was  natural.  During  the 
legitimate  reaction  from  the  dry  Rationalism  of  the 
previous  age,  men  undervalued  all  that  was  associ- 
ated with  it.  The  problem  of  the  individual  is  apt 
to  be  dry  and  abstract,  whereas  the  problem  of  in- 
dividuality is  varied  and  more  easily  takes  to  itself 
a  poetic  and  exalted  expression.  It  is  less  critical, 
less  negative,  more  appreciative,  more  creative.  To 
an  age  that  made  its  great  aim  a  large,  varied, 
abundant,  glowing  life,  the  dry  temper  of  the  pre- 
ceding century,  especially  its  habit  of  measuring 
the  whole  world  by  its  little  footrule  of  the  human 
understanding,  was  bitterly  antagonistic.  It  is  time 
now,  however,  that  we  began  to  see  that  this  glory 
in  individuality,  when  unbalanced  by  the  question 
of  the  individual  as  such,  is  full  both  of  moral  and 
spiritual  danger. 

Regarding  this  danger  Kant  himself  lived  long 
enough  to  utter  a  warning. 

Against  Herder's  conception  of  nature  as  a 
series  of  progressive  kingdoms,  each  growing  more 
abundantly  varied  and  leading  up  to  man  as  its 
crown,  and  against  the  confusion  of  moral  issues 
implied  in  his  making  man's  upright  j^osition  the 
cause  of  his  reason,  and  in  his  comparison  of  im- 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  195 

mortality  to  the  metamorphosis  of  a  caterpillar, 
Kant  showed  that  this  confusion  of  the  physical 
and  the  moral  left  no  room  for  freedom  without 
which  there  could  be  no  ethics  ;  that  it  made  virtue 
and  vice  mere  varying  degrees  of  self-love  ;  and  that 
in  the  vast  labyrinth  we  can  have  no  clue  unless 
we  make  morals  the  measure  of  progress,  and  re- 
gard the  goal  of  history  as  man's  moral  freedom. 

In  Jacobi's  doctrine  that  we  have  a  poetical 
intuition  of  all  higher  beliefs  Kant  finds  it  im 
possible  to  take  his  intellectual  bearings,  and  he 
sees  nothing  but  a  wide  door  for  the  return  of 
every  foolish  enthusiasm  and  vain  superstition. 
By  setting  up  this  exalted  intuition  which  cannot 
be  tested,  and  by  rejecting  the  prosaic  appeal  which 
every  man  ought  to  have  to  the  common  under- 
standing, it  destroys  every  guarantee  for  freedom  of 
thought.^  The  superior  tone  also  of  these  artistic 
philosophers  who  soar  so  easily  into  the  empyrean 
and  look  down  upon  the  laborious  people  plodding 
along  the  highway  of  inquiry,  seems  to  Kant  to 
sin  against  the  toiler.  Philosophy  is  in  his  eyes 
laboriously  prosaic,  and  these  philosophers  of  vision 
are  merely  hazarding  its  hard-won  gains. ^ 

Though  Kant's  fears  were  amply  realised,  the 
Romantic  movement,  nevertheless,  enriched  both 
life  and  thought.  Kant  had  no  hope  from  any- 
thing except  fighting  in  the  valley  :  Romanticism 
would  conquer  its  land  from  the  top  of  Pisgah. 

*  Was  heisst :  Sich  im  Denken  Orientiren  ?  Werke  I.,  121  ff. 
2  Von  eineni  neuerdings  erhobenen  vornehmen  Ton  in   clef 
Philosophic,  Werke  I.,  175  ff. 


196     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

Kant's  is  the  only  secure  way  in  the  end.  With- 
out it  nothing  is  proved,  nothing  won,  nothing 
guaranteed.  But,  without  some  Pisgah  vision  of 
the  heart,  fighting  is  a  poor,  dull,  ineffective  trade. 
Without  vision,  in  point  of  fact,  few  do  great  things 
in  life.  It  may  only  be  the  dimmest  intuition,  a 
vague  anticipation,  the  sense  of  some  great  thing 
undefined  ;  but  to  him  who  is  willing  in  the  sweat 
of  his  brow  to  define  it  by  the  great  experiment  of 
life,  it  is  neither  hazardous  nor  useless. 

Few  influences,  too,  did  more  to  create  the 
Romantic  movement  than  Kant's  own.  No  man 
stood  more  between  the  two  ages,  with  his  hand 
on  both.  His  moral  temperament  and  religious 
attitude  were  even  exaggerations  of  the  limitation 
of  the  eighteenth  century.  The  moral  law  was  the 
law  of  reason.  Reason  was  the  abstract  and  uni- 
form element  in  life.  It  enjoined  man  to  be  moral, 
but  did  not  show  what  he  was  to  be  moral  about ; 
it  asserted  the  dignity  of  the  individual,  but  did 
not  show  in  what  form  of  individuality  this  dignity 
was  to  display  itself ;  it  asserted  freedom,  but  it 
was  freedom  in  a  vacuum  not  a  world.  Yet  an 
ethic  like  Kant's,  which  went  deeper  into  the  foun- 
dations, could  not  help  showing  them  to  be  broader 
as  well  as  deeper,  and  could  not  but  demand  the 
larger  fulfilment  which  not  resolution  but  only  love 
is  great  enough  to  afford.  Thus  Kant  himself  made 
it  plain  that  the  moral  reason  must  be  more  than 
a  faculty  of  abstract  injunctions,  and  that  it  must 
show  God's  infinite  variety  as  well  as  the  absence 
in  Him  of  variableness  or  shadow  of  turning.    Then 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  197 

the  clanger  was  no  more  the  austere  dominance  of 
an  inflexible  uniformity  of  rule,  but  such  generous 
recognition  of  every  manifestation  of  life,  and  such 
neglect  of  Kant's  half  of  the  truth  as  made  it  easy 
to  regard  sin  itself  as  little  more  than  the  necessary 
shadow  where  there  is  so  much  sunlight. 

In  Kant's  doctrine  of  religion  the  feelings  have 
no  place.  "  Such  a  system,"  as  Schleiermacher 
says,  "  can  only  logically  say  of  them  all  what  has 
been  said  of  friendship,  that  man  ought  to  have  no 
time  to  begin  it  or  to  cherish  it."  Yet  what  religious 
scheme  had  ever  more  need  of  being  floated  by  a 
rising  tide  of  feeling  ?  Kant's  doctrine  also  made 
little  of  history,  yet  it  placed  the  whole  emphasis 
on  the  realisation  of  the  Kingdom  of  God.  But  if 
the  Kingdom  of  God  within  must  be  completed  by 
a  Kingdom  of  God  without,  the  history  of  that 
Kingdom  must  deal  with  facts  of  supreme  import 
for  the  conduct  of  life — the  more  so  if  it  is  the 
history  of  human  freedom,  which,  as  Kant  teaches, 
alone  touches  the  absolute  and  eternal  things. 
When  this  became  clear,  the  danger  of  the  nine- 
teenth century  was  no  longer  in  the  direction  of 
separating  man  from  history,  but — Kant's  half  of 
the  truth  being  again  forgotten — in  vague  tolerance 
of  everything  that  ever  had  historical  justification. 

Still  more  marked  was  the  eS'ect  of  Kant's 
theory  of  knowledge.  Implicit  in  it,  the  new  age 
found  its  two  great  conceptions — Idealism  and 
Evolution.  Where  knowledge  was  so  much  a 
creation  of  the  mind,  it  seemed  superfluous  to 
draw  any  of  it  from  another  source,  especially  as 


198     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

the  manifold  of  sense  could  not  possibly  be  the 
atomic  haze  Kant  assumed.  The  world  we  know 
is  an  ordered  world,  a  world  we  receive  and  do  not 
create,  or  if  we  do  create  it,  the  process  must  be  in 
accordance  with  the  Creative  Mind  and  not  merely 
with  our  own.  Fichte  cut  the  knot,  making  reason 
itself  produce  the  manifold  of  sense  as  well  as  fashion 
it  into  experience ;  but,  through  Schelling,  it  came 
home  to  the  age,  with  the  thrill  of  a  new  spiritual 
discovery,  that  the  contact  between  man  and  the 
universe  must  be  an  intercourse  of  reason,  not  the 
creation  of  a  world  out  of  mist,  but  the  thinking 
again  of  God's  thought,  because  man  was  made  in 
God's  image.  In  all  its  wealth  of  suggestion  the 
conception  is  wrought  out  in  Hegel,  but,  in  a 
slightly  different,  less  Idealistic  form,  it  is  also  the 
root  of  Schleiermacher's  thinking.  With  this 
conception,  freedom  could  no  longer  be  regarded 
as  mere  autonomy,  mere  self-government,  or  the 
task  of  maintaining  it  as  a  mere  riding  of  the 
marches  between  God  and  man  and  between  man 
and  man.  God  ceased  to  be  thought  of  as  a  great 
planet  moving  in  His  great  orbit,  and  man  as  a 
little  planet  moving  in  his  little  orbit.  Then  each 
seemed  so  intimately  linked  to  all  that  the  danger 
was  no  longer  of  a  hard  and  barren  Deism,  but — 
Kant's  half  of  the  truth  being  again  neglected — of 
a  gorgeous  pantheism  with  its  confusion  of  all  vital 
distinctions  and  its  idea  of  liberty  as  mere  luxuri- 
ance. 

The  other  idea,  which  was  Evolution,  tended  in 
the  same  direction.    Of  the  presence  of  this  concep- 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  199 

tion  in  his  scheme  Kant  was  more  conscious.  In- 
stead of  being  content  to  accept  knowledge  as  it  is, 
he  asks  the  great  question  of  how  it  came  to  be. 
While  the  basis  of  his  explanation  is  the  mechani- 
cal law  of  gravitation,  it  is  not  a  mechanical  law 
but  an  organic  that  he  seeks  to  establish,  a  law 
whereby  it  appears  that  the  whole  is  in  all  the 
parts.  This  at  once  became  the  predominating 
scientific  idea  of  the  century.  As  the  mechanical 
idea  governed  the  thinking  of  the  eighteenth  cen- 
tury, the  organic  idea  governed  the  thinking  of  the 
nineteenth.  What  the  Law  of  Gravitation  was  to 
the  eighteenth  century  the  Theory  of  Evolution 
was  to  the  nineteenth.  Hegelianism  is  a  theory  of 
Evolution,  of  the  self-unfolding  of  the  Universal 
Reason.  Schleiermacher  even  comes  within  sight 
of  the  Darwinian  idea  and,  in  one  important  re- 
spect, goes  beyond  it.  All  that  is  in  man,  he  says, 
is  a  strife  which  avails  for  progress,  because  he  has 
his  place  in  an  ordered  whole — the  significance  of 
an  ordered  whole  for  the  struggle  of  evolution  being 
apt  to  be  ignored.  This  conception  of  a  restless 
struggle  and  a  growing  individuality  in  the  bosom 
of  a  universe  that  rejoices  in  the  unfolding  of  all  its 
variety,  is  the  keynote  of  the  new  age. 

Evolution  in  its  Darwinian  form — the  only  form 
ever  heard  of  by  many — has  been  used  as  the 
foundation  of  a  materialism  which  does  not,  like 
the  old  Law  of  Gravitation,  require  even  the  Great 
Mechanician.  It  manages  everything  by  the  in- 
genious process  of  spreading  sufficiently  small 
changes  over  sufficiently  long  time.     This  way  of 


200     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

begging  the  cause  piecemeal  of  so  vast  and  won- 
derful a  phenomenon  as  the  world  grows  less  and 
less  convincing,  especially  as  it  cannot  move  a  step 
without  admitting  a  goal  and  regarding  every  de- 
tail as  directed  towards  it.  Supposing  such  a 
thing  as  spiritual  experience,  it  is  manifestly  much 
easier  to  find  room  for  it  in  this  idea  of  organic 
evolution  than  in  the  idea  of  a  world  governed  by 
a  mechanical  law  of  changeless  operation.  So  far, 
therefore,  the  last  century  wrought  with  a  freer 
conception  of  the  world  than  its  predecessor. 

With  this  conception  of  the  world  as  a  great 
growing  organism,  or,  as  it  appeared  to  others,  a 
great  work  of  art  in  process  of  creation,  the  past 
became  of  overwhelming  interest,  and  every  form  of 
research  tended  to  become  historical.  History  was 
no  longer  a  mere  record  of  kings,  but  had  all  the  past 
for  its  province.  Dead  languages  were  interpreted, 
buried  libraries  were  dug  up,  remote  centuries  at 
least  dimly  illuminated.  Science  began  where  his- 
tory ended,  and  sought  to  carry  back  our  knowledge 
of  society  and  man  and  living  creatures  and  even 
the  inorganic  world  to  the  very  beginning  of  things. 
Philosophy  also  became  historical,  giving  its  energy 
to  the  task  of  understanding  all  that  is  implied  in 
the  process  of  evolution  and  staking  its  conclusions 
on  the  result.  Above  all,  the  study  of  religion,  and 
many  of  its  practical  interests  besides,  have  been 
historical — the  investigation  of  the  Sacred  Writings 
and  the  history  of  the  Church  being  the  centre  of 
the  whole  inquiry. 

The  temper  of  this  new  age  first  came  to  self- 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  201 

consciousness  in  literature,  and  it  was  profoundly 
influenced  by  the  artistic  idea  throughout  its  whole 
course. 

Through  a  variety  of  influences  the  dry  moral 
temper  of  the  eighteenth  century  reached  its  cul- 
mination in  Germany.  After  the  long  chaos  of 
the  Thirty  Years'  War  rule  and  order  seemed  the 
one  object  of  desire ;  men  had  been  so  long  mere 
pawns  in  the  game  of  war  that  it  was  enough  to 
assert  the  worth  and  independence  of  the  indivi- 
dual ;  the  poverty  of  the  country,  the  simplicity  of 
life  and  the  absence  of  patriotic  interest  made  men 
indifferent  to  the  want  of  intellectual  scope.  And 
naturally  the  reaction  was  strongest  where  this 
temper  was  least  qualified.  In  rapid  and  glowing 
contrast  to  the  dry  and  inexpansive  spirit  of  Ra- 
tionalism the  Komantic  movement  developed  in 
Germany.  This  movement  which,  above  all  else, 
gave  its  character  to  the  nineteenth  century,  was 
concerned,  not  with  man's  rights  as  man,  but  with 
the  development  of  all  that  was  in  man.  It  de- 
manded, first  of  all,  a  climate  in  which  the  soul 
should  expand  and  put  forth  its  whole  glory.  A 
new  age  seemed  to  have  dawned  upon  the  world, 
an  age  of  higher  interests  and  fresh  creative  power. 
In  Goethe's  Autobiography  ^  we  have  the  very 
feeling  of  the  time.  It  was  this  faithful  reproduc- 
tion of  the  spirit  of  the  age  that  made  Jacobi  say 
that  the  truth  of  this  poetry  was  often  truer  than 
truth  itself.  Goethe's  youth  lived  long  in  him  and 
its  glow  was  not  extinct  when  he  wrote,  yet,  at  the 

^  Aus  meinem  Leben  :  Dichtung  tmd  Wahrheit. 


202     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

same  time,  the  calm  of  age  makes  the  reflection  lie 
like  the  skies  in  the  mirror  of  a  lake.  Naturally, 
artistic  interest  predominates,  for  it  was  the  first 
interest  not  only  of  Goethe  himself  but  of  the  time. 
Yet  he  is  just  even  to  interests  that  did  not  very 
deeply  concern  himself.  The  artistic  movement, 
he  saw,  had  a  political  and  still  more  a  religious 
source.  The  victories  of  Frederick  the  Great  awoke 
a  new  sense  of  self-respect  and  even  a  new  intel- 
lectual confidence  in  the  German  race.  Frederick 
himself  might  despise  his  blood  and  his  native 
tongue,  and  give  himself  to  writing  bad  poetry  and 
using  bad  language  in  French,  but  he  could  not 
make  Rosbach  anything  but  a  German  triumph,  nor 
hinder  the  revival  of  the  despised  German  tongue 
which  followed  the  revival  of  national  power. 

At  the  same  time  Pietism,  having  broken  up 
the  icy  Orthodoxy  as  well  as  the  dry  Rationalism, 
awoke  to  life  the  religious  feelings,  and  made  the 
Bible  a  book  of  life  and  not  a  mere  text-book  of 
abstract  moral  principles.  To  students  of  Scrip- 
ture like  Bengel,  Goethe  ascribes  a  large  share  in 
the  revival  of  historical  interest.  Bengel,  he  says, 
being  known  as  a  sensible,  upright,  pious,  blame- 
less man,  his  book  on  the  Revelation  constrained 
many  deep  spirits  to  live  both  in  the  past  and  in 
the  future.  The  revival  of  religion  brought  many 
sects  into  being,  such  as  the  Moravians  and  the 
Quiet  in  the  Land,  but  they  all,  Goethe  says,  sought 
one  object — a  more  direct  access  to  God  than  was 
afforded  by  the  dry  morality  of  the  established 
religion. 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  203 

The  influence  of  the  Pietistic  or  Evangelical 
Revival  in  winning  its  place  for  feeling  and  giving 
such  prominence  to  the  artistic  judgment  of  men 
and  things  can  hardly  be  exaggerated.  Few  pro- 
minent leaders  of  the  Romantic  movement  were 
quite  untouched  by  it.  Kant,  the  forerunner,  grew 
up  in  the  atmosphere  of  it.  Schleiermacher  was 
trained  by  the  Moravians  and  continued,  according 
to  his  own  acknowledgment,  to  the  end  a  Moravian 
of  a  higher  order.  Newman's  religious  life  also 
owed  its  birth  to  Evangelicalism.  Even  Goethe  in 
his  early  manhood  was  touched  by  it,  especially  as 
he  saw  it  in  the  elder  women  of  his  acquaintance. 

But  the  literary  and  artistic  revival  itself  drew 
the  young  spirits  like  a  religion.  A  new  sense  of 
freedom  glowed  in  them,  freedom  of  individuality, 
freedom  of  luxuriant  growth  asserted  against  the 
gardener's  shears.  One  of  those  straws  which 
show  how  the  wind  blows,  was  the  extraordinary 
prominence  given  to  Lavater  with  his  doctrine  of 
the  significance  of  the  human  physiognomy.  In  any 
other  age  it  would  have  been  an  interesting  diver- 
sion ;  in  that  age  it  was  a  serious  demonstration 
that  man,  as  it  has  been  expressed,  is  each  one  a 
separate  thought  of  God.  The  adorable  thing  in 
the  new  writers  was  that  every  one  stood  for  some- 
thing in  particular.  Klopstock  stood  for  the  right 
of  immediate  feeling,  Winkelmann  for  beauty  of 
form,  Lessing  for  pursuit  of  the  whole  truth, 
Herder  for  interest  in  all  human  affairs.  The 
Jupiter  of  the  whole  Pantheon  was  Shakespeare, 
whose    name    was    as    a    battle-cry    against    the 


204     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

mechanical  rules  and  intellectual  frostiness  which 
the  eighteenth  century  honoured  as  classical,  and 
the  model  of  which  was  the  French  drama. 

To  this  whole  movement  the  name  Romanticism 
is  frequently  applied.  It  then  stands  for  the  great 
poetic  movement  of  the  century,  the  movement  of 
which  Wordsworth  and  Coleridge  were  priests  as 
well  as  Goethe  and  Schiller.  But  the  word  is  also 
used  with  a  narrower  meaning,  being  applied  speci- 
ally to  a  particular  school  of  literature  which,  at 
the  end  of  the  eighteenth  and  the  beginning  of 
the  nineteenth  century,  had  its  centre  in  Berlin, 
and  which  may  be  described  as  the  extreme  left 
wing  of  the  wider  movement.  The  School  bore  all 
the  marks  of  an  extreme  reaction.  Individuality 
was  often  driven  to  whim  and  self-pleasing,  and 
the  sacred  riohts  of  feelins^  were  too  often  con- 
f erred  uj^on  the  shallow  claims  of  sentimentality. 
Its  special  appeal  was  to  the  artistic  intuition,  and 
its  special  task  was  to  expound  that  great  work  of 
art,  the  Universe,  with  its  boundless  variety  in 
closest  unity  of  design. 

The  man  after  the  heart  of  this  School  was 
Goethe.  Carlyle's  reverence  for  that  vaguely  moral 
personality  has  puzzled  many  readers  of  the  great 
moral  dogmatist.  But  Carlyle  had  a  sure  eye  for 
a  great  force,  and  he  was  not  mistaken  about  the 
preponderating  influence  of  Goethe  in  that  age, 
and  in  the  main  for  good.  Goethe's  resolve  to 
build  as  high  as  he  could  the  pyramid  of  his 
nature  sounds  pagan.  Understood  in  one  way, 
such  a  task  is  for  mortal  man  the  erection  of  a 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  205 

molehill.  As  it  wrought  on  his  admirers,  however, 
it  was  an  assertion  of  the  right  to  walk  against 
foot-binding,  of  nature  against  rules,  of  the  beauty, 
variety  and  splendour  of  what  God  had  made 
against  the  platitude,  sameness,  barrenness  of  what 
man  had  determined.  His  aim  is  summed  up  in 
one  word — Culture.  If  not  a  religion,  it  was,  at 
least,  a  worship.  Culture  purifies  the  heart  and 
stirs  the  sense  for  the  true  and  good.  "  In  the  cul- 
tured society  the  world  is  harmonised.  Possession 
and  community  of  goods  do  not  exclude  but  include 
each  other.  The  old  world  is  done  away,  a  new 
order  of  things  is  created,  a  free  race  blooms  on  a 
free  earth.  The  ideal  and  the  real  are  reconciled  ; 
nature  and  art  united.  That  is  the  fair  humanity, 
of  peaceful  nature,  of  free  heart,  lively  and  serene  ; 
that  is  the  fair  world  given  to  man  to  replenish,  to 
till  and  to  preserve.  The  aesthetic  state  is  a  peace- 
ful content  in  which  the  soul  of  man  at  once  suffices 
for  itself  and  breathes  a  diviner  air."^  That  is  the 
new  ideal  of  freedom,  the  new  Kingdom  of  God. 

Under  Goethe's  influence  the  world  came  to 
be  looked  upon  as  a  great  work  of  art,  of  which 
artistic  insight  was  the  only  Divine  interpreter.  He 
even  gave  birth  to  the  new  faith  by  which  this 
freedom  was  to  live.  The  influences  at  work  in 
creating  it  appear  in  the  enthusiasm  for  Spinoza. 
Goethe,  no  lover  of  abstract  philosophy,  read  him 
and  found  peace  in  his  doctrines  as  in  a  religion ; 
Schleiermacher   invokes    his   holy   shade ;    nearly 

1  Ehrenfeuchter,  Christenthum  unci  moderne  Weltanschauung, 
p.  40. 


206     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

every  great  thinker  of  the  age  came,  in  one  way  or 
another,  under  his  influence.  In  Goethe's  mind 
this  pantheism  took  the  artistic  form  which  con- 
ceived of  the  world-spirit  unfolding  itself  into  all 
the  variety  of  life  and  being,  for  its  own  artistic 
satisfaction.  This  conception,  begun  by  Goethe, 
and  wrought  out  by  philosophy  into  many  forms, 
had,  as  its  "  sentiment  of  the  rational,"  no  longer 
the  undeniable  but  the  harmonious.  The  first  to  give 
scientific  expression  to  this  faith  was  Schelling  with 
his  philosophy  of  Identity,  and  nothing  shows  better 
the  gain  and  the  loss  of  the  age  than  the  contrast 
between  him  and  Fichte.  Every  man's  philosophy, 
said  Fichte,  depends  on  the  kind  of  man  he  is  ;  and 
in  Fichte  moral  strenuousness  was  the  note  both 
of  the  man  and  of  the  philosophy.  This  sensuous 
world  was  a  kind  of  gymnasium  built  by  the  soul 
itself  for  the  exercise  of  its  moral  energy.  It  was 
essentially  a  place  to  play  the  man  in,  with  diffi- 
culties and  drawbacks  expressly  for  that  purpose. 
What  man  ought  to  do,  he  can  do ;  and  to  keep 
one's  loins  girt  is  to  be  free  against  the  universe. 
But  in  Schelling  the  Rationalist  conception  of  man 
as  master  in  his  own  world  has  vanished,  and  the 
new  conception  of  man  as  at  once  the  creature 
and  the  interpreter  of  the  world  has  come.  Then 
Fichte's  limitations  passed  away,  but  also  his 
strenuousness.  Renunciation  also  vanishes  and 
artistic  expansiveness  takes  its  place.  The  world 
is  one  great  organic,  artistic  whole,  thought  and 
substance  being  only  two  sides  of  the  same  thing, 
the  Absolute  being  the  identity  of  both. 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  207 

Then,  as  utterly  as  the  eighteenth  century  started 
with  ignoring  Pascal's  religious  appeal,  the  nine- 
teenth started  with  ignoring  Kant's  moral  appeal. 
Both  centuries  set  off  in  pursuit  of  the  same  thing 
— an  easier  and  completer  solution.  What  has 
come  in  our  day  to  be  the  common  Hegelian  ob- 
jection to  Kant,  starts  by  a  radical  denial  of  the 
dualism  upon  which  Kant  based  his  whole  hope. 
Kant,  it  is  said,  starts  with  a  foreign  element  in 
the  object  opposed  to  the  subject,  *'  which  can  never 
be  exorcised  even  though  in  knowledge  and  action 
it  may  practically  be  overcome  "}  This,  of  course, 
Kant  not  merely  acknowledges,  but  tries  deliber- 
ately to  demonstrate,  and  even  bases  upon  it  his 
whole  belief  in  a  higher  world.  It  is  precisely  be- 
cause there  is  this  antagonism  between  the  world 
and  us  which  no  thinking  can  exorcise,  that  our 
practical  moral  victory  over  it  is  so  profoundly 
significant.  As  this  opposition  is  one  of  the  first 
certainties  in  life,  the  boasted  artistic  conclusion 
that  all  things,  man  and  nature,  are  gloriously  one, 
is  not  a  solution  but  an  attempt  to  ignore  the  diffi- 
culty to  be  solved.  It  is  upon  this  dualism  in 
life  that  our  whole  spiritual  conflict  must  bear,  and 
to  start  with  the  assurance  that  we  have  abolished 
it,  is  only  to  do  away  with  the  resistance  by  which 
we  must  climb.  By  starting  without  this  dualism, 
we  must  end  with  a  denial  of  all  fundamental  dis- 
tinctions, with  the  repetition  of  the  mystic  phrase 
"  all  in  one,"  with  the  great  cloud-land  of  pan- 
theism where  the  mere  shadows  of  giants  carry  on 

1  Edward  Caird,  Hegel,  p.  121  ff. 


208     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

a  phantom  battle  of  the  gods ;  whereas,  by  starting 
with  this  duahsm  and  bearing  the  burden  of  it  in 
life,  we  may  end  with  the  high  solution  of  wisdom 
and  love,  which  after  all  is  the  only  unity  worth 
finding  in  the  world.  With  such  a  conflict  on 
hand,  however,  it  is  necessary  to  acknowledge  that 
the  way  of  freedom  and  duty  often  refuses  to  be 
artistic.  The  world  in  which  they  act  has  a  way  of 
being  unsatisfactory.  Nothing  but  a  world  ordered 
evenly  from  the  centre  out  to  the  circumference 
can  wholly  satisfy  the  sense  of  the  harmonious. 

This  defect  in  moral  strenuousness  being  ac- 
knowledged, the  gain  of  Romanticism,  however, 
ought  also  to  be  acknowledged — its  recognition  of 
elements  in  human  nature  and  in  life  which  had 
been  ignored,  its  attempt  to  live  in  a  world  and 
not  in  a  vacuum,  its  thought  of  the  universe  no 
longer  as  a  great  machine  of  which  the  main  prob- 
lem was  to  find  the  driving  wheel,  but  as  a  great 
work  of  art,  the  more  glorious  that  it  is  still  in 
process  of  creation,  its  idea  of  man's  mind  no  more 
as  a  mere  calculating  machine,  a  lathe  for  turning 
out  logical  conclusions,  but  as  a  mirror  of  the  uni- 
verse, a  copy  in  finite  form  of  the  Eternal  Reason, 
not  a  mere  faculty  of  abstractions,  but  a  treasure- 
house  of  all  the  variety  and  individuality  of  the 
world. 

Of  this  Romanticist  conception  Hegel  is  the 
great  philosopher  and  Schleiermacher  the  great 
theologian. 

To  Hegel  the  human  reason  is  a  mirror  of  the 
Divine,  the  Eternal  Reason  ;  the  process  of  thought 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  209 

by  which  we  interpret  the  world  is  the  same  pro- 
cess by  which  the  world  came  to  pass.  And  thought 
is  essentially  creative.  It  is  not,  as  the  old  logic 
held,  a  mere  process  of  discriminating.  We  do  not 
merely  affirm  and  deny,  and  remain  where  we  were. 
The  process  of  thought  consists  in  making  an  affir- 
mation, then  in  seeing  a  distinction  in  it  which 
leads  us  to  deny,  and  then,  in  discovering  the  wider 
conception  which  includes  both.  That  being  so, 
thought  is  not  the  mere  abstract  element  in  life. 
Eeason  is  not  the  mere  universal  law,  but  is  a  pro- 
cess by  which  we  are  always  passing  to  more  de- 
tailed knowledge,  to  more  concrete  conceptions,  a 
process  which  is  always  widening  to  embrace  the 
whole  fulness  of  the  truth. 

Under  the  same  influences,  but  quite  indepen- 
dently, it  came  upon  Schleiermacher  like  a  revela- 
tion that  reason  might  be  the  source  of  individuality, 
that,  like  the  Absolute  Reason,  it  might  reveal 
identity  in  variety,  unity  in  multiplicity,  and  that 
the  individual  might  be  one  distinct,  necessary, 
glorious  presentation  of  the  Infinite  variety,  each 
person  a  sort  of  quintessence  of  the  Universe,  but 
with  a  character  all  his  own. 

The  idea  of  the  world  as  a  great  picture  where 
all  the  details  have  been  developed  out  of  the  main 
conception,  is  the  essence  of  all  the  Romanticist 
thinking.  Its  great  task  was  to  find  a  place  in 
reason  for  individuality.  Individuality  is  its  domi- 
nant thought,  and  it  is  because  of  the  place  assigned 
to  individuality  that  Schleiermacher's  Speeches  on 

Religion  have  been  called  the  religious  programme 

14 


210     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

of  Komanticism.  The  book  was  written  in  the 
midst  of  the  extreme  Romanticist  movement,  and 
no  writing  is  more  characteristic  of  this  phase  of 
thought.  It  had  the  deep  and  lasting  influence 
which  a  book  can  only  have  when  it  is  borne  on 
the  crest  of  a  great  movement.  As  Ritschl  says,  it 
represents  a  movement  which  would  have  had  a 
large  influence  without  it,  but  the  soil  would  not 
have  been  so  fruitful,  either  of  good  or  of  evil,  had 
not  Schleiermacher  tilled  it. 

The  full  title  of  the  book  is  On  Religion : 
Speeches  to  its  Cultured  Bespisers,  and  it  was  pub- 
lished in  1799.  As  it  now  stands,  it  is  a  very 
valuable  record  both  of  Schleiermacher's  own  de- 
velopment and  of  the  changes  which  took  place  in 
his  time,  but  it  is  not  the  book  that  made  the  first 
deep  impression.  Large  alterations  were  intro- 
duced into  the  text  of  the  second  edition  in  1806, 
and  extensive  explanations  were  added  to  each 
Speech  in  the  third  edition  in  1821.  When  the 
book  first  appeared,  the  author  was  living  in  the 
closest  intimacy  with  the  writers  of  the  Berlin 
Romantic  School,  face  to  face  with  an  easy  worldly 
culture  which  had  decided  that  religion  was  only 
for  the  vulgar.  Just  as  little,  he  knows,  do  his 
friends  worship  the  Deity  in  sacred  retirement  as 
they  visit  the  forsaken  temples.  But  seven  years 
afterwards,  the  Cultured  had  become  enthusiastic 
for  religion.  Yet  it  was  only  as  aesthetic  feeling. 
Doctrine  they  would  have  none,  and  to  buffet  their 
body  they  had  no  intention.  Twice  seven  years 
after  that  again,  and  it  would   have  been  fitter, 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  211 

Schleiermacher  says,  to  write  Speeches  for  the 
Pietistic  slaves  of  the  letter.  Thus  the  book  in  its 
present  form  stands  as  an  evidence  of  the  growing 
seriousness  of  the  age.  In  the  first  edition 
Schleiermacher  bent  his  whole  energy  to  the  task 
of  showing  those  literary  friends  of  his  that,  to 
despise  so  fundamental  and  formative  an  element 
in  man  as  religion,  was  a  defect  in  their  culture. 
He  asserted  that  religion  was  not  a  mere  com- 
pendium of  doctrines  about  God  of  a  kind  to 
influence  morals,  but  that  it  was  something  funda- 
mental and  original,  a  vital  element  both  in 
human  nature  and  in  history.  Merely  to  have 
affirmed  that  truth  in  that  age  was  a  work  of 
great  merit.  Yet,  so  eager  was  he  in  showing  that 
religion  is  not  mere  doctrines  and  moralities,  that 
he  scarcely  stopped  to  inquire  whether  it  had  any 
relation  either  to  right  thinking  or  right  acting. 
Everything  seemed  to  end  in  mere  mystical  feeling. 
Hence  it  became  an  urgent  duty  in  the  second 
edition  to  show  that  an  element  so  fundamental 
as  religion  must  be  intimately  related  both  to 
thinking  and  to  acting.  In  accordance  with  this 
purpose,  the  changes  in  the  text  are  all  in  the 
direction  of  seeking  a  more  steadfast  basis  for  re- 
ligion than  mere  mystical  feeling.  In  the  third 
edition  the  text  is  very  little  altered,  but  extensive 
explanations  set  forth  the  author's  later  views, 
especially  in  the  direction  of  assigning  a  higher 
practical  value  to  the  visible  Church,  and  of  show- 
ing more  interest  in  the  practical  bearings  of  re- 
ligion.    All  these  changes  mark  the  influence  of 


212     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

the  book  and  add  to  its  value  as  a  biographical 
and  historical  monument. 

We  are,  however,  mainly  concerned  only  with 
the  first  form  of  it,  for  only  the  first  edition  can 
be  properly  described  as  the  religious  programme 
of  Romanticism. 

The  main  contention  of  the  book  is  expressed 
in  the  title,  a  contention  which  the  usual  translation 
Addresses  or  Discourses  entirely  obscures.  The 
religious  man  does  not  discourse.  He  speaks  as 
man  to  man.  Being  in  touch  with  the  Infinite,  he 
feels  deeply  the  need  of  confirming  and  completing 
himself  by  fellowship  with  others.  Man  is  not  free 
merely  as  he  is  self-contained.  He  reaches  the 
freedom  of  a  large  individuality  only  in  relation  to 
humanity  and  the  Infinite.  This  relation  being 
fundamental  to  his  freedom,  to  give  utterance  to 
his  deepest  feelings  is,  for  the  religious  man,  always 
an  inward  and  often  an  overwhelming  necessity. 
But  then  comes  the  task  of  finding  adequate  ex- 
pression for  so  high  a  theme.  On  the  highest  sub- 
ject with  which  language  has  to  deal,  we  may  not 
fall  into  the  light  tone  of  common  conversation. 
We  require  all  the  fulness  and  splendour  of  human 
speech.  Where  poetical  skill  is  wanting,  '*  religion 
can  only  be  expressed  and  communicated  rhetori- 
cally, in  all  power  and  skill  of  speech".  In  ac- 
cordance with  this  idea,  the  style  of  the  book  is 
throughout  the  style  of  the  platform — enthusiastic, 
flowing,  intense,  rhetorical,  in  deliberate  and  glar- 
ing contrast  to  the  dull  level  of  expository  prose, 
the  cherished  medium  of  Rationalism.     Rationalism 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  213 

had  plentifully  discoursed  on  a  religion  "  the  hinges 
of  which  were  providence  and  immortality,"  and 
the  sole  result  had  been  "  the  ill-put- together  frag- 
ments of  metaphysics  and  ethics  now  called  Purified 
Christianity  .  .  .  that  perfect  plaything  with  which 
our  century  has  presented  history".  The  whole 
affair  is  the  handiwork  of  the  calculating  under- 
standing, and  the  discussion,  which  ever  runs  into 
cold  argumentation,  treats  the  highest  themes  in 
the  tone  of  a  common  School  controversy.  In 
opposition  to  all  this,  the  very  thing  to  be  asserted 
is  just  that  religion  is  not  this  cold  argumentative 
thing,  but  that  it  can  only  be  seen  in  the  pious 
exaltations  of  mind  from  which  all  activities  are 
excluded,  until  the  whole  soul  is  dissolved  in  the 
immediate  feeling  of  the  Infinite  and  the  Eternal. 
This  is  the  original,  personal  experience  by  which 
alone  religion  can  be  understood.  Only  when  we 
have  this  clue  to  it,  may  we  hope  to  discover  it  in 
the  outer  world.  A  man  must  first  fall  back  on 
himself  and  there  find  the  plan  and  key  to  the 
Whole,  if  he  would  hope  to  find  any  religious 
meaning  anywhere  else.  As  one  who  has  had  such 
an  experience,  Schleiermacher  comes  forward.  He 
comes,  not  as  one  who  hopes  to  argue  others  into 
agreeing  with  him,  but  as  one  who  hopes  to  awake 
in  others  an  experience  akin  to  his  own.  To  ac- 
complish that  object  he  will  speak  as  man  to  man, 
without  any  prepossession  of  orthodoxy  or  pulpit 
conventionality  between  him  and  his  audience. 
Of  all  ways  of  communicating  religion,  he  says  at 
the  close,  he  has  not  shunned  the  loudest.     This 


214     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

direct,  personal,  rhetorical,  unconventional  deliver- 
ance, even  though  it  may  never  have  been  actually 
spoken  before  an  audience,  is  rightly  enough  called 
Sjyeeches. 

Fundamental  to  the  whole  contention  is  the 
Romanticist  idea  of  freedom,  as  freedom  of  in- 
dividuality, with  its  conscious  opposition  to  the 
previous  idea  of  duty  as  the  same  obedience  ren- 
dered by  all  to  the  same  legal  injunction. 

That  doctrine  is  thus  set  forth  by  Fichte. 
"  What  is  pure  in  a  rational  being  and  individuality 
are  to  be  sharply  distinguished.  The  expression 
and  presentation  of  what  is  pure  in  reason  is  the 
moral  law  :  the  individual  is  that  whereby  each 
one  is  distinguished  from  others.  A  rational  being 
must  be  an  individual  absolutely,  not  this  or  that 
definitely,  not  this  or  that  distinct  individual  which 
is  a  mere  thing  that  comes  to  pass.  .  .  .  Individu- 
ality depends  merely  on  the  relation  to  a  particular 
body  and  on  the  plurality  of  mankind."  All  indivi- 
duality, in  that  case,  is  apt  to  appear  mere  aberra- 
tion, and  the  suppression,  not  the  development  of 
it,  the  moral  task. 

His  escape  from  this  conception  of  freedom 
seemed  to  Schleiermacher  nothing  less  than  an 
emancipation.  It  delivered  him  from  the  sceptre 
of  necessity  and  the  curse  of  all-devouring  time. 
Formerly,  he  says  in  the  Monologues,  he  had  hon- 
oured what  was  the  same  in  all  existences.  He 
regarded  that  as  the  highest,  the  only  thing  to  be 
considered.  He  looked  for  only  one  rule  for  all 
circumstances,    and    distinguished    men    only   by 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  215 

situation  and  locality.  Mankind  were  a  uniform 
mass,  outwardly  divided  but  inwardly  the  same. 
Even  special  mental  characteristics  were  only  the 
fleeting  results  of  social  attrition.  But  a  new  con- 
ception of  freedom  dawned  upon  him,  when  he 
saw  that  "  every  man  represents  mankind  in  his 
own  way,  that  he  feels  himself  a  distinct  creation, 
a  chosen  work  of  the  Godhead,  and  that  he  ought 
to  rejoice  in  a  distinct  form  and  development  ". 
This  discovery  of  one's  destiny  to  be  singular  only 
comes  hard  and  late,  but,  when  it  does  come,  it 
creates  tranquillity  and  serenity  of  heart.  It  lifts 
above  the  common  life  and  commotion  of  the  world  ; 
it  affords  glimpses  of  promise  into  the  future  ;  it 
beautifies  youth  and  age. 

The  point  of  this  contention  is  not  that  there 
are  diiferences  among  men.  That  is  always  ad- 
mitted. The  point  is  that  the  variety  is  regarded 
as  a  necessary  presentation  of  the  Universal.  Each 
individual  is  one  aspect  of  the  same  infinite  image 
of  God.  The  duty  of  the  individual  is  to  be  him- 
self, to  realise  the  special  thought  of  God  which  he 
embodies.  As  a  moral  being,  it  is  the  highest  act 
of  a  man's  freedom  to  follow  his  own  bent,  limit 
himself  to  his  own  task,  be  himself. 

This  is  Schleiermacher's  ethical  view,  the  stand- 
point of  the  Monologues.  His  religious  conception, 
as  set  forth  in  the  Speeches,  is  in  accord.  The  moral 
duty  to  be  oneself  rests  on  the  religious  view  that 
every  man  is  a  distinct  manifestation  of  the  Infinite, 
that  "  in  him  a  portion  of  the  Infinite  consciousness 
divides  itself  off  and,  as  a  finite  being,  links  itself 


216     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

to  one  definite  movement  in  the  series  of  organic 
evolutions ".  That  is  the  point  of  view  of  the 
Speeches.  The  Infinite  is  endlessly  at  work  ex- 
pressing itself  in  the  most  multifarious  forms,  and 
each  individual  rejoices  in  being  one  such  expres- 
sion of  the  infinite  variety.  It  would  almost  appear 
as  if,  to  Schleiermacher's  mind,  infinity  in  God  de- 
rived meaning  and  significance  mainly  from  indivi- 
duality in  man. 

This  view  of  man's  freedom,  as  the  right  and 
duty  to  be  himself,  went  with  a  different  concep- 
tion of  the  source  of  freedom.  The  creative  power 
in  man  is  not  ratiocination,  but  feeling  or  intui- 
tion. By  feeling  we  have  intercourse  with  reality. 
Where  Kant  sees  only  the  chaotic  manifold  of 
sense,  Schleiermacher  sees  an  intercourse  with  the 
Eternal  Reason.  Behind  the  distinct  conscious- 
ness, before  the  object  perceived  comes  to  stand 
over  against  the  subject  perceiving,  we  have  that 
undivided  feeling  in  which  the  soul  and  the  Uni- 
verse mingle  and  are  one.  This  moment  in  our 
perception  is  the  intercommunion,  not  of  opposite 
elements — mere  spirit  and  alien  matter,  but  of  the 
Universe  with  the  soul  formed  by  it  to  correspond 
with  it.  It  is  described  as  fleeting  and  transparent 
as  the  dew  on  a  blossom,  bashful  and  tender  as  a 
maiden's  kiss,  holy  and  fruitful  as  a  bridal  embrace. 
It  fills  no  time  and  fashions  nothing  palpable,  yet 
is  the  holy  wedlock  of  the  universe  with  reason  in- 
carnated in  man.  Being  immediate,  it  is  above 
error  ;  and,  by  laying  man  directly  on  the  bosom  of 
the  Infinite  World,  it  communicates  every  living. 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  217 

every  original  movement  in  his  life.  It  is  the 
original  primal  experience  in  which  lies  the  root 
at  once  of  every  impulse  of  freedom  and  of  every 
religious  emotion.  Wherefore,  freedom  is  a  dis- 
tinctive, practical  expression  of  the  Infinite,  and 
religion  is  feeling  or  intuition  of  the  Infinite.  Feel- 
ing being  understood  in  this  sense  of  direct  contact 
with  reality,  the  religion  which  springs  from  it  can- 
not shut  up  a  man  in  himself  or  make  his  freedom 
consist  in  mere  absence  of  outside  interference. 
Man  truly  finds  himself  only  when  he  goes  out 
into  the  world  and  contemplates  the  visible  crea- 
tion and  studies  men  and  history,  and  then  returns 
with  his  treasure  back  into  himself,  there  to  find 
both  himself  and  the  title  to  the  possession  of  all 
else  as  truly  his  own.  In  this  way,  the  more  a  man 
derives  from  the  world  both  of  men  and  of  things, 
the  more  he  will  be  himself,  and  the  more  all  he 
has  will  be  his  own  characteristic  possession. 

Here  we  have  the  truth  which  appears  most 
plainly  in  the  poetry  of  the  age — as  much  in  Words- 
worth as  in  Goethe — and  it  is  a  truth  essential  for 
giving  meaning  to  life  and  scope  to  duty.  To  dis- 
charge his  task,  man  must  follow  more  than  a  rule, 
and  he  may  not  follow  the  multitude  even  to  do 
good  ;  for,  except  it  is  his  own  task  which  is  in- 
cumbent upon  him  in  particular  without  any  refer- 
ence to  how  far  it  may  apply  to  others,  something 
is  wanting  to  the  right  idea  of  duty.  At  the  same 
time  it.  is  not  difficult  to  see  that  this  idea  of  free- 
dom, as  liberty  of  individuality,  can  be  easily  per- 
verted, even  to  the  destruction  of  moral  equality 


218     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

on  the  one  hand,  and  moral  strenuousness  on  the 
other.     This  danger  already  appears  in  the  very- 
fact  of  an  appeal   to   the   Cultured.      Partly  the 
appeal  to  this  special  class  was  due  to  the  author's 
situation,  but  it  also  shows  the  influence  of  the 
Romanticist  ideal  of  liberty  as  luxuriance  of  indi- 
viduality, the  cultured  being  those  in  whom  indi- 
vidual distinctiveness  is  most  developed.    They  are 
appealed  to  in  contrast  with  those  who  are  enslaved 
to  mechanical  tasks,  a  slave  being  defined  as  ''one 
who  must  toil  at  what  should  only  be  done  by  dead 
forces".     We  hope,  Schleiermacher  says,  that  the 
perfecting  of  the  sciences  and  arts  will  make  these 
dead  forces  available  for  us.      That  is  the  same 
thing   as   Aristotle's   idea   of   a  great   mechanical 
slave.     Like  him,  apparently,  Schleiermacher  can 
think  of  no  other  foundation  of  society  but  slavery 
or  a  substitute.     Indeed  the  whole  conception  is 
more  akin  to  Aristotle's  ideal  of  the  large-souled 
man  than  to  any  Christian  ideal  of  meekness  and 
lowliness.     It  has  no  real  hope  of  being  able  to 
call  the  slave  God's  freedman,  and  is  in  this  re- 
spect far  behind  the  eighteenth  century.    Only  this 
hope  of  rescuing  mankind  from  these  slavish  tasks 
saves  the  enthusiasm  for  culture  from  being  a  mere 
selfish  caste  interest.      But  this  hope  rests  on  a 
material  not  a  moral  basis,  and  so  long  as  the  idea 
of  freedom  is  merely  that  of  a  spacious  individu- 
ality, it  is  impossible  to  have  any  other  than  a 
material  basis,  or  to  sec  how  even  from  it  the  great 
bulk  of  mankind  would  not  for  ever  be  excluded. 
At  all  events,  Schleiermacher  finds  that  at  present 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  219 

"the  pressure  of  mechanical  and  unworthy  tasks, 
under  which  millions  of  both  sexes  and  all  ranks 
sigh,  makes  them  incapable  of  the  free  glance  with 
which  the  Universe  can  be  found".  They  have 
glimmerings  of  religion  which  ought  to  be  encour- 
aged, but  they  have  not  the  free  individuality,  such 
as  is  possessed  by  the  Cultured,  which  would  enable 
them  to  reach  the  deepest  things. 

Manifestly,  there  is  some  mistake.  The  glorious 
liberty  of  the  children  of  God  can  glorify  the  basest 
tasks,  and  our  spiritual  heritage  should  not  be  at 
the  mercy  of  any  outward  condition,  even  the 
means  of  culture.  Man  in  that  case  is  not  free  in 
any  right  sense  of  the  word.  Unless  life's  final 
goal  is  something  more  independent  of  circum- 
stances than  culture,  there  can  never  be  any  true 
inward  freedom.  Even  such  an  outward  good  as 
entire  social  justice  would  wholly  overturn  at  least 
the  present  basis  of  culture.  That  problem  all 
Romanticism  left  unsolved.  A  condescending  at- 
titude towards  the  uncultured  characterised  the 
whole  movement.  It  failed  to  make  prominent 
the  glory  of  man  which  comes  from  possessing 
in  his  own  bosom  that  high  authority  which  ought 
to  govern  the  world,  that  sovereign  which  is  ever 
called  upon  to  lay  down  a  law  universal.  The 
uncultured  ever  remained  persons  in  whom  the 
true  glory  of  mankind,  their  individuality,  had  been 
suppressed,  persons,  therefore,  who  must  always 
be  expected  to  be  in  pupilage.  Such  an  attitude 
is  so  far  from  being  confined  to  Schleiermacher 
that  there  are  very  few  of  the  Romantic  writers 


220    ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

in  whom  it  is  less  apparent.  In  Newman,  for  ex- 
ample, it  is  far  more  prominent.  What  is  the 
argument  by  which  he  defends  the  authority  of 
the  Church,  when  stripped  of  its  trappings,  if  not 
that  it  is  absurd  to  supjDOse  that  the  ruck  of  man- 
kind can  ever  be  in  any  position  but  pupilage  ? 
This  failure  to  assert  the  significance  of  the  in- 
dividual as  such,  with  his  own  responsibility,  his 
own  guilt,  his  own  weakness,  his  own  need  of 
victory,  has  throughout  its  whole  course  been  as- 
sociated with  the  idea  of  development.  That  doc- 
trine has  ample  room  for  individuality  in  all  shades 
and  phases,  but  the  abiding  problem  for  it  is  to 
find  a  rock  in  the  stream  on  which  to  set  the  in- 
dividual, so  as  to  secure  his  unchanging  identity 
and  personal  responsibility,  and  so  as  to  find  in 
him  a  worth  which  is  not  dependent  on  any  acci- 
dental gain,  even  culture. 

Ultimately  all  man's  greatness  must  depend  on 
his  individuality,  on  what  he  can  attain  of  victory 
and  character  that  is  his  own.  Even  humility, 
rightly  interpreted,  is  such  a  trust  in  God  as  en- 
courages us  in  the  face  of  society  and  the  world  to 
be  ourselves.  But  there  is  a  common  character  of 
reason  and  conscience  which  belongs  to  man  as 
man,  upon  which,  and  not  upon  culture,  his  true 
individuality  is  to  be  built.  Only  the  individuality 
that  is  built  on  this  enduring  element  in  man  as 
man  can  be  described  as  giving  freedom.  In  the 
whole  conception  of  development  this  great  truth 
has  not  yet  found  its  due  place,  and  least  of  all 
was  it  found  in  Romanticism.     With  its  conception 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  221 

of  freedom  as  luxuriance  of  nature,  it  had  no  right 
esteem  for  man  as  man,  and  no  right  way  of  testing 
its  convictions  by  the  great  experiment  of  the  com- 
mon life. 

A  fluid  artistic  idea  is  at  the  heart  of  the  whole 
movement,  and  this  it  is  that  appears  in  Schleier- 
macher's  conception  of  religion.     Religion  he  de- 
fines as  feeling  or  intuition  for  the  Infinite.     The 
favourite  words  in  the  Speeches  are  Universe,  hijin- 
ite,  the  Whole,  All.     They  indicate  the  same  thing 
— the  unity  of  the  great  work  of  art  we  call  the 
world.    Frank,  however,  denies  that  Schleiermacher 
regards  religion  as  a  kind  of  art,  and  says  that  what 
he  does  is  to  regard  art  as  a  kind  of  religion.'     In 
either  case  his  conception  is  illustrated  by  art,  the 
prime  condition  of  which  is  that  all  the  variety  of 
detail  be  subordinated  to  one  conception.      The 
distinction  of  every  true  work  of  art  is  to  have 
abundance,  variety,  beauty  and  interest  of  detail 
all  wrought  into  the  unity  of  one  design.     Artistic 
sense  is  a  sure  feeling  for  every  way  in  which  the 
detail  illustrates  the  unity  and  the  unity  governs 
the  detail.     The  sense  of  the  highest  unity  is  re- 
ligion, and  art  could  not  stop  short  of  it,  Schleier- 
macher maintains,  were  it  not   for  the  rest   and 
satisfaction  which  every  completed   work   of   art 
offers  to   the   mind.      Without  that   it  would  be 
necessary  to  go  on  to  see  that  the  greatest  work 
of  art  has  for  its  material  humanity  itself,  and  that 
the  Supreme  Artist  is  the  Deity  who  fashions  it. 

1  Fr.  H.  E.  von  Frank,  Geschichte  und  Eritik  der  neueren 
Theologie,  3rd  ed.,  p.  76. 


222     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

This  conception  of  religion  is  connected  with 
the  theory  of  perception  before  explained.  The 
source  of  the  feeling  in  which  it  consists,  is  that 
primal  moment  of  contact  between  the  individual 
and  the  Universe,  which  is  the  creative  origin  of 
all  experience.  From  that  feeling  religion  also 
springs  ;  and  when  Schleiermacher  speaks  of  re- 
ligion as  feeling  or  intuition,  it  is  in  this  sense  of 
direct  experience. 

As  this  transaction  between  man  and  the  Uni- 
verse is  a  more  personal  transaction  in  Schleier- 
macher's  view  than  in  the  other  philosophies  of 
the  time,  his  religious  conception  is  less  pantheistic. 
Yet,  even  in  his  case,  the  tendency  of  a  religion 
which  consists  in  a  sense  of  the  unity  of  the  Whole 
is  strongly  towards  pantheism.  The  essential  ele- 
ment in  it  is  mysticism,  an  element  vital  to  religion, 
but  not  one  that  can  govern  religion  without  tending 
to  reduce  it  to  a  placid  contemplation  of  an  undis- 
turbed unity,  without  making  it  hazy  in  thought  and 
ineffective  in  action.  Schleiermacher's  conception, 
nevertheless,  is  rather  to  be  described  as  defective 
tha,n  as  erroneous ;  and  even  the  defectiveness  is 
almost  atoned  for  by  the  necessity  there  was  at  the 
time  of  affirming  strongly  the  other  side  against 
the  rage  for  calculating  and  explaining  which,  he 
says,  allows  nothing  to  be  done  in  the  true  spirit  of 
discovery,  nothing  in  child-like  intuition,  nothing  in 
a  way  to  receive  the  impression  of  anything  as  a 
whole. 

The  value  of  the  book  is  the  vigour  with  which 
it  asserts  that  religion  is  an  original  and  funda- 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  223 

mental  element  in  human  nature.  "  I  maintain 
that,  in  all  better  souls,  piety  springs  necessarily 
by  itself  ;  that  a  province  of  its  own  belongs  to  it 
in  which  it  has  unlimited  sway  ;  that  it  is  worthy 
to  animate  most  profoundly  the  noblest  and  the 
best,  and  to  be  fully  accepted  and  known  by  them." 
That  is  the  claim  by  which  the  Speeches  on  Religion 
marked  an  era  in  religious  thought.  More  than 
any  other  influence,  the  book  helped  to  overthrow 
the  idea  which  nationalism  had  so  long  upheld, 
that  religion  consisted  solely  in  uncertain  doctrines 
about  God,  virtue  and  immortality,  and  in  ques- 
tionable motives  of  reward  in  a  life  to  come. 

Our  nature  is  one,  and  all  our  activities  are 
interdependent.  Religion  springs  from  the  very 
roots  of  our  nature.  It  is  implicit  in  those  first 
intuitions  which  are  the  beginning  both  of  our 
knowledge  and  of  our  activity.  Hence  religion 
must  have  a  very  intimate  relation  both  to  truth 
and  to  morals.  But  religion,  Schleiermacher  main- 
tains, is  not  in  itself  either  doctrine  or  morals.  A 
system  of  doctrine  is  only  an  attempt  to  review  the 
province  of  religion,  while,  in  respect  of  morals, 
everything  should  be  done  ivlth  religion  but  nothing 
for  religion.  The  ideas,  for  example,  of  God  and 
of  immortality  are  not  immediate  religious  impres- 
sions, but  interpretations  involving  doctrinal  and 
moral  elements.  The  religious  impressions  may  be 
direct  and  intuitive,  while  the  ideas  might  contain 
irreligious  elements,  such  as  anthropomorphism  in 
the  conception  of  God  and  other  worldliness  in  the 
conception  of  immortality. 


224    ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

Religion,  thus  conceived,  cannot,  in  the  strict 
sense,  be  taught,  any  more  than  the  artistic  sense 
can  be  taught.  Yet  it  does  not  feed  on  itself,  but, 
again  like  the  artistic  sense,  goes  out  into  the 
great  world,  where  it  can  be  forwarded  or  retarded 
by  everything  it  encounters.  Rationalism  is  here 
looked  on  as  the  main  hindrance.  Though  the 
amount  of  religion  may  be  as  great  as  ever,  it  is 
broken  up  by  this  oppressive  force  and  so  is  hindered 
of  its  due  place  and  influence.  Discreet  and  prac- 
tical men,  under  the  delusion  that  their  own  activity 
exhausts  the  task  of  humanity,  crush  out  aspira- 
tion, employing  even  such  openings  into  Infinity 
as  birth  and  death  only  to  win  young  souls  for 
economy  and  caution.  The  religious  sense,  no 
more  than  the  artistic  sense,  can  be  forwarded  by 
discussing  and  expounding.  Religion  is  not  know- 
ledge that  can  be  taught  in  a  formula,  but  is  a 
fundamental  relation  of  life,  the  key  to  its  changes 
and  opulent  variety.  The  capacity  for  it  is  born 
with  man,  even  as  the  capacity  for  morality  or  for 
government,  and,  like  everything  that  ought  to  be 
ever  present  and  ever  active  in  the  soul,  it  lies  far 
beyond  the  domain  of  teaching  and  imparting.  All 
that  another  person  can  do  for  us,  is  to  help  to 
quicken  this  innate  power  by  uttering  his  own 
religion.  This  help,  however,  is  of  the  utmost  im- 
portance, and  it  succeeds  best  when  it  rouses  in 
others  a  living  force  which  shows  that  it  is  alive  by 
going  its  own  way.  The  persons  who,  through  the 
expression  and  communication  of  their  own  religion, 
can  thus  rouse  a  life  which  will  afterwards  go  its 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  225 

own  way,  perhaps  to  the  extent  of  choosing  a  quite 
different  master,  occujDy  the  high  position  of  media- 
tors. So  far  is  true  freedom  from  requiring  us  to 
be  independent  of  these  mediators  that  we  need 
their  help  in  all  departments  to  mediate  ''  between 
limited  man  and  infinite  humanity  ".  Man,  that  is 
to  say,  only  comes  to  his  heritage  by  finding  how 
much  there  is  in  him  that  responds  to  the  highest 
mankind  has  thought  and  done  ;  and,  for  calling 
out  this  response,  he  is  indebted  to  others.  Most 
of  all  in  religion,  which  is  a  response  to  the  Infinite, 
we  need  such  mediators,  who,  instead  of  interfering 
with  our  freedom,  as  Rationalism  ever  dreaded,  are 
the  chief  means  whereby  we  reach  it. 

In  life  there  are  two  opposite  activities.  The 
Deity  by  an  immutable  decree  appears  to  have 
divided  His  great  work  to  infinity.  Thus  we  see 
in  the  human  soul,  on  the  one  hand,  the  endeavour, 
by  absorbing  what  is  around  it  for  its  own  susten- 
ance and  increase,  to  establish  itself  as  an  indi- 
vidual ;  and,  on  the  other,  the  endeavour  to  avoid 
the  dread  fear  of  standing  over  against  the  Uni- 
verse, by  surrendering  oneself  to  be  absorbed  in 
a  Greater,  to  be  taken  hold  of  and  determined. 
Sometimes  one  tendency  is  extreme,  sometimes 
the  other.  The  commonest  and  lowest,  however, 
is  colourlessness  and  feebleness  of  both.  The  thing 
to  be  desired  is  that  both  activities,  self-surrender 
and  self-realisation,  should  be  at  once  invigorated 
and  reconciled.  Towards  that  object  we  can  only 
be  forwarded  by  those  prophetic  souls  who  have 
found  God  without  losing  themselves.     They  are 

15 


226     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

also  called  the  heroes  of  religion,  and  their  task  is 
to  reconcile  man  to  his  place  on  earth  by  interpret- 
ing to  him  the  misunderstood  voice  of  God  and  by 
opposing  to  his  restless  self-love  another  self-love, 
whereby,  in  this  earthly  life  and  along  with  it,  he 
can  love  the  Highest  and  the  Best. 

In  this  attitude  towards  life  and  towards  other 
men  the  great  significance  of  the  Romantic  move- 
ment appears.  Romanticism  saw  that  man  must 
be  free,  not  to  be  nothing,  but  to  be  something  ;  not 
in  a  vacuum,  but  in  a  world ;  not  in  disregard  for 
others,  but  in  possession  of  the  great  heritage  of 
the  race.  All  this  is  summed  up  by  Schleiermacher 
as  freedom  in  God,  and  freedom  in  God  may  be 
said  to  have  been  the  burden  of  his  message. 

But  another  question  still  remains  over  from 
Rationalism.  We  have  seen  that  strictly  speaking 
there  are  no  teachers  but  only  mediators  of  religion, 
and  that,  therefore,  seeing  they  only  help  us  to  our 
own  heritage,  no  debt  to  them  interferes  with  the 
freedom  of  the  religious  man.  But  it  still  remains 
to  be  shown  how  we  can  be  free,  if  we  owe  any 
debt  to  the  historical  religions. 

The  primary  intuition  which  gives  birth  to  re- 
ligion derives  its  significance  from  the  very  fact 
that,  like  the  seed  sown  in  the  ground,  it  does  not 
remain  alone.  Religion,  even  for  Schleiermacher, 
is  not  mere  mystical  absorption  in  the  Universe. 
That  is  the  beginning,  but  religion  continues  as 
"  the  working  of  the  hour  of  birth  ".  Or — to  use 
another  figure — in  the  harbour  of  his  own  soul  man 
fits  out  his  vessel,  and,  only  when  he  returns  thither 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  227 

again,  can  he  discover  what  wealth  he  has  brought 
back  from  foreign  shores.  Yet  he  must  make  his 
voyage  and  win  his  treasure  abroad,  if  he  would 
not  abide  in  penury.  Something  he  can  get  from 
nature  and  something  more  from  nature's  laws,  but 
nothing  in  comparison  with  what  he  gains  from 
humanity.  The  great  task  of  the  religious  man  is 
to  love  humanity,  to  regard  even  the  worst  indivi- 
dual as  a  revelation  of  endless,  undivided  humanity. 
That  is  the  truth  Romanticism  needed  and  which 
even  Schleiermacher  so  imperfectly  attained,  but  it 
is  to  his  credit  that,  in  that  age,  he  was  not  ig- 
norant of  the  necessity.  This  interest  in  humanity 
is  not  to  be  attributed  to  his  Romanticism,  but  to 
his  Moravianism ;  not  to  his  theory,  but  to  the 
deeper  religion  which  with  him  continually  went 
beyond  his  theory.  The  Moravian  element  in 
him,  however,  should  never  be  forgotten.  He  is 
always  a  religious  man  speaking  of  the  things  of 
religion,  which,  though  it  may  not  have  added  to  his 
consistency,  greatly  added  to  his  truth  and  power. 

But  if  our  treasure  is  thus  to  be  won  abroad, 
and  most  of  all  from  humanity,  history  must  be 
for  the  religious  man  the  greatest  and  most  general 
revelation  of  the  deepest  and  holiest.  For  religion 
history  is  prophecy,  predicting  that  the  rude,  the 
barbarian,  the  formless  will  be  recast,  that  nothing 
will  remain  dead  mass,  but  that  all  shall  be  made 
individual,  connected,  complex,  exalted  life.  Blind 
instinct,  unthinking  custom,  dull  obedience,  every- 
thing inert  and  passive,  all  the  sad  symptoms  of 
the  death  slumber  of  freedom  and  humanity  are 


228    ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

to  be  obliterated.  That  is  the  goal  of  the  minutes 
and  the  centuries,  the  great  ever-advancing  work 
of  redemptive  love. 

Here  we  have  Kant's  idea  of  the  Kingdom  of 
God,  with  the  Romantic  conception  of  individuality 
to  give  it  meaning,  and  the  doctrine  of  development 
to  put  it  in  motion. 

We  must  note,  however,  that  it  is  not  so  much 
to  history  as  to  a  philosophy  of  history  that  appeal 
is  made.  Now  no  philosophy  of  history  can  be  so 
unhistorical  as  to  neglect  the  religions.  In  many 
cases,  Schleiermacher  admits  they  are  degenerate. 
But  that  does  not  prove  them  to  be  unimportant, 
for  the  same  is  true  of  everything  in  time.  Religion 
is  debased  by  being  dragged  from  the  depths  of 
the  heart  into  the  civil  world,  but,  even  then,  every 
positive  religion  has  a  marked  physiognomy  of  its 
own,  and  the  worst  has  a  vigour  and  reality  nowhere 
discoverable  in  the  tags  of  metaphysics  known  as 
natural  religion.  And,  further,  even  what  is  now 
dead  dross  was  once  molten  outpourings  of  the 
inner  fire. 

A  man  no  more  loses  his  individuality  by  be- 
longing to  a  positive  religion,  than  by  belonging  to 
an  actual  society  or  an  actual  state.  Only  under 
such  great  common  influences  can  individuality  be 
created  and  displayed.  The  boasted  freedom  of 
natural  religion  is  mere  freedom  to  be  nothing  in 
particular.  It  has  a  providence  in  general,  a  right- 
eousness in  general,  a  divine  education  in  general. 
Why  it  exists  the  gods  may  know  !  Perhaps  to 
show  that  the  indefinite  also  can  have  a  kind  of 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  229 

existence  !  What  existence  it  does  have,  however, 
is  mainly  in  denial  and  in  violent  polemics.  And  its 
polemic  is  against  life,  like  objecting  to  be  born, 
because  of  the  necessity  of  being  a  particular  per- 
son and  not  a  man  in  general. 

A  historical  religion  is  a  repetition,  on  a  great 
scale,  of  our  own  awakening  to  the  sense  of  religion. 
To  religious  men  the  original  fact  upon  which  their 
own  religion  is  founded,  and  the  moment  when 
they  were  filled  with  the  consciousness  which  has 
become  the  centre  of  their  religious  life,  are  always 
sacred.  And  more  sacred  still  is  the  moment  when 
an  intuition  of  the  Infinite  was  set  up  in  the  world 
to  be  the  foundation  and  the  centre  of  a  particular 
religion. 

What  determines  the  character  of  a  religion  is 
this  intuition  and  the  way  everything  is  grouped 
round  it.  Not  by  the  mere  quantity  of  truth  it 
contains,  greater  or  less,  is  a  religion  to  be  esti- 
mated, but  by  its  special  intuition  of  the  Infinite. 
The  original  intuition  of  Judaism,  for  example,  is 
the  feeling  of  universal  retribution,  the  opposition 
of  God  to  all  caprice.  This  appears  in  that  marked 
feature  of  its  literature,  its  parallelism,  which  ex- 
presses the  continual  colloquy  in  word  and  deed 
which  goes  on  between  man  and  God  ;  and,  again, 
in  that  marked  feature  of  its  religious  life,  prophecy, 
which  is  the  presentation  of  the  part  of  the  dialogue 
not  yet  overtaken. 

The  intuition  of  every  religion  is  to  be  esteemed. 
All  religions  have  their  significance  as  manifesta- 
tions of  life  and  progress.     Yet  they  have  not  all 


230    ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

equal  value.  Christianity  is  assigned  a  distinctive 
place,  though  there  is  difference  of  opinion  as  to 
whether  in  the  Speeches  this  pre-eminence  is  re- 
garded as  final  or  not.  Strauss  takes  Christianity 
to  have  been  regarded  in  the  first  edition  as  merely 
one  of  many  religions,  the  highest,  but  not  other- 
wise distinct,  and  looks  on  all  the  alterations  of 
the  later  editions  as  a  painful  and  not  very  honest 
schoolmastering  of  the  younger  Schleiermacher  by 
the  older.  Albrecht  Ritschl  receives  the  same 
unsatisfactory  impression  from  the  book,  as  if  it 
merely  covered  its  abandonment  of  Christianity 
by  using  Christian  phraseology.  But  Ritschl's  son 
Otto  has  answered  both.^  He  draws  a  careful  dis- 
tinction between  what  Schleiermacher  considered 
profitable  to  bring  before  his  audience  of  cultured 
despisers,  and  the  hints  he  gives  of  his  own  fuller 
persuasion.  He  even  maintains  that  the  last  word 
in  the  book  is  the  recommendation  of  positive  reli- 
gion, and  of  Christianity  as  its  highest  embodiment. 
In  the  situation,  Schleiermacher's  exposition  was 
necessarily  exoteric,  determined,  that  is,  by  the  dis- 
tance to  which  he  could  hope  to  carry  his  audience. 
He  does  not,  however,  fail  to  indicate  his  own 
position,  for  he  speaks  of  Christianity  as  being  to 
his  readers  foolishness,  and  as  lying  at  an  endless 
distance  from  them,  plainly  hinting  that,  to  himself, 
it  is  otherwise. 

The  original  intuition  of  Christianity,  Schleier- 
macher maintains,  cannot  be  advanced  on.  It  is 
not  one  among  an  endless  number  of  intuitions  of 

^  Sohleiermacher's  Beden  iiber  die  Beligion. 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  231 

the  Infinite,  but  it  deals  with  the  opposition  of  all 
finite  things  to  God  and  with  God's  way  of  treat- 
ing this  resistance.  Corruption  and  redemption, 
hostility  and  mediation,  give  its  whole  form  to 
Christianity.  It  looks  upon  the  spiritual  world  as 
alienated,  and  upon  all  God's  dealings  as  directed 
to  the  work  of  reconciliation.  All  God's  works,  in 
its  eyes,  are  ever  new  devices  for  counteracting  the 
innate  irreligious  principle.  Christianity  thus  uses 
religion  as  matter  for  religion,  so  that  it  is  not  a  re- 
ligion merely,  but  religion  raised  to  a  higher  power. 
This  finality  of  Christianity  might  seem  to  be 
called  in  question  by  the  two  assertions  that,  un- 
like other  religions,  it  recognises  its  own  transitori- 
ness,  and  that  it  is  quite  ready  to  tolerate  other 
religions  alongside  of  it,  and  even  expects  to  see 
fairer  forms  of  religion  still  arise.  But  it  is  only 
when  all  things  are  reconciled  to  God  that  it  is  to 
pass,  only  when  its  purpose  is  wholly  fulfilled — a 
success  hardly  to  be  looked  for  on  this  side  of  time. 
Other  religions  it  tolerates,  not  because  they  might 
be  equally  good,  but  because  its  first  task  is  to 
maintain  its  own  purity,  to  be  intensive  not  exten- 
sive. As  for  the  fairer  forms,  they  are  evidently 
fairer  forms  of  Christianity  itself,  for,  as  there  is 
no  higher  intuition  of  God  than  the  Christian  idea 
of  reconciliation,  there  can  be  no  advance  upon  it. 
Nor,  with  Schleiermacher's  view  of  religion  as  an 
artistic  sense  of  the  unity  of  all  things,  could  he 
assign  any  less  significance  to  an  idea  so  much 
needed  if  we  are  to  find  repose  and  order  amid 
the  very  inartistic  turmoil  of  life. 


232     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

Of  the  founder  of  Christianity  he  says  in  one 
of  the  Explanations  added  to  the  third  edition,  ''  I 
acknowledge  a  purely  inward  and  mysterious  re- 
lation of  Christ  to  human  nature  generally  which 
is  absolutely  unlimited".  This,  it  has  been  main- 
tained, is  an  entire  departure  from  the  conception  of 
Christ  in  the  first  edition,  which  is  said  to  be  purely 
that  of  a  great  hero  of  religion.  But,  while  a  doc- 
trine of  Christ  could  not  be  expected  in  the  cir- 
cumstances, hints  of  a  higher  conception  are  not 
altogether  absent.  Before  we  can  see  the  Divine 
in  humanity,  he  says,  we  must  seek  a  "  Divine 
sign  ".  Among  all  the  holy  men  in  whom  humanity 
reveals  itself,  we  must  seek  one  who  shall  be  a  reli- 
gious mediator  for  the  transfiguration  of  our  intuition 
of  humanity.  And  a  higher  character  must  be  found 
in  man  to  relate  him  to  the  universe.  Every  religion 
has  sighed  for  something  outside  and  above  humanity 
to  fashion  and  take  possession  of  it.  When  within 
the  limits  of  humanity  *'  Divine  nature "  is  met, 
this  aspiration  is  satisfied.  So  Christ  remains  of 
abiding  value  for  mankind,  both  through  the  clear- 
ness with  which  the  original  intuition  of  alienation 
and  reconciliation  was  realised  in  Him,  and  through 
the  new  impulse  He  implanted  in  the  race. 

But  the  same  relation  to  humanity  which  re- 
quires religion  to  be  historical,  requires  it  also  to 
be  social.  This  social  quality  is  essential  to  it.  So 
personal  an  experience  needs  a  response  from  with- 
out to  witness  to  its  reality,  and  the  Infinite  is  a 
subject  which,  of  all  subjects,  we  can  least  exhaust 
by  ourselves,  and   in   respect   of  which  we  have 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  233 

most  need  to  share  with  others.  Seeing,  then,  that 
we  are  seeking  witnesses  and  partners,  our  profit 
lies  in  the  largest  mutual  interchange,  and  we  have 
nothing  to  tempt  us  to  cry,  "  No  salvation  except 
with  us  ". 

Having  made  the  distinction  between  the  Church 
Triumphant  and  the  Church  Militant,  we  must  not 
seek  the  former  where  hundreds  are  assembled  in 
the  great  temples.  The  virtuosos  in  religion  are 
always  few.  To  that  name  it  is  necessary  to  draw 
attention,  for  it  gives  a  hint  of  the  whole  concep- 
tion. The  Church  Triumphant  is  the  ideal  of  a 
true  religious  association  which  the  virtuoso,  the 
artist  in  religion,  carries  about  with  him,  in  which 
he  lives,  and  by  which  he  estimates  the  actual 
Church  at  its  proper  value,  which  is  not  specially 
high.  Of  outward  embodiment  all  he  needs  is  a 
fluid  society  where  he  may  easily  come  into  contact 
with  those  who  can  most  help  him  and  those  whom 
he  can  most  help. 

The  actual  Church  is,  at  best,  an  assembly  of 
persons  seeking  religion.  Too  often  it  is  still  less, 
consisting  of  people  who  are  rather  trying  to  eke 
out  the  want  of  religion  than  to  attain  religion 
itself.  They  expect  to  be  passive  while  one 
teaches  ;  they  set  limits  on  all  sides  to  the  ex- 
pression of  that  teacher's  most  individual  feelings 
and  intuitions,  so  prohibiting  what,  above  all  things, 
they  ought  to  demand  ;  they  receive  notions,  opin- 
ions, dogmas,  in  place  of  the  genuine  elements 
of  religion ;  finally  they  distract  themselves  from 
all  religious  concerns   by  absorption  in   practical 


234     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHEK'S 

affairs.  The  result  is  a  ruinous  sectarian  spirit. 
Religious  opinions,  being  deemed  the  way  of  attain- 
ing relijrion.  must  be  broucrht  into  a  system  to  be 
received  on  the  authority  of  him  who  propounds 
it.  Then  eyery  one  who  thinks  differently  must  be 
regarded  as  a  disturber.  All  this  strife,  division, 
insistence  on  dogma  and  degeneration  into  mytho- 
lotfv  is  not,  however,  from  religion.  On  the  con- 
trary,  it  is  quite  irreligious. 

But  here  it  may  be  objected  that,  even  if  this 
.state  of  things  is  not  due  to  the  \nrtuo.sos  in  holi- 
ness, it  at  least  proves  that  they  have  not  fulfilled 
their  task,  and  that,  if  the  Visible  Church  is  not  to 
be  regarded  as  their  work,  it  must,  at  least,  be  re- 
garded as  their  failure.  But  the  true  cau.se  of  a 
deficiency  so  grave  in  the  Church  is  precisely  that 
these,  its  true  leaders,  have  been  excluded  from 
their  task 

A  religion  arises  with  its  first  fre.sh  enthusiasm. 
The  fire  catches  all  round.  Presently  it  appears 
that  the  majority  have  only  responded  with  a  fleet- 
ing glow.  Then  the  Church  is  tempted  and  comes 
down  to  their  level.  Time  would  soon  put  this 
right  again,  for  the  indifferent  would  fall  awav. 
But  the  State  st€;ps  in,  and  then  everything  is 
fixed.  The  Church  is  turned  into  a  corporation, 
and  its  work  Is  made  secular  and  of  no  interest  to 
the  virtuoso  in  holiness.  In  return  for  this  calami- 
tous favour,  the  State  treats  the  Church  as  an 
institution  of  its  own  apjxjintment,  and  turns  the 
priest  from  being  a  religious  teacher  into  a  moralist 
in  the  .senice  of  the  State.     Would  that  this  fatal 


SPEECHES  OX  RELIGION  235 

gift  had  been  refused,  for  the  Church  never  needs 
anything  on  earth  but  room  and  utterance,  and  this 
hurtful  connection  with  the  State  cannot  be  too 
soon  ended. 

Just  as  little  should  the  Church  be  held  to- 
gether by  the  imholy  bond  of  creeii  as  by  the  se- 
cular bond  of  the  State.  Even  to  diWde  the  Church 
into  many  creeds  is  no  giiin.  Each  part,  like  the 
divisions  of  a  polypus,  then  becomes  a  whole,  and 
•*  many  individuals  are  not  better  than  fewer ". 
What  is  desired  is  a  duid  mass,  whei'ein  the  sec- 
tarian and  proselytising  spirit  has  ceased,  whei*e 
each  expresses  his  full  individuality  and  seeks  what 
is  in  attinity  with  it.  In  the  last  issue  the  only 
necess;\ry  visible  chuivh  may  be  the  family.  Mean- 
time our  reliance  must  not  be  on  any  outward  bond. 
The  great  bond  is  for  each  to  approach  the  Uni- 
verse and  commimicate  with  othei*s.  The  more 
that  is  accomplishod.  the  more  perfectly  all  are 
one. 

Most  of  this  is  true  at  all  times  regaixiing  the 
Church,  and  was  specially  true  when  it  was  written. 
Yet  the  very  low  estimate  of  the  Visible  Chuix^h 
and  the  very  unsymj^\thetic  estimate  of  its  divi- 
sions are  plainly  inconsistent  with  the  enthusiasm 
for  individuality  which  characterises  the  rest  of 
the  book.  If  natural  religion  is  a  hollow  abstrac- 
tion, what  is  to  bo  said  of  a  natural  church  ?  If  a 
religion  does  not  lose  its  signiticauce  by  falling  into 
corruption,  why  should  a  church  ?  If  it  be  the 
Divine  way  that  a  religion  must  operate  on  the 
world,  not  by  remaining  pure,  but  by  entering  into 


236     ROMANTICISM  AND  SCHLEIERMACHER'S 

the  world,  and  then  striving  to  regain  its  purity, 
why  should  it  not  be  the  Divine  way  that  the 
Church  should  operate,  not  by  keeping  apart  from 
social  organisations,  but  by  struggling  ever  to  rise 
above  them,  so  as  to  be  in  the  world  yet  not  of  it  ? 
It  cannot  be  consistent  to  maintain  that  a  religion 
must  work  on  the  world,  even  though  it  stain  its 
purity  in  doing  so,  and  take  no  account  of  the  good 
in  the  actual  channels  by  which  its  influence  has 
travelled.  To  have  a  Church  in  general  must  be 
as  useless  as  to  have  a  religion  in  general. 

But,  however  illogical  the  position  may  be,  it 
accords  entirely  with  the  spirit  of  the  system. 
Religion  is  a  matter  chiefly  of  large  impressions. 
It  has  no  special  victory  to  accomplish  in  the  world. 
All  it  needs,  therefore,  is  the  free  intercourse  of  an 
artistic  society,  where  each  may  find  what  will 
kindle  his  own  enthusiasm.  There  is  no  common 
task  for  which  a  closer  association  might  be  neces- 
sary. The  pantheistic  idea  of  God,  the  merely 
contemplative  idea  of  Christ,  the  merely  philo- 
sophical treatment  of  history,  the  view  of  the 
Church  as  a  fluid  artistic  association,  all  go  back 
to  one  root  and  all  indicate  the  same  attitude. 
The  interest  is  so  concentrated  on  individuality, 
that  the  individual  disappears  behind  it.  Man 
does  not  stand,  as  he  did  to  the  writers  of  the 
eighteenth  century,  with  the  burden  of  his  freedom 
on  his  own  shoulders,  distinct  both  from  God  and 
from  other  men,  arraigning  himself  before  the 
tribunal  of  his  own  conscience  and  laying  upon 
himself  the  burden  of  his  own  duty.     When  that 


SPEECHES  ON  RELIGION  237 

was  all,  freedom  was  apt  to  be  an  empty  idea,  and 
it  is  Schleiermacher's  enduring  merit  that  he  in- 
sisted that  man  must  be  free  to  be  something,  and 
that  there  is  no  real  freedom  except  in  God.  But, 
on  the  other  hand,  though  Christianity  is  said  to 
be  wholly  concerned  with  ruin  and  redemption,  the 
ruin  is  not  of  sin,  but  is  only  the  striving  of  the 
finite  against  the  Infinite — rather  an  artistic  than 
a  spiritual  failure.  The  individual  with  his  own 
responsibility,  his  own  guilt,  his  own  weakness,  his 
own  need  of  victory  is  not  asserted. 

This  defect  is  not  merely  Schleiermacher's  per- 
sonal failure.  It  belongs  to  the  whole  Romantic 
conception  of  development.  The  doctrine  of  de- 
velopment has  ample  room  for  individuality  in  all 
shades  and  phases.  The  very  purpose  of  its  opera- 
tion seems  to  be  the  creation  of  variety  and  com- 
plexity of  life.  But  amid  the  continual  flow  of 
change,  it  finds  no  place  for  the  permanence  and 
worth  of  the  individual  as  an  individual.  That 
has  been  its  moral  weakness  throughout,  and  the 
great  task,  one  that  would  be  of  incalculable  gain 
for  the  strenuousness  of  life,  is  to  find  a  rock  in 
the  stream  on  which  to  set  the  individual  with  his 
unchanging  identity  and  his  abiding  responsibility. 


LECTURE   VI 

THE   EEVOLUTION  AND  NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA 


Wordsworth  and  Coleridge,  Lyrical  Ballads,  1798. 

Hegel,  Encydopcidie  der  philosophischeii  Wissenschaften,  1817. 

Schleiermacher,  Der  christliche  Glauhe,  1821. 

Coleridge,  Aids  to  Beflection,  1825. 

Hegel,  Beligionsphilosophie,  1832. 

Tracts  for  the  Times,  1833. 

Newman,  Apologia  pro  Vita  sua,  1864. 

Books  of  Reference 

Spinoza  tmd  Schleiermacher,  Theodor  Kamerer,  1903.  Schleier- 
machers  Glaubenslehre  in  ihrer  Bedeutung  fur  Vergangen- 
heit  und  Zukunft,  Carl  Clemen,  1905.  Hegel's  Philosophy 
of  Beligion,  trans,  by  E.  B.  Spiers  and  J.  B.  Sanderson, 
1895.  Hegel's  Philosophy  of  History,  trans,  by  J.  Sibree, 
1857.  The  Logic  of  Hegel,  W.  Wallace.  Hegelianism  and 
Personality,  1887 ;  Man's  Place  in  the  Cosmos,  1902 ;  and 
The  Development  from  Kant  to  Hegel,  A.  Seth  Pringle- 
Pattison.  Kahnis,  hiternal  History  of  German  Protestant- 
ism, trans.  T.  Meyer,  1856.  The  Oxford  Movement,  E.  W. 
Church,  1892.  Letters  and  Correspondence  of  John  Henry 
Neivman  dimng  his  Life  in  the  English  Church,  Anne 
Mozley,  1891.  Modern  Guides  of  English  Thought  in 
Matters  of  Faith,  1900,  and  Cardinal  Newmati,  1891,  R.  H. 
Hutton.  Cardinal  Neivman,  Wm.  Barry,  1904.  The  his- 
torians of  theology  as  above,  especially  Pfleiderer  and  von 
Frank  on  Schleiermacher. 


LECTURE  VI 

THE  EEVOLUTION   AND   NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA 

The  Komanticism  of  the  last  lecture  flourished  in 
the  dawn  of  the  French  Revolution,  in  the  days 
when,  Wordsworth  says,  it  was  bliss  to  be  alive, 
and  to  be  young  was  very  heaven.  Humanity,  like 
Samson,  was  awaking  and  rending  its  withes  ;  and 
henceforth  evolution  would  be  what  the  Deity 
meant  it  to  be,  a  fair  and  even  progress.  Only  ten 
years  later,  and  the  temper  of  the  nations  had  en- 
tirely changed.  In  the  sacred  name  of  freedom  the 
Revolution  had  assailed  rights  for  which  men  wish 
to  be  free,  and  the  last  rampart  against  the  flood 
had  vanished  in  one  day  at  Jena.  Then  men's 
thoughts  changed.  So  long  as  the  great  army  of 
Frederick  was  believed  to  be  an  adamantine  bul- 
wark of  the  existing  social  order,  it  was  easy  to 
believe  that  the  Revolution  was  a  cleansing  flood  ; 
when  it  swept  unchecked  over  all  shores,  it  was 
hard  to  think  of  it  as  anything  but  a  devastation. 
Men  began  to  discover  that  they  might  pursue 
the  form  of  freedom  and  miss  the  substance ;  and 
then  a  serious  spirit  fell  upon  the  age.  "  Only  in 
the  days  of  calamity,"  says  Schleiermacher,  "  which 
were   the  days  of  glory,  did  we  again  learn   the 

power  of  common  sentiments,  and  then  the  con- 

(241)  16 


242  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

sciousness  and  consolation  of  a  common  piety  re- 
turned." The  importance  of  the  social  state  became 
apparent,  and  especially  the  need  for  some  fellow- 
ship in  pursuit  of  righteousness  which  could  be 
called  a  church.  The  difference  is  nowhere  more 
apparent  than  in  Schleiermacher,  who  himself  re- 
cognises that  all  the  changes  in  his  later  thinking 
have  their  root  in  a  higher  estimate  of  the  import- 
ance of  the  actual  Christian  society. 

This  is  manifest  in  his  two  characteristic  concep- 
tions of  the  function  of  dogmatic  theology  and  the 
nature  of  Christian  piety,  both  fundamental  ideas 
in  the  Glauhenslehre. 

Dogmatic  theology  he  defines  as  "  the  science  of 
the  system  of  teaching  obtaining  in  a  Christian 
society  at  a  given  time,"  the  purpose  of  which  is  to 
help  forward  a  harmonious  guidance  of  the  Chris- 
tian Church.^  Hegel  takes  this  to  mean  that  theo- 
logy is  to  be  an  account  of  what  other  people  think, 
and  he  assails  it  as  an  abandonment  of  the  task  of 
finding  the  truth. ^  Ritschl,  on  the  other  hand, 
praises  this  recognition  of  the  Christian  society  as 
Schleiermacher's  chief  service.  As  Schleiermacher 
imposes  upon  theology  the  task  of  showing  the 
harmony  between  speculation,  which  is  the  highest 
objective  function  of  the  human  spirit,  and  the  pious 
self-consciousness,  which  is  the  highest  subjective, 
he  cannot  have  meant,  as  Hegel  sujjposes,  to  shirk 
the  task  of  showing  somehow  that  what  he  says  is 
true.     What  he  does  contend  for  is  that  Christian- 

1  Der  Christliche  Glaube,  1884,  i.,  pp.  102  and  108. 
"  Philosojjhy  of  Bel ig ion,  Eng.  trans.,  i.,  40. 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  243 

ity,  in  its  essence,  is  a  fellowship,  that  Christian 
piety  of  necessity  leads  to  the  Christian  society,  and 
that  the  Christian  theologian,  writing  in  the  society 
and  for  it,  must  meet  the  test,  not  only  of  his  own 
individual  conviction,  but  of  application  in  the 
society. 

Piety  he  defines  as  "  the  feeling  of  absolute 
dependence  ".  That  conception  governs  his  whole 
later  system.  The  expression  affords  excuse  for 
Hegel's  criticism  that  it  makes  the  dog  a  more  pious 
animal  than  his  master.  But  Schleiermacher  did 
not  mean  absolute  in  the  sense  merely  of  unlimited. 
It  is  absolute  because  its  object  is  the  Absolute. 
Practically  it  means  the  same  as  the  former  defini- 
tion, "  sense  or  intuition  of  the  Infinite  ".  The 
essential  thing  in  real  religion  is  still  the  feeling 
of  the  Infinite  as  something  we  everywhere  come 

upon, 

a  sense  sublime 
Of  something  far  more  deeply  interfused. 

It  is  still  the  sense  that  life  is  an  intercourse  not 
of  one  person  with  a  multitude  of  things,  but  of  one 
person  with  one  Infinite.  But  the  new  expression 
is  chosen  to  avoid  the  appearance  of  making  religion 
begin  and  end  with  mystical  feeling.  Feeling  is  not 
mere  emotion,  but  an  immediate  consciousness,  a 
direct  contact  with  reality,  a  creative  experience  out 
of  which  all  knowledge  and  all  activity  are  engen- 
dered. Just  because  it  is  immediate  contact  with 
reality,  it  at  once  divides  into  thought  on  the  one 
hand  and  action  on  the  other,  and  proceeds  to  build 
up  its  system  of  things.    That  the  pious  feeling,  the 


244  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

feeling  of  the  Infinite,  is  capable  of  a  like  develop- 
ment, that  it  at  once  divides  into  doctrine  on  the 
one  hand  and  morals  on  the  other,  and  so  builds  up 
its  system  of  faith  and  duty,  Schleiermacher  now 
labours  more  fully  to  express.  In  the  old  days  he 
conceived  the  Universe  as  the  great  work  of  art 
wherein  man  found  scope  and  variety.  Now  he 
thinks  of  it  rather  as  the  great  system  in  which  men 
may  build  their  own  systems  of  society  securely 
and  be  assured  of  peace.  Sense  or  intuition  cor- 
responded with  the  conception  of  a  work  of  art ; 
the  feeling  of  absolute  dependence  is  the  same 
thing  adapted  to  the  conception  of  a  system. 

This  absolute  dependence  on  the  one  Infinite 
carries  with  it  an  absolute  relation  to  all  rational 
creatures.  The  task  of  progress  is  to  fashion  a 
fellowship  to  be  a  joint  recognition  of  the  common 
order  and  a  joint  refuge  from  the  common  corrup- 
tion. That  fellowship  is  the  goal  of  history,  and 
Christ  derives  His  significance  from  being  the  Ideal 
which  the  society  needs,  but  cannot  itself  be. 

The  same  determination  to  get  beyond  mere 
feeling  is  still  more  marked  in  Hegel.  His  i)hilo- 
sophy  professes  to  unfold  nothing  less  than  the 
great  system  in  which  man's  societies  and  systems 
of  thought  find  their  due  place.  The  appearance  of 
these  two  great  system-builders  together  is  more 
than  an  accident.  A  system  of  things  was  a  re- 
ligious and  not  merely  an  intellectual  requirement. 
It  was  the  way  of  securing  both  the  substance  and 
the  form  of  freedom  which  met  the  need  of  the 
time.    The  Revolution  had  taught  that  true  freedom 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  245 

could  only  exist  in  an  ordered  world.  But,  in  the 
troubled  days  which  followed,  it  was  impossible  to 
think  any  more  of  an  ordered  world  as  a  work  of 
art  without  any  discords.  Wherefore,  men  were 
forced  to  think  of  it  as  a  system  which  could  in- 
clude and  harmonise  discords.  In  accordance  with 
this  necessity  both  Hegel  and  Schleiermacher  aim 
at  a  system  wherein  the  natural  shall  be  super- 
natural and  the  supernatural  natural,  wherein  God 
shall  not  be  interpreted  by  incidents  but  by  the 
system  as  a  whole. 

For  both,  history  is  the  true  revelation  of  God. 
As  the  revolutionary,  negative,  antagonistic  element 
in  history  was  then  much  in  men's  thoughts,  the 
first  part  of  the  endeavour  of  both'  was  to  find  a 
place  for  it.  Those  who  were  born  in  the  days  of 
the  Revolution  could  regard  it  as  a  mere  eruption 
from  the  pit,  but  those  who  were  old  enough  to 
have  known  all  that  preceded  it  always  felt  the 
obligation  laid  upon  them  to  acknowledge  something 
of  a  Divine  purpose  in  it.  Hence,  indeed,  the  re- 
ligious necessity  of  a  system.  It  was  a  method  of 
explaining  the  negative,  a  method  of  justifying  the 
seemingly  chaotic  ways  of  God  to  man. 

The  essential  thing  in  the  explanation  of  both 
is  the  same.  The  antagonisms  only  exist  in  time. 
God  is  beyond  the  region  of  antithesis,  beyond 
contrasts  and  oppositions,  beyond  the  whole  strife 
between  good  and  evil  in  which  we  at  present  live. 
The  bad,  Schleiermacher  argues,  is  a  necessary  part 
of  the  good.  The  good  could  only  come  into  action 
"  through  the  ability  of  man  to  come  forward  with 


246  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

what  is  in  him,"  and  that  involves  the  possibility  of 
evil.  He  even  seems  to  argue  for  more  than  a 
possibility,  as  if  evil  were  a  necessity  for  finite 
creatures,  an  unavoidable  stage  in  development. 
The  bad,  being  in  this  way  only  a  consequence  of 
what  is  good,  is,  in  a  sense,  not  from  God,  and,  as 
the  good  develops,  it  will  disappear.^  To  Hegel 
suffering  and  sin  are  necessary  aspects  of  Spirit  in 
its  progress,  valleys  through  the  gloomy  bottoms  of 
which  we  pass  on  to  the  heights.  This  place  of 
the  negative  in  progress  is  the  most  characteristic 
feature  of  his  whole  scheme  of  thought. 

Development  by  suffering,  struggle,  sin,  is  the 
centre  of  both  systems.  Progress  is  no  longer 
an  even  process  of  fruit  ripening  in  the  summer 
sun.  Nevertheless,  both  were  still  seeking  the  old 
Romanticist  idea  of  freedom  as  the  luxuriant  ex- 
pansion of  individuality.  Hence  the  reality  of 
this  struggle  had  somehow  to  be  denied.  Sin  for 
Schleiermacher  is  restriction  of  the  consciousness 
of  God,  and  for  Hegel  it  is  in  a  similar  way  a  matter 
of  limitation  not  of  transgression. 

The  feeling  of  absolute  dependence  which  is  true 
piety,  Schleiermacher  says,  involves  a  belief  in  the 
original  perfection  of  the  world.  But  that  original 
perfection  may  only  be  an  original  possibility  of 
being  perfected.  No  actual  good  exists  that  has 
not  come  into  being  through  struggle.  In  the 
course  of  development  conflict  must  arise,  because 
the  spirit,  being  one,  advances  by  moments  of  re- 
markable illumination  and  quickening  ;  whereas  the 
'-  On  his  view  of  sia  see  i.,  pp.  348-50. 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  247 

lower  powers  of  sense,  being  a  multitude,  require 
to  be  vanquished  in  detail.  Hence  the  develop- 
ment becomes  irregular,  and  sin,  as  the  sense  of  the 
restriction  of  the  consciousness  of  God,  enters.  The 
removal  of  this  restriction  is  redemption,  but  that 
process  also  is  so  irregular  that  guilt  and  ill-desert 
must  come  in  to  prepare  the  way.  Hence  arises 
also  a  heritage  of  sinful  impulse  which  we  make 
our  own  by  accepting  and  furthering,  and  we  need 
not  only  individual  succour,  but  the  shelter  of  a 
divinely  effected  common  life  to  counterwork  sin 
and  the  unhappiness  which  follows  it.  The  crea- 
tion of  this  Divine  common  life  is  for  him  the  very 
goal  of  history.  It  is  at  once  the  greatest  task  and 
the  crowning  need  of  freedom. 

Hegel  starts  from  the  same  point  as  Schleier- 
macher — from  the  moment  of  contact  between  the 
individual  and  the  Universal  Reason.  The  differ- 
ence is  only  in  the  more  intellectual  nature  of 
Hegel's  solution.  For  Schleiermacher  the  creative 
element  is  feeling ;  for  Hegel  the  only  reality  is 
thought.  Perception,  with  Hegel,  is  a  rethinking 
God's  thought ;  it  is  picture  thought.  His  whole 
scheme  rests  on  one  great  postulate.  If  the  Uni- 
versal Mind  can  be  thus  interpreted  by  my  mind, 
the  process  of  thinking  must  be  identical  in  both. 
There  cannot  be  two  kinds  of  thought,  and  hence, 
as  God  is  not  the  highest  feeling  but  the  highest 
thought,  the  individual  reason  must  be  the  key  to 
the  Universal  Reason.  As  Spirit  is  the  ultimate,  in 
the  end  the  only,  reality,  this  movement  of  reason 
or  spirit  must  be  the  key  to  everything.     Truth  and 


248  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

the  free  spirit  are  identical.  Free  means  being 
delivered  from  what  is  individual  and  particular. 
Our  minds,  being  free  from  such  disturbance,  being 
in  their  own  unperturbed  orbit,  correspond  with 
God's  orbit,  so  that  the  whole  process  of  the  world 
is  a  sort  of  logic  in  action. 

To  find  the  key  to  the  Universe,  then,  we  only- 
need  to  discover  the  true  process  of  thought.  Now 
the  essence  of  thinking  is,  first,  to  distinguish,  to 
make  differences,  and  second,  to  surmount  them, 
to  find  agreements.  I  cannot  think  in  my  own 
soul.  An  object  I  must  have,  and  it  must  stand  over 
against  me,  different  from  me,  alien  to  me.  Yet 
the  task  of  coming  to  know  it  is  a  process  of  bring- 
ing it  back  into  myself  and  of  finding  myself  in  it. 
This  is  the  rhythm,  the  pure,  eternal  life  of  Spirit. 
In  this  process  of  setting  something  over  against 
itself,  and  then  of  finding  itself  in  it,  this  process  of 
negation  and  reconciliation,  the  notion  unfolds  itself 
according  to  a  necessity  which  is  the  process  by 
which  the  Universal  Spirit  creates  actuality,  as  well 
as  that  by  which  the  individual  spirit  knows  it. 

In  this  process  negation  is  essential.  The 
general  impression  with  which  we  start  contains 
everything,  but,  not  until  we  discern  differences  in 
it,  is  anything  clear  in  it,  anything  individual.  And 
this  progress  by  division,  by  opposition,  is  as  true 
of  the  Universal  Mind  as  of  ours.  The  Christian 
truth  that  we  must  deny  self  to  live  to  self  is  the 
method  of  Spirit  in  its  whole  advance  from  the 
lowest  natural  form  to  the  highest  self-conscious- 
ness.     Wherefore,  we  can  in  one  sense  say  that 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  249 

everything  was  in  God  from  the  beginning,  but  only 
in  the  undefined  sense  that  everything  is  contained 
in  a  general  proposition.  The  individualising  and 
realising  is  through  this  process  of  discriminating 
and  reconciling,  so  that  God  only  understands  Him- 
self in  His  universe.  Thus  God  for  Hegel  is  not 
merely  the  great  System-builder,  He  is  the  great 
System  in  which  everything  is  right  because  every- 
thing is  in  its  place. 

History,  then,  is  this  movement  of  Spirit  on  its 
way  to  self-consciousness,  and  the  historical  religions 
are  important  stages.  All  have  their  place  and 
their  importance,  but  Christianity  is  the  absolute 
religion,  because  it  has  attained  the  absolute  truth 
of  the  movement  of  Spirit  in  its  doctrine  of  the 
Trinity  and  in  its  idea  of  reconciliation  in  the  God- 
Man.  God  the  Father  is  the  unity  out  of  which  all 
comes,  but  in  which  nothing  is  defined.  He  repro- 
duces Himself  out  of  Himself  and  distinguishes 
Himself  from  Himself  in  the  form  of  the  Son. 
Then  the  reconciliation  takes  place  in  the  Holy 
Spirit.  And,  at  the  same  time  that  God  is  justly 
conceived,  the  right  relation  between  God  and  man 
is  justly  conceived.  The  hard  division  between 
man  and  God  which  Rationalism  carried  through  so 
drastically  is  overcome.  God  is  found  in  man  and 
man  in  God,  and  so  the  finite  and  the  Infinite  are 
reconciled. 

Through  this  scheme  we  see  Hegel's  interpreta- 
tion of  the  lesson  of  his  age.  But  he  also  definitely 
refers  to  it.  The  French  Revolution,  he  says,  was 
the  result  of  two  partial  ideas  coming  together,  not 


250  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

in  union  but  in  collision.  Religion  prescribed  law 
for  eternity  and  the  State  for  time.  Two  things 
that  should  go  together  were  thus  separated,  till  in 
the  Catholic  States  personal  freedom  came  to  be 
looked  on  as  opposed  to  religion.  It  seemed  to  set 
up  against  religion  subjective  freedom  as  something 
true  in  and  for  itself.  Conflict  then  ensued  between 
the  religious  principle  which  requires  the  surrender 
of  the  will,  and  the  worldly  principle  which  makes 
the  will  the  foundation  of  everything.  Religion  in 
this  purely  negative  attitude  is  thus,  in  Hegel's  eyes, 
the  prime  revolutionary  force. 

That  religion  should  maintain  the  substance  of 
freedom  is,  in  his  view,  not  enough.  The  form 
is  also  essential.  I  must  be  free  in  the  sense  of 
being  in  accord  with  truth  and  reality,  i.e.,  with 
God  ;  but  I  must  also  be  free  in  the  sense  of  ac- 
cepting myself  my  own  beliefs  and  choosing  myself 
my  own  actions.  Except  I  am  thus  free  both  in 
my  own  soul  and  in  God,  I  am  not  really  free. 
Plato's  Republic,  for  example,  which  considers  only 
the  arrangements  of  freedom,  does  not  present 
freedom ;  nor  does  Kant's  Metaphysic  of  Ethics, 
which  only  asserts  the  categorical  imperative,  the 
form  of  freedom.^  Both  elements  are  required  in 
true  freedom. 

With  all  this  Schleiermacher  was  in  essential 
agreement,  the  basis  of  all  his  theology  being 
Freedom  in  God.  As  God  is  the  goal  of  all  de- 
velopment and  the  bond  of  all  true  fellowship,  as 
immediate  knowledge  of  Him  is  the  higher  life, 

^  Philosophy  of  Beligion,  i.,  252  ff. 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  251 

while  distraction  among  the  various  calls  of  the 
senses  is  the  lower,  we  cannot  truly  be  free  in  God 
without  being  free  in  our  own  souls.  Both  to 
Schleiermacher  and  to  Hegel  freedom  and  truth 
are  one,  because  God  and  man  are,  or  may  be,  one. 
In  finding  the  truth  man  finds  himself,  finds  what 
reveals  him  to  himself,  while  the  presence  of  the 
Divine  is  its  own  witness  to  minds  made  in  God's 
image,  the  appeal  of  the  actual  to  the  potential,  of 
attainment  to  original  disposition. 

All  this  is  of  the  first  importance  for  the  con- 
viction that  genuine  faith  and  real  freedom  can 
never  be  in  disagreement,  but  when  we  come  to 
ask  how  this  freedom  is  attained  and  what  this 
freedom  really  is,  the  weakness  of  the  whole 
Romantic  Movement  even  in  its  highest  and  most 
serious  mood  becomes  apparent.  Freedom  with 
Hegel  and  Schleiermacher  alike  is  rather  a  result 
of  progressive  development  than  a  work  of  purpose 
and  endeavour.  Man  rather  registers  the  barometer 
than  does  anything  to  improve  the  weather.  As 
Ritschl  says,  Hegel  made  nothing  of  the  individual 
will,  but  gave  exclusive  heed  to  the  development 
of  the  good  in  the  form  of  states ;  while  Schleier- 
macher, through  his  intentional  indifference  to  the 
idea  of  will,  built  his  comjDrehensive  organisation 
of  the  ethical  system  in  the  air.^ 

But  to  give  any  other  place  to  will  was  to 
abandon  the  whole  artistic  explanation,  was  to  in- 
troduce disharmonies  which  could  not  be  treated 
as  mere  discords  to  perfect  the  music.     Will  is  a 

^  Bitschls  Leben,  ii.,  347. 


252  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

disturbing  element  to  include  in  the  perfection  of 
a  system. 

But  while  so  much  similarity  in  men  so  widely 
different  shows  that  they  reflect  the  spirit  of  the 
age,  Schleiermacher  and  Hegel  also  represent  the 
division  that  was  appearing  in  the  age. 

Though  Hegel  exalts  religion  as  the  necessary 
completion  of  the  natural  and  the  moral,  in  practice 
he  differs  very  little  from  the  old  view  that  religion 
is  a  kind  of  popular  philosophy.  Historically  indeed 
he  assigns  it  a  higher  significance,  for  he  sees  that  it 
embodies  large  human  interests  and  that  it  is  a  great 
creative  force.  But  in  respect  of  its  present  value 
it  contains  the  truth  onl}^  in  an  instinctive,  popular, 
pictorial  way.  Philosophy  alone  can  state  it  ab- 
solutely. Worship  is  a  practical  reconciliation  of 
the  Divine  and  the  human,  but  philosophy  is  a 
continuous  worship.  The  reconciliations  which 
religion  only  gropes  after,  philosophy,  by  showing 
how  everything  is  right  in  its  due  place  in  the  great 
scheme,  wholly  attains.  In  the  last  issue  we  come 
upon  a  great  formula,  and  when  that  absolute  truth 
is  found,  religion  is  not  only  satisfied  but  surpassed. 

Schleiermacher,  on  the  contrary,  maintains  that 
we  cannot  know  God  in  that  absolute  sense.  We 
know  Him  only  as  He  is  reflected  in  ourselves. 
Theology  is  not  a  statement  of  absolute  formulas, 
but  only  a  description  of  the  pious  states  of  con- 
sciousness in  which  the  Divine  is  mirrored,  and 
religion  is  not  theology,  not  any  doctrine,  but  a 
feeling,  a  sense,  a  direct  relation.^ 

1  Der  ChrisUiche  Glaube,  i,,  pp.  6,  94,  158. 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  253 

In  opposition  to  this  attitude  Hegel  argues  that 
religion  has  always  been  first  of  all  doctrine,  and 
doctrine  has  always  been  accepted  as  a  statement 
of  absolute  truth.  ^ 

The  difference  is  not  intellectual  merely.  It  is 
a  difference  in  the  conception  of  the  faith  by  which 
men  can  be  free.  Whether  Hegelianism  is  to  be 
called  pantheism  or  not  is  largely  a  matter  of  words, 
but  it  is  pantheistic  in  the  sense  of  seeking  a  free- 
dom which  can  sit  at  the  centre  and  watch  the 
planets  roll,  which  can  know  the  whole  current  and 
disregard  the  eddies,  which  can  contemplate  the 
Universe  and  disregard  the  incidents.  At  first 
sight  such  absolute  knowledge  seems  alone  to  meet 
our  need  of  reality,  while  the  admission  that  re- 
ligious knowledge  is  relative  to  our  needs  seems  to 
concede  that  it  is  not  knowledge  of  reality  at  all. 
It  also  seems  at  first  sight  to  make  us  masters  of 
the  whole  situation  and  to  give  a  marvellous  sense 
of  emancipation.  But  we  soon  find  that  it  is  no 
gain  in  knowledge  to  neglect  the  relation  to  us  by 
which  alone  we  can  know  it.  So  far  as  knowledge 
from  experience  goes,  it  is  real  knowledge,  and  its 
very  inadequacy  leaves  us  with  a  sense  of  freedom  ; 
whereas  a  great  formula  which  comprehends  God 
reaches  so  far  beyond  man's  grasp  as  to  leave  us 
sure  of  nothing  but  a  great  inexorable  force. 

Nevertheless,  the  Hegelian  idea  of  religion  as 

essentially  doctrine  made  a  powerful  appeal  to  an 

age  that  was  above  everything  in  search  of  rest. 

Men  had  been  wearied  by  struggle  into  something 

^  Philosophy  of  Beligion,  i.,  38  ff.,  and  ii.,  343. 


254  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

of  an  Oriental  willingness  to  take  rest  for  peace, 
and  in  Hegelianism  there  was  something  of  the 
Oriental  pantheistic  answer  to  man's  turmoil  which 
met  this  weariness.  It  all  ends  in  intellectual 
contemplation,  in  the  vision  of  the  panorama  of 
progress,  in  making  history  a  movement  and  Christ 
an  idea,  but  it  seemed  to  offer  a  way  back  to  a  well- 
founded  orthodoxy  and  a  stable  order. 

Schleiermacher's  conception  of  God  is  also  tinged 
with  pantheism  to  the  extent  of  corrupting  his  whole 
view  of  Christianity,  but  the  ditierence  can  be  seen 
in  his  doctrine  of  Christ.  With  his  view  of  history 
he  must  also  give  Christ  an  important  place,  but  it 
is  as  a  moral  force,  not  as  a  mere  logical  idea. 

He  is  careful  to  make  Christ  part  of  the  system, 
to  make  Him,  like  the  rest,  both  natural  and  super- 
natural ;  but  religion  is  a  prime  reality  with  Schleier- 
macher  and  no  mere  rudiments  of  philosophy,  and, 
in  his  doctrine  of  Christ,  he  cannot  help  caring  for 
the  religious  interests  of  faith  and  hope  and  love. 

The  perfect  society,  he  argues,  in  which  we  ought 
to  work  out  our  salvation  is  at  the  present  time  an 
impossibility,  but  a  perfect  individual  is  possible. 
Wherefore,  the  perfection  of  the  Church  is  not  in 
its  state  at  any  time  or  in  any  communion,  but  in 
having,  as  a  common  possession,  the  sinless  perfec- 
tion of  Christ  to  which  every  one  may  turn  as  the 
ideal  of  the  society.  Such  a  manifestation,  however, 
is  not  a  purely  supernatural  and  separate  act.  The 
appearance  of  Christ  in  our  humanity  is  only  a  reve- 
lation of  a  capacity  for  the  consciousness  of  God 
implanted  from  the  beginning.      Christ's  work  is 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  255 

simply  a  completion  of  the  creation  of  human 
nature.  In  this  sense  of  expressing  the  perfect 
consciousness  of  God  Jesus  is  Divine.  He  is  arche- 
typal {^arbildlich),  not  merely  exemplary  {vorbild- 
lich)}  He  is  the  manifestation  in  a  definite  person 
of  an  eternal  act,  the  highest  development  of  an 
already  existing  power,  the  completion  for  which 
all  that  went  before  was  preparation. 

Just  because  this  conception  is  based  on  a 
true  idea  of  freedom  as  a  thing  of  character  and 
purpose,  it  remains  to  this  day  an  indication  of  the 
right  solution.  But  for  that  very  reason  its  efifect 
was  less  immediate.  The  Church  thought  it  found 
a  greater  security  in  Hegelianism  with  its  revival 
of  old  formulas,  its  justification  of  existing  institu- 
tions, its  insistence  on  doctrine.  Hegel,  too,  re- 
garded himself  as  a  good  Protestant,  but  he  did 
more  than  any  other  to  provide  intellectual  shelter 
for  the  Catholic  revival,  and  at  the  same  time,  it 
must  be  added,  for  the  most  negative  movement. 
Nor  will  this  combination  seem  strange,  if  we  re- 
member that  both  the  extreme  right  and  the 
extreme  left  sought  their  freedom  in  completeness 
of  system,  and  that  both  were  determined  to  bring 
the  struggle  of  contending  interests  to  a  final  issue. 

The  Kevolution  formed  for  Romanticism  an 
intellectual  and  spiritual  watershed  which  made 
one  stream  travel,  like  the  Danube,  to  the  East,  and 
the  other,  like  the  Khine,  to  the  West.  What 
determined  the  direction  was  the  way  in  which 
quiet  was  to  be  sought.      This  depended  on  the 

1  ii.,  28  ff. 


256  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

interpretation  of  the  Revolution.  If  it  were  mere 
anarchy  nurtured  by  excess  of  Hberty,  it  was  to  be 
suppressed  as  a  revolt  against  properly  constituted 
authority  and  against  the  God  who  appointed  that 
authority.  If,  however,  it  had  been  suckled  at  the 
breasts  of  oppression,  then  the  body  politic  was 
only  suffering  from  a  raging  but  recuperative  sick- 
ness which  must  be  gone  through  with.  In  the 
latter  case  the  remedy  was  plainly  greater  freedom  ; 
in  the  former  every  buttress  of  authority  in  Church 
and  State  needed  to  be  strengthened.  Most  of  the 
men  who  lived  through  the  Revolution  maintained 
their  faith  in  its  Divine  necessity,  but  many  who 
were  born  under  its  shadow  could  only  regard  it 
and  all  its  intellectual  offspring  as  a  brood  of  dark- 
ness. The  first  need  manifestly  was  to  revive  the 
power  of  the  Visible  Church,  the  supreme  bulwark 
against  anarchy.  That  would  guarantee  the  sub- 
stance whatever  it  might  do  for  the  form  of  free- 
dom. That  this  movement  was  due  to  general  and 
not  to  local  causes,  appears  from  the  fact  that  it 
sprang  up  even  earlier  in  Germany  than  in  England. 
Kahnis,  for  example,  in  his  Internal  History  of  Ger- 
man Protestantism,  finds  the  revival  of  orthodox 
Lutheranism  the  adequate  Divine  purpose  of  the 
whole  period,  and  he  is  quite  conscious  of  the 
extent  to  which  the  movement  was  indebted  to 
Hegel.  As  to  a  High  Churchman  among  ourselves. 
Rationalism  is  to  Kahnis  only  another  name  for 
Revolution,  and  Revolution,  political  or  intellec- 
tual, merely  anarchy.  For  him  also  the  sacra- 
mentarian  doctrine   has   derived   new  significance 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  257 

from  a  philosophy  which  regards  matter  as  the  mere 
vehicle  of  spirit ;  and,  under  the  influence  of  a 
conception  of  religion  which  makes  dogma  its 
essence,  he  has  the  same  tenderness  towards  every 
word  of  the  Creed. 

In  Germany,  as  in  England,  others  travelled 
farther  on  the  same  road.  The  study  of  history, 
and  especially  the  study  of  the  Middle  Ages  which 
Romanticism  had  called  forth,  became  of  practical 
significance  through  the  temper  of  the  time.  If 
the  Revolution  was  a  mere  chaotic  upheaval,  why 
not  the  whole  commotion  since  the  Reformation  ? 
Before  that  event  divided  the  German  people  into 
two  camps,  the  Church  was  the  bond  of  society, 
and  the  Holy  Roman  Empire  the  pillar  of  unity 
and  strength.  Had  not  the  substance  of  freedom 
been  sacrificed  all  these  centuries  to  the  form  of 
it  ?  Why  not  go  back,  by  one  bold  leap,  to  those 
days  of  greatness  ? 

This  movement,  though  it  began  in  Germany 
and  though  its  reverence  for  the  Middle  Ages  had 
its  historical  reasons  in  Germany  and  not  in  Eng- 
land, was  far  more  effectively  carried  through  in 
our  own  country.  The  idea  of  a  freedom  which 
should  ignore  the  form  for  the  substance  appealed 
powerfully  to  a  practical  race  habitually  indifferent 
to  logical  consistencies  and  enamoured  of  working 
compromises  ;  favourable  conditions  fostered  it  ; 
the  enterprising  character  of  the  people  organised 
it ;  a  man  of  religious  genius  guided  and  inspired 
it.  The  German  movement,  moreover,  never  re- 
ceived such  adequate  literary  expression  as  would 

17 


258  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

bring  the  study  of  it  within  compass,  whereas  in 
Newman's  Ajyologia  we  have  a  narrative  written 
from  within  with  full  sympathy  and  unrivalled 
subtlety  of  presentation.  For  the  stream  of  Ro- 
manticism, therefore,  as  it  were  on  the  Eastern 
slope,  we  shall  limit  ourselves  to  the  Ajjologia. 

The  book  palpitates  with  horror  of  the  Revolu- 
tion. The  Tractarian  Movement  was  begun  in  1838 
by  men  as  old  as,  or  a  little  older  than,  the  century, 
by  men,  therefore,  whose  most  sensitive  years  were 
spent  under  the  shadow  of  the  Revolution.  They 
looked  on  it  as  a  mere  submerging  flood,  and  their 
whole  endeavour  was  to  form  an  association  able  to 
build  a  dyke  against  its  encroachments.  To  con- 
firm authority  and  beat  down  Liberalism  in  every 
form  was  their  sole  remedy.  Liberalism  was 
Rationalism,  and  Rationalism,  as  the  universal  sol- 
vent, was  Revolution.  Liberalism  was  Antichrist, 
because  it  exalted  itself  above  the  yoke  of  religion 
and  law  ;  and  this  spirit  of  lawlessness,  of  which 
Liberalism  is  the  offspring,  came  in  with  the  Re- 
formation. That  is  to  say,  they  repeated  Bossuet's 
charge  with  less  than  Bossuet's  justification. 

That  Romanticism  was  the  other  impulse  in  the 
movement  Newman  himself  is  partially  aware.  The 
doctrines,  he  says,  were  in  the  air.  To  assert  was 
to  prove  ;  to  explain  was  to  persuade.  He  ascribes 
the  change  to  a  reaction  from  the  dry  and  super- 
ficial character  of  the  religious  teaching  and  the 
literature  of  the  last  generation,  or  even  century. 
It  came  from  a  need  felt  both  by  the  hearts  and 
intellects  of  the  nation  for  a  deeper  philosophy. 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  259 

He  traces  it  to  Scott,  who  turned  men's  minds  to 
the  Middle  Ages,  to  Coleridge  who,  "  while  he 
indulged  a  liberty  of  speculation  which  no  Christian 
can  tolerate,"  after  all  installed  a  higher  philosophy 
into  in(j[uiring  minds,  and  to  Southey  and  Words- 
worth, who  "  addressed  themselves  to  the  same 
high  principles  and  feelings  and  carried  forward 
their  readers  in  the  same  direction  ". 

This  recognition  of  Coleridge  in  particular  is  no 
more  than  the  barest  justice.  Though  he  stood  on 
the  other  side  of  the  ecclesiastical  watershed  and 
was  rather  a  forerunner  of  the  Broad  Church  than 
of  Tractarianism,  like  Schleiermacher,  he  has  the 
merit  as  a  religious  thinker  of  having  influenced  his 
opponents  almost  as  deeply  as  his  followers.  To 
Coleridge's  doctrine  of  a  higher,  director,  more  in- 
tuitive religious  faculty  than  the  understanding,  and 
to  his  widely  tolerant  historical  outlook,  the  new 
spirit  upon  which  Tractarianism  grew  strong  is  first 
of  all  to  be  ascribed.  Had  Coleridge  been  no  more 
than  the  living  and  vivid  translator  of  German 
ideas,  he  would,  from  the  situation  of  the  time, 
have  been  the  prime  religious  force  of  his  genera- 
tion in  England. 

Of  any  obligation  direct  or  indirect  to  the 
great  movement  of  thought  in  Germany,  Newman 
is  unaware,  and  it  has  even  been  said  in  sorrow 
that  his  attitude  would  have  been  different  and  the 
religious  life  of  England  different,  if  he  had  had 
some  acquaintance  with  it.  Of  the  theology  of 
Schleiermacher  and  the  philosophy  of  Hegel  he  only 
knew  enough  to  be  in  great  fear.     But  he   had 


260  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

larger  obligations  than  he  knew,  for,  though  his 
power  of  ignoring  even  English  books  was  amazing, 
he  was  a  man  peculiarly  sensitive  to  the  influences 
that  were  in  the  air.  From  what  other  source  did 
he  derive  his  mistrust  of  the  reality  of  material 
phenomena ;  his  assurance  of  two  and  two  only 
absolute  and  luminously  self-evident  beings,  him- 
self and  his  Creator ;  or  the  conception  of  nature 
upon  which  he  based  his  whole  sacramental  system, 
the  denial  of  space  except  as  a  subjective  idea  ? 
He  was  told  that  his  notion  of  material  things,  as 
mere  types  and  instruments  of  real  things  unseen, 
came  from  Berkeley,  who,  good  man,  thought  he 
had  dealt  the  death-blow  to  such  notions.  But 
that  the  true  source  was  the  Transcendental  Philo- 
sophy appears  in  the  way  in  which  he  makes  the 
intellectual  basis  of  the  doctrine  of  the  Real 
Presence,  *'  the  denial  of  the  existence  of  space 
except  as  a  subjective  idea  of  our  own  minds,"  it 
being  hardly  possible  that,  so  many  years  after 
Kant,  he  arrived  at  this  conception  by  his  own  un- 
aided speculative  talent.  Above  all,  he  is  indebted 
to  a  person  whom  he  would  have  regarded  as  a 
cultured  pagan,  to  Goethe. 

Even  in  his  evangelical  days,  he  says,  he  re- 
garded doctrine  as  vital  to  his  religion.  "■  At  the 
age  of  fifteen  I  fell  under  the  influences  of  a 
definite  creed,  and  received  into  my  intelligence 
impressions  of  dogma,  which,  through  God's  mercy, 
have  never  been  effaced  or  obscured."  ''From  the 
age  of  fifteen  dogma  has  been  the  fundamental 
element  of  my  religion ;  I  know  no  other  religion  ; 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  261 

I  cannot  enter  into  the  idea  of  another  religion ; 
relisrion  as  a  mere  sentiment  is  to  me  a  mere  dream 
and  a  mockery.  As  well  can  there  be  filial  love 
without  the  fact  of  a  father  as  devotion  without 
the  fact  of  a  Supreme  Being."  The  illustration  is 
not  happy  for  his  purpose,  as  a  fact  might  be  too 
directly  known  to  be  formulated  into  propositions, 
and  filial  love  would  scarcely  be  fostered  by  an 
intellectual  scheme  of  our  father's  nature.  Yet  it 
indicates  the  man  that  he  should  use  it,  for  even 
such  a  scheme  of  an  earthly  parent  one  could  con- 
ceive him  finding  a  necessity. 

Dogma  was  thus  of  the  very  essence  of  his 
religion,  and  yet  there  never  was  a  clearer  case  of  a 
man's  dogma  growing  out  of  his  religion,  not  his 
religion  out  of  his  dogma.  *'  For  myself,"  he  truly 
says,  "it  was  not  logic  that  carried  me  on  ;  as  well 
might  one  say  that  the  quicksilver  in  the  barometer 
changes  the  weather."  He  found  no  obligation 
to  study  the  other  side ;  a  hint  was  sufficient  to 
lead  him  on,  and  he  passed  by  everything  else  to 
find  what  completed  his  own  view  even  in  the  most 
unlikely  quarters.  For  example,  he  found  nothing 
in  Middleton  on  Miracles  except  a  quotation  from 
Laud  about  "  the  Thirty-nine  Articles  seeming 
patient,  if  not  ambitious  also,  of  some  Catholic 
sense".  He  follows  a  kind  of  aesthetic  intuition, 
and  builds  up  a  scheme  which  draws  him  by  its 
completeness  ;  and  he  never  seems  to  experience 
the  need  of  falling  back  on  the  question  whether  it 
had  actuality  behind  it  or  not.  Everything  con- 
genial to  his  views,  everything  that  rendered  his 


262  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

scheme  more  artistically  complete,  he  readily 
assimilated,  and  the  rest  he  could  pass  by  as 
though  it  were  not.  He  heard  the  proposition 
once  stated  that  the  sacred  text  was  never  in- 
tended to  teach  doctrine,  but  only  to  prove  it — 
the  source  of  doctrine  being  the  formularies  of  the 
Church — and  his  attitude  to  Scripture  was  deter- 
mined. The  doctrine  of  Apostolical  Succession  he 
learned  in  the  course  of  a  walk  round  Christ 
Church  Meadow.  At  a  hint  from  Whately  he 
conceived  the  Church  as  called  to  be  mighty  in  the 
State  yet  free  from  State  interference.  In  Butler 
he  found  mainly  a  justification  for  his  method 
of  arguing,  a  method  entirely  different  from  But- 
ler's. Keble  maintained  that  it  is  faith  and  love 
which  raise  probabilities  in  religion  to  certainties. 
Friends,  Keble  said,  do  not  ask  for  literal 
commands,  but  from  their  knowledge  of  the 
speaker  they  understand  his  half  words,  and  from 
love  of  him  they  anticipate  his  wishes.  Thus  we 
are  treated  as  sons,  not  as  servants  ;  addressed  as 
those  who  love  God  and  wish  to  please  Him,  not  as 
those  subjected  to  a  code  of  formal  commandments. 
This  Newman  finds  beautiful  and  religious,  but 
thinks  it  does  not  even  profess  to  be  logical.  By 
that  he  means  that  it  is  an  argument  which  does 
not  travel  by  his  road,  that  it  led  in  a  direction 
opposite  to  what  he  most  wanted — the  definite 
authority  of  a  Visible  Church.  Perhaps  the 
greatest  influence  in  his  life  was  Hurrell  Froude, 
and  it  was  of  the  same  impressionist  nature.  As 
even  his  dearest  friend  admits  that  Froude's  power 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  263 

of  entering  into  the  minds  of  others  did  not  equal 
his  other  gifts,  it  is  not  strange  that  an  unsympa- 
thetic person  like  Pfleiderer  sums  him  up  as  one 
''  who,  from  his  limited  aristocratic  Anglican  stand- 
point, passed  sentence  on  everything  beyond  it 
with  the  greater  arrogance  in  proportion  to  his 
ignorance".  He  openly  admired  the  Church  of 
Rome  and  hated  the  Reformers,  was  "  powerfully 
drawn  to  the  Mediaeval  Church,  but  not  to  the 
Primitive  .  .  .  delighted  in  the  notion  of  a  hier- 
archical system,  of  sacerdotal  power,  and  of  full 
ecclesiastical  liberty  .  .  .  had  also  a  firm  faith  in 
the  Real  Presence".  In  the  same  aesthetic  way 
portions  of  the  writings  of  the  Fathers  came  like 
music  to  Newman's  inward  ear,  as  if  in  response  to 
ideas  he  had  long  cherished,  especially  those  based 
on  the  mystical  or  sacramental  principle,  those 
which  spoke  of  Nature  as  a  parable,  Scripture  as 
an  allegory,  and  pagan  literature,  philosophy  and 
mythology  as  a  preparation  for  the  Gospel.  In  all 
this  Newman  is  the  Romanticist  seeking  first  of 
all  perfection  for  his  work  of  art. 

The  same  artistic  sense  which  was  drawn  by  the 
conception  of  a  great,  rounded  ecclesiastical  system, 
was  repelled  by  all  the  agitation  in  Church  and 
State  which  he  sums  up  as  Liberalism.  Liberalism 
dares  to  interfere  with  the  Irish  sees  ;  to  tell,  by 
the  mouth  of  the  Prime  Minister,  the  English 
bishops  to  set  their  house  in  order  ;  to  demand 
from  the  Church,  as  the  price  of  liberty,  emolument 
and  dignity.  Could  it  once  gain  a  footing  in  the 
Church,  it  would  be  sure  of  victory  in  the  end,  and 


264  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

Reformation  principles  would  be  powerless  to  save 
her.  Succour  must  be  looked  for  from  the  one  true 
Church,  the  guardian  of  dogma,  the  possessor  of 
sacrament  and  rite,  the  visible  channel  of  invisible 
grace,  the  possessor  of  continuity  in  the  bishop 
who  is  the  successor  of  the  Apostles,  the  Vicar 
of  Christ. 

Thus  Newman  arrived  at  the  famous  Via  Media, 
in  which  the  Greek,  Latin  and  Anglican  Churches 
are  all  identical  with  the  early  undivided  Church 
and  only  kept  apart  by  later  errors,  such  as  the 
existence  of  the  Pope  who  is  Antichrist,  which 
alone  keeps  Anglicanism  apart  from  the  larger 
Roman  communion. 

The  Tracts  for  the  Times  were  begun  in  1833 
in  defence  of  this  Via  Media.  But  the  note  of 
Catholicity  in  the  Latin  Church  became  more  im- 
portant for  Newman  and  his  fellow-workers,  and 
the  error  of  the  Papacy  less.  Then  the  difficulty 
of  signing  the  Thirty-nine  Articles  troubled  many. 
Tract  90,  showing,  in  the  words  of  Laud's  bio- 
grapher, that  they  were  "  patient,  if  not  ambitious, 
of  some  Catholic  sense,"  or,  as  Ward  more  bluntly 
said,  that  they  could  be  signed  in  ''  a  non-natural 
sense,"  indicated  plainly  in  which  direction  the  new 
way  was  turning,  and  lost  the  cause  many  sym- 
pathisers. The  practical  failure  of  an  attempt 
too  subtle  for  the  straightforward  English  mind 
alienated  Newman  from  the  English  Church  and 
made  him  more  intolerant  of  anything  between 
what  he  calls  Rationalism  and  Catholic  Truth. 
The  dislike  to  the  Papacy,  in  which  he  had  been 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  265 

bred,  and  which  he  calls  a  stain  on  his  imagination, 
slowly  disappeared.  The  evils  of  the  practical  sys- 
tem of  the  Roman  Church  vanished  for  him  in 
view  of  the  scope  which  the  Church  of  Rome  alone 
seemed  to  give  *'to  the  feelings  of  awe,  mystery, 
tenderness,  reverence,  devotedness  and  other  feel- 
ings which  may  especially  be  called  Catholic ". 
Gradually,  what  had  seemed  to  him  the  perversion, 
became  the  development  of  doctrine,  the  uninter- 
rupted progress  in  the  truth.  The  Roman  system 
now  appears  for  him  a  telescope  or  magnifier  "  for 
pale,  faint,  distant  Apostolic  Christianity  ".  It  is 
one  great,  perfect,  completed  whole,  wherein  every- 
thing down  to  the  late-determined  immaculate  con- 
ception of  the  Virgin  is  right  in  its  context  and 
requisite  in  its  place.  In  this  rounded  work  of  art, 
this  co-ordinated  and  compacted  system,  his  soul  is 
at  peace,  and  he  is  as  one  coming  into  port  after  a 
rough  sea. 

Here  at  last  is  the  Church  that  has  power  to 
control  and  to  counteract  reason.  Though  God  is 
sensible  to  his  heart,  Newman  cannot  trace  Him  in 
this  world.  The  human  race  is  utterly  at  variance 
with  the  purpose  of  its  Creator,  and  shows  every 
evidence  of  having  been  implicated  in  some  great 
aboriginal  calamity.  In  this  anarchical  condition 
of  things  we  must  expect  God  to  interfere.  The 
easiest  way  to  do  this,  so  far  as  we  can  see,  is  to 
set  up  a  face-to-face  antagonist  to  baffie  the  fierce 
energy  of  passion  and  the  all-corroding,  all-dis- 
solving scepticism  of  the  intellect  in  religious  in- 
quiries, against  which  no  truth,  however  sacred, 


266  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

can  stand  in  the  long  run.  This  will  naturally  be 
a  concrete,  actual  representative  of  things  invisible, 
and  the  simple  way  is  to  introduce  into  the  world 
an  authority  invested  with  the  prerogative  of  in- 
fallibility in  religious  matters.  Such  a  working 
instrument  is  happily  adapted  for  smiting  hard  and 
throwing  back  the  immense  energy  of  the  aggres- 
sive, capricious,  untrustworthy  intellect.  This  is 
the  Church  which  alone  can  put  down  rebellion 
against  our  Maker  and  denounce  rebellion  of 
every  kind  as,  of  all  possible  evils,  the  greatest. 
Such  is  Newman's  solution  of  the  problem  of 
Kevolution. 

All  this  might  seem  to  be  deliberately  and 
consciously  antagonistic  to  the  great  movement 
we  are  tracing,  the  attempt  to  reconcile  faith  and 
freedom.  It  is  even  possible  to  maintain  that 
Newman  seeks  neither  true  freedom  nor  true  faith. 
The  only  possible  meeting-place  of  both  is  the 
truth  in  which  God's  will  and  ours  agree,  in  which 
the  truth  makes  us  free,  in  which  we  are  free  be- 
cause there  is  no  constraint  but  faith  in  the  truth ; 
and  the  impossibility  of  such  a  result  is  Newman's 
fundamental  contention.  There  is  no  haltinsj-OTound 
in  philosophy,  he  affirms,  between  Atheism  and  the 
infallibility  of  a  Visible  Church.  That  position 
nothing  can  make  consistent  with  his  own  spiritual 
experience.  If  he  has  a  spiritual  experience  more 
certain  than  hands  or  feet,  and  if  there  are  only 
two  absolute  and  luminously  self-evident  beings  in 
the  world,  himself  and  his  Creator,  a  true  philo- 
sophy does  not  need  the  infallibility  of  a  \^isible 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  267 

Church  in  order  to  take  account  of  them.  Through 
personal  prejudice  and  panic  he  was  unable  to 
give  this  experience  its  place,  or  to  see  that  it, 
and  not  a  visible  Infallibility,  is  the  true  oppo- 
site of  Atheism.  As  a  matter  of  fact,  Athe- 
ism and  Infallibility  are  not  opposites  at  all,  but 
both  appeal  to  minds  that  find  satisfaction  in  a 
completed  scheme  with  a  material  demonstration, 
a  swift  passage  from  one  to  the  other  being  not 
infrequent.  Newman's  resort  to  Infallibility  only 
shows  how  near  he  must  have  stood  to  Atheism, 
for  his  whole  argument  is  an  appeal  to  panic,  not 
to  faith.  With  all  his  delicacy  of  thought  and 
language  he  only  holds  up  the  hangman's  scourge 
over  cringing  humanity.  Nothing,  after  all,  is  so 
cruel  or  so  unbelieving  as  panic.  To  deny  the 
power  of  truth  to  fight  its  own  battle,  to  expect  no 
effect  from  God's  Spirit  striving  with  man's,  to  see 
nothing  spiritual  except  what  is  brought  in  by  force 
from  the  outside,  is  a  melancholy  absence  of  faith. 

Kingsley's  blunt  accusation  of  intellectual  dis- 
honesty is  capable  of  being  misunderstood,  as  if  it 
meant  deliberate  misrepresentation,  from  which  no 
one  was  freer  than  Newman.  Yet  Newman's  mental 
attitude  makes  something  less  than  the  impression 
of  a  whole-hearted  regard  for  truth.  Many,  at 
least,  feel  the  need  of  a  less  subtle,  a  simpler,  a 
directer  temperament,  of  broader  principles,  and  of 
a  deeper  sympathy  with  the  fundamental  facts  of 
human  nature.  Newman,  I  know,  would  have  re- 
garded this  cross-country  steeple-chase  after  truth 
as  a  work  of  the  pride  of  intellect.     But  that  is 


268  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

where  the  issue  joins.  The  blinding  pride  of 
intellect  is  indeed  an  ever-present  and  most 
dangerous  temptation.  To  spread  our  peacock 
feathers  over  our  eyes  is  the  surest  way  of  shutting 
out  the  heavens.  But  pride  of  intellect  is  only 
rightly  escaped  by  the  humility  which  is  not  the 
resolve  to  abandon  the  intellect  God  has  given  us, 
but  the  resolve  to  use  it  as  He  guides  us. 

We  are  often  tempted  where  we  are  strongest, 
misled  where  we  are  most  nearly  right,  assailed 
by  pride,  when  we  are  surest  we  have  cast  it  out ; 
and  Tractarianism  largely  cast  out  the  logical  pride 
of  Eationalism  by  the  artistic  pride  of  Romanticism. 
Even  Evangelical  piety  has  not  been  free  from  the 
complacency  of  distinguishing  the  artist  in  religion 
from  the  unappreciative  multitude  ;  and  Tractarian- 
ism was  still  less  conscious  that  this  attitude  is 
pride.  Newman  himself  confesses  to  this  temper 
with  disarming  frankness.  At  the  people  who 
were  perplexed  by  the  Tracts  for  the  Times  he  was 
amused  ;  for  the  people  who  were  in  doubt  he  had 
contempt.  Fools  were  answered  according  to  their 
folly  in  an  ironical  spirit  which  held  a  good  many 
people  to  be  fools.  He  acknowledges  that  he  des- 
pised every  rival  system  of  doctrine  and  its  argu- 
ments as  well,  and  that  he  was  rather  pleased  by 
the  anger  of  dull  and  self-conceited  men  at  proposi- 
tions they  did  not  understand.  Indeed  his  intel- 
lectual temper  caused  one  of  his  friends  to  say, 
"  Such  is  the  venomous  character  of  orthodoxy. 
What  mischief  must  it  create  in  a  bad  and  narrow 
mind,  when  it  can  work  so  effectively  for  evil  in  one 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  269 

of  the  most  benevolent  of  bosoms  and  one  of  the 
ablest  of  minds ! "  And  when,  in  vindication  of 
his  over-subtlety,  Newman  himself  says,  "  I  never 
used  an  argument  which  I  saw  clearly  to  be  un- 
sound," he  is  surely  as  near  trifling  with  God's 
truth  as  with  God's  creatures.  The  whole  attitude 
is  more  that  of  the  finished  fencer  than  of  the 
humble  seeker  after  truth,  or,  as  Lord  Acton 
expresses  it,  of  the  "  sophist,  the  manipulator,  and 
not  the  servant,  of  the  truth"/ 

Nor  is  the  terror  at  Liberalism  consistent  with 
true  humility.  True  humility  could  never  assume 
such  superiority  to  our  fellow  mortals  as  to  believe 
that  salvation  is  only  to  be  found  for  them  in  abject 
submission  of  the  intelligence  to  another  person. 
That  would  be  so,  even  if  the  interj^retation  of  the 
Revolution  were  right,  even  if  it  were  not  the  worst 
kind  of  pride  of  intellect  to  be  sure  that  we  had  so 
measured  any  movement  as  to  know  there  was  no 
Divine  meaning  in  it,  but  that  it  was  a  pure  erup- 
tion from  the  pit.  To  sum  up  all  Liberalism  and 
Democracy  as  Kevolution  and  ascribe  it  to  the 
spirit  of  the  age  as  manifest  in  Materialism,  shows 
no  great  insight,  for,  as  Laveleye  says,  "  Material- 
ism is  always  unmasking  itself  as  a  powerless  con- 
servatism". It  is  rather  with  Materialism,  with 
the  power  of  things  seen — council  and  Pope  and 
sacrament — that  Newman  opposes  what  after  all 
may  only  be  the  birth  pangs  of  a  more  spiritual 
humanity.     In  any  case,  true  humility  cannot  be 

^Letters  of  Lord  Actofi  to  Mary  Gladstone,  1904,  p.  Ix, 


270  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

dismayed  by  such  alternatives  as  Infallibility  and 
Revolution.  It  has  too  large  a  sense  of  God's 
wisdom,  patience,  power,  goodness  in  all  things, 
to  assume  the  responsibility  of  walking  except  by 
the  light  immediately  given  to  it. 

Though  this  false  reading  of  humility  would 
make  even  truth  an  untruth  and  faith  an  unfaith, 
there  are  few  movements,  nevertheless,  which  an 
inquiry  into  the  problem  of  faith  and  freedom 
could  less  afford  to  neglect,  if  for  no  other  reason 
than  that  nothing  interprets  a  position  so  much  as 
extreme  opposition. 

To  begin  with,  we  see  here  the  great  temptation 
of  the  artistic  temperament.     It  is  to  be  impatient 
at  the  disorder  of  a  half-done  task.     We  see  here 
the  same  spirit  at  work  which  made  Hegel  think 
he  had  summed  up  the  Eternal  in  an  intellectual 
formula.     It  is  impatient  at  doubts  and  half-lights 
and  incompleteness  of  system.     Everything  revolu- 
tionary, everything  sceptical  pains  it.     And  when 
it  finds  a  completed  system,  it  meets  another  temp- 
tation.    The  immediate  perfection  satisfies  it,  and 
it  does  not  go  on  to  ask  whether  that  is  the  final 
perfection.     The  Roman  system,  being  the  work  of 
many  centuries,  has,  in  a  high  degree,  the  rounded 
completeness  which   satisfies   this   type   of   mind. 
Yet  it  is  only  a  narrow  interpretation  of  God's 
ways,  for,   if  the  whole  world  is  a  sacrament  of 
things  spiritual,  the  sacraments  of  the  Church  must 
be  great   symbols   laden  with  a  world  of  mean- 
ing, but  to  narrow  the  sacramental  efficacy  of  all 
material  creation  down  to  the  wonder-working  of 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  271 

a  material  substance  debases  and  does  not  glorify 
the  idea.  Nor  is  the  highest  way  to  place  the 
sacramental  idea  in  the  material  world  at  all,  for  its 
ultimate  symbol  is  man  not  nature,  and  the  funda- 
mental error  is  the  denial  of  that  liberty  upon 
which  that  sacramental  importance  of  humanity 
depends.  Moreover,  what  is  the  worth  of  God's 
long  patience  and  all  the  infinite  device  of  His 
providence,  if  infallibility  goes  by  office,  and  the 
end  of  all  our  search  is  not  the  light  of  the  souls 
that  love  truth  and  the  liberty  of  the  souls  that 
obey  it,  but  the  reception  at  the  hands  of  another 
of  a  body  of  doctrine,  and  the  performance  at  the 
direction  of  another  of  a  body  of  ritual  ?  History, 
on  such  a  scheme,  has  no  meaning,  for  God  could 
have  so  dominated  us  from  the  beginning,  with- 
out all  this  intervening  misery  and  error.  It  is 
all  chaos,  if  it  does  not  mean  that  God  is  patient 
enough  to  let  us  work  out  our  freedom,  that,  in  the 
end.  He  may  bind  us  by  the  only  eternal  bond  of 
love.  How  much  grander  and  truer  to  reality,  how 
much  more  satisfying,  in  the  last  issue,  to  all  our 
instincts  of  harmony  and  completeness,  to  conceive 
the  Christian  faith,  not  as  an  infallible  body  of  doc- 
trine, guarded  by  an  infallible  body  of  men,  but  as 
a  new  power  of  vitality  which  enters  the  world, 
partakes  of  its  evil,  and  again  rejects  it,  at  times  by 
violent  commotion.  As  the  great  triumph  of  faith 
in  regard  to  the  world  to  come  is  not  to  abolish 
death  but  to  transfigure  it,  to  turn  it  into  a  supreme 
ground  of  hope,  so  it  must  be  a  supreme  triumph 
of  faith  for  our  present  life  to  see  that  revolution 


272  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

may  as  gloriously  reveal  providence  as  death  reveal 
immortality. 

Again,  we  are  taught  the  necessity  of  retaining 
the  form  of  freedom  if  we  are  truly  to  win  the  sub- 
stance. In  a  sense  this  is  the  same  lesson,  for  one 
of  our  temptations  is  always  to  take  short-cuts  to 
freedom.  Rationalism  had  insisted  that  the  short 
way  was  to  assert  the  right  of  individual  judgment 
and  resent  all  other  bonds.  Romanticism  had 
tended  to  take  the  other  short  way,  and  had  ex- 
horted man  to  seek  the  system  in  which  he  could 
be  free  and  be  content.  Hegel,  who  had  asserted 
the  importance  of  both,  nevertheless  practically 
laid  all  stress  on  the  institution,  and  made  little  of 
the  individual.  Newman  only  illustrates  the  same 
tendency  after  a  more  pronounced  manner.  He 
does  not  wish  to  lose  his  freedom,  he  does  not  even 
wish  any  man  to  have  less  freedom  than  he  is  fit 
for.  But  then,  he  says,  this  contention  for  indi- 
vidual freedom,  for  knowing  the  truth  of  our 
doctrine  and  deciding  the  direction  of  our  duty, 
only  leads  us  into  trouble  and  makes  us  lose  the 
peaceable  fruits  of  freedom.  Man  is  not  able  to 
win  his  emancipation  in  that  way.  He  must  find 
some  one  to  lead  him  by  the  hand,  and  then  he  will 
be  sure  of  the  right  road.  It  is  the  old  argument 
of  the  slave  being  really  more  free  who  has  a  good 
master,  than  the  freeman  who  lives  a  precarious 
life,  having  no  one  better  to  care  for  him  than  his 
own  inadequate  self.  But  when  we  take  for 
granted  that  the  authority  of  an  outward  organisa- 
tion is  easier  for  the  common  man  to  accept  than 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  273 

the  authority  of  a  general  truth,  it  is  because  we 
degrade  the  idea  of  acceptance.  The  authority 
of  a  truth  can  be  rightly  accepted  by  all  in  the 
measure  in  which  they  see  it,  and,  if  it  is  funda- 
mentally a  moral  truth,  all  can  see  it  to  the  extent 
to  which  they  are  willing  to  practise  it ;  while 
rightly  to  accept  an  institution,  to  accept  it  on 
other  grounds  than  custom,  demands  an  inquiry 
possible  for  few,  and  on  conditions  which,  being 
purely  intellectual,  are  not  necessarily  incumbent 
upon  any.  Thus  the  work  of  renouncing  intellect 
is  itself  a  very  difficult  intellectual  feat.  But  the 
idea  that  we  can  reach  our  goal  by  some  kind 
of  rapid  intellectual  gymnastic  is  the  vice  of  the 
whole  Romantic  Movement. 

Further,  we  see  the  necessity  of  making  a  study 
of  history  precede  a  philosophy  of  history.  His- 
torical inquiry  was  too  slow,  too  irregular,  too 
interrupted,  too  uncertain  in  its  utterance  for 
Romanticism.  It,  therefore,  proceeded  at  once  to  a 
philosophy  of  history,  the  prime  endeavour  being  to 
adjust  the  facts  to  the  theory,  not  to  found  the 
theory  on  the  facts.  Of  this  tendency  Newman  is 
an  even  more  pronounced  example  than  Hegel. 
He  is  not  at  all  concerned  to  look  at  things  as  mere 
facts.  His  sole  interest  is  in  what  he  calls  the 
"  various  Economics  or  Dispensations  of  the  Eter- 
nal ".  He  is  in  no  sense  a  historian  ;  he  is  a  philo- 
sopher of  history ;  he  looks  at  facts  purely  to  see 
if  they  will  fit  into  his  scheme  as  Hegel  does  with 
his  categories.     Here,  again,  we  see  the  need  of 

patience,  the  need  of  looking   at   history   not   as 

18 


274  THE  REVOLUTION  AND 

a  large  scheme,  but  as  a  record  of  the  toils  and 
struggles  of  men  for  faith  and  freedom,  struggles 
depending  upon  will  and  character  in  the  final 
issue. 

This  being  recognised,  it  becomes  apparent  that 
the  movement  has  also  a  positive  value  for  our 
inquiry.  The  apparent  effect  is  not  always  the 
ultimate  issue.  Man  advances,  not  so  much  by 
great  visions  of  his  journey  from  mountain  peaks  of 
thought,  as  by  earnestly  trying  all  ways  and  finding, 
by  coming  to  the  end  of  them,  that  he  is  away  from 
the  great  highway  of  true  progress.  This  attempt 
to  ignore  the  centuries  cannot  be  anything  but  such 
a  blind  alley.  Men  have  seen  the  vision  of  a  faith 
that  shall  be  free  as  well  as  of  a  freedom  that  lives 
by  faith,  and  they  cannot  now  turn  aside  from 
pursuing  it.  But  the  High  Church  movement  was 
too  general,  and  sprang  too  directly  out  of  the 
influences  of  the  time  not  to  represent  in  some  way 
man's  requirement  and  the  age's  need.  Though  it 
does  not  escape  the  difficulty  of  making  faith 
depend  on  an  intellectual  feat,  its  attitude  shows 
a  deep  dissatisfaction  with  this  result,  and  an  earnest 
resolve  at  all  costs  to  avoid  it.  Like  the  other 
phases  of  Romanticism,  it  also  seeks  rest  in  a 
system,  but  it  has  made  this  advance,  that  it  looks 
to  a  system  which  has  grown  out  of  life  and  action, 
which  has  grown  out  of  reverence  and  devotion 
and  self-sacrifice.  Development  is  for  it  a  religious 
and  not  merely  an  intellectual  progress.  In  short, 
with  all  its  seeming  repudiation  of  the  task  of 
uniting  freedom  with  faith  in  a  bond  of  mutual 


NEWMAN'S  APOLOGIA  275 

interaction  and  common  support,  it  recognises,  as 
Kahnis  says  of  it,  that  fruits  which  the  tree  of 
knowledge  refuses  to  yield  grow  on  the  tree  of 
life.^ 

1  Kahnis,  Internal  History  of  Protestantism,   Eng.  trans., 
p.  306. 


LECTURE  VII 

THE  THEOKY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND  BAUK'S 

FIBST  TEHEE  CENTUBIES 


Eichhorn,  Allgemeine  Bibliothek  der  biblischen  Literatur,  1787- 

1801. 
Semler,  Abhandhmg  von  der  Untersuchung  des  Kanons,  VJll-lb. 
Strauss,  Das  Leben  Jesu  JcritiscJi  bearbeitet,  1835. 
Schwegler,  Das  nachapostolische  Zeitalter,  1846. 
Baur,  Kritische  UntersuoJiungen  ilber  die  hanonischenEvangelien, 

1847. 
Baur,  Kirchengeschichte  der  drei  ersten  JahrJmnderte,  1853. 
Eitschl,   Die  EntsteJmng  der  AltkatJiolischen  Eirche,   second 

edition,  1857. 

Books  op  Refeeence 

Founders  of  Old  Testament  Criticism,  T,  K.  Cheyne,  1893. 
L'Evangile  et  L'Eglise,  A.  Loisy,  1904.  Essence  of  Christi- 
anity, A.  Harnack.  Strauss's  Life  of  Jesus,  trans,  by  M. 
Evans  (George  Eliot).  Pfleiderer's  account  of  Baur  and 
Strauss  has  the  sympathy  of  a  disciple. 


LECTURE  VII 

THE    THEOEY    OF   DEVELOPMENT    AND    BAUK'S 
FIBST  THREE  CENTURIES 

By  what  must  seem,  so  long  as  we  look  only  at  the 
external  aspects  of  things,  a  mere  irony  of  fate. 
High  Churchism  and  Higher  Criticism  reached 
maturity  together.  Few  movements  would  seem 
to  be  farther  apart,  yet  this  correspondence  is  not 
mere  coincidence.  Both  sprang  from  the  Roman- 
tic, the  historical  interest  of  the  century,  and,  in 
however  opposite  ways,  both  dealt  with  the  same 
problems. 

From  the  first  attack  of  Deism  upon  the  un- 
questioned authority  of  Scrij^ture,  a  full  inquiry 
into  the  nature  of  the  documents  that  compose  it 
was  inevitable,  even  though  the  Deists  themselves 
had  too  little  interest  in  what  they  regarded  as 
the  outlived  writings  of  a  rude  age  and  too  little 
scholarship  to  make  even  a  beginning  at  the  task. 

Rationalism,  being  a  system  of  free- thinking 
within  the  Church,  and  having  an  omnivorous,  en- 
cyclopaedic appetite  for  facts,  possessed  both  the 
interest  and  the  learning  necessary  for  the  task. 
Yet  the  age  of  Rationalism  did  not  carry  the 
work  much  beyond  the  Lower  or  Textual  Criticism. 

Ernesti  concerned  himself  wholly  with  the  minute 

(279) 


280   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

grammatical  interpretation  of  Scripture,  and  even 
maintained  that  religion  stood  or  fell  with  it. 
Michaelis  occupied  himself  with  the  text  of  the  Old 
Testament  as  Ernesti  had  done  with  the  text  of  the 
New.  Semler,  more  than  any  other,  embodied  the 
encyclopsedic  learning  of  Rationalism.  He  prepared 
the  way  for  all  later  criticism  by  laying  down  the 
rule  that  the  Bible  is  not  a  uniform  whole,  but  that 
each  book  is  to  be  interpreted  according  to  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  writer  and  his  purpose  in  writing. 
Yet  his  chief  critical  work  was  an  endeavour  to 
make  a  complete  classification  of  the  sources  of  the 
New  Testament  text,  and  the  most  valuable  work 
of  Griesbach  was  done  in  the  same  field. 

The  arbitrary,  negative,  unliterary,  confident 
spirit  of  its  Rationalistic  beginnings  may  to  this 
day  be  too  evident  in  the  critical  investigation  of 
the  Scriptures.  Yet  it  was  only  under  the  influence 
of  Romanticism  that  criticism  began  to  see  the 
scope  of  its  labours,  and,  however  blind  it  may 
have  been  at  times  to  the  real  issues,  its  inspiration 
has  continued  to  be,  not  the  Rationalist  interest  in 
moral  generalities,  but  the  Romanticist  interest  in 
life.  The  Higher  Criticism,  both  of  the  Old  and 
the  New  Testament,  began  with  Eichhorn,  the  friend 
of  Herder.  The  name  Higher  Criticism  he  took 
from  the  classical  scholars  who  first  used  it  for 
the  investigations  which  go  beyond  the  Lower 
or  Textual  Criticism.  Eichhorn  distinguished  the 
Jehovistic  and  Elohistic  documents  in  Genesis,  and 
propounded  the  theory  of  an  original  Aramaic 
gospel  to  explain  the  verbal  similarity  of  the  Syn- 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         281 

optics.  His  great  successors,  whether  theological 
Rationalists,  like  Gesenius,  or  more  direct  adherents 
of  Romanticism,  as  De  Wette  and  Ewald,  were  all 
under  the  influence  of  the  Romantic  movement, 
while  the  Tubingen  school  regarded  themselves  as 
sjiecially  called  to  apply  its  principles. 

Tractarianism,  springing  from  the  same  move- 
ment, consciously  or  unconsciously  raises  the  same 
questions.  It  settles  none  of  the  problems  criticism 
has  raised,  but  rather  accentuates  the  necessity  of 
determining  the  relation  of  living  Christianity  to  its 
whole  past.  This  must  include  any  authority  to 
which  it  appeals,  and  the  Scriptures  not  least.  The 
Tractarians  might  utter  warnings  from  university 
pulpits  of  "■  the  perils  to  England  which  lay  in  the 
biblical  and  theological  speculations  of  Germany,"  ^ 
but  a  movement  which  exalts  the  Catholic  and 
Primitive  above  all  other  authorities  can  only  ac- 
centuate the  need  of  inquiring  what,  in  point  of 
fact,  Catholicism  and  Primitive  Christianity  really 
are. 

Under  the  impulse  of  the  Romantic  Movement 
men  began  to  subject  the  whole  record  of  humanity 
to  investigation,  as  if  it  were  no  longer  possible  to 
enjoy  our  heritage  from  the  past,  unless  we  could 
learn  how  it  first  came  to  be.  Had  it  been  possible 
for  any  movement  to  exclude  from  this  inquiry 
the  history  of  Christianity,  the  one  history  which 
creates  supreme  interest  in  the  past,  how  should 
the  greatest  intellectual  labour  of  the  age  be  void 
of  religious  significance,  and  how  should  faith  be 

1  Newman,  Apologia,  p.  37- 


282   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

shadowed  by  the  slavish  dread  that  the  sanctuary 
it  dare  not  open  must  be  empty  of  its  shrine  !  We 
might  rather  conclude  from  the  inevitableness  of  it 
that  this  inquiry  was  one  of  the  chief  providential 
tasks  imposed  upon  the  age. 

The  only  alternative  is  Newman's  perverted 
conception  of  humility.  True  humility  must  surely 
be  submission  to  God,  and,  therefore,  acceptance  of 
God's  task ;  submission  to  truth,  and,  therefore, 
diligence  in  investigation.  But  to  Newman  true 
humility  might  be  mere  intellectual  surrender.  "  It 
may  be  fairly  questioned,"  he  says,  "  whether  in  an 
intellectual  age,  when  freedom  both  of  thought  and 
of  action  are  so  dearly  prized,  a  greater  penance 
can  be  devised  for  the  soldier  of  Christ,  than  the 
absolute  surrender  of  judgment  and  will  to  the 
command  of  another. "  ^  As  in  theology  so  in  history, 
we  are  not  to  be  freed  from  our  chain,  but  it  is  to 
be  made  so  much  an  ornament  and  we  are  to  be 
taught  so  well  how  to  wear  it,  that  we  shall  feel  it 
to  be  a  decoration  and  not  a  fetter.  There  also  we 
have  to  do  with  an  artist.  What  he  desires  to  find 
is  an  institution,  so  spacious,  so  proportionate  and 
harmonious  that  it  can  be  to  us  the  goal  and  measure 
of  history.  As  the  most  eloquent  presentation  of 
this  alternative  to  freedom  his  Essay  on  the  Develop- 
ment of  Doctrine  remains  of  permanent  significance. 
It  was  written  during  the  period  when,  as  he  de- 
scribes it,  he  was  on  his  death-bed  as  regards  his 
membership  with  the  Anglican  Church,  and  it  has 
in  it  the  moving  eloquence  of  that  period  of  inward 

^  Essay  on  the  Development  of  Doctrine,  2iid  ed.,  p.  397. 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         283 

struggle.  He  spent  his  last  year  as  an  Anglican 
upon  it,  and,  before  it  was  finished,  he  resolved  to 
be  received  into  the  Church  of  Rome.  In  that 
unfinished  state  the  book  remained,  and  all  the 
power  and  passion  of  a  man  in  the  crisis  of  his  soul 
are  found  in  it.  Nevertheless,  there  are  two  things 
strangely  absent  from  such  a  dialogue  with  one's 
heart.  First,  one  would  expect  it  to  be  simple  and 
direct  and  free  from  all  sophistry ;  but  apparently 
Newman  kept  up  a  logical  court  retinue  even  in 
the  inner  chambers  of  his  spirit.  Second,  one 
would  expect  to  find  the  problem  considered  in  all 
its  bearings  and  in  the  face  of  all  other  alternatives  ; 
but  instead,  we  find  the  most  amazing  absence  of 
reference  to  any  other  aspect  of  the  matter,  even  to 
what  might  seem  to  lie  nearest.  In  extreme  old 
age  Newman  wrote,  **  I  never  read  a  word  of 
Coleridge  ".  That  sums  up  everything.  Even  the 
most  learned  person  might  not  regard  it  as  any  duty 
to  read  Kant,  but  to  go  through  such  a  crisis  at 
that  time  and  entirely  ignore  a  writer  whom  he 
otherwise  recognised  as  one  of  his  spiritual  ancestors, 
and  who  lay,  as  it  were,  to  his  hand,  shows  an 
amazing  power  of  abstraction  upon  one  aspect  of 
a  great  question.  By  Coleridge  the  most  spiritual 
and  thoughtful  minds  in  this  country  were  prepared 
for  the  inevitable  crisis,  and,  though  his  ideas  are 
sometimes  only  half  born  or  concealed  in  wrappings 
of  strange  words  and  expounded  unsystematically 
in  the  course  of  several  volumes,  one  would  have 
imagined  that  his  Letters  of  an  Inquiring  Spirit, 
which  was  still  a  new  book  when  Newman  wrote, 


284   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

having  been  published  some  years  after  the  author's 
death,  could  hardly  have  been  overlooked.  In  it 
are  many  things  which  have  never  been  better 
said  from  that  day  until  now. 

Like  the  Tractarians,  Coleridge  approached  the 
Scriptures  through  the  Church,  but  it  is  the  Church 
of  the  saints,  not  of  the  hierarchy.  The  old  test  of 
truth,  quod  semper,  quod  uhique,  quod  ah  omnibus, 
was  for  him  the  truth  which  in  every  age  and  under 
every  condition  had  appealed  to  the  believing  heart, 
and  the  true  Apostolic  Succession  was  the  succession 
of  the  faithful. 

Like  the  Tractarians,  also,  he  started  with  the 
unity  of  the  faith,  but  it  is  not  a  unity  built  up  of 
separate  dogmas.  It  is  a  unity  of  conception,  a 
unity  arising  from  such  a  relation  of  the  soul  to 
its  Maker  as  shall  harmonise  all  our  thinking  and 
all  our  acting.  He  sees  religion  as  a  landscape 
which  is  none  the  less  one  for  running  far  away 
into  shadowy  horizons,  and  not  as  a  series  of  fields 
which  can  only  be  known  by  being  accurately  sur- 
veyed. "  Revealed  religion,  and  there  is  no  other, 
is  the  unity  of  Subjective  and  Objective."  The  word 
of  God  without  speaks  to  God's  word  within,  in- 
terpreting us  to  ourselves  and  completing  what  is 
wanting  to  us.  The  soul  that  is  emancipated  by  it 
recognises  it.  "  Fact  and  Luminary  without  corre- 
spond to  Life  and  Truth  within." 

With  this  witness  of  the  Church  and  this  evi- 
dence of  faith,  why  should  we  fear  any  investiga- 
tion into  Scripture  ?  Why  should  any  one  fear  for 
a  book  in  which  he  finds  words  for  his  inmost 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         285 

thoughts,  songs  for  his  joy,  utterances  for  his 
hidden  griefs,  pleadings  for  his  shame  and  feeble- 
ness ?  By  finding  him,  it  bears  witness  to  itself 
that  it  has  proceeded  from  a  Holy  Spirit,  and  it 
ought  to  be  enough  that  there  is  more  in  it  that 
finds  one  than  in  all  other  books  put  together. 
Why  on  behalf  of  such  a  book  should  it  seem 
necessary  to  indulge  in  such  harmonising  feats  as 
would  make  Falstaff' s  account  of  the  rogues  in 
buckram  into  a  coherent  and  consistent  narrative  ? 
Faith  and  Scripture  are  reciprocal,  the  Word  feed- 
ing Faith  and  Faith  witnessing  to  the  Word.  This 
proves  that,  for  all  who  seek  truth  with  humble 
spirits,  it  is  an  unquestioned  guide,  but  it  does  not 
prove  that  it  is  a  book  to  be  in  all  points  unques- 
tioned, or  that  God's  Spirit  everywhere  speaks  in 
it  in  the  same  way,  using  all  the  writers  as  one 
musician  might  play  on  a  variety  of  instruments. 
Such  a  doctrine  of  plenary  inspiration  only  serves 
to  petrify  the  whole  body  of  Holy  Writ.  And,  if 
it  be  objected  that,  failing  that  guarantee,  we  have 
no  infallible  arbiter  in  questions  of  faith  and  duty, 
we  ask  in  reply.  What  advantage  have  we  derived 
from  using  the  Bible  as  such  an  arbiter  ?  Has  the 
result  been  unity  and  peace  ?  Has  it  not  rather 
been  such  piecing  together  of  texts  as  would  justify 
anything,  the  Inquisition  itself,  and  the  slothful, 
indiscriminate  acquiescence  in  detail  that  neglects 
the  spirit  which  shines  in  the  parts  only  as  it  per- 
vades and  irradiates  the  whole  ? 

In  contrast  to  all  this,  Newman  affirms  that  the 
essence  of  all  religion  is  authority  and  obedience, 


286   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

the  distinction,  for  him,  between  natural  and  re- 
vealed religion  lying  in  this,  that  the  former  has 
only  a  subjective  authority,  the  latter  has  an  objec- 
tive. Christianity  comes  as  a  Divine  institution, 
whole,  objective,  infallible ;  and,  as  preservation  is 
involved  in  creation,  only  an  infallible  authority 
could  preserve  what  an  infallible  authority  has 
given.  This  position  the  Roman  system  claims, 
and  it  has  no  rival.  ^  It  is  taken  for  granted  that 
nothing  can  keep  men  to  the  truth  except  such  an 
external  standard.  That  truth  is  what  a  man 
troweth,  is  a  position  Newman  always  regards 
with  horror.  That  to  trow  rightly  may  be  the  only 
means  God  has  given  us  of  knowing  truth,  he  is 
unable  to  imagine.  He  can  dream  of  no  meeting- 
place  for  those  who  love  truth  anywhere  between 
the  anarchy  of  individual  notions  and  the  rigidity 
of  dogmas  received  from  without.  Truth,  for  him, 
to  be  true,  must  have  one  form  and  one  expression, 
absolutely  right,  and  proving  all  else  to  be  false. 
He  does  not  even  honour  with  a  glance  the  view 
that  Scripture  reveals  only  what  is  necessary  that 
we  may  know  God's  will  with  us,  and  not  the 
secrets  of  His  counsel,  that  we  should  not  be  wise 
above  what  is  written,  and  that  the  absence  of  de- 
tails of  duty  is  no  imperfection  but  the  necessary 
condition  of  our  liberty  to  follow  the  guidance  of 
the  Spirit  of  Christ.  On  the  contrary,  this  is  what 
he  finds  :  "  Our  Lord's  style  shows  itself  in  solemn 
declarations,  canons,  sentences  or  sayings,  such  as 

1  An  Essay    on    the  Development    of  Christian  Doctrine, 
p.  86. 


BAUR^S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         287 

legislators  propound  and  scribes  and  lawyers  com- 
ment on  ".^  And  we  had  begun  to  think  again  that 
it  was  the  common  people  who  heard  Him  gladly, 
and  that  the  highest  evidence  of  His  spiritual 
power  was  the  certainty  with  which  He  spoke  to 
the  divine  in  man  without  needing  the  intervention 
of  such  official  people !  But  this  inability  to  see 
any  spiritual  truth  except  at  his  own  ecclesiastical 
angle  must  be  accepted  in  Newman  once  for  all. 

To  maintain  that  the  Church  of  the  Papacy  was, 
still  unchanged,  the  Church  of  the  Apostles,  had 
become  too  hard  a  task  even  for  this  exclusive 
treatment  and  for  the  greatest  special  pleader  who 
ever  used  the  English  speech.  But  the  Theory  of 
Development  had  already  risen  upon  the  horizon  of 
thought,  offering  itself  as  a  solution  of  all  the  pro- 
blems of  history.  To  live  is  to  change,  and,  mani- 
festly, the  changes  which  come  by  growth  are 
inevitable  and  legitimate.  As  the  man  who  builds 
towers  and  pinnacles  in  accordance  with  the  idea 
of  the  man  who  laid  the  foundations  is  the  true 
successor  of  the  founder,  even  though  the  simple 
lower  storey  could  only  have  suggested  to  the  skilled 
and  experienced  eye  the  palace  reared  upon  it  by 
later  generations,  so  the  Church  of  Rome  may  be 
the  legitimate  successor  of  the  Church  of  the 
Apostles. 

Like  the  biologist  with  life,  Newman's  chief 
difficulty  is  to  find  the  first  link  in  the  series.  In 
the  amazing  freedom  of  the  New  Testament,  especi- 
ally of  the  Gospels  and  the  Pauline  Epistles,  the 

1  P.  67. 


288      THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

germ  of  a  church  which  should  act  as  a  dominating 
external  authority  can  only  be  found  by  microscopic 
search.  Wherefore,  like  the  biologist,  he  throws  the 
burden  upon  his  opponents  and  requires  them  to 
prove  that  the  germ  could  not  be  there.  In  the 
nature  of  the  case  he  feels  justified  in  assuming 
that  the  Catholicism  of  the  sixteenth  and  of  the 
second  centuries  are,  in  substance,  the  very  religion 
which  Christ  and  His  Apostles  taught  in  the 
first.  ^  If  what  Protestantism  maintains  ever 
existed,  it  has  been  swept  away  by  a  deluge. 
"Whatever  history  teaches,  whatever  it  omits, 
whatever  it  exaggerates  or  extenuates,  whatever 
it  says  or  unsays,  at  least  the  Christianity  of  His- 
tory is  not  Protestantism."  ^  This,  of  course,  could 
be  said  of  every  new  aspect,  even  of  the  oldest 
truth.  It  is  precisely  the  argument  the  Judaisers 
used  against  Paul  when  he  maintained  that  the 
Promise  had  been  before  the  Law.  Whatever 
might  be  said  or  unsaid,  legal,  ceremonial  Judaism 
had  been  the  Judaism  of  history. 

In  the  same  summary  way  Newman  takes  his 
second  step.  The  first  three  centuries  are  treated 
as  one  period,  as  if  it  were  not  one  of  the  greatest 
problems  of  history  to  explain  how  the  end  of  the 
third  could  be  so  diff'erent  from  the  beginning  of 
the  second.  Nor  can  he  proceed  even  then,  except 
by  canons  which  forestall  inquiry.  If  we  find  Ter- 
tuUian  explaining  "  This  is  My  body  "  as  "  This  is 
the  figure  of  My  body,"  yea,  if  we  think  that  to  be 
the  most  natural  explanation  of  the  Scripture,  we 

1  P.  5.         -  P.  7. 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         289 

are  not  to  conclude,  as  we  should  in  an  ordinary- 
case,  that  neither  Tertullian  nor  Scripture  held  the 
sacramental  doctrine,  but  we  must  carry  the  deeper 
sacramental  meaning  back  both  into  the  Father  and 
into  the  Gospel/  Again,  if,  in  an  earlier  age,  we 
find  no  trace  of  the  existence  of  later  institutions, 
we  may  not  conclude  that  they  did  not  exist,  for 
we  can  suppose  that  "  an  idolatrous  Paganism 
tended  to  repress  the  externals  of  Christianity  ".^ 

In  arguing  that,  from  the  first  age  of  Christ- 
ianity, its  teaching  looked  toward  a  closely  com- 
pacted dogmatic  and  hierarchical  system,'^  he  uses 
canons  which,  turned  to  the  work  of  destruction, 
could  dissolve  any  basis  of  fact.  Their  legitimate 
application  ends  in  the  Hegelian  view  of  the  im- 
portance of  the  idea  and  the  insignificance  of  all 
else,  and  Strauss  found  them  as  useful  for  his 
contention  as  Newman  for  his.  The  thing  of  su- 
preme value  to  Newman  is  the  ecclesiastical  find- 
ing, and  to  discover  the  agreement  of  Scripture 
with  this  orthodoxy  we  require  to  interpret  it 
mystically,  all  schools  of  literal  interpretation  hav- 
ing been  mere  seed-beds  of  heresy.  Surely  it  is 
a  perilous  approach  to  an  admission  of  Strauss's 
identification  of  the  mystical  and  the  mythical  thus 
to  propound  the  Church's  method  of  interpreting 
her  Scriptures  as  liberty  to  read  her  own  ideas  back 
into  them. 

Nor  is  this  method  of  reading  history  by  a  pre- 
determined scheme  the  only  reminder  of   Hegel. 
The  conception  of  development  by  struggle  and 
1  P.  26.        2  p.  28.         3  p.  122. 
19 


290   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

reconciliation  has  its  ancestry,  by  however  indirect 
a  channel,  in  Hegel's  scheme  of  thought.  Dr.  Barry 
sees  in  every  page  of  the  Development  Darwin's  ad- 
vancing shadow.^  A  thing  very  much  easier  to  see 
is  the  departing  shadow  of  Hegel.  Dr.  Barry  takes 
for  granted  that,  if  Newman  has  not  read  an  author, 
he  is  not  indebted  to  him,  as  if  any  man  of  cul- 
ture could  shut  his  mind  to  the  forces  which  in- 
fluence deeply  his  time.  Newman  himself  knew 
better,  for,  though  he  had  not  read  a  word  of 
Coleridge,  he  knew  him  to  be  one  of  the  spiritual 
ancestors  of  Tractarianism,  and,  though  he  had  not 
read  a  word  of  Kant,  he  considered  himself  in  a 
position  to  judge  his  philosophy  the  legitimate  fruit 
of  Lutheranism.  Of  his  indebtedness  to  Hegel, 
Newman,  with  his  usual  disregard  to  his  contem- 
poraries, is  not  aware,  yet,  who  that  has  once  heard 
it,  can  fail  to  recognise  the  accent  of  that  great 
thinker  when  Newman  goes  on  to  describe  the 
development  he  believes  in  ?  From  the  nature  of 
the  human  mind,  he  says,  time  is  necessary  for  the 
full  comprehension  and  perfection  of  great  ideas. 
When  an  idea  is  of  a  nature  to  arrest  and  possess 
the  mind,  it  becomes  an  active  principle.  First, 
there  is  a  time  of  confusion  when  conception  and 
misconception  are  in  conflict.  By  this  process  one 
view  is  modified  by  another  and  then  combined 
with  a  third,  till  it  is  to  each  mind  what  before  it 
was  only  to  all  together.^  By  this  process  an  idea 
may  be  developed  into  an  ethical  code,  a  system  of 
government,  a  theology,  a  ritual,  while  remaining 

1  William  Barry,  Neiv7?ia?i,  1904,  p.  278.  ^  P.  29. 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         291 

in  substance  what  it  was  from  the  beginning.  In- 
stead of  the  stream  being  clearest  at  the  spring,  it  is 
more  equable  and  purer  and  stronger  when  it  has 
become  deep  and  broad  and  full.^ 

Nor  does  Newman  avoid  the  supreme  danger  of 
this  intellectual  conception  of  development,  which 
is  not  the  denial  of  any  idea  or  of  any  body  of  ideas, 
but  the  dissolution  of  the  whole  reality  of  religion 
into  ideas.  Religion  to  the  Hegelian  also  was  essen- 
tially dogma.  He  also  could  say  with  Newman  : 
"  I  know  no  other  religion  ".  He  also  sought  in- 
tellectual emancipation  by  tracing  in  the  past  a 
great,  logical,  harmonious  growth  of  ideas,  asking 
only  concerning  ideas.  But  it  was  this  very  dogma 
which  Newman  took  to  be  the  indissoluble  ele- 
ment in  religion,  that  the  Hegelian  evaporated  into 
philosophical  abstractions. 

Hegel  allows  a  legitimacy  to  revolution  which 
Newman  denies,  yet  even  Newman  has  to  admit 
the  services  of  heresies  in  bringing  out  what  was 
implicit  in  the  Church's  faith.  Further,  Hegel  might 
seem  to  be  very  different  from  Newman  in  making 
freedom  the  goal  of  history,  seeing  that  to  New- 
man emancipation  is  a  synonym  for  anarchy.  Yet, 
in  this  also,  the  difference  is  less  than  appears. 
To  Hegel  freedom  is  simply  obedience  to  an  in- 
ward law,  to  have  the  centre  of  motion  within. 
And  his  interest  also  is  not  in  the  individual  with 
his  personal  moral  struggle,  but  in  the  institution 
in  which  the  idea  that  has  succeeded  abides  and 
acts. 

1  P.  40. 


292   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

This  correspondence  arises  partly  from  the  fact 
that  both  writers  were  the  fruit  of  the  same  Ro- 
mantic Movement,  partly  from  the  wide-spread 
influence  of  Hegel's  conception  of  history  which 
probably  reached  Newman  through  the  Catholic 
theologians,  but  which  has,  unknown  to  them, 
influenced  many  minds  besides  Newman's.  His- 
tory to  Hegel  is  the  unfolding  of  the  Reason, 
the  bringing  out  and  making  explicit  of  what 
was  from  the  first  implicit.  Great  men  are  simply 
organs  of  the  Universal  Reason.  Whatever  may 
be  thought  of  his  great  cryptogram  written  in 
history,  made  clear  as  soon  as  we  have  the  key  of 
the  true  movement  of  thought,  by  affirmation,  denial 
and  reconciliation,  we  can  hardly  exaggerate  Hegel's 
influence  on  the  study  of  history.  What  Mr. 
Bradley  calls  the  "  unearthly  ballet  of  bloodless 
categories"  may  leave  us  only  amazed,  and  with 
Professor  Pringle-Pattison  we  may  not  be  moved 
by  the  achievements  of  the  World  Spirit  to  unquali- 
fied admiration,  or  be  able  to  accept  the  abstraction 
of  the  race  in  place  of  the  living  children  of  men ; 
but  the  idea  that  we  see  in  history  our  life  in  the 
making,  in  the  first  fresh  realisation  of  its  contrasts, 
in  the  early  intensity  with  which  men  looked  at 
the  opposite  sides  of  it,  ere  they  had  been  able  to 
look  all  round  it  and  fit  it  into  its  obscure  place  in 
the  foundations  of  our  civilisation,  inspired  all  the 
historians  of  the  last  century,  and  brought  to  a 
definite  conclusion  the  eighteenth  century  concep- 
tion of  history  as  a  sort  of  museum  of  old  clothes, 
mainly  interesting  from  the  sense  of  superiority  it 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         293 

gave  to  those  who  had  attained  a  better  fashion. 
Again,  nothing  may  seem  to  us  more  unsatisfactory 
than  Hegel's  idea  of  freedom.  Every  word  of  Pro- 
fessor Pringle-Pattison's  criticism  may  seem  to  us 
justified.  "  Even  if  the  enormous  spiral  of  human 
history  is  destined  to  wind  itself  at  last  to  a  point 
which  may  be  called  achievement,  what,  I  ask, 
of  the  multitudes  which  perished  by  the  way  ? 
'These  all  died,  not  having  received  the  promises.' 
What  if  there  are  no  promises  to  them  ?  To  me 
the  old  idea  of  the  world  as  the  training-ground  of 
individual  character  seems  to  offer  a  much  more 
human,  and,  I  will  add,  a  much  more  Divine,  solu- 
tion than  this  philosophical  procession  of  the  car  of 
progress."  ^  Yet,  however  little  this  kind  of  free- 
dom seems  to  be  free,  the  attempt  to  interpret 
history  as  the  discipline  of  freedom  has  been  abun- 
dantly fruitful.  It  has  been  realised  in  consequence 
that  an  event,  to  be  properly  understood,  must  be 
looked  at  in  both  directions,  backwards  towards  its 
causes  and  forwards  towards  its  results,  and  that 
it  can  only  be  rightly  understood  in  its  place  in  the 
whole  scheme,  and  that  the  key  to  this  scheme 
must  be  a  spiritual  end,  not  a  material  cause. 

.  Most  deeply  Hegel  has  influenced  the  study  of 
the  origins  of  Christianity.  His  influence  has  not 
been  confined  to  one  school,  and  it  continues  to 
this  day ;  but  the  distinctively  Hegelian  school  is 
the  Tubingen,  the  writers  of  which  only  lived  to 
apply  his  principles  to  history.  To  them,  as  to 
Hegel,  the  distinguishing  characteristic  of  spirit  is 

'^Mail's  Place  in  the  Cosmos,  p.  62. 


294  THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

its  power  to  reconcile  opposites,  and  history  they 
take  to  be  simply  the  necessary  stages  in  the  evo- 
lution of  spirit.  They  also  found  in  history  a  fixed 
process  of  affirming  a  truth,  then  of  opposing  to  it 
a  seeming  contradiction,  and  then  of  discovering  the 
whole  truth  which  can  reconcile  and  embrace  both. 
This  scheme  was  apt  to  become  a  rack  on  which  to 
torture  the  facts  of  history  into  the  required  shape, 
a  serious  disturbance  to  an  impartial  investigation. 
Moreover,  it  tended,  in  the  hands  of  duller  men,  to 
work  as  mechanically  as  the  old  eighteenth  century 
concejDtion,  to  create  the  same  intolerance  of  the 
idea  of  new  forces,  and  to  make  religion  a  mere 
phase  of  the  race's  childhood.  Religion  was  philo- 
sophy in  the  making,  its  forms  being  a  kind  of 
picture  language,  to  be  interpreted  and  superseded 
by  the  ideas  which  afterwards  came  to  clearness  in 
the  process.  In  distinction  from  the  eighteenth 
century  the  spirit  of  religion  was  recognised  as  the 
prime  driving  force  in  the  progress  of  thought,  but 
it  was  the  progress  of  thought  which  drew  to  itself 
the  final  interest.  Now  that  the  true  philosophy 
had  come  to  put  everything  in  its  place  and  to  show 
that  everything  in  its  place  is  very  good,  not  only 
was  positive  religion  evaporated  into  ideas,  but  the 
primary  moral  condition  of  spiritual  progress — a 
new  heart — would  seem  to  have  become  super- 
fluous. 

Under  the  influence  of  this  conception.  Criticism 
devoted  itself  to  the  task  of  explaining  the  histori- 
cal origins  of  Christianity.  The  heart  of  the  prob- 
lem,  it   was    felt,    lay    in    the    Gospels.      Of    the 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         295 

methods  employed  in  the  task  Baur  gives  an 
account  in  his  Critical  Investigations  regarding  the 
Canonical  Gospels.  The  criticism  of  the  whole  New 
Testament,  he  says,  centres  in  the  Gospels,  and 
theology  and  the  whole  Christian  view  of  the  world 
are  deeply  concerned  in  the  issue.  The  real  prob- 
lem of  the  Gospels,  the  existence  in  them  of  every 
shade  of  correspondence,  from  verbal  agreement  to 
manifest  contradiction,  appears  as  soon  as  they  are 
compared,  and  must  have  been  evident  from  the  day 
they  were  placed  together  in  the  canon  of  Scripture. 
Four  methods,  Baur  says,  have  been  used  to 
solve  this  problem,  (1)  the  Dogmatic,  (2)  the  Ab- 
stract Critical,  (3)  the  Negative  Critical  or  Dialectic, 
(4)  the  Historical. 

(1)  According  to  the  Dogmatic  explanation,  the 
Gospels  are  all  alike  primarily  the  work  of  one 
Divine  Spirit.  On  a  deeper  consideration,  their 
differences  are  found  to  be  either  insignificant  or 
necessary  and  useful.  To  the  Fathers  there  were 
not  four  Gospels,  but  only  one  Gospel  in  four 
forms,  and  the  Protestant  harmonies  all  went  on 
the  assumption  that  the  differences  arose  from  one 
evangelist  giving  more  detail,  another  less.  Yet 
the  very  attempts  at  harmonising  made  it  evident 
that  all  four  Gospels  could  not  be  biographies  in 
chronological  order. 

(2)  By  the  Abstract- Critical  method  the  Gos- 
pels are  treated,  not  yet  as  historical,  but  purely 
as  literary  documents.  By  what  process,  it  asked, 
could  these  narratives  become  so  like  and  so  un- 
like ?    Eichhorn  suggested  as  the  basis  an  original 


296   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

Aramaic  Gospel,  added  to,  altered,  and  variously 
translated.  Hug  assumed  the  dependence  of 
Matthew  on  Mark,  and  of  Luke  on  both.  Gabler 
fell  back  on  a  stereotyped,  though  fluctuating, 
oral  tradition.  Schleiermacher  postulated  multi- 
tudes of  detached  narratives  of  single  events.  No 
finality  was  possible. 

(3)  From  this  method  of  fluctuating  hypotheses  it 
was  easy  to  pass  to  the  Negative  Critical  or  Dialec- 
tic. The  most  conspicuous  example  of  this  method 
is  Strauss's  Life  of  Jesus.  In  the  strict  sense  it 
attempts  no  criticism  of  the  Gospels,  but  denies 
their  trustworthiness  on  the  ground  that  what  they 
relate  is  incredible.  Like  all  other  sacred  books, 
they  are  not  histories  but  mythical  embodiments  of 
spiritual  truths.  They  are  not  written  by  eye- 
witnesses or  persons  well  informed.  As  everything 
contrary  to  common  experience  is  at  once  to  be  re- 
garded as  unhistorical,  and  as  all  the  narratives 
are  woven  throughout  with  what  is  contrary  to 
experience,  no  confidence  can  be  placed  on  any 
part  of  any  of  the  Gospels.  In  Strauss,  Baur  says, 
the  age  saw  itself — its  contradictions,  its  incon- 
sequences, its  assumptions — mercilessly  exposed, 
and,  as  a  consequence,  it  hated  him.^ 

But  the  resentment  had  more  justification  than 
that.  Ritschl's  criticism  is  also  just.  Strauss,  he 
says,  "wrote  on  religion,  as  one  might  write  on 
harmony  to  whom  all  music  was  a  disagreeable 
noise  ".  ^     The  highest  he  ever  finds  in  any  event 

^  Die  kanonischen  Evangelien,  p.  48. 

2  Eechtfertigung  und  Versohnung,  p.  390. 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         297 

in  history  that  rises  an  inch  above  the  common 
level,  is  a  mythical  embodiment  of  a  philosophical 
thought.  All  heroism  vanished  at  a  stroke  from 
history,  and  the  figure  which  above  all  others  meant 
for  so  many  that  life  could  be  nobly  and  freely 
lived  against  all  oppositions,  vanished  into  mis- 
understood Old  Testament  texts.  No  man  was  ever 
less  troubled  by  any  haunting  sense  that  religion 
might  be  a  feeling,  a  life,  greater  than  we  know 
how  to  measure  and  express,  and  that  the  highest 
embodiment  of  it  bore  witness  of  being  a  real 
Person  to  the  hearts  that  knew  the  secret  and  were 
fighting  for  the  same  victory. 

To  Strauss  the  Jesus  of  the  Gospels  is  in  no 
way  the  peasant  of  Galilee,  but  is  built  \i\)  of  what 
the  early  Christians,  influenced  mainly  by  Old 
Testament  texts,  thought  the  Messiah  should  have 
been.  Once  admit  this,  he  maintains,  and  the  dif- 
ficulties in  the  Gospels  are  all  dissipated.  All  we 
have  then  to  explain  is  how  the  narratives  arose, 
and,  in  treating  that  question,  we  may  exercise  the 
largest  freedom,  for  the  Gospels  neither  originated 
in  the  Apostolic  age  nor  among  a  people  of  histori- 
cal temper.  Each  evangelist  shapes  the  narratives 
to  his  own  notions.  Matthew,  for  the  most  part, 
has  the  incident  in  its  least  decorated  form ;  Luke 
shows  it  at  a  more  advanced  stage ;  Mark  ever 
indulges  his  love  of  the  picturesque ;  and  John  is 
mainly  concerned  to  overshoot  all  his  predecessors. 
With  a  subtlety  which  could  prove  that  no  histor- 
ical incident  ever  did  happen,  Strauss  finds  con- 
tradictions in  the  most   ordinary  incidents,  as  if 


298   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

nothing  ever  came  to  pass  except  in  ways  a  man 
in  his  study  would  regard  as  consistent.  Yet,  in  the 
most  remarkable  of  all  the  narratives,  the  accounts 
of  the  Resurrection,  some  kind  of  reality  he  must 
acknowledge.  He  reduces  it  to  subjective  impres- 
sions, prepared  for  by  misunderstanding  our  Lord's 
prediction  of  the  revival  of  His  cause,  and  produced 
in  an  atmosphere  of  fervid  pious  enthusiasm  ;  but, 
even  so,  it  remains  the  unusual,  while  his  general 
canon  is  that  the  unusual  is  the  incredible. 

Strauss  contends  that  he  distils  from  the  narra- 
tives all  faith  requires,  while  rendering  to  free- 
dom all  her  dues.  On  high  philosophic  grounds 
he  holds  that,  from  the  nature  of  the  case,  all 
religious  narratives  must  necessarily  be  unhis- 
torical.  "  If  religion  be  defined  as  the  perception  of 
truth,  not  in  the  form  of  an  idea,  which  is  the 
philosophical  perception,  but  invested  with  imagery, 
it  is  easy  to  see  that  the  mythical  element  can  be 
wanting  only  when  religion  either  falls  short  of,  or 
goes  beyond,  its  particular  province,  and  that,  in 
the  proper  religions,  it  must  necessarily  exist."  ^ 
This  is  Spinoza's  doctrine  of  imaginatio  and  that 
in  eoccelsis.  Religion  is  only  religion,  because  its 
ideas  are  still  bathed  in  the  mists  of  myth  and 
legend.  Directly  the  sun  rises,  it  becomes  philoso- 
phy. Here,  then,  is  how  we  are,  in  freedom,  to 
inherit  the  past.  The  shell  of  the  narrative  is  to 
be  stripped  off,  and  the  ideal  truth  which  consti- 
tutes its  value  is  to  be  held.  Strauss  quotes 
Hegel  to  the  effect  that  faith,  in  its  earlier  stages, 

1  Eng.  trans.,  p.  80. 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         299 

is  governed  by  the  senses,  and  therefore  contem- 
plates a  temporal  history,  which,  once  it  has  helped 
to  bring  into  the  mind  the  idea  of  humanity  as  one 
with  God,  is  seen  to  be  only  the  presentation  of  an 
idea.  We  arrive,  then,  not  at  a  sensible,  empirical 
fact,  but  at  a  spiritual.  Divine  idea,  to  be  confirmed 
no  longer  by  history  but  by  philosophy.^  On  this 
principle  we  reach  two  results  of  value — not  a  sin- 
less Christ,  which  would  be  a  miracle,  but  the  best 
ideal  an  age  could  draw,  which  is  vague  enough  to 
be  modified  as  increasing  enlightenment  may  re- 
quire, and,  not  a  God-man,  but  the  idea  of  the 
race  as  a  reconciliation  of  the  earthly  and  the 
Divine.^ 

(4)  In  contrast  to  these  three  previous  methods, 
Baur  calls  his  own  method  the  Historical.  The 
chief  difference  consists  in  giving  a  wider  scope 
to  his  inquiry.  Baur  is  as  much  a  Hegelian  as 
Strauss,  but  he  applies  his  Hegelianism  more  in 
the  spirit  and  less  in  the  letter.  At  the  whole 
problem  of  the  rise  of  the  Christian  Church  he  will 
look,  and  he  will  look  at  it  both  in  its  causes  and 
in  its  results,  seeing  it  in  its  whole  place  in  history. 
Few  of  Baur's  own  results  have  stood,  but,  if  they 
have  been  overturned,  it  has  been  by  his  own 
method. 

He  begins  by  asking  how  each  writer  himself 
regarded  his  own  work — what  he  aimed  at,  what 
interest  he  wished  to  serve,  what  purpose  he 
followed,  what  character  he  has  thereby  given  his 
writing.  To  these  questions  only  a  knowledge  of 
1  P.  780.         2  p_  773_ 


300      THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

the  whole  historical  circumstances  amid  which  he 
wrote  can  afford  the  answer. 

Yet  the  characteristic  feature  of  the  Tubingen 
Criticism  was  not  this  method  alone,  but  this 
method  with  a  postulate.  As  soon  as  a  book  is 
shown  to  have  been  written  with  a  purpose,  it  is 
to  be  discounted  as  an  accurate  historical  report. 
This  principle  is  not  merely  applied  in  particular 
instances  in  which  a  tendency  to  accommodate  facts 
to  general  contentions  can  be  traced,  but  is  laid 
down  as  a  broad  proposition.  Yet  Macaulay's 
History  is  not  a  work  of  fiction,  although  it  has 
been  called  a  huge  Whig  pamphlet ;  and  it  is  surely 
possible  to  imagine  a  writer  so  honestly  certain  that 
facts  square  with  his  views,  as  to  be  in  a  very 
special  degree  delivered  from  the  temptation  to 
pervert  them.  With  Baur,  however,  Tendenz  or 
purpose  is  almost  as  fruitful  a  mother  of  invention 
as  myth  with  Strauss,  and  it  is  certainly  not  more 
reassuring  for  being  nearer  deliberate  creation. 

Apart,  however,  from  this  postulate,  Baur's 
method  remains  what  he  called  it,  the  Historical 
Method.  As  it  arranges  the  documents  from  the 
history  and  the  history  from  the  documents,  it  may 
seem  to  reason  in  a  circle.  But  it  is  rather  like 
putting  the  pieces  of  a  Chinese  puzzle  together. 
First,  the  whole  must  be  made  up  out  of  the  pieces, 
and  then,  that  the  pieces  are  in  their  right  place, 
must  be  proved  by  reference  to  the  whole.  Where 
the  dates  of  the  writings  are  in  question  no  other 
method  can  be  employed,  but,  to  be  convincing,  it 
must  be  done  with  completeness  and  on  a  large  scale. 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         301 

On  this  scale  Strauss  had  not  conducted  his 
inquiry.  His  elimination  of  everything  remarkable 
from  the  person  of  Jesus  only  made  the  rise  of  the 
Christian  Church  more  inexplicable.  In  the  third 
century  the  Church  existed  in  a  form  not  to  be 
denied,  and  it  was  manifestly  a  duty  to  explain,  on 
the  accepted  principles,  how  it  came  to  be.  To 
Protestant  theologians  the  Catholic  Church  was 
a  declension  from  Apostolic  Christianity,  but  the 
Hegelian,  as  much  as  the  Catholic,  had  to  show 
that  it  was  a  development.  The  Hegelian  key  to 
the  process  was  furnished  by  Baur.  First,  there 
was  primitive  Judaistic  Christianity.  Then,  the 
Pauline  universal  antithesis  to  it  arose.  Finally, 
these  antitheses  were  reconciled  in  the  Catholic 
Church.  This  solution  Schwegler  in  his  Post- 
Apostolic  Age  endeavoured  to  carry  out  in  detail. 
Judaistic  Apostolic  Christianity  began  as  mere 
Ebionitism,  as  Jewish  in  everything  but  a  belief 
that  the  Messiah  had  come.  From  it  Paul  took 
nothing  but  the  idea  of  a  Messiah  who  died  and 
rose  again.  The  rest  followed  as  the  reasoned 
transformation  of  the  legal  religion  into  a  religion 
of  freedom,  of  an  enslaved  and  unhappy  conscious- 
ness into  the  assurance  of  reconciliation.  Only 
after  a  century  of  toning  down  their  differences 
were  both  parties  absorbed  into  the  unity  of  the 
Catholic  Church. 

But  this  scheme  at  once  raises  the  question, 
how,  if  the  Jewish  Christians  were  a  mere  Jewish 
sect,  and  if  Paul's  teaching  were  merely  accidentally 
connected  with  the  same  Person,  to  whom,  how- 


302   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

ever,  he  attached  a  quite  different  idea  of  his  own, 
there  could  be  common  interests  to  keep  these 
parties  together  under  the  Christian  name,  and  com- 
mon grounds  upon  which  they  could  seek  recon- 
ciliation ?  Schwegler  only  seems  to  succeed  by 
refraining  from  giving  any  clear  account  of  the 
parties.  Nothing  is  left  to  work  the  reconciliation 
except  a  desire  for  external  unity,  and,  even  when 
the  reconciliation  is  accomplished,  Schwegler  him- 
self cannot  maintain  that  it  is  an  advance  upon 
Paul. 

After  Schwegler's  attempt  had  been  subjected 
to  much  criticism,  Baur  set  himself  to  the  task  of 
working  out  his  own  idea  in  detail.  He  was  thus 
able  to  apply  the  learning  of  a  long  and  laborious 
lifetime  to  the  subject,  in  the  light  of  a  keen  dis- 
cussion. Yet  the  interest  of  the  work  is  in  the 
mode  of  trying  and  not  in  the  measure  of  success. 
From  the  first  it  was  a  forlorn  hope.  When  Schweg- 
ler wrote  in  1845  the  Tubingen  school  was  in  its 
prime.  When  Baur's  Chiwch  History  of  the  First 
Three  Centuries  appeared  in  1853  the  movement  of 
thought,  to  use  its  own  language,  was  passing  over 
into  its  opposite.  Baur  had  already  quarrelled 
bitterly  with  Ritschl  for  declaring  that  the  Tubingen 
school  was  dissolved  and  that  its  influence  would 
only  deserve  recognition,  in  so  far  as  it  had  con- 
ducted to  an  opposite  conception  of  Primitive 
Christianity  from  that  of  Baur  and  Schwegler.  Yet 
this  was  no  mean  desert  which  Ritschl  indicates, 
for  it  is  one  of  Baur's  high  merits  that  he  so  states 
the  problem  as  to  lead  on  from  his  own  conclusion 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         303 

to  a  truer.  Naturally,  however,  that  was  not  Baur's 
own  view  of  his  services.  Though  he  felt  himself 
alone  in  the  world,  his  faith  in  his  position  was  un- 
faded.  He  still  claimed  to  have  comj^rehended 
things  as  they  are,  and  to  have  put  the  various 
writings  in  the  place  to  which  they  belong,  with  a 
confidence  which  made  Ritschl  exclaim  :  "  What  a 
superstition  of  the  objectivity  of  his  own  knowledge 
an  old  Hegelian  can  have  ! "  ^ 

The  Hegelian  formula  is  Baur's  guide  to  his- 
torical truth.  First  there  is  unity,  then  enters 
difference,  and  then  the  advancement  takes  place 
by  the  reconciliation  of  the  difference.  Men  are 
mere  vehicles  of  the  idea  which  is  of  itself  strug- 
gling to  light.  It  is  all  "  an  unearthly  ballet  of 
bloodless  categories,"  and  even  Paul,  who  more  than 
Jesus  is  taken  to  be  the  creator  of  Christianity,  is  a 
mere  puppet  pulled  by  a  string.  Christianity,  Baur 
says,  like  every  other  great  movement,  is  a  synthesis 
of  elements  already  existing  in  opposition,  and  it 
again  advances  by  making  a  new  synthesis  of  the 
contradictory  elements  first  latent  and  then  appar- 
ent in  itself.  Christianity  is  a  great  reconciliation  of 
the  bitter  social  contrasts  and  deep  spiritual  needs 
existing  in  the  world  in  the  time  of  Christ,  and  the 
Catholic  Church  is  a  great  reconciliation  of  the 
opposing  views  and  interests  which  existed  in  the 
Church  at  the  close  of  the  second  century. 

Our  human  interest  asks  bread  from  this  scheme 
and  receives  a  stone.  Instead  of  the  "  living^  chil- 
dren  of  men"  we  have  a  formula.     Nevertheless, 

1  Bitschls  Leben,  vol.  i.,  p.  271. 


304   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

the  advance  which  the  new  philosophy  brought  into 
the  study  of  history  is  at  once  apparent.  The  old 
Kationalist  idea  of  Christianity  as  a  sort  of  happy 
accident,  brought  about  by  a  few  well-meaning 
but  ignorant  men  in  an  out-of-the-way  corner  of 
the  world,  gives  place  to  a  great  historic  move- 
ment which  came  forth  at  the  call  of  man's 
deepest  needs.  We  are  made  to  see  that  no 
movement  ever  united  so  many  interests,  or  made 
use  of  so  many  advantages,  or  satisfied  so  many 
aspirations. 

Alexander  opened  the  portals  of  the  East,  not 
merely  for  Greek  speech  and  culture  to  be  a 
vehicle  of  the  new  faith,  but  also  for  the  spirit 
which  assailed  the  national  and  particular.  In 
both  ways  he  helped  to  make  a  universal  religion 
a  necessity.  In  a  similar  manner,  the  Empire  of 
Rome  conquered  the  world  not  merely  to  provide 
highways  for  the  ambassadors  of  the  Cross,  but  also 
to  be  the  bond  and  protection  of  the  universalism 
of  Christianity.  Heathenism  was  dying  and  Juda- 
ism dividing,  but  only  because  they  had  created  a 
higher  need  than  they  were  able  to  satisfy.  The 
old  religions  were  crumbling,  because  a  new,  which 
required  a  worship  free  from  the  sensuous  and 
material,  with  its  foundations  deep  in  man's  moral 
nature,  was  already  come. 

After  the  Old  Testament,  the  most  spiritual 
link  with  the  earlier  religious  development  was  the 
Greek  philosophy.  It  created  and  did  not  merely 
criticise.  Platonism  recognised  a  certain  unity  of 
the   consciousness  of   God   and   sought  a   higher 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         305 

ground  for  the  Divine  life.  Epicureanism  was  not 
mere  Euclsemonism  and  Atheism,  nor  was  Stoicism 
mere  self-sufficiency.  Epicureanism  and  Stoicism 
both  alike,  though  in  different  ways,  enforced  the 
lesson  of  Socrates  that  a  man  should  return  into 
himself  to  find  the  essence  of  virtue  there,  that 
man's  blessedness  is  to  be  found  only  in  a  satisfied 
and  disciplined  moral  frame.  Scepticism  taught 
not  to  be  proudly  self-sufficient.  Eclecticism  cor- 
rected partial  views  and  Neo-Platonism  urged  an 
immediate  consciousness  of  the  Divine.  By  all 
alike,  this  great  necessary  lesson  preparatory  for 
Christianity  was  taught — that  man  is  a  moral  sub- 
ject with  his  own  special  life's  task. 

Most  important  of  all,  so  conspicuous  as  to 
require  no  exposition,  we  have  the  preparation  of 
the  Old  Testament. 

All  these  elements  were  combined  in  Hellenistic 
Judaism,  which,  having  been  delivered  from  Jewish 
particularism  by  Greek  culture,  was  ready  to  receive 
a  more  spiritual  form  of  faith  and  to  provide  the 
ambassadors  of  the  new  religion. 

All  these  elements,  however  much  separated, 
were  the  result  of  one  and  the  same  wide  move- 
ment. Christianity  is  the  natural  unity  of  them 
all,  and  contains  nothing  which  had  not  made  itself 
felt  as  a  result  of  rational  thinking,  or  as  a  need  of 
the  human  heart,  or  as  a  requirement  of  the  moral 
consciousness. 

To  pass  from  the  natural  Christianity  of  Deism 

and  the  respectable  moral  Christianity  of  Eational- 

ism   to   these   high    places    of  the   human    spirit, 

20 


S06   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

makes  one  say  with  Keats  and  for  a  far  greater 
reason : — 

Then  felt  I  like  some  watcher  of  the  skies, 
When  a  new  planet  swims  into  his  ken. 

But  the  greatness  of  Baur's  description  only  makes 
his  easy  solution  the  less  convincing.  Is  it 
strange,  he  demands,  that,  when  all  this  was  urging 
itself  in  so  many  ways  upon  the  developed  con- 
sciousness of  mankind,  it  should  finally  appear 
in  the  simplest,  purest,  naturalest  expression  in 
Christianity  ?  We  can  only  reply,  especially  when 
we  are  driven  back  to  what  Baur  sought  so  strenu- 
ously to  avoid,  to  the  certainty  that  all  that  met 
this  vast  need  was  embodied  in  one  man,  that  it  is 
the  strangest  of  all  conceivable  things,  strange  as 
life,  strange  as  love. 

The  aim  of  Baur's  theory  is  to  pour  the  fulness 
of  the  perfected  idea  of  Christianity  into  many 
vessels,  and  he  seems  to  ascribe  as  much  to  Paul 
as  to  Jesus,  but  he  is  too  great  a  historian  to  be 
able  to  conceal  the  unique  greatness  of  Him  who 
remains  the  Author  of  the  Faith  ;  nor,  although 
his  task  is  to  prove  development,  can  he  obscure 
the  fact  that  nothing  ever  rises  higher  than  the 
religion  of  Jesus.  Jesus,  he  says,  dealt  with  the 
social  problem  which  ojDpressed  His  age,  and  found 
a  solution  whereby  those  who  have  nothing,  yet 
have  all  things.  To  be  poor  in  spirit,  gladly  ac- 
cepting one's  lot,  is  to  have  the  Kingdom  of 
Heaven.  In  this  solution,  again,  there  lie  the 
deeper  contrast  of  sin  and  grace,  and  the  higher 
reconciliation  of  them  in  redemption.     Moreover, 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         307 

man  being  thus  viewed  apart  from  his  position, 
morals  could  be  viewed  apart  from  circumstances, 
and  the  disposition  could  be  made  the  express 
principle  of  morality.  This  carries  with  it  a  rela- 
tion to  men  of  equal  rights  and  love  to  all,  and  a 
relation  to  God  of  moral  disposition,  not  of  cere- 
mony. Forgiveness  plays  a  larger  part  than  ever, 
but  it  is  as  the  necessary  condition  for  fulfilling 
God's  will.  Under  the  influence  of  this  higher 
moral  conception,  the  idea  of  the  Old  Testament 
Theocracy  was  spiritualised  into  the  idea  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  into  the  idea,  that  is,  of  an 
association  for  fulfilling  the  will  of  God,  which  rests 
entirely  upon  moral  conditions,  upon  the  man  him- 
self, his  will  and  moral  receptivity,  and  only  de- 
mands that,  on  entering  it,  he  lay  aside  all  external 
claims  for  himself.  Thus  Christianity  in  its  most 
original  elements  is  a  purely  moral  religion,  and  to 
this,  its  most  distinctive  character,  we  must,  after 
all  the  errors  of  an  excessive  dogmatism,  ever 
return. 

The  contrast  between  this  lofty  idea  of  the 
morality  of  the  Gospel  and  the  compound  of  pru- 
dential maxims  and  dubious  accommodation  which 
constituted  the  idea  of  a  century  earlier  is  a  signi- 
ficant sign  of  progress,  a  valuable  result  of  investi- 
gation, for  the  understanding  of  the  Christian  Ethic 
is  the  beginning  of  all  understanding  of  Christianity. 
Yet,  even  with  this  high  conception  of  Jesus,  Baur 
cannot  effect  a  convincing  beginning.  Why  should 
the  idea  of  the  Jewish  Messiah,  though  it  were  the 
most  national  of  all  Jewish  ideas,  be  attached  to 


308   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

One  who  had  indeed  the  greatest  elements  of  the 
Old  Testament  conceptions,  but  none  of  the  ele- 
ments which  alone  the  popular  mind  regarded  ? 
Still  less  do  we  see  how  Jesus  should  have  cared 
to  claim  the  title,  when,  in  the  minds  of  His  con- 
temporaries, it  in  no  way  represented  the  type  of 
salvation  He  sought  to  accomplish.  And,  if  we 
admit  with  Baur  that  the  incontrovertible  cer- 
tainty the  disciples  entertained  regarding  the 
Kesurrection  afiPorded  a  firm  ground  for  the  further 
development  of  Christianity,  what  right  have  we  to 
regard  the  source  of  so  great  a  historical  force  as 
outside  the  circle  of  historical  inquiry  ?  The  sole 
result  of  the  discussion  is  to  make  us  feel  that 
Jesus  impressed  His  contemporaries,  and  especially 
His  friends,  with  a  greatness  which  Baur  is  equally 
powerless  to  explain  or  to  explain  away. 

In  carrying  out  his  work  of  pouring  the  fulness 
of  Christianity  into  many  vessels,  Baur  claims  the 
right  to  date  any  of  the  books  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment anywhere  in  the  first  two  centuries.  Mark 
is  a  mere  compilation  from  Matthew  and  Luke. 
Luke  is  a  Gospel  with  a  purpose — the  defence  of 
the  Pauline  teaching — and  dates  from  the  end  of 
the  first  century.  John  is  another  Gospel  with  a 
purpose — the  exposition  of  the  Catholic  theology 
— and  dates  from  the  end  of  the  second  century. 
The  only  trustworthy  document  is  the  teaching  of 
Jesus,  the  Logia  in  Matthew. 

The  only  authentic  writings  are  the  four  great 
Epistles  of  Paul,  and,  interpreting  the  other  writings 
by  them,  we  find  that,  almost  from  the  day  of  our 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         309 

Lord's  death,  Christianity  began  to  sj^lit  into  two 
camps.  To  one  the  risen  Christ  was  to  return  in 
the  clouds  of  heaven  to  restore  a  Jewish  kingdom  ; 
to  the  other  He  had  died,  at  the  hands  of  the  Jews, 
to  all  Jewish  distinctions.  The  freer  development 
began  with  the  Hellenistic  party  led  by  Stephen. 
This  party  was  expelled  by  the  first  persecution. 
Their  departure  left  Jerusalem  henceforth  the 
centre  of  Judaistic  Christianity.  Paul's  persecu- 
tion of  Stephen  and  his  associates  only  shows  how 
clearly  he  saw  the  issues  ;  so  that,  on  his  conversion, 
he  at  once  accepted  a  universal  Christianity,  and 
regarded  the  death  of  Christ  as  the  end  of  the 
Jewish  idea.  Thus  Christ's  death  and  resurrec- 
tion were  his  chief  concern.  Of  the  life  of  Christ, 
seeing  he  could  have  the  word  of  the  living  and 
working  Christ  in  himself,  why  should  he  inquire 
at  the  other  Apostles  ?  Yet  surely  it  is  this  belief 
in  a  living  Christ  that  has  nourished  in  all  other 
men,  besides  this  singularly  constituted  Apostle, 
the  undying  interest  in  the  narratives  of  Christ's 
earthly  life. 

Paul  became  the  leader  of  the  universal  party, 
while  the  older  Apostles  headed  the  Jewish  party. 
The  Apostles  conceded  something  to  events  and  to 
Paul's  arguments,  and  Paul  sought  to  maintain  a 
link  with  the  Jerusalem  Church  by  raising  contri- 
butions for  its  poor ;  but  the  rupture  with  Peter  at 
Antioch  was,  in  Baur's  view,  never  healed,  and  left 
a  deep,  rankling  feeling  of  resentment  in  the  Petrine 
party. 

The    purest    source   of    information   regarding 


310   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

Paul's  party  after  his  death  is  Luke's  Gospel, 
which  sets  forth  Jesus  as  the  Son  of  God  in  Paul's 
sense,  and  relates  how  the  Gentiles  received  the 
Gospel  when  the  Jews  rejected  it.  The  Apoca- 
lypse, which  Baur  is  willing  to  ascribe  to  the 
Apostle  John,  represents  the  other  side.  John,  he 
argues,  settled  in  Ephesus  for  the  express  purpose 
of  controverting  the  Pauline  party,  and  it  is  Paul 
and  his  followers  who  are  described  as  **  those  who 
call  themselves  AjDOstles  and  are  not  ". 

The  other  writings  of  the  New  Testament  are 
landmarks  on  the  way  towards  the  reconciliation 
which  ended  in  the  Early  Catholic  Church.  On  the 
one  hand,  Judaistic  Christianity  sank  circumcision 
in  baptism,  claimed  Paul's  universalism  for  Peter, 
and  ascribed  all  the  better  elements  of  heathenism 
to  Peter's  converts ;  on  the  other  hand,  Gentile 
Christianity  modified  Paul's  doctrine  of  faith,  and 
gradually  adopted  the  theocratic  institutions  and 
aristocratic  forms  of  Judaism.  The  influence  of 
Judaism  in  fashioning  the  Catholic  Church  cannot, 
Baur  maintains,  be  exaggerated,  and  the  bishop, 
who  was  the  germ  of  the  whole  Papal  hierarchy, 
was  simply  the  creation  of  the  inborn  imjjulse  of 
the  Jew  toward  a  theocratic  world-emj)ire. 

Apart  altogether  from  the  question  of  whether 
the  facts  justify  this  scheme,  Baur  does  not  show 
that  Catholicism  is  a  wider  and  higher  synthesis  of 
thought  than  original  Christianity,  and  he  cannot 
obscure  the  fact  that  it  is  a  great  departure  from 
the  freedom  of  the  Apostle  of  the  Gentiles. 

If  Baur  failed  to  gain  any  wide  acceptance  for 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         311 

his  scheme,  it  was  due  largely  to  a  change  that  was 
taking  place  in  what  Professor  James  has  called 
the  "  sentiment  of  rationality ".  Men  were  no 
longer  so  much  charmed  by  the  idea  of  evolution 
by  intellectual  movement.  That,  too,  they  began 
to  feel,  was  only  a  kind  of  machinery.  Pessimism, 
among  other  things,  was  changing  the  temper  of 
the  age.  To  it  the  car  of  progress  was  only  a 
Juggernaut  car  rolling  on  over  the  bodies  of  its 
worshippers.  Life,  the  Pessimist  affirmed,  is  not 
rational  in  the  Hegelian  sense.  It  is  not  a  fine 
optimistic  business  of  climbing  a  ladder,  first  with 
the  right  foot  and  then  with  the  left,  and  then  sett- 
ing both  feet  on  the  rung  above.  Just  because  the 
truth  Pessimism  affirms  had  been  so  utterly  ig- 
nored, it  could  be  spoken  of  as  if  there  were  nothing 
else  in  the  world.  Life,  it  was  affirmed,  is  a  mere 
blind  groping  in  the  darkness  with  the  smell  of  the 
underground  prison-house  about  us,  and  our  heads 
of  little  use  except  to  hit  the  rafters.  Then  this 
easy  conquest  of  the  promised  land  by  spacious 
intellectual  formulae  became  a  mockery,  and  men 
had  to  make  their  choice  between  regarding  life  as 
a  poor  attempt  for  a  little  season  at  cheating  the 
worms  of  their  due  or  as  the  tribulation  by  which 
we  must  enter  the  kingdom,  there  being  manifestly 
no  easy  middle  way.  In  view  of  this  stern  neces- 
sity of  choice  the  history  of  the  Early  Church 
assumed  a  different  shape  and  the  figure  of  Christ 
received  a  new  value.  In  face  of  a  life  made  real 
by  temjitation  and  trial,  it  was  inconceivable  that 
such  a  Being  was  made  up  of  shreds  and  patches, 


312   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

of  Old  Testament  texts  and  popular  misconcep- 
tions. Apart  from  all  else,  how  could  any  religious 
enthusiasm,  working  with  the  ignorant  imagination, 
conceive  that  glorious  liberty  of  a  child  of  God, 
that  attitude  of  a  Son  in  His  Father's  house  ?  Who, 
in  that  age  enslaved  to  the  past,  could  imagine  even 
the  intellectual  freedom  ?  How,  above  all,  could 
such  a  picture  of  liberty  come  to  pass,  when,  on 
the  hypothesis,  mental  subjection  was  its  presup- 
position ?  Think  only  of  how  in  Christ  the  problem 
of  history  and  the  individual  is  solved.  In  Him 
there  is  nothing  of  the  painful  conflict  which  dis- 
turbs other  seekers  after  truth,  that,  without  his- 
torical religion,  they  are  barren,  and  that,  with  it, 
they  are  enslaved.  For  Him  there  is  no  "  ugly, 
wide  ditch  "  to  get  over  in  passing  from  "  contingent 
truths  of  history  to  eternal  truths  of  reason  ".  Like 
a  Son  in  His  Father's  house  He  takes  secure  and 
easy  possession  of  all  the  treasures  of  the  past. 
They  are  always  at  His  service  and  never  in  His 
way.  With  entire  freedom  He  uses  the  Old  Testa- 
ment, finding  in  it  a  continual  provision  for  His 
thought,  but  ever  using  it  in  His  own  way  and  for 
His  own  ends,  and  ever  accepting  its  teaching 
because  it  is  true  and  never  because  it  is  authori- 
tative. Just  because  He  never  takes  up  a  merely 
intellectual  attitude  towards  the  truth,  just  because 
He  is  ever  practically  fulfilling  the  Kingdom  of  God, 
for  which  those  who  had  gone  before  Him  lived 
and  died.  He  is  always  in  living  succession  to  them, 
inheriting  all  their  labours,  yet  needing  to  call  no 
man  master. 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         313 

Still  less  could  any  one  imagine  the  perfect  moral 
freedom  by  which  this  intellectual  freedom  was  fed. 
Pessimism  has  all  its  rights  accorded  to  it.  Poor 
humanity's  sores  are  not  covered  over.  The  harlot 
and  the  publican  prostitute  womanhood  and  man- 
hood. The  formalist  and  hypocrite  holds  religion 
like  a  corpse  to  his  icy  heart.  Poverty,  disease 
and  death  occupy  the  scene.  Jesus  is  in  the  midst 
of  it  all,  bearing  the  burden  of  it  all,  seeking  no 
freedom  by  fleeing  pam  and  evil,  yet  free  ;  poor,  but 
with  no  burden  and  degradation  of  poverty  ;  know- 
ing all  trial,  yet  having  a  peace  the  world  could  not 
take  away  ;  finally  meeting  death,  from  which  His 
flesh  shrank  with  horror,  but  with  the  Father's 
name  on  His  lips  mingled  with  a  prayer  for  His 
cruel  brethren.  The  man  who  has  struggled  for 
freedom  knows  the  reality  of  that  portraiture, 
knows  it  is  no  painted  image  to  deceive  the  senses. 
By  faith  and  not  by  criticism  he  reaches  out  to- 
wards it,  knowing  its  supreme  significance  for  his 
own  freedom  in  a  world  of  suffering  and  sin. 

It  is,  then,  easy  to  believe  that  men  could  come 
short  of  the  freedom  of  Christ,  because  they  were 
unable  to  rise  above  the  old  levels  of  their  thought 
and  action,  that  they  might  again  turn  Him  into  a 
formula  and  acknowledge  Him  as  Master  in  a  way 
to  destroy  the  very  liberty  which  was  the  founda- 
tion of  His  whole  relation  both  to  God  and  to  man  : 
but  what  is  no  longer  possible  to  be  believed,  is 
that  one  who  did  know  His  freedom,  like  the 
Apostle  Paul,  and  who  ascribed  all  his  emancipa- 
tion of  spirit  to  Him,  was  satisfied  with  a  mere  lay 


314   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

figure,  a  shadowy  Messiah  about  whom  he  knew 
nothing  and  cared  to  know  nothing,  except  that,  on 
the  very  dubious  ground  of  a  subjective  vision,  he 
believed  Him  to  have  risen  from  the  dead. 

The  one  thing  that  stands  out  with  absolute 
plainness  from  the  whole  history,  the  one  thing 
which  clamantly  demands  some  explanation,  is  the 
unique  Personality  by  whom  so  many  have  pierced 
their  way  through  a  world  of  sin  and  suffering  to  a 
buoyant  and  glad  hope,  a  radiant  Kingdom  of  God  ; 
and  there  the  Tiibingen  criticism  utterly  broke 
down. 

The  weightiest  criticism  of  the  Tiibingen  position 
came  from  E-itschl.  Though  his  work  has  inspired 
the  labours  of  at  least  one  disciple  whose  know- 
ledge of  the  period  is  greater  than  his  own,  his 
study  of  the  Early  Church  remains  to  this  day,  in 
many  respects,  a  conclusive  utterance.  Ritschl 
himself  once  belonged  to  the  School,  and  he  always 
acknowledged  what  he  had  learned  from  Baur 
both  in  regard  to  matter  and  method.  Only  in  the 
second  edition  of  his  Rise  of  the  Old  Catholic 
Church  did  he  attain  a  quite  independent  position. 
His  history  is  weighty  just  because  he  had  learned 
from  Baur  the  whole  extent  of  the  problem  in- 
volved in  the  rise  of  the  Christian  Church,  but  it 
abides  in  value  because  it  does  not  deal  with  blood- 
less categories  but  with  living  men,  and  because  it 
sees  that  the  supreme  concern  is  the  Person  of 
Christ. 

The  first  question  Ritschl  asks  is,  What  was 
Christ's  own  relation  to  the  Mosaic   Law  ?     The 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         315 

answer  must  largely  depend  on  the  Gospel  we 
start  with.  It  is  of  importance  for  Kitschl's  whole 
outlook  that  he  starts  with  Mark,  which  he  holds 
to  be  one  of  the  sources  both  of  Matthew  and  of 
Luke.  When  he  reached  that  conclusion  he  knew 
he  was  setting  up  a  different  standard  of  reality — 
not  the  idea  but  the  world  of  men.  Now,  in  Mark, 
Christ  is  seen  to  grow  in  freedom  in  respect  of  the 
Law.  At  the  beginning  of  His  ministry  He  sent 
a  man  He  had  healed  to  show  himself  to  the  priest. 
From  that  point  He  advanced,  till  in  the  end  He 
set  up  the  law  of  love  to  God  and  our  neighbour  as 
the  substance  of  all  laws,  as  a  law  to  which  the 
Law  of  Sacrifice  and  Sabbath  rest  were  indifferent, 
the  Law  of  Ceremonial  Purity  useless,  and  the  Law 
of  Divorce  a  concession  to  sin.  In  Matthew  some- 
thing of  this  is  toned  down,  but  something  also  is 
accentuated.  The  Law  as  expounded  and  de- 
veloped by  the  prophets  is  no  longer  a  mere  Law 
of  Holiness  in  the  Mosaic  sense,  but  is  a  Law  of 
Righteousness,  a  Law  which  love  can  fulfil,  while 
abolishing,  at  the  same  time,  all  legal  ordinances 
and  precepts. 

Liberty,  therefore,  in  respect  of  the  Law  began 
with  Jesus  Himself.  This  freedom,  however.  He 
did  not  use  in  a  revolutionary  way,  not  even  in  His 
own  action,  but  He  left  it  as  a  principle  attached 
to  His  Person  to  be  afterwards  realised  in  the 
Kingdom  of  God.  The  disciples  were  not  with- 
drawn from  their  ancestral  worship,  and  their 
future  action  was  left  to  be  determined  by  their 
subsequent  progress  under  the  guidance  of  the  Holy 


316   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

Spirit.  The  question  is  to  determine  how,  from 
this  starting-point,  we  arrive  at  the  Catholic  Church 
of  the  fifth  century  with  its  rule  of  faith,  its  hier- 
archy and  its  sacramental  system. 

In  arranging  his  authorities  Ritschl  found  no 
place  for  any  of  the  New  Testament  writings  in  the 
second  century.  "  I  confess  generally,"  he  says, 
"that,  if  the  statements  of  the  New  Testament 
writers  and  Patristic  deliverances  come  into  con- 
flict, I  unhesitatingly  question  the  latter.  The 
Church  Fathers  knew  amazingly  little  about  the 
circumstances  of  the  Apostolic  time,  and  what  they 
knew  was  mostly  wrong." 

Ritschl's  contention  is  that  the  Scriptures  are 
right  in  representing  the  differences  between  the 
older  Apostles  and  Paul  as  not  doctrinal  but  only 
practical.  For  this  view  his  arguments  are  (1) 
that  only  the  practical  difference  arose  out  of  the 
situation  in  which  Christ  left  the  Church,  and  (2) 
that  only  the  practical  difference  is  found  in  the 
later  history. 

(1)  In  respect  of  the  situation  as  Christ  left  it, 
both  parties  started  with  a  large  neutral  basis  of 
Jewish  belief,  and  were  agreed  on  the  universality 
of  Christianity,  and  on  the  necessity  of  belief  in 
Christ  as  the  sole  condition  of  salvation  and  of 
entrance  into  the  Kingdom  of  God.  Both  took 
love  and  patience  to  be  the  law  of  this  kingdom. 
Neither  party  ever  refers  to  Ceremonial  Purity, 
Sabbath  Law,  or  Sacrifice.  Nor  do  Peter  and  John 
come  behind  Paul  in  their  dogmatic  conception  of 
the  Person  of  Christ,  or  in  acknowledging  that  the 


BAUR'S  FIRHT  THREE  CENTURIES         317 

revelation  in  Him  is  absolute.  Even  when  Paul 
differs  from  Jesus  and  His  immediate  followers  in 
distinguishing  definitely  the  righteousness  given 
by  God  through  faith  in  Jesus  Christ  from  the 
righteousness  which  is  the  fulfilment  of  the  law  by 
love,  he  is  not  departing  from  Christ's  meaning, 
but  is  only  taking  special  care  to  avoid  a  Pharisaic 
misconstruction  of  it  as  though  it  were  still  a  law 
of  special  precepts.  To  avoid  the  danger  of  con- 
ceiving the  love  by  which  the  moral  duties  in  detail 
are  to  be  renovated  as  a  legal  task,  Paul  insists 
that  love  is  the  necessary  religious  outcome  of  faith. 
But  this  difference  in  expression  and  practical  in- 
terest only  shows  more  clearly  the  agreement  of 
Paul  and  the  other  Apostles  in  the  leading  ideas  of 
Christ.  Even  Paul's  view  of  the  Law,  as  a  Divine 
stage  of  moral  development,  but  one  which,  from 
its  want  of  power  to  carry  out  its  own  demands, 
necessarily  points  beyond  itself,  was  not  repugnant 
to  the  older  Apostles,  who,  while  they  themselves 
observed  the  Mosaic  Law,  quietly  omitted  all  men- 
tion of  it  from  their  Christian  teaching.  The  real 
difference  was  that,  while  Paul  was  face  to  face 
with  the  obstacle  the  Law  opposed  to  the  reception 
of  Gentiles  into  the  Church,  the  Apostles  of  the 
Circumcision  were  face  to  face  with  the  obstacle 
which  the  rejection  of  the  Law  would  oppose  to  the 
reception  of  the  Jews.  The  Apostolic  Decree  was 
a  natural  attempt  at  a  compromise,  though  it  was 
perhaps  as  natural  that  James  should  understand 
it  in  one  sense  and  Paul  in  another. 

(2)  In   the   later   history  this   account    of  the 


318   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

situation  is  confirmed,  first  of  all,  by  the  attitude 
of  the  Nazarenes,  the  most  direct  descendants  of 
the  Church  at  eJerusalem.  As  they  continued  to 
hold  Paul  and  his  work  among  the  Gentiles  in 
unqualified  respect,  it  would  appear,  not  only  that 
the  division  did  not  go  farther  than  the  New  Tes- 
tament represents,  but  that  some  further  reconcilia- 
tion must  afterwards  have  been  reached.  The 
later  Ebionites  who  decried  Paul,  of  whom  Baur 
made  so  much,  were  descendants  not  of  the  Apos- 
tolic Church,  but  of  the  Pharisaic  Judaising  party 
who  only  used  Peter's  name,  and  of  Christianised 
Essenes, 

Even  this  practical  difference,  Eitschl  argues, 
presently  disappeared.  With  the  prohibition  of 
circumcision  after  the  destruction  of  Jerusalem,  the 
Apostolic  Church  lost  its  last  sign  of  distinction. 
The  Catholic  Church,  therefore,  was  essentially 
Gentile  in  origin,  but  it  was  not,  for  that  reason, 
Pauline.  Heathenism,  not  Judaism,  stood  between 
the  Gentile  Christians  and  their  understanding  of 
Paul.  It  left  them  incapable  of  feeling  the  per- 
sonal contrast  between  his  doctrine  of  Justification 
by  Faith  and  his  earlier  Pharisaism,  of  knowing 
perfectly  his  idea  of  the  oneness  of  God,  and  of 
understanding  the  history  of  God's  covenant  rela- 
tion, of  moral  righteousness  and  judgment,  of  sin 
and  redemption,  of  God's  kingdom  and  God's  Son. 
What  we  find  in  the  Apostolic  Fathers  is  not  the 
freedom  of  Paul  but  a  new  Christian  legalism. 
Instead  of  the  idea  of  the  new  birth  which,  in  its 
original  meaning,  was  the  expression  of  the  most 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         319 

vivid  sense  of  religious  freedom,  we  have  Christ  as 
a  new  Lawgiver,  whose  rule  of  faith  is  to  be  ac- 
cepted and  whose  commandments  are  to  be  ful- 
filled. The  rule  of  faith  was  a  sort  of  cross-section 
of  the  Apostolic  teaching  which  so  combined  the 
Apostolic  types  of  thought  that  the  individual 
stamp  of  every  one  of  them  is  lost ;  while  the  com- 
mands were  without  the  sense  of  a  new  relation  to 
God  and  a  new  principle  of  life  which  gave  in  the 
eyes  of  the  Apostles  such  supreme  significance  to 
the  death  and  resurrection  of  Christ.  This  last 
failure  seems  most  amazing  till  we  remember 
how  ignorant  the  Gentile  converts  were  of  the  Old 
Testament  foundations  of  the  Apostolic  teaching. 
So  marked  is  this  ignorance  that  Ritschl  considers 
it  the  supreme  distinction  between  the  later  writers 
and  all  the  writers  of  the  New  Testament. 

This  lapse  from  freedom  into  legalism  is  so  far 
from  being  incredible,  as  Newman  argued,  that  it 
is  always  taking  place.  Men  continually  fall  away 
from  the  high  demands  of  freedom  to  the  common 
level  of  rule  and  compromise,  and,  considering  the 
world  into  which  Christianity  entered,  the  wonder 
was  that  men  understood  as  much  of  it  as  they  did. 

Much  of  what  was  a  departure  from  the  high 
Apostolic  ideal  was,  Kitschl  argues,  nevertheless, 
practically  helpful  to  the  Church.  The  sacramental 
idea,  though  contrary  to  the  Apostolic  teaching, 
helped  in  that  age  to  keep  alive  the  idea  of  grace 
as  a  Divine  act.  The  triumph  of  the  sacramental 
element  was  assured  by  the  increasing  worldliness 
of  the  Church  and  the  need  of  a  means  for  pardon- 


320  THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

ing  even  heinous  sins,  if  the  Church  was  still  to 
increase.  For  the  same  reason  a  ritual  and  mediat- 
ing character  in  the  clergy,  though  it  had  no  place 
in  the  original  conception  of  the  Church,  became 
necessary,  and  the  same  cause  created  the  mon- 
archical bishop  whose  real  authority  was  the  power 
of  discipline  in  an  age  when  the  world  was  rapidly 
being  included  in  the  Church. 

This  reintroduction  of  the  legal  and  sacramental 
must,  therefore,  be  regarded  as  a  discipline  required 
by  the  Church  in  view  of  outward  opposition  and 
inward  corruption.  But  that  does  not  hinder  the 
fact  that  the  great  question  of  freedom  which  is 
solved  in  the  New  Testament  is  unsolved  in  the 
Church.  Elements  which  in  the  teaching  of  Christ 
and  the  Apostles  were  intimately  blended,  are  in 
the  Catholic  Church  merely  set  over  against  one 
another.  No  attempt  is  made  to  seek  that  organic 
relation  between  Divine  grace  and  human  morality 
which  is  perfect  freedom.  Life  and  dogma  move 
between  the  legal  and  the  sacramental,  and  the 
only  question  is  which  should  predominate. 

This  admission  of  the  temporal  advantage  of 
the  great  change  which  the  Catholic  Church  in- 
troduced into  the  Apostolic  faith  is  seized  upon  by 
the  Abb^  Loisy  in  order  to  set  up  a  new  doctrine 
of  development.  His  view  is  a  combination  of 
Baur  and  Newman.  Newman's  contention  that  a 
religion  infallibly  given  must  be  infallibly  preserved 
is  no  longer  credible  to  him,  but  the  prestige  criti- 
cism takes  from  the  Scripture,  Loisy  argues,  it 
adds  to  the  Church.    His  chief  difficulty  is  to  make 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         321 

anything  out  of  Jesus  without  setting  Him  so  high 
that  He  and  not  the  Church  must  be  the  last  ground 
of  appeal,  or  without  showing  in  Him  such  freedom 
that  no  system  of  ecclesiastical  belief  and  order  can 
be  regarded  as  an  advance  upon  His  life  and  teach- 
ing. While  Loisy  speaks  of  the  impossibility  of 
understanding  Christ  except  through  the  Church, 
the  actual  Jesus  is  not  interpreted  by  the  Church, 
but  by  the  most  ruthless  critical  canons.  He  is  only 
a  man  with  an  apocalyptic,  impossible  idea  of  the 
Kingdom  of  God,  an  ordinary  Jewish  conception  of 
the  Deity,  and  an  ethical  belief  that  there  will  be 
good  to  him  who  does  good.  When  the  immediate, 
visible  rule  of  God  did  not  come  at  once,  there  was 
nothing  for  it  but  to  take  the  Church  in  its  place. 
Even  the  first  society  had  this  outward  aim.  It 
was  a  centralised,  yea  a  hierarchical  fraternity. 
True  the  hierarchy  was  only  of  devotion,  but  the 
Apostles  received  converts,  excluded  the  unworthy, 
and  maintained  good  order.  That  the  whole  differ- 
ence between  freedom  and  subjection  lies  in  the 
distinction  between  an  authority  that  is  merely  of 
devotion  and  an  authority  that  is  merely  official, 
Loisy  does  not  condescend  to  consider.  Then  this 
Christ  of  criticism  suddenly  becomes  the  Christ  of 
the  Church,  apparently  on  the  old  Hegelian  ground 
that  it  is  only  the  idea  that  matters.  Thereafter 
the  contention  is  practically  the  same  as  Newman's. 
At  important  moments  the  Church  became  what 
she  had  to  become  or  perish.  Whatever  the  Church 
has  been,  whether  at  the  height  of  temporal  power 

in  the  Middle  Ages  or  deprived  of  it  in  order  that 

21 


322   THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT  AND 

she  may  turn  her  more  spiritual  attention  to  the 
exigencies  of  this  doubting  age,  it  has  all  been  good. 
This  true  Hegelian  optimism  ought  to  encourage  a 
believer  to  go  a  little  farther  and  include  also  her 
divisions  among  the  good  things  that  have  come  to 
the  Church. 

From  all  this,  one  thing,  and  one  thing  only,  is 
perfectly  clear.  The  Person  of  Jesus  loses  all  real 
significance  as  soon  as  we  interpret  Him  mainly  as 
the  Founder  of  an  outwardly  authoritative  institu- 
tion. The  key  is  lost  to  all  His  unique  greatness 
when  the  freedom  of  a  Son  in  His  Father's  house  is 
omitted,  and  the  gift  of  this  freedom  to  His  fol- 
lowers is  regarded  as  a  Protestant  prejudice.  The 
determination  of  this  question  must  ultimately 
depend  on  a  religious,  not  a  historical,  judgment. 
If  the  sacramental  meaning  is  deeper  than  the 
things  of  the  heart,  and  the  rounded  perfection  of 
an  ecclesiastical  system  higher  than  the  simplicity 
which  affords  scope  for  freedom,  Loisy  is  right  in 
what  Jesus  was,  and  Strauss  not  very  far  wrong. 
But  in  that  case  the  New  Testament  is  only  a  very 
rudimentary  germ.  If,  however,  the  true  Divine 
end  is  freedom,  if  that  is  the  purpose  both  of  God's 
unveiling  of  Himself  in  revelation  and  of  His  work- 
ing in  providence,  if  the  end  of  all  regulation  is  to 
enable  men  to  pass  on  to  the  inward  regulation  of 
souls  at  one  with  God,  or,  in  Paul's  language,  to 
shut  us  up  to  disobedience  in  order  to  turn  us  to 
the  spiritual  sources  of  freedom,  the  New  Testa- 
ment becomes  of  very  different  significance.  It  is 
then  the  record  of  a  mornent  of  freedom  before  it 


BAUR'S  FIRST  THREE  CENTURIES         323 

was  subjected  again  to  the  discipline  of  institutions, 
of  the  visibility  of  the  promise  before  it  was  again 
subjected  to  the  discipline  of  law.  It  is  such  a 
moment  as  when,  in  the  morning  on  the  hill-top, 
we  catch  a  glimpse  of  our  distant  goal  before  we 
descend  to  the  plain  to  struggle  towards  it  through 
the  dust  and  the  heat.  This  does  not  mean  that 
the  subsequent  discipline  was  unnecessary,  any 
more  than  that  the  Jewish  Law  was  unnecessary. 
If  freedom  is  the  final  goal,  the  most  difficult  and 
distant  of  all  human  endeavours,  if  it  cannot  be 
compassed  either  by  argument  or  by  resolution,  if 
it  is  only  possible  through  what  Paul  means  by 
being  in  Christ,  in  an  atmosphere  flooded  by  the 
presence  of  God,  and  if  men,  even  in  the  Church, 
live  much  in  an  atmosphere  flooded  by  the  world, 
and  are  always  coming  short  of  the  Divine  goal  and 
needing  to  be  put  in  pupilage  again,  the  vast  labour 
for  one  visible  organisation  to  embody  the  discip- 
line and  for  a  great  network  of  sacrament  around 
life  to  embody  the  grace,  was  not  in  vain.  But  so 
long  as  we  remember  that  the  purpose  of  these 
things  is  to  enable  us  to  pass  beyond  them,  the 
New  Testament  will  ever  continue  to  raise  two 
questions  with  increasing  emphasis — the  signifi- 
cance of  Christ  for  this  freedom,  on  the  one  hand, 
and  the  necessity  of  striving  after  the  life  of 
freedom,  if  we  would  realise  our  relation  to  Him, 
on  the  other.  If  Christ  has  this  practical  value, 
the  Scriptures  derive  their  significance  from  Him, 
and  not  from  any  conclusions  regarding  their 
accuracy    or    authorship.       Ritschl's   test   of    the 


324    THE  THEORY  OF  DEVELOPMENT 

canon  of  the  New  Testament,  that,  out  of  all  com- 
parison with  contemporary  and  later  writers,  the 
New  Testament  authors  show  an  understanding 
not  only  of  Christ's  teaching  but  of  its  Old  Testa- 
ment foundations,  at  once  recognises  a  unity  in  all 
revelation,  and  a  wide  distinction  from  other 
writings.  All  the  Scriptures  may  be  broadly 
described  as  the  literature  of  our  goal  of  freedom 
in  God.  The  practical  test  of  it  is  whether,  against 
the  world  without  and  within,  it  can  afford  ground 
for  maintaining  the  glorious  liberty  of  the  children 
of  God. 


LECTURE  YIII 

THE  THEOLOGY  OF  EXPEKIENCE  AND 
EITSCHL'S  JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION 


Schleiermacher,  Glaube7islehre,  1821. 

Erskine  of  Linlathen,  The  Unconditioned  Freeness  of  the  Gospel, 
1828. 

Domer,  Entwiokelungsgeschichte  der  Lehre  von  der  Person 
Christi,  1839. 

Eothe,  Theologische  Ethik,  1845. 

Maurice,  The  Doctrine  of  Sacrifice,  preached  1854,  Dedicatory 
Letter,  2nd  edition,  1878. 

Hofmann,  Schriftbeweis,  1852-56. 

M'Leod  Campbell,  The  Nature  of  the  Atonement,  1855,  Intro- 
duction, 2nd  edition,  1867. 

Biedermann,  Christliche  Dogmatik,  1868. 

Von  Frank,  System  der  christlichen  Gewissheit,  1870-73. 

Ritschl,  Christliche  Lehre  von  der  Rechtfertigung  und  Versoh- 
nung,  1870-74. 

Mozley,  University  Sermons,  sermon  on  the  Atonement,  1873. 

Dale,  The  Atonement,  Congregational  Lecture,  1875. 

Lipsius,  Dogmatik,  1876. 

Pfleiderer,  Beligionsphilosophie  auf  geschichtlicher  Grundlage, 
1878. 

Books  of  Reference 

Histories  of  Theology  as  above,  especially  Pfleiderer  and  von 
Frank  on  Biedermann,  Frank  on  Hofmann,  and  Ehrenfeuch- 
ter  on  Eothe.  Geschichte  der  christlichen  Beligionsphilo- 
sophie (Eng.  trans..  History  of  the  Philosophy  of  Religion), 
B.  Piinjer.  Von  Schleiermacher  zu  Ritschl,  F.  Kattenbusch, 
1893.  A  full  account  of  the  Ritschlian  Literature  may  be 
found  in  The  Ritschlian  Theology  aiid  the  Evangelical 
Faith,  James  Orr,  1898,  and  in  The  Ritschlian  TJteology, 
Critical  and  Constructive,  Alfred  E.  Garvie,  2nd  ed.,  1902. 
The  most  important  commentary  on  Ritschl  is  his  life  by  his 
son,  Albrecht  Ritschls  Leben,  Otto  Ritschl,  1892.  A  sym- 
pathetic short  account  of  Ritschl's  theology  is  to  be  found 
translated  in  Faith  and  Morals,  W.  Herrmann.  Ritschl's 
The  CJiristian  Doctrine  of  Justification  and  Recojiciliation, 
trans,  by  H.  R.  Mackintosh  and  A.  B.  Macaulay,  2nd  ed., 
1902. 


LECTURE  VIII 

THE  THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE   AND  EITSGHL'S 
JUSTIFICATION  AND  BE  CONCILIATION 

Through  all  this  discussion  one  result  has  become 
clear.  Christianity  has  no  means  left  to  it  where- 
by to  compel  consent  from  the  outside.  There  is 
no  sound  doctrine  of  Scripture  which  can  overbear 
us  ;  and  just  as  little  is  there  any  sound  doctrine  of 
the  Church.  What  power  the  Scripture  and  the 
Church  have  a  right  to  exercise  presupposes  faith. 
They  cannot,  therefore,  be  the  foundation  upon 
which  faith  is  built.  The  Protestant  cannot  say  : 
Here  is  the  infallible  Scripture,  submit  to  it ;  nor 
the  Catholic  :  Here  is  the  infallible  Church,  submit 
to  it.  Hence  all  theologies  which  go  no  deeper 
than  Scripture  texts  or  Church  dogmas  are  insuffi- 
cient. As  soon  as  they  turn  upon  us  and  say :  It 
does  not  matter  what  you  think,  this  is  the  doctrine 
of  Scripture,  or  this  is  the  dogma  of  the  Church, 
which  it  is  your  duty  to  accept,  they  are  building 
on  the  past  in  a  way  which  our  whole  inquiry 
shows  to  be  not  only  intellectually  but  spiritually 
indefensible. 

The  question  now  is  whether  the  Christianity 
which  cannot  coerce  may  not  all  the  better  attract. 

(327) 


328      THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

Is  it  still  capable  of  making  the  same  impression  as 
it  did  when  the  Apostles  went,  unsupported  by 
anything  but  the  Gospel  itself,  to  men  prepared  for 
its  reception  by  no  kind  of  tradition  ?  Is  it  a 
Gospel,  good  news  of  God,  and,  like  other  good 
news,  its  own  evidence  ?  Can  it  win  the  mind  by 
its  inner  harmony,  the  conscience  by  giving  peace, 
the  will  by  the  regeneration  of  love,  the  heart  by 
the  true  fellowship  ?  In  that  case  it  should  have 
its  sufficient  enforcement  in  the  great  experience 
and  the  great  fellowship  which,  during  the  cen- 
turies, it  has  created,  a  fellowship  to  which  we  may 
ourselves  belong  and  an  experience  we  may  our- 
selves verify. 

The  first  to  recognise  clearly  the  necessity  and 
the  fruitfulness  of  this  method  was  Schleiermacher. 
As  Dorner  puts  it,  Schleiermacher  made  an  epoch 
in  thought  by  seeking  to  renovate  theology  and  the 
Church  by  the  ethical  idea  of  personal  freedom  in 
God.  To  prosecute  still  farther  that  endeavour 
remains  to  this  day  the  first  duty  of  theology,  and 
modern  German  theology  derives  its  significance 
entirely  from  the  fact  that,  largely  owing  to  the 
influence  of  Schleiermacher,  it  has  clearly  under- 
stood the  nature  of  its  call. 

During  the  discussion  the  large  issues  of  per- 
sonal freedom  have  become  apparent.  Personal 
freedom  never  can  be  a  mere  intellectual  matter, 
mere  width  of  outlook.  Nor  can  it  be  a  mere 
political  matter,  mere  right  of  speech  and  vote  and 
action  in  relation  to  others.  Nor  can  it  be  a  mere 
social  matter,  mere  equality  of  position.      In  the 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION     329 

last  issue,  fi^eedom  must  be  a  religious  question,  a 
question  not  of  the  things  we  see,  but  of  victory 
over  them  by  the  things  unseen.  It  cannot  be  a 
matter  of  finding  peace  in  the  world,  but  requires 
peace  in  spite  of  the  world.  There  can  be  no  free- 
dom in  the  end  without  reaching  God.  In  that  case 
the  fundamental  question  of  religion  must  always 
be  :  How  are  we  reconciled  to  God  ?  The  test  of 
every  religion  must  be  its  ability  to  work  this 
reconciliation.  Regarding  Christianity,  the  great 
question  will  not  be  its  outward  credentials,  but 
whether  it  can  place  man  in  such  a  relation  to 
God  that  his  moral  and  religious  needs  shall  both 
be  satisfied,  that  he  shall  be  right  with  himself  and 
master  of  his  life.  In  that  case  reconciliation 
would  not  follow  merely  when  Christianity  had 
been  proved  to  be  true,  but  its  power  to  reconcile 
would  be  the  highest  evidence  of  its  truth.  Is  not 
an  authoritative  doctrine  of  the  Atonement  even 
something  of  a  contradiction  ?  An  Atonement 
must  be  its  own  witness  to  the  hearts  that  have 
been  atoned,  or  it  is  nothing.  Of  course  our  own 
personal  experience  may  be  inadequate.  The 
higher  God's  goodness,  the  less  we  may,  in  the 
hardness  of  our  hearts,  be  able  to  respond  to  it. 
As  M'Leod  Campbell  says,  our  true  need  should 
be  measured,  not  by  our  sense  of  it,  but  by  what 
God  has  done  to  meet  it.  And  even  in  estimating 
what  God  has  done  to  meet  our  need,  we  may 
require  to  enlarge  our  individual  experience  by  the 
general  Christian  experience.  Yet,  in  the  final 
issue,  such  an  appeal  can  only  be  to  our  own  ex- 


330    THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

perience  thus  instructed  and  stimulated.  It  must 
be  some  kind  of  experience  in  which  we  have 
realised  our  freedom,  an  experience  in  which  feel- 
ing should  have  its  place,  but  which  cannot  end 
with  mere  feeling.  It  must  concern  itself  with  our 
whole  experience  of  sin  and  of  penitence,  of  inward 
peace  and  of  victory  over  the  world.  But  truth 
cannot  be  announced  to  us  merely  as  God's  good 
pleasure.  Theology  must  not,  on  any  pretext,  fall 
back  on  the  position  of  Duns  Scotus,  that  merit  is 
anything  which  God  chooses  to  announce  to  us, 
on  good  authority,  as  what  will  satisfy  Him.  It 
must  recognise  that  if  we  have  not  already  in  our 
hearts  and  consciences  the  authoritative  announce- 
ment of  what  will  satisfy  Him,  we  are  without  any 
criterion  of  things  Divine. 

Though  the  weakness  of  English  theology  of  all 
schools  has  been  in  one  way  or  another  to  fall  back 
on  the  position  that  truth  is  what  God  has  authori- 
tatively announced,  its  deep  interest  in  the  ques- 
tion of  the  Atonement  and  its  earnest  endeavour 
to  make  the  doctrine  convincing  to  the  heart  and 
conscience  show  that  the  greatness  of  the  issue  at 
stake  has  not  been  altogether  unperceived.  In 
every  theory  the  attempt  is  more  or  less  perfectly 
made  to  rest  Christianity  on  its  own  foundations, 
to  enforce  it,  not  as  an  external  dogma,  but  as  a 
Gospel  which  is  its  own  evidence. 

Among  the  many  influences  which  directed 
general  attention  to  this  question  of  the  Atone- 
ment, Tractarianism  was  one  of  the  greatest.  On 
the  negative  side  it  compelled  the  Evangelicals  in 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION     331 

particular  to  revise  their  assumptions,  and  on  the 
positive  side  it  contributed  the  idea  of  a  doctrine 
which  would  be  impressive  through  its  unity,  and 
vital  through  embodying  the  large  experience  of  the 
saints.  The  effect  immediately  became  apparent. 
The  list  of  books  on  the  Atonement  quoted  by 
Campbell,  which  appeared  within  some  twenty 
years  after  the  Tracts,  includes  reprints  from  John 
Owen  and  Jonathan  Edwards,  half  a  dozen  elabo- 
rate works  modifying  Calvinism,  and  one  or  two 
works  from  the  Anglican  standpoint ;  and  it  does 
not  include  the  works  of  his  friend  Erskine  of  Lin- 
lathen,  to  whom  he  himself  is  most  akin,  or  of 
Coleridge,  the  forerunner  of  the  whole  discussion. 
To  this  day  English  theology  has  not  fully  realised 
that  its  task  is  to  give  a  complete  study  of  Christi- 
anity as  a  reconciliation  of  man  to  God,  under  the 
conditions  imposed  upon  our  thinking  by  the  scien- 
tific account  of  the  origin  of  man  and  of  man's 
place  in  the  world,  by  the  Criticism  of  Scripture, 
and  by  the  poverty-stricken  results  of  all  philoso- 
phical reconstructions  of  religion.  The  discussion, 
nevertheless,  having  dealt  with  a  living  religious 
experience,  has  contributed  much  that  is  perma- 
nently suggestive. 

The  Nature  of  the  Atonement  and  its  Relations  to 
Remission  of  Sins  and  Eternal  TAfe,  by  John  M'Leod 
Campbell,  may  not  always  satisfy  the  reader  by  its 
results,  but  it  cannot  fail  to  touch  him  by  its  spirit. 
If  the  Atonement  is  meant  to  reveal  a  God  of  love, 
Campbell  argues,  it  cannot  be  either  an  arbitrary 
or  an  unintelligible  act.      In   this   age   when  the 


332    THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

reign  of  law  has  for  so  many  minds  taken  the  place 
of  God,  and  the  idea  of  development  has  led  them 
to  regard  sin  as  only  a  form  of  ignorance,  Christi- 
anity must  have  its  highest  and  ultimate  evidence 
in  what  it  is,  and  the  crown  of  its  argument  should 
be  the  doctrine  of  the  Atonement.  The  Calvinistic 
doctrine  of  satisfaction  for  the  sins  of  the  elect  did 
at  least  preserve  the  idea  that  guilt  is  the  sense  of 
sin  and  punishment  the  desert  of  it,  but  the  modifi- 
cation of  the  doctrine  which  makes  it  merely  a 
necessity  of  God's  government,  merely  a  means  of 
deterring  others,  only  confuses  clear  moral  issues 
regarding  sin  and  guilt  and  punishment.  The 
difficulties,  Campbell  thinks,  are  avoided  by  re- 
cognising that  the  Incarnation  was  not  for  the  sake 
of  an  atonement,  but  that  the  Atonement  naturally 
followed  from  an  incarnation  among  a  sinful  race. 
The  Incarnation  is  the  primary  fact,  the  supreme 
witness  to  God's  interest  in  man  and  His  purpose 
with  man  ;  and  the  Divine  mind  in  Christ,  which 
was  perfect  Sonship  towards  God  and  perfect 
Brotherhood  towards  man,  necessarily  undertook 
all  the  task  required  to  show  this  interest  and  ac- 
complish this  purpose.  We  have  to  show  that  the 
Atonement  is  the  highest  manifestation  of  the 
Fatherliness  of  God.  That  must  be,  in  the  last 
issue,  an  appeal  to  the  hearts  of  His  children.  Yet 
in  order  to  estimate  it  with  fulness,  we  must  attend 
to  the  universal  witness  of  the  Church,  lest  we 
omit  any  genuine  experience  of  the  saints,  any- 
thing of  their  great  and  real  burden  of  sin,  or  of 
their  great  and  real  deliverance. 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION     333 

The  work  of  the  Atonement  is  to  bridge  the 
gulf  between  what  man  is  and  what  God  wills  him 
to  be,  and  the  essence  of  it  is  Christ's  sympathy 
with  God's  judgment  of  sin.  It  deals  with  man  on 
the  part  of  God  and  with  God  on  the  part  of  man, 
and  is  both  retrospective  and  prospective.  It  deals 
with  man  on  God's  behalf  regarding  the  past,  say- 
ing about  God's  will,  against  which  we  rebel,  and 
about  the  Father's  heart,  in  which  we  will  not  trust, 
"  He  that  hath  seen  Me  hath  seen  the  Father  ".  Re- 
garding the  past  also  it  deals  with  God  on  man's 
behalf,  being  a  perfect  Amen  in  humanity  to  God's 
judgment  of  sin  and,  therefore,  a  fuller  satisfaction 
to  God's  righteous  heart  of  love  than  any  punish- 
ment. In  a  similar  way  it  deals  with  the  future. 
First,  it  witnesses  for  the  Father  to  men.  By  re- 
vealing His  Fatherly  mind  towards  us,  it  shows  the 
inestimable  preciousness  which  is  hidden  for  God 
in  humanity  and  which  only  needs  the  right  rela- 
tion to  Him  to  become  manifest.  It  thus  calls  us 
into  God's  righteousness,  which  is  not  legal  obliga- 
tion discharged,  but  the  mind  of  Sonship  towards 
God.  Then  it  deals  with  the  Father  on  man's  be- 
half, making  intercession  for  us,  not  as  for  some- 
thing the  Father  is  unwilling  to  give,  but,  as  all 
prayer  should  be,  the  expression  of  the  Father's 
own  highest  purpose.  Christ  pleads  His  merit  with 
the  Father,  in  the  sense  that  what  He  is  we  may 
be,  and  that  His  filial  spirit  contains  the  new  mind 
in  which  His  rebellious  children  should  return  to 
the  Father. 

In   comparison    with    Campbell's    great    book. 


334    THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

Frederick  Denison  Maurice's  Doctrine  of  Sacrifice 
seems  superficial,  but  it  represented  a  wider  school 
and  appealed  to  a  more  distinguished  audience. 
The  second  edition  is  prefaced  by  a  long  reply  to 
a  lecture  by  Dr.  Candlish,  the  ruthlessness  of 
whose  attack  upon  him  Maurice  failed  to  under- 
stand, for  the  simple  reason  that  he  had  no  sus- 
picion that  his  own  view  of  the  older  theology 
he  attacked  was  a  caricature.  When  a  man's 
faith  is  represented  as  a  mere  superstitious  at- 
tempt to  appease  an  angry  God,  probably  he  does 
well,  like  Candlish,  to  be  angry.  For  that  agonis- 
ing sense  of  sin  which  in  all  ages  has  found  expres- 
sion in  sacrifice,  Maurice  has  no  better  explanation 
than  man's  selfish  desire  for  personal  good.  In  his 
eyes  it  never  rises  higher  than  an  attempt  at  bribery 
of  the  incorruptible  gods.  Though  he  may  speak 
more  of  the  unity  of  the  truth  and  of  the  witness  of 
the  Church  than  Campbell,  his  conception  is  much 
more  external  and  far  less  vital  to  his  contention. 
He  attaches  the  idea  of  unity  of  the  truth  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  Trinity.  The  source  of  all  morality 
and  religion,  he  says,  is  that  at  the  foundation  of 
all  things  there  is  an  absolute  root  of  Truth  and 
Good  ;  that  of  this  Truth  and  Good  there  is  a  per- 
fect Utterer  and  Revealer  ;  that  to  make  them 
effective  over  rebellious  wills,  there  is  a  Living 
Person  carrying  them  out.  In  respect  of  the 
Church,  his  test  is  too  apt  to  be  agreement  with 
his  own  views,  not  the  enlargement  of  their  pos- 
sible limitations.  Everything  is  to  be  approved  by 
the  right  doctrine  of  sacrifice  as  the  sacrifice  of  sur- 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION     335 

render.  That  is  the  true  root  of  all  theology  and 
morality,  while  the  idea  of  sacrifice  as  offerings  to 
appease  the  gods  is  the  root  of  all  superstition. 

The  very  purpose  of  the  Old  Testament  is  to 
combat  the  wrong  idea  of  sacrifice  and  establish 
the  right,  its  sacrifices  being  the  symbol  of  man's 
surrender  of  himself.  It  thereby  reveals  what  is 
highest  both  in  God  and  man ;  and  this  teaching  is 
the  link  between  the  Old  Testament  and  the  New, 
for  the  essence  of  Christ's  humiliation  is  that  He 
sacrificed  Himself.  The  Lamb  slain  from  the  founda- 
tion of  the  world  is  the  perfect  revelation  of  God. 
Blood  is  the  symbol  of  entire  dedication  to  God, 
and  because  that  is  the  only  way  of  return  to  Him, 
it  is  also  the  symbol  of  restoration.  Christ  bore 
sin  in  the  sense  of  having  perfect  antipathy  to  sin 
and  perfect  sympathy  with  the  sinner,  which  is  the 
only  appeal  capable  of  raising  a  voluntary  and  spirit- 
ual creature  out  of  voluntary  and  spiritual  death 
to  a  right  and  true  life.  Christ  sounds  the  abyss 
of  human  misery  to  disclose  the  abyss  of  the  Divine 
love,  thereby  restoring  men  to  the  power  of  control 
which  makes  them  kings,  and  to  the  power  of  sym- 
pathy which  makes  them  priests,  and  this  Atone- 
ment, like  the  love  it  proclaims,  is  unlimited. 

This  system,  if  it  can  be  called  a  system,  suc- 
ceeds mainly  by  ignoring  the  difficulties.  The 
glorious  liberty  of  the  children  of  God  needs  some 
better  ground  for  self-sacrifice  than  the  sense  that 
it  is  a  very  fine  thing,  and  some  better  ground  for 
peace  than  that  God  is  more  easy-going  than  the 
things  which  happen  in  the  world  would  show  Him 


336      THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

to  be.  All  the  pressing  questions  begin  where  this 
system  ends. 

In  reply  to  the  attack  on  Mediation  as  an  im- 
moral doctrine,  Mozley,  in  his  University  Sermons, 
urges  that  what  has  called  forth  the  moral  affection 
of  man  so  strongly  must  be  seriously  misunderstood, 
if  it  is  represented  as  mere  injustice — a  vice  which 
in  others  at  least  none  love.  Its  voluntariness,  its 
quality  of  personal  intercession,  its  relation  to  a 
whole  system  of  society  in  which  we  all  profit  by 
what  we  have  done  nothing  to  bring  about,  are 
quite  overlooked.  Christ's  sacrifice  is  the  sacrifice 
of  love,  and,  as  such,  it  is  a  real  fulfilment  of  justice. 
It  appeases  the  appetite  for  punishment,  which  is 
the  characteristic  of  justice  in  relation  to  evil ;  and 
it  is  also  the  highest  guarantee  of  that  change  of 
disposition  in  the  criminal  which  justice  naturally 
requires.  That  is  the  substitution  inherent  in  all 
acts  of  love.  The  heart  accepts  it,  and  the  heart 
is  a  true  witness,  not  to  be  rejected  because  the  idea 
may  remain  for  the  mind  only  a  fragment.  Al- 
though we  cannot  reconcile  them,  justice,  mercy, 
mediation  are  great  vistas  and  openings  into  an 
invisible  world  in  which  is  the  point  of  view  which 
brings  them  all  together. 

Dale,  in  his  Lectures  on  the  Atonement,  seeks  to 
establish  a  still  more  positive  doctrine  of  Substitu- 
tion. If  the  Atonement  is  only  a  wonderful  mani- 
festation of  love,  he  thinks  it  fails  even  in  displaying 
love,  for  only  a  sacrifice  that  is  required  can  be 
such  a  manifestation.  Christ's  sacrifice  only  proves 
love   because   he   bore   for  man  a  penalty  which 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION      337 

otherwise  man  would  have  had  to  bear  for  himself. 
As  only  those  who  hold  that  Reconciliation  is  not 
the  removal  of  our  hostility  to  God,  but  of  God's 
hostility  to  us,  have  the  apostolic  feeling  about  sin, 
it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  they  hold  the  apos- 
tolic faith.  The  reason  of  this  hostility  on  God's 
part  is  His  unique  relation  to  the  moral  law.  He 
must  maintain  His  will  as  a  complete  expression 
of  the  law,  even  as  a  parent  must  maintain  the 
respect  and  obedience  of  his  children ;  and  the 
assertion  and  expression  of  this  identity  between 
the  will  of  God  and  the  eternal  law  of  righteous- 
ness require  that  sin  must  be  punished,  or,  if  it 
be  remitted,  another  act  must  express  with  equal 
energy  the  ill-desert  of  sin.  This  latter  alternative 
was  accepted  when  Christ,  instead  of  inflicting 
the  penalty.  Himself  bore  it.  At  the  same  time, 
as  our  Representative,  He  made  for  us  perfect  ac- 
knowledgment of  sin,  restored  our  original  relation 
to  God,  and,  through  His  mystical  relation  to  us, 
became  the  death  of  our  sin.  Dale's  argument 
would  be  more  convincing  had  he  more  clearly 
defined  his  relation  to  the  authority  of  Scripture. 
In  all  these  writers  we  have  some  of  the  best 
characteristics  of  English  thinking.  They  show  a 
willingness  to  recognise  the  fragmentary  nature  of 
human  knowledge  and  to  allow  a  due  place  to  all 
the  fragments,  they  insist  on  the  living  issues  of 
life's  tasks,  on  the  necessity  of  doing  them  with  what 
light  we  have,  and  they  do  not  soar  into  abstrac- 
tions either  about  man  or  about  God.     The  Briton 

always  retains  a  sense  of  what  is  needed  by  a  man 

22 


338      THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

who  has  a  restless  spirit  within  him  ever  disturbing 
him,  and  who  lives  in  a  world  with  good  wages  in 
its  hand  to  bribe  him,  and  he  has  a  notion  which 
never  leaves  him,  that  he  would  like  to  be  making 
improvements  both  upon  himself  and  the  world. 
Mere  contemplating  and  cataloguing  improvements 
does  not  satisfy  him.  Hence,  in  spite  of  his  limita- 
tions, he  usually  accomplishes  something  for  the 
practical  issues  of  freedom.  But  his  practical  ten- 
dency also  leads  him  into  compromises  which  regard 
human  agreements,  not  ultimate  truth.  Instead 
of  considering  whether  he  must  not  seek  new 
foundations,  his  tendency  is  to  continue  to  build 
on  the  fragment  of  Scripture  authority  criticism 
has  left,  of  ecclesiastical  authority  division  has  left, 
and  of  moral  authority  comfort  and  conventionality 
have  left.  To  deal  with  fundamental  principles  he 
finds  disturbing  to  the  good  terms  on  which  he  would 
like  to  be  with  his  neighbour,  and  is  with  himself. 

The  German  discussion  has  too  often  lacked  this 
moderation,  this  fidelity  to  life,  this  regard  for  the 
hints  and  half  lights  of  experience,  but  it  has,  on 
the  other  hand,  much  more  fully  realised  the 
actual  conditions,  and  it  has  dealt  much  more 
thoroughly  with  the  whole  intellectual  and  even 
with  the  whole  spiritual  situation,  for  it  has  realised 
that  the  one  thing  worth  dealing  with  is  funda- 
mental principles. 

It  has  been  the  custom  to  divide  German  theo- 
logians into  Liberal,  Ortlwdox  and  Mediating 
Schools,  and  the  division  will  sufficiently  serve  our 
purpose. 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION     339 

The  school  farthest  away  from  the  English  type 
of  thought  is  the  Liberal.  It  continued  the  in- 
fluence of  the  Hegelian  or  at  least  of  the  Monistic 
philosophy.  The  world  was  regarded  as  an  emana- 
tion in  which  God's  qualities  were  all  unfolded. 
Things  hostile  to  Grod  could  not  exist  in  it  as  in  a 
creation,  but  evil  was,  as  Schelling  said,  from  the 
dark  ground  in  God.  Hence  no  other  reconcilia- 
tion could  be  needed  in  it  except  the  expansion  of 
a  partial  into  a  complete  view.  Even  the  most 
orthodox  Hegelians,  such  as  Daub  and  Marheineke, 
could  not  make  this  view  of  God  and  the  world 
and  sin  appear  Christian.  Yet  it  was  painful  when 
Strauss,  who  always  used  language  with  the  cold 
clearness  of  a  frosty  day,  explained  the  idea  of  the 
Incarnation  as  humanity,  the  child  of  the  visible 
earthly  mother  and  the  invisible  Spirit,  and  when 
he  went  on  to  say  :  "  We  who  have  critically 
dissolved  the  Evangelical  history,  who  have  thrown 
the  Scripture  doctrines  of  the  Church  into  the 
lumber  room  of  superstition,  are  no  more  Chris- 
tians ".  Feuerbach  would  seem  to  go  even  farther 
when  he  regarded  all  religion  as  the  dream  of  what 
man,  in  his  weakness,  would  like  to  be  true ;  but 
this  acknowledgment  that  religion  has  a  right,  in 
this  troubled  life,  to  be  a  dream  of  power,  was  an 
acknowledgment  of  other  elements  in  it  besides 
mere  critical  intellectualism  which  went  far  beyond 
Strauss.  When  he  goes  on  to  say  that  what  men 
are  now  attempting  to  reinstate  is  a  Christianity 
with  the  roses  and  myrtles  of  the  heathen  Venus 
interwoven    with    the   crown    of    thorns    of    the 


340     THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RlTSCHL'S 

heavenly  Bridegroom,  a  dissolute,  characterless, 
comfortable,  belleletterish,  coquettish,  epicurean 
Christianity,  and  when  he  quotes  Luther  with 
approval  as  saying  that  it  is  all  or  nothing,  he 
shows  where  the  real  stress  of  accepting  or  reject- 
ing Christianity  lies. 

The  attempt  to  reconstruct  Christianity  on 
essentially  Hegelian  lines,  however,  still  continued. 
A  school  which  regarded  themselves  as,  in  a  quite 
unique  way,  scientific  theologians,  expounded  the 
Christian  teaching  as  it  has  existed  in  history,  in 
order,  by  a  critical  and  philosophical  process,  to 
distil  out  of  it  the  truth  which  lay  hidden  in  the 
popular  and  pictorial  representation.  The  best 
known  representatives  are  Biedermann,  Pfleiderer 
and  Lipsius.  All  alike  deny  our  right  in  reason  to 
ascribe  personality  to  God.  To  Biedermann  the 
idea  of  a  personal  and  an  absolute  God  is  a  contra- 
diction ;  to  Pfleiderer  God's  self-consciousness  can- 
not stand  over  against  His  world-consciousness  ;  to 
Lipsius  the  ascription  of  personality  to  God  is  a 
sensuous  and  pictorial  way  of  speaking  which  we 
can  never  quite  get  beyond,  but  which  we  must 
think  our  way  out  of  as  much  as  possible.  Pfleid- 
erer is  most  fully  satisfied  with  the  position.  The 
Christian  doctrine  of  Creation,  he  says,  is  right  in 
regarding  everything  as  from  God,  but  wrong  in  re- 
garding the  world  as  a  free  act  in  time.  The  world 
is  simply  the  manifestation  of  God's  infinite  poten- 
cies. The  Trinity  he  explains,  after  the  most 
approved  Hegelian  fashion,  as  various  aspects  of 
these  potencies.     Biedermann,  though  he   accepts 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION     341 

the  logical  consequences  of  his  position  to  the  ex- 
tent of  making  immortality  an  imagination  which 
has  its  only  meaning  in  a  Kingdom  of  God,  which 
again  is  only  the  goal  of  evolution,  nevertheless 
maintains  the  right  of  personal  feeling  to  cherish 
such  a  conception  as  a  personal  God  and  to  be- 
lieve in  the  reality  of  the  love  of  God.  Lipsius 
maintains  that  the  one  thing  we  really  know  is 
"  how  we  are  related  to  God  and  God  related  to 
us,  and  how  our  world  appears  in  the  light  of  our 
pious  self-consciousness,  and  how  our  pious  self- 
consciousness  is  affected  by  our  world". 

Kattenbusch  complains  of  the  unspeakable  mon- 
otony of  the  long  process  of  distilling  the  true  idea 
which  always  turns  out  to  be  the  same  abstract 
formula,  that  the  finite  spirit  stands  in  a  peculiar 
relation  to  the  Infinite  Spirit,  and  that  freedom 
and  dependence  are  united  in  religion,  because  all 
impression  of  finite  dependence  is  lost  for  the  pious 
self-consciousness  in  the  idea  of  infinite  dependence. 
'*  I  recognise,"  he  says,  "no  other  ground  for 
blessedness  than  the  aesthetic,  that  the  Infinite 
Spirit  is  a  principle  of  harmony,  of  ordered  method, 
of  illumination,  of  exaltation,  and  that  everything 
is  in  Him  in  transparent  rationality."  ^  That  result 
is  natural  enough,  for  everything  characteristic  and 
individual  and  varied  is  connected  with  personality, 
and  nothing  but  an  abstraction  can  remain  if  we 
remove  it.  And  the  weakness  of  this  theology  lies 
here,  for  if  personality  is  nothing,  man's  faith  and 

1  Vo7i  Schleiennacher  zu  Bitschl,  p.  35. 


342      THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

service  are  nothing.  No  system  would  more  con- 
fidently claim  to  be  a  presentation  of  freedom.  It 
offers  the  freedom  of  spacious  and  detached  con- 
templation. But  the  one  thing  it  cannot  admit  is 
any  effective  result  freedom  accomplishes.  That 
would  explode  its  whole  notion  of  reason  as  the 
even,  the  undisturbed,  the  smooth  flow  of  the 
present  out  of  the  past.  It  is  an  Oriental  way  of 
thinking,  a  way  of  sitting  to  watch  the  stream  of 
life  go  by,  and  it  can  only  regard  the  idea  that  the 
current  can  in  any  way  be  affected  by  the  individual 
will  as  an  illusion.  Man  has  not  yet  won  such 
freedom  that  he  could  not  profit  by  what  this 
professes  to  be — a  large  system  of  emancipation, 
but,  so  far  at  least,  he  has  not  won  any  freedom 
except  with  the  sense  upon  him  that  the  issues 
of  will  and  purpose  are  of  infinite  consequence. 
Even  the  institutions  of  freedom,  so  highly  esteemed 
by  this  type  of  thinker,  could  not  be  retained  on 
such  a  quiescent  acceptance  of  things  as  they  are. 
As  Laveleye  has  pointed  out,  there  is  no  such 
thing  even  as  political  freedom  outside  of  Chris- 
tianity ;  while,  with  the  possible  exception  of 
Russia,  no  Christian  country  altogether  lacks  it. 
And  he  is  surely  right  in  ascribing  this  result,  not 
to  natural  progress,  but  to  a  religion  which  teaches 
men  to  deny  themselves,  and  to  consider  liberty  as 
above  life.  Only  when  men  are  convinced,  to  the 
extent  of  being  willing  to  stake  their  lives  upon  it, 
that  everything  that  is  is  not  right,  can  freedom  be 
won  or  retained,  for  otherwise  parliamentary  safe- 
guards would  be  waste-paper.     Moreover,  this  in- 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    343 

difference  to  the  individual  by  whose  sacrifices  all 
progress  is  won,  though  it  may  seem  at  first  to  give 
us  spacious  horizons  and  great  and  enduring  ele- 
ments to  work  with,  lands  us  at  last  in  a  world  of 
dreams.  We  hear  much  about  the  goal  of  all  pro- 
gress being  a  Kingdom  of  God,  the  high  end  towards 
which  the  great  spiral  of  progress  is  ever  winding 
upwards.  But  what  is  a  Kingdom  of  God  if  it  is 
not  a  kingdom  of  immortal  spirits,  and  what  is 
perfection  if  no  individual  is  finally  perfected  ?  In 
view  of  eternity,  a  world  process  is  nothing  to  speak 
of  longer  or  greater  than  an  individual  life.  A 
world  process  loses  all  its  meaning  if  the  material 
it  works  upon  is  so  perishable  as  mortal  man.  It 
is  maya,  a  moment's  dream  of  the  Eternal  as  He 
turns  in  His  endless  sleep. 

At  the  other  extreme  is  the  Orthodox  or  Con- 
fessional School.  They  all  belonged  to  the  strict 
Lutheran  party,  hated  the  Union  with  the  Reformed, 
and  regarded  themselves  as  the  true  representatives 
of  German  piety.  They  stood  for  a  High  Church 
Lutheranism  which  derived  new  vitality  from  the 
revival  of  German  patriotism  that  followed  the 
struggle  with  Napoleon.  They  made  their  own 
use  of  Hegel's  insistence  on  doctrine  as  the  essence 
of  religion,  and  of  Schleiermacher's  presentation  of 
doctrine  as  the  belief  existing  in  the  Christian 
association. 

In  so  far  as  this  movement  sprang  merely  from 
a  revival  of  German  feeling  which  required,  among 
other  German  things,  a  German  creed,  it  sought 
only  what  its  opponents  were  in  the  habit  of  calling 


344     THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

7'ep7nstination — the  resurrection  of  ancient  beliefs 
without  any  justification  of  them  to  the  mind  of 
the  present.  Of  that  attitude  Hengstenberg,  a 
virulent  and  even  bitterly  orthodox  person,  was 
the  most  vigorous  exponent.  As  he  seemed  to 
many  to  represent  the  truly  patriotic  position,  he 
was,  in  his  day,  a  great  power  in  the  land.  But  if 
there  had  been  no  more  in  the  movement,  it  would 
have  passed  as  a  fashion  of  a  day.  What  gave  it 
vitality  was  the  revival  of  practical  religion  which 
passed,  not  over  Germany  alone,  but  over  a  good 
part  of  Western  Europe.  The  Church  thereby  be- 
came a  concern  of  vital  interest,  and  the  old  con- 
fessions were  found  to  have  spiritual  forces  in 
them,  of  which  no  trace  could  be  found  in  the 
recent  intellectual  constructions  of  Christianity. 
In  those  circumstances  it  was  natural  that  some 
good  men,  like  Philippi,  should  assume  that  the 
Lutheran  confessions  embodied  all  truth,  that  they 
had  a  kind  of  infallibility  which  entitled  them  to 
be  reimposed  upon  the  age  without  defence  or 
discrimination. 

The  Liberal  theologians  of  Germany  too  fre- 
quently speak  as  if  this  unquestioning  conservatism 
had  been  the  attitude  of  all  the  theologians  of  this 
school,  as  if  they  deserved  no  reply  except  an 
affirmation  of  the  claims  of  freedom.  But  a  theo- 
logian like  Hofmann  had  no  intention  of  restoring 
the  past  undefended  and  unchanged.  While  ac- 
knowledging that  his  religious  life  was  deeply 
rooted  in  the  existing  religious  institutions,  he 
maintained  an  attitude  of  freedom  towards  them 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    345 

as  much  as  any  Liberal  theologian.  The  only  re- 
gard for  the  past  he  cared  for  was  to  maintain  the 
growing  life  and  thought  of  the  Church  that  had 
nurtured  him.  Frank  considers  Hofmann  the 
greatest  theologian  since  Schleiermacher,  and  if 
intellectual  resource  and  originality  are  the  tests, 
his  opinion  is  not  indefensible. 

The  basis  of  all  scientific  theology  for  Hofmann 
is  the  freedom  which  comes  from  a  new  relation  to 
God.  This  new  relation  is  brought  about  by  a 
living  faith  ;  and  a  living  faith  is  made  possible 
through  Jesus  Christ.  The  result  is  the  spiritually 
renovated  person  who  should  be  the  object  of  all 
theological  study.  "  I  the  Christian  am  for  me  the 
theologian  the  proper  object  of  scientific,  syste- 
matic exposition." 

All  real  conviction  is  in  this  way  from  within, 
yet  it  is  no  real  conviction  unless  it  rest  on  some- 
thing without.  The  true  revelation  of  God  is 
history  ;  and  the  same  revelation  is  repeated  in 
three  forms.  First,  we  have  it  in  our  own  believ- 
ing experience  ;  second,  in  the  progressive  growth 
of  the  Christian  commonwealth  ;  third,  in  its  first 
beginning  and  manifestation  as  unfolded  in  the 
Scriptures.  The  Divine  revelation  in  all  three  cor- 
responds. The  agreement  of  our  own  experience 
with  Scripture  forms  the  strongest  and  purest 
method  of  proof.  When  our  experience  and  re- 
velation agree,  we  are  sure  that  we  have  reached 
what  is  not  only  of  personal  but  of  universal 
validity.  All  historical  life  is  revelation,  but,  at 
the  centre,  revealing  its  law  and  its  goal,  stands 


346      THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

the  temple  of  the  sacred  history.  The  present  has 
always  something  of  the  future  in  it,  something 
which  points  to  the  stage  beyond.  It  is,  therefore, 
always  prophetic.  Scripture  is  prophetic  in  the 
same  way,  but  in  a  special  degree,  because  it  sees 
into  the  inner  meaninors  of  events  and  finds  the 
creative  beginnings  of  the  Kingdom  of  God.  It 
is,  therefore,  not  to  be  regarded  as  a  rejDository 
of  texts,  but  as  an  organism  to  be  brought  to 
bear  as  a  whole  upon  the  whole  system  of  truth. 
Then  it  is  found  to  be  no  mere  external  announce- 
ment. We  find  a  wonderful  unity  of  history  and 
truth,  so  that  the  essential  thing  in  history,  which 
is  the  unfolding  of  sonship  to  God,  repeats  itself  in 
the  heart  of  man  just  as  it  was  first  wrought  by 
God. 

But  history  is  also  fulfilment,  and  Christ  stands 
at  the  centre  as  the  goal  of  its  prophecy  and  the 
beginning  of  its  fulfilment.  His  obedience,  which 
endured  the  assaults  of  evil,  even  to  suffering  the 
death  of  a  criminal,  exhausted  sin's  ungodly  nature 
and  action,  and  made  a  new  order  of  things  pos- 
sible ;  and  He  founded  the  new  society  which  is 
God's  witness  to  the  peoples,  to  carry  out  this  new 
order.  Even  his  doctrine  of  God  Hofmann  bases 
on  this  relationship  of  grace.  This  relation  of  man 
to  God  presupposes,  he  argues,  a  relation  of  God 
within  Himself.  It  thus  forms  the  basis  of  our 
knowledge  of  the  Triune  God,  and  thereby  shows 
us  how  He  could  endure  that  His  work  should  go 
forth  from  Him  as  a  historical  process. 

The  systematic  thinker  of  the  school  is  Frank. 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    347 

In  the  main  he  works  with  Hofmann's  suggestions. 
The  theologian  takes  his  own  spiritual  nature  to  be 
a  great  reality,  and  he  believes  in  the  reality  of  the 
roots  upon  which  that  grows.  This  proves,  first, 
the  reality  of  the  things  rationalism  ignored  or  per- 
verted— sin  as  moral  bondage,  deliverance  from 
guilt  as  entrance  into  a  new  life,  a  new  life  of 
moral  freedom,  and  the  hope  of  eternity  as  the 
completion  of  that  life.  It  involves,  further,  the 
assertion  of  the  things  pantheism  denies  or  per- 
verts— the  sense  of  absolute  guilt  and  absolute 
pardon,  which  requires  an  absolute  supramundane 
Personality  to  be  so  sinned  against  and  so  to  par- 
don. It  even  presupposes  a  Divine  and  human 
Mediator  to  afford  an  atonement  which  God  alone 
could  work,  yet  which  man  alone  can  render. 
That,  of  course,  again  assumes  that  the  personal 
relation  is  fundamental  in  God.  Finally,  it  affirms 
all  that  a  negative  criticism  denies  or  perverts. 
The  experience  of  regeneration  requires  channels 
of  communication — AVord,  Church  and  Sacrament. 
Kegeneration,  moreover,  being  the  experience  of  a 
causality  interposing  in  the  natural  order,  makes 
credible  the  belief  that,  for  the  purpose  of  salvation 
in  Christ,  the  natural  order  has  been  impregnated 
with  new  potencies  ;  and,  as  saving  thoughts  go  with 
saving  acts,  inspiration  goes  with  miracle. 

Whether  all  this  can  be  established  in  this  way 
may  be  open  to  question.  But  what  cannot  be 
questioned  is  the  existence  in  this  Lutheran 
theology  of  the  vitality  of  a  new  religious  life, 
making  it  dissatisfied  with  a  merely  contemplative 


348      THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

and  artistically  expansive  type  of  freedom.  It  in- 
sists that  to  be  in  God  we  must  be  of  God  after 
the  practical  fashion  of  living  above  our  world  and 
above  ourselves.  It  sees  that  a  religion  which 
merely  interprets  God  by  the  world,  is  helpless  in 
the  day  of  our  calamity,  that  unless  we  find  a  reli- 
gion which  interprets  the  world  by  God,  we  have 
no  power  to  bear  us  up,  that  unless  we  have  faith 
and  not  merely  induction,  our  hope  will  vanish  in 
the  day  we  most  need  it.  This  faith  it  seeks,  not 
at  the  bottom  of  its  experience,  not  in  the  generali- 
ties -after  everything  living  and  concrete  has  been 
withdrawn,  but  at  the  summit  of  experience,  with 
all  the  soul  has  won  from  the  past  and  all  it  ex- 
periences in  the  present  and  all  it  anticipates  from 
the  future. 

The  Mediating  School  was  so  named  by  Heng- 
stenberg,  who  had  a  high  orthodox  contempt  for  a 
person  who  imagined  a  question  might  have  two 
sides.  The  name  was  taken  up  by  the  Liberals  who 
had  a  high  intellectual  contempt  for  those  who 
were  not  satisfied  with  the  faith  that  the  widest 
formula  covers  most  ground.  But  the  title  applied 
in  contempt  has  come  to  be  a  quite  serious  designa- 
tion. The  endeavoiu-  to  find  a  place  for  seemingly 
opposing  elements  in  religion  was  too  great  a  need 
of  the  age  to  be  long  contemptible.  Their  position 
naturally  exposed  the  adherents  of  this  school  to 
taunts  of  temporising,  but  at  the  present  day  it  is 
clear  that  they  occupied  a  definite  ecclesiastical 
position,  and  sought  vigorously  a  clearly  defined 
practical   result.      While    the   sympathies   of   the 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION     349 

Orthodox  party  were  with  High  Lutheranism  of 
a  Catholic  type,  their  sympathies  were  with  the 
Union,  and  they  had  an  advanced  Protestant  out- 
look. Two  things  in  particular  they  inherited  from 
Schleiermacher  :  (1)  The  desire  to  set  the  Church 
free  from  such  statutory  fetters  as  maintain  out- 
ward divisions  where  no  fundamental  distinction 
really  exists,  (2)  The  conception  of  Christ  as  es- 
sentially a  moral  phenomenon,  not  explicable  by 
doctrines  of  His  person,  but  by  His  central  place 
in  man's  need  and  God's  Kingdom.  They  were 
deeply  influenced  by  the  Romantic  Movement,  but 
they  were  also  deeply  dissatisfied  with  its  pantheis- 
tic view  of  sin  as  irregularity  in  development,  of 
reconciliation  as  an  advance  to  an  artistic  view  of 
the  whole,  and  of  free-will  as  development  to  the 
stage  of  reason. 

Thinkers  of  all  shades  of  opinion  belonged  to 
the  school,  but  Dorner  is  usually  taken  as  the 
typical  example  of  its  mediating  nature.  His  main 
endeavour  is  to  show  how  the  Christianity  which 
comes  to  us  from  history  can,  when  we  attain  an 
independent  position,  shine  for  us  in  the  light  of  its 
own  truth.  Christ  was  necessary  to  the  world 
apart  from  sin.  His  appearance  corresponds  to  the 
true  idea  of  humanity.  The  historical  manifestation 
is  thus  implicit  in  reason.  In  Christ  is  actualised 
the  God-manhood  which  is  at  the  heart  of  all 
religion  and  is  the  foundation  of  every  ethical  ideal. 
Christianity  has  two  principles,  an  inward,  which 
is  justification — the  realising  of  our  freedom  in 
being  sons  of  God,  and  an  outward,  which  is  Scrip- 


350     THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

ture — the  means  whereby  justification  is  presented 
for  our  acceptance.  Dorner  probably  attempted  to 
reconcile  too  many  interests,  and  he  is  more  es- 
teemed as  a  suggestive  than  as  a  consistent  thinker. 
The  most  interesting  representative  of  the 
school,  and  the  only  one  on  whom  we  need  linger, 
is  Rothe.  In  the  days  when  the  doctrine  of  de- 
velopment first  flashed  upon  men's  dazzled  imagina- 
tion, they  were  so  satisfied  by  the  sense  of  glorious 
progress  that  the  idea  of  any  reality  in  man's  inter- 
ference seemed  a  mere  disturbance.  But  experience 
showed,  as  Carlyle  expresses  it,  that  pantheism, 
which  seemed  to  be  fine  flour,  was  ground  glass. 
E/Othe  was  among  the  first  to  feel  this  danger,  and 
he  felt  it  deeply,  though  he  did  not  always  escape 
it.  His  theology,  therefore,  has  two  great  aims  :  (1) 
To  find  a  place  both  for  God's  action  and  for  man's  ; 
(2)  To  interpret  the  world  by  God  and  not  God 
by  the  world.  In  contrast  to  philosophy,  Rothe 
calls  his  position  theosophy.  Philosophy  interprets 
God  from  the  development,  whereas  theosophy 
begins  with  our  immediate  knowledge  of  God,  and, 
from  it,  interprets  the  development.  That  distinc- 
tion is  vital,  for  a  religion  which  is  a  mere  deduc- 
tion from  life  can  never  give  us  victory  over  life. 
At  the  very  point  where  it  ought  to  deduce  triumph, 
it  would  deduce  failure.  It  is  this  bitter  need  of 
something  to  give  us  mastery  over  life  which 
makes  so  many  persons  adhere  with  such  tenacity 
to  an  external  authority  of  some  sort.  Our  own 
impressions  are  at  the  mercy  of  our  moods,  while 
forms  of  faith  which   are   received   from  without 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    351 

seem  independent  of  our  perplexities  and  struggles, 
so  that  the  surrender  of  intellectual  seems  well  re- 
paid in  practical  freedom.  That  is  the  difficulty  of 
which  Rothe  is  conscious,  but  he  seeks  deliverance 
in  advance,  not  in  retreat.  He  does  not  wish  to 
surrender  either  intellectual  or  practical  freedom. 
Instead  of  regarding  freedom  under  any  aspect  as  a 
disturbance,  he  takes  it  to  be  the  first  great  turn- 
ing point  in  creation,  the  first  clear  manifestation  of 
what  God  aims  at,  the  first  clear  proof  of  the 
spiritual  significance  of  the  world.  What  went 
before  was  only  the  material  matrix  ;  what  followed 
is  the  transmutation  of  matter  into  spirit.  History 
is  a  moral  process  of  spiritualising  our  nature,  which 
means  also  a  religious  process  of  becoming  like 
God.  From  the  point  at  which  man  was  endowed 
with  free-will,  he  became  the  organ  of  God  in  His 
work  of  creation.  That  involves  for  him  the  two 
tasks  of  knowing,  i.e.,  of  idealising  the  real,  and  of 
acting,  i.e.,  of  realising  the  ideal.  Of  this  work  the 
material  basis  is  marriage  and  the  Church.  We 
shall,  however,  pass  beyond  both  into  an  immor- 
tality which  is  not  a  natural  possession,  but  a 
spiritual  acquisition. 

Rothe  also  holds  that  in  this  development  de- 
parture from  the  normal  was  inevitable,  but  the 
departure  is  due  to  human  failure  in  man's  struggle 
for  freedom,  not  to  the  inevitableness  of  a  process. 
Yet  it  was  so  inevitable,  that  a  redemption  was 
from  the  first  a  necessity.  Hence  the  second  Adam 
is  the  central  individual  of  the  new  spiritual  man- 
hood.    By  occupying  that  position  He  is  able  to 


352     THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

overcome  sin  and  its  consequences,  and  so  to  be- 
come King  of  this  spiritual  kingdom  which  through 
Him  comes  to  pass. 

Nor  is  this  heavenly  kingdom  altogether  of  the 
future.  The  process  of  absorbing  the  Church  into 
the  Kingdom  of  God,  he  believes,  has  already  begun. 
The  Kingdom  of  God  is  not  a  Church  but  a  State, 
and  the  final  religious  organisation  is  to  be  sought 
in  the  development  of  the  State.  The  Church  is  a 
redeeming  institution,  but  the  redeemed  society  at 
once  takes  the  form  of  a  religious  and  moral  or- 
ganisation of  the  State,  so  that  the  absorption  of 
the  Church  in  the  State  is  to  be  welcomed,  not 
resisted.  Herein  he  finds  the  distinction  between 
Catholic  and  Protestant.  The  Catholic  knows  the 
Christian  Society  only  as  a  Church — a  position  once 
necessary  but  now  an  anachronism,  the  Pi'otestant 
looks  on  it  as  a  means  for  realising  a  kingdom. 
We  need  a  larger  Christianity,  including  morality 
as  well  as  piety,  including  nature  and  history,  art 
and  science,  personal  and  public  life,  all  united  to 
God  as  its  eternal  basis  and  directed  towards  Him 
as  its  eternal  goal. 

On  this  theory  he  sought  to  interpret  his  age. 
In  his  heart  of  hearts  he  did  not  love  it.  Its  dry 
and  unadmiring  spirit,  he  admits,  was  alien  to  a 
soul  that  rejoiced  in  God's  miraculous  world  of 
wonders,  that  found  no  inconsistency  between 
miracle  and  every  truth  of  science.  But  he  also 
recognised  that  the  new  wine  could  not  be  put  into 
the  old  vessels  and  that  it  was  necessary  the  old 
ecclesiastical  dogmas  should  be  broken  up,  as  they 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    353 

have  been  in  this  age.  Wherefore,  in  spite  of  every- 
thing that  repels  him,  he  has  faith  in  the  age's 
Divine  significance.  But  the  Christian  thinker 
ought  to  realise  that  his  duty  to-day  is  to  reconcile 
Christianity  and  culture,  to  show  Christianity  that 
the  modern  idea  of  everything  coming  to  pass  by 
development  is  not  opposed  to  its  coming  to  pass 
by  Divine  omnipotence,  and  to  show  culture  that 
the  laws  of  the  world  are  contained  in  Christianity 
and  the  complete  history  of  the  universe  in  its 
revelation. 

Ritschl  is  also  to  be  assigned  to  the  Mediating 
School.  He  was  a  child  of  the  Union  of  the 
Lutheran  and  Reformed  Churches,  a  vigorous  de- 
fender of  the  Protestantism  that  went  with  it,  and 
a  trenchant  critic  of  the  High  Lutheran  assumption 
of  being  the  only  true  Church.  The  true  Church 
exists,  he  held,  wherever  the  Christian  moral  life 
is  set  up  through  faith  in  Christ.  The  present 
divisions  of  Protestantism,  he  says,  are  chiefly 
maintained  by  insistence  on  externals  to  the 
neglect  of  essentials,  and  the  only  division  of  im- 
portance is  between  Catholicism  and  Protestantism. 
He  does  not,  however,  accept  the  exposition  of  it 
in  Schleiermacher's  well-known  saying,  that  Catho- 
licism reaches  Christ  through  the  Church,  whereas 
Protestantism  reaches  the  Church  through  Christ. 
Protestantism  also  reaches  Christ  through  the 
Church,  for  the  Protestant,  as  well  as  the  Catholic, 
must  depend  on  the  community  for  his  knowledge 
of  Christ.     The  real  diff'erence  is  in  the  idea  of  the 

Church.     To  Protestantism  the  Church  is  the  reli- 

23 


354      THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

gious  community ;  to  Catholicism  it  is  the  legally 
privileged  clergy  who  do  not  absolutely  require  to 
belong  to  the  community  of  believers  at  all.  Our 
first  task  is  to  rid  ourselves  of  the  idea  that  the 
Church  is  the  organisation.  "The  very  things  in 
which  many  seek  the  proofs  of  the  might  of  Christi- 
anity— j)olitical  influence  and  statutory  authority 
and  ecclesiastical  institutions — are  exactly  what 
come  under  strong  suspicion  of  falsifying  Christ's 
intent.  It  requires,  on  the  contrary,  a  good  stout 
faith  in  the  invisible  to  trace  amid  the  chaos, 
abominations  and  trivialities  of  Church  history 
Christ's  advancing  might  over  the  world."  "The 
legally  constituted  Church,  a  prey  to  party  spirit, 
is  in  no  way  the  Kingdom  of  God ;  nor  is  the 
statutory  order  of  the  Church  the  Christian  reli- 
gion." Nothing  were  more  to  be  desired  than 
some  recognition  by  the  ecclesiastic  that  the  legal 
institution  of  the  Church  can  be  perverted  to  serve 
ends  directly  opiDOsed  to  the  Kingdom  of  God.  To 
have  a  particular  Church  is  a  necessity,  but  let  him 
that  has  it  have  it  as  though  he  had  it  not,  for  to 
cherish  the  true  sense  of  union  and  to  have  pain  at 
the  ruinous  dealings  of  party  men  is  the  mark  of 
possessing  the  Holy  Spirit. 

This  conception  of  the  Church  is  the  foundation- 
stone  of  Ritschl's  theology.  His  practical  aim  is 
to  make  this  Church  of  the  saints,  though  it  never 
can  have  the  visibility  of  an  institution,  as  real, 
and  in  a  sense  as  objective,  a  basis  of  faith  as  a 
visible  church  with  organisation,  creed  and  authori- 
tative Scripture.      To  this,  the  true  Church,  God 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    355 

reveals  Himself,  and  in  it  His  revelation  abides 
and  works.  Christ  is  the  Head  of  it,  and  His 
Kingdom  is  built  up  in  it.  Reconciliation  gives 
us  the  freedom  which  makes  us  members  of  it,  and 
by  service  in  it,  and  not  by  sentiment  and  feeling, 
we  make  God's  purpose  our  own  personal  end. 
The  neglect  of  this  conception  of  the  Christian 
community  often  leads  to  grave  misunderstanding 
of  Ritschl's  views,  and  in  particular  of  his  assertion 
that  an  essential  part  of  being  justified  is  to  reckon 
ourselves  one  of  the  community  of  faith. 

At  this  stage  we  come  upon  Ritschl  with  a 
certain  inevitableness.  Partly,  no  doubt,  it  is  the 
inevitableness  of  reaction  and  not  of  the  final  and 
balanced  truth.  But  few  things  are  more  signifi- 
cant than  an  inevitable  reaction.  In  revolting  from 
the  Tubingen  Criticism,  he  revolted  from  the  whole 
Hegelian  conception  of  life  and  history.  He  had 
gone  into  the  spider's  parlour  of  the  Absolute  Philo- 
sophy, the  web  of  its  dialectic  had  been  woven 
round  his  limbs,  a  religion  of  mere  ideas  had  threat- 
ened to  suck  the  life-blood  from  a  religion  of  active 
and  burden-bearing  faith.  Life  and  history  had 
been  reduced  for  him  to  a  moving  picture,  man's 
struggle  to  an  illusion,  the  human  personality  to  a 
fleeting  embodiment  of  the  World-Spirit.  When  he 
turned  from  it,  it  seemed  to  him  like  a  bad  dream, 
and  pantheism  in  every  form  remained  his  night- 
mare. "  If  freedom  of  thought  is  appreciation  of 
the  freedom  of  the  individual,  pantheism  is  a  poor 
perversion  of  Christianity,  incapable  of  reaching  a 
high  conception  of  the  destiny  and  worth  of  the 


356     THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

human  person."  Freedom,  for  him,  was  essentially 
personal.  Being  the  basis  of  the  worth  and  distinc- 
tiveness of  the  individual  it  required  a  distinction, 
not  only  between  man  and  the  world,  but  also  be- 
tween man  and  God.  Hence  he  labours  so  to  con- 
ceive the  operations  of  God's  grace  as  to  exalt  and 
not  to  obliterate  the  human  personality,  and  he  con- 
tinually takes  up  his  parable  against  that  mysticism 
which  teaches  that  "  the  life  of  God  works  in  the 
believer  at  the  cost  of  moral  freedom,"  in  the  belief 
that  no  error  has  so  widely,  so  continuously,  so 
deeply  corrupted  Christianity. 

Ritschl's  system  is  often  criticised  as  if  it  were 
a  mere  torso  of  orthodox  beliefs,  a  church  system 
with  the  prime  defect  of  not  being  a  satisfactory 
foundation  for  any  existing  church.  But,  apart 
from  the  fact  that  Ritschl  would  not  have  regarded 
the  endeavour  to  maintain  any  church  as  it  now  is 
as  a  great  good,  his  theology  receives  a  new  interest 
when  we  remember  the  situation  in  which  it  was 
produced  and  the  experiences  through  which 
Ritschl  himself  had  passed.  Would  we  justly  esti- 
mate his  value,  we  must  remember  how  he  had 
known  the  time  when  Criticism  had  not  got  beyond 
Strauss — the  story  of  Jesus  being  a  mixture  of  Old 
Testament  passages,  of  popular  expectations  of  a 
Jewish  Messiah,  and  of  crude  religious  ideas  ;  when 
Baur  seemed  to  have  said  the  last  word  in  Church 
history — almost  all  the  writings  of  the  New  Testa- 
ment being  placed  in  the  second  century,  and  the 
rise  of  the  Christian  Church  being  accounted  for 
by  an  intellectual  antagonism  and  a  political  recon- 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    357 

ciliation ;  when  life  seemed  a  mental  panorama, 
history  an  emanation,  free-will  an  assertion  that 
man  is  a  clock  moved  by  his  own  mainspring,  and 
religion  a  thermometer  to  measure  the  rise  in  the 
intellectual  temperature.  Against  all  this  the 
watchwords  of  Ritschlianism  are  battle  cries.  Man 
and  his  vocation  are  supreme  realities ;  victory 
over  the  world  is  at  once  our  supreme  need  and 
the  supreme  evidence  of  God's  help  ;  free-will  is 
the  basis  of  all  rationality ;  the  judgment  of  worth 
is  the  fragmentary  but  moral  comprehension  of  the 
universe. 

Like  the  rest  of  the  Mediating  School,  Ritschl 
sought  a  reconciliation  between  historical  Christi- 
anity and  the  modern  mind,  which  should  do  justice 
to  both  and  subordinate  neither.  Like  the  rest  of 
the  school,  too,  he  followed  in  the  main  Schleier- 
macher's  solution.  Though  he  disliked  and  dis- 
trusted Schleiermacher,  even  his  own  followers  do 
not  deny  his  obligation  to  the  earlier  thinker. 
Schleiermacher,  Kattenbusch  says,  introduced  a 
new  era ;  Ritschl  only  a  new  phase  of  it.  From 
Schleiermacher  Ritschl  learned  that  religion  is  a 
thing  by  itself,  distinct  from  doctrine  and  morality, 
that  it  is  positive  and  social,  and  that  everything 
distinctive  in  it  depends  on  the  Person  of  Christ. 
Moreover,  Ritschl  himself  acknowledges  Schleier- 
macher's  great  merit  in  asserting  the  significance 
of  the  Christian  community. 

Ritschl's  debt  to  the  whole  Romantic  Movement 
is  apt  to  be  forgotten  amid  his  strong  opposition  to 
its  pantheism.    Though  he  returned  to  Kant,  it  was 


858     THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

through  Komanticism.  The  world  without  was  no 
longer  for  him,  as  it  was  for  Kant,  a  mere  manifold 
of  sense,  a  mere  haze  of  impressions,  but  was  one 
great  ordered  reality  to  be  tested  at  one  point  by 
a  spirit  which  should  also  be  an  ordered  reality. 
As  Hegel  took  the  point  at  which  we  test  it  to  be 
reason,  and  Schleiermacher  to  be  feeling,  Ritschl 
took  it  to  be  will.  The  unity  of  experience  Hegel 
sought  to  understand  by  the  idea  of  process, 
Schleiermacher  by  the  idea  of  plan,  and  Ritschl 
by  the  idea  of  purpose.  All  alike,  therefore,  re- 
garded the  world  as  ordered  on  one  principle.  Nor 
would  Hegel  or  Schleiermacher  have  objected  to 
Ritschl's  principle.  The  idea  of  development  was 
fundamental  to  the  whole  Romantic  conception, 
and  the  development  must  always  be  estimated  by 
its  goal,  and  this  goal  was  always  recognised  as,  in 
some  form,  a  Kingdom  of  God.  But  if  the  general 
conception  is  the  same,  the  emphasis  is  entirely 
altered.  The  order  which  is  directed  to  purpose 
and  appeals  to  the  will,  is  neither  an  intellectual 
nor  an  artistic,  but  a  moral  unity.  The  way  to 
reach  it  is  to  become  complete  moral  personalities 
and  thereby  find  the  world  in  which  we  carry  out 
our  tasks  capable  of  being  treated  as  a  moral  whole. 
Neither  by  science  nor  by  art  do  we  reach  the  order 
and  unity  of  the  world,  but  by  introducing  moral 
order  and  unity  into  the  life  we  live  in  it.  Not  by 
intellect  and  not  by  feeling,  but  in  the  last  issue  by 
will,  do  we  come  into  contact  with  reality.  The 
primacy  in  human  nature,  therefore,  is  to  be  as- 
signed to  will. 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    359 

Much  criticism  of  Ritschl's  theory  of  knowledge 
takes  for  granted  that  the  denial  of  the  primacy  to 
reason  is  equivalent  to  the  rejection  of  every  objec- 
tive test  of  the  truth.  In  the  same  way  it  was 
formerly  said  that  Schleiermacher's  assertion  of  the 
primacy  of  feeling  left  everything  at  the  mercy  of 
sentiment.  As  both  Schleiermacher  and  Ritschl 
devoted  their  lives  to  systematic  thinking,  it  can 
hardly  be  supposed  that  they  undervalued  know- 
ledge. But  when  they  came  to  ask  what  is  the 
ultimate  basis  upon  which  knowledge  rests,  Schleier- 
macher found  it  in  that  first  moment  when  thought 
and  action  are  undivided  in  feeling,  and  liitschl 
said  it  is  just  that  movement  of  dividing  and  react- 
ing that  is  essential.  Thus  it  is  not  a  question  of 
what  is  exclusive  in  our  experience,  but  of  what  is 
fundamental. 

Though  his  theory  of  knowledge  is  not  essential 
to  his  theology,  though  it  was  not  laid  as  a  founda- 
tion but  was  added  afterwards  as  a  buttress,  Ritschl 
seemed  to  regard  the  fact  that  the  world  had  finally 
arrived  at  it,  as  a  providential  demonstration  of  the 
true  basis  of  Christianity,  at  a  time  when  such  new 
succour  was  much  needed.  His  tangled  exposition 
justifies  any  misunderstanding,  but  if  we  ignore 
details  and  regard  only  the  general  conception,  it 
is  not  without  glimmerings  of  reason.  Would  the 
world  be  anything  more  than  a  series  of  sensations 
of  a  more  or  less  orderly  kind  to  any  creature,  how- 
ever intellectually  endowed,  that  merely  obeyed  its 
impulses  and  had  no  power  of  reacting  on  the  world 
according  to  a  deliberate  purpose  ?     When  we  take 


360      THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

up  our  resolution  at  another  point,  ascribe  responsi- 
bility to  ourselves  for  things  long  past,  modify  out- 
ward forces  and  are  modified  by  them,  we  find 
reality  in  ourselves,  and  learn,  by  carrying  out  our 
tasks  among  them,  to  ascribe  the  same  kind  of 
reality  to  the  things  about  us.  By  transferring 
ourselves  into  the  world,  we  find  identity  amid 
change,  efifectiveness  as  the  cause  of  change,  power 
to  treasure  up  the  result  of  change.  But  nothing, 
Ritschl  urges,  is  added  to  our  knowledge  by 
conceiving  another  reality  at  rest  behind  the  plane 
of  the  reality  we  only  know  by  its  relation  to 
our  activities.  The  practical  reality  is  not  en- 
larged or  confirmed  by  an  intellectual  abstrac- 
tion, a  noumenon,  or  idea,  or  thing-in-itself.  The 
thing  is  not  behind  the  phenomena  but  in  them,  as 
their  cause,  the  end  they  serve  as  means,  the  law  of 
their  constant  modifications.  Ritschl,  of  course, 
must  also  have  a  presupposition  behind  phenomena. 
But  what  would  be  the  supposition  behind  a  world 
which  proved  itself  real  by  accepting  such  a  trans- 
ference of  ourselves  into  it  and  responding  to  our 
rational  activities  ?  It  would  not  be  a  thing-in- 
itself,  but  an  active  reasonable  will  such  as  ours 
ought  to  be. 

If  life  would  be  no  more  than  a  moving  picture, 
supposing  we  could  maintain  towards  it  a  purely 
contemplative  attitude,  very  little  more  is  needed 
to  vindicate  Ritschl 's  position  and  make  his  theory 
of  religion  at  least  possible.  All  religions,  he  says, 
seek,  by  the  aid  of  the  exalted  spiritual  might  they 
revere,  the  solution  of  the  contradiction  in  which 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    361 

man  finds  himself,  as  on  the  one  hand  an  insignifi- 
cant part  of  the  world  of  nature,  and  on  the  other 
a  spiritual  personality  claiming  to  dominate  nature. 
Hence  the  religious  solution  always  looks  in  the 
direction  of  spiritual  personalities,  in  the  direction 
of  a  kinship  between  gods  and  men. 

Frank  may  be  right  in  saying  that  this  view  of 
religion  makes  God  a  hypothesis.^  But  that  does 
not  necessarily  prove  it  a  descent  from  Schleier- 
macher's  doctrine  of  an  immediate  intuition  of 
God.  If  Schleiermacher's  view  is  right,  why  is  the 
situation  so  difficult,  and  why  does  the  knowledge 
of  God  seem  to  depend  so  much  on  character  and 
so  little  on  knowledaj-e  ?  The  essential  element  in 
the  various  religions  does  not  seem  to  be  the  intui- 
tion of  the  One  in  the  many ;  the  way  of  advance 
does  not  appear  to  be  emotional  education  into  this 
higher  intuition ;  the  task  of  religion  is  not  any 
contemplation  of  its  unity  which  enables  us  to  find 
ourselves  at  home  in  the  world.  We  are  required 
to  find  our  way  through  the  world  at  the  cost,  if 
need  be,  of  being  strangers  and  pilgrims  in  it.  No 
religion  offers  itself  as  an  insight  into  the  world 
which  would  enable  us  to  be  at  peace  with  it,  but 
all  require  that  we  shall  have  victory  over  it  for 
the  sake  of  some  purpose  which  lies  beyond  it. 
Schleiermacher's  assertion  of  the  immediate  nature 
of  our  knowledge  of  God  was  a  great  advance  on 
a  knowledge  demonstrated  like  a  proposition  in 
Euclid,  but  the  advance  was  mainly  because  it 
brought  the  knowledge  of  God  nearer  to  life. 
^  Geschichte  imd  Kritik  der  neueren  Tlieologie,  p.  326. 


362     THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

But  Kitschl  makes  it  a  still  more  direct  outcome 
of  life.  Nor,  if  our  knowledge  of  God  depends  on 
our  practical  attitude,  can  it  be  justly  described  as 
less  certain  than  if  it  were  an  intuition.  It  is  only 
more  arduous,  and  that  can  hardly  be  an  argu- 
ment against  it,  seeing  that  all  religions  take  the 
arduous  way.  In  seeking  succour  against  the 
restrictions  of  the  world,  as  Kitschl  says,  men  show 
a  determined  will  to  give  reality  to  the  acknow- 
ledgment of  God  by  sacrifice  of  their  belongings 
and  by  self-denial. 

On  this  view  the  revelation  of  God  is  revelation 
of  His  will ;  and  our  verification  of  it  must  be 
intimately  connected  with  our  willingness  to  do 
His  will.  God's  revelation  and  our  ideals  can  only 
be  two  sides  of  the  same  thing.  All  religious 
judgments  are  what  Eitschl  calls  "independent 
judgments  of  worth  ".  That  is  to  say,  they  depend 
primarily  on  the  significance  we  assign  to  our 
spiritual  nature  over  against  the  material  world. 
Materialism  is  not  science,  but  a  low  estimate 
of  the  worth  of  the  spirit  in  contrast  to  nature. 
Christianity  in  the  same  way  "  displays  itself  as  a 
judgment  of  the  worth  of  the  human  spirit  as 
greater  than  the  world  ".  Both  conclusions  alike 
are  reached,  not  by  argument,  but  by  a  direct  prac- 
tical estimate  of  the  world's  purpose,  arising  from 
our  attitude  towards  it.  The  Christian  estimate  is 
reached  by  response  to  the  revelation  of  God's  will, 
by  faith  in  God  as  our  Father,  and  by  service  for 
the  Kingdom  of  God  ;  and  it  is  rejected  only  by  the 
absence  of  such  a  response. 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    363 

The  basis  of  a  judgment  of  worth  is  personal 
freedom.  By  staking  our  life  on  it  we  can  prove 
what  freedom  needs.  Laboratories  and  experi- 
ments for  testing  truth  are  various,  but  the 
greatest  laboratory  is  the  world  and  the  greatest 
experiment  is  life.  In  them  alone  can  we  demon- 
strate Grod.  The  man  who  will  live  by  faith  in  a 
God  above  the  world  who  is  his  Father  and  by 
whom  the  most  contrary  things  are  made  to  work 
together  for  good,  and  who  will  live  for  that 
Father's  goal  beyond  the  world,  even  for  the  king- 
dom of  souls  set  free  and  bound  only  by  love,  will 
be  able  to  demonstrate  his  conviction  by  finding  his 
emancipation  in  that  life  ;  but  he  can  demonstrate 
it  on  no  easier  terms.  Wherefore,  God  and  a 
living  faith  are  inseparable  conceptions,  not  that  a 
man's  God  varies  with  his  faith,  but  that  a  revela- 
tion of  God  can  only  reflect  itself  in  a  faith  which 
lives  by  it. 

In  that  case  personality  must  be  fundamental 
to  the  idea  of  God.  That  conclusion  is  the  reason 
of  Ritschl's  practical  interest  in  the  whole  discus- 
sion. The  method  of  first  reaching  the  Absolute 
and  then  adding  personality  as  one  of  its  attributes 
ends,  he  maintains,  in  a  metaphysical  idol.  "When 
a  Christian  enters  upon  metaphysical  knowledge  of 
God  he  leaves  his  Christian  horizon."  ^  Personality 
and  absoluteness  are  so  far  from  being  contraries, 
as  Strauss  contends,  that  nothing  but  personality 
can  be  absolute  in  any  right  sense.  The  very  mark 
of  personality  is  to  take  up  and  apply  its  environ- 

1  Theologieund  Metaphysik,  p.  11. 


364     THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

ment  to  its  own  uses,  without  being  confused  with 
it.  Personality,  therefore,  is  essential  to  any  belief 
in  God's  succour,  while  absoluteness  follows  as  the 
belief  that  His  succour  is  limitless.  We  understand 
God's  perfect  personality  through  our  very  limita- 
tions, while  we  can  only  understand  our  independ- 
ence in  spite  of  our  limitations  through  God's 
absolute  personality.  Nor  is  God's  personality  less 
essential  for  understanding  His  relation  to  the 
world  than  for  understanding  His  relation  to  us. 
Belief  in  a  personal  God  saves  us  from  setting  Him 
outside  the  world  and  apart  from  it,  like  the  deist, 
and  from  confusing  Him  with  the  world  like  the 
pantheist.  We  do  not  identify  God  with  the 
world  but  with  His  purpose  in  it,  with  the  realisa- 
tion of  His  Kingdom.  And  this  purpose  we  are  in 
a  position  to  interpret  as  the  will  of  love,  a  solution 
of  the  problem  of  the  world  far  more  satisfying  to 
the  mind  than  any  process  of  reason.  We  then 
obtain  a  truly  rational  view  of  the  world,  as  the 
means  for  producing  the  moral  kingdom  of  created 
spirits. 

This  rejection  of  metaphysics  has  seemed  to 
many  a  denial  of  the  objectivity  of  all  religious 
knowledge.  The  objection  that  "  value-judgments 
do  not  fulfil  the  conditions  of  the  old  canon  of 
Catholicity,  Quod  semper,  quod  ubique,  quod  ah 
omnibus"^  is  not  very  weighty,  for  that  was  a 
practical,  not  a  theoretical  test — a  test  very  much 
of  the  nature  of  a  judgment  of  worth.     It  might 

1  Galloway,  Studies  in  the  Philosophy  of  Religion,  1904, 
p.  315. 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    365 

even  be  maintained  that  judgments  of  worth,  judg- 
ments regarding  God's  Kingdom,  and  man's  moral 
worth,  and  Christ's  place  as  Revealer  and  Head, 
have  alone  been  the  Catholic  elements  in  Christi- 
anity ;  while,  on  the  other  hand,  one  would  not 
look  for  them  in  any  intellectual  reconstruction  of 
Christianity.  But  why,  it  is  asked,  if  these  judg- 
ments have  to  do  with  reality,  does  Ritschl  object 
to  calling  them  scientific,  theoretical  ?  Because  a 
theoretical  truth  is  one  that  can  be  forced  upon 
any  intelligent  person  by  argument,  and  religious 
truth  never  arrives  at  that  stage.  To  the  end  we 
must  do  the  deed  if  we  would  know  the  doctrine  ; 
to  the  end  we  require,  not  merely  intelligent  con- 
sideration, but  an  attitude  of  the  will.  The  validity 
of  the  judgment  of  worth  depends  entirely  on 
whether  or  not  it  corresponds  to  God's  judgment. 
It  is  only  a  way  of  knowing  God's  revelation,  all 
religious  truth  being  revelation  on  God's  side  and 
judgment  of  worth  on  man's. 

Lotze  distinguished  the  judgment  of  worth  from 
the  theoretical  judgment  before  Kitschl,  and  the 
distinction  has  been  widely  accepted  since.  Re- 
ligious, moral  and  sesthetic  judgments  are  recog- 
nised as  having  a  relation  to  our  own  personal 
significance,  which,  for  example,  a  law  of  astronomy 
does  not  have.  The  important  thing  to  seek  in 
history  is  precisely  the  development  of  man's  judg- 
ments of  worth.  There  are  some,  like  Troeltsch, 
who  find  this  the  only  revelation  of  God,  and  who 
estimate  the  person  of  Christ  purely  by  His  place 
in  the  development  of  these  ideals.     But  to  Kitschl 


366     THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

the  person  of  Christ  is  so  pre-eminent  a  revelation 
of  God  as  to  make  all  else  superfluous.  Unfor- 
tunately it  is  precisely  on  this  important  point  that 
his  exposition  is  frequently  elusive.  He  is  accused 
of  so  emphasising  the  uniqueness  of  the  revelation 
in  Christ  as  to  divide  history  hopelessly  in  twain, 
with  the  result,  not  of  exalting  Christ,  but  of 
depreciating  God's  general  working.  Christ  is  cer- 
tainly for  him  the  essential  revelation.  "  An  au- 
thority which  excludes  or  subordinates  all  other 
standards,  and  which  at  the  same  time  exhaustively 
regulates  all  trust  in  God,  has  the  worth  of  God- 
head." Yet  he  admits  degrees  as  well  as  diff'er- 
ences  in  the  various  religions.  They  become  richer, 
clearer,  more  connected,  worthier  of  humanity. 
They  all  claim  to  be  in  possession  of  a  revelation. 
To  make  that  claim  is  the  very  mark  of  a  religion. 
And  apparently  the  claim  is  justified  so  far  as  it 
goes.  Moreover,  the  development  of  the  family, 
of  society,  and  of  the  State  prepares  for,  and  so 
far  reveals,  the  Kingdom  of  God,  their  high  place 
in  human  life  being  due  apparently  to  their  Divine 
meaning.  Nor  does  Ritschl  cut  off  Christianity 
from  the  past  as  Schleiermacher  does,  for  he  makes 
an  understanding  of  how  it  was  rooted  in  the  Old 
Testament  the  sole  test  of  the  canon  of  the  New. 
Christ  is,  therefore,  only  an  exclusive  revelation  by 
pre-eminence. 

The  general  position  is  allied  to  Rothe's  view, 
that  from  the  time  freedom  entered  into  the  world 
man  became  a  fellow  labourer  with  God  in  the  work 
of  development.     To  Hegel  and  even  to  Schleier- 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    367 

macher  freedom  was  a  stage  of  progress  ;  to  Ritschl 
progress  is  a  work  of  freedom.  On  the  former 
supposition  the  potentiah'ties  of  Deity  unfold  into 
actualities,  till  man  reaches  the  stage  of  reason, 
when,  being  moved  from  within  by  an  ideal  and 
not  from  without  by  an  impulse,  he  may  be  called 
free.  On  such  a  scheme  sin  can  only  be  a  neces- 
sary illusion.  But  if  progress  is  a  work  of  freedom, 
the  Kingdom  of  God  is  man's  task  as  well  as  God's 
gift,  and  neglect  of  it  is  a  genuine  failure. 

Ritschl's  work  on  the  Christian  Doctrine  of 
Justification  and  Reconciliation  consists  of  three 
extensive  volumes.  The  first,  dealing  with  the 
history  of  the  doctrine,  proves  abundantly  his  deep 
and  exact  theological  learning.  The  important 
points,  however,  are  repeated  in  the  third  volume 
in  learned  excursions  which  do  not  always  help 
the  progress  of  the  argument.  But  the  second 
volume,  on  the  Biblical  sources  of  the  doctrine, 
should  not  be  neglected.  It  shows,  at  all  events, 
what  in  Ritschl's  eyes  a  revelation  is  not. 

Every  religion  aiming  at  universality,  he  says, 
must  display  its  characteristic  quality  in  its  founder  ; 
and  this  general  principle  is  specially  true  of  Chris- 
tianity as  a  religion  of  reconciliation  with  God. 
This  assertion  is  not  so  fully  justified  as  the  im- 
portance of  it  would  seem  to  require.  The  only 
defence  offered  is  that  nothing  else  could  distin- 
guish it  from  the  surrounding  forces.  That  is  a 
vague  statement,  yet  if  we  apply  it  to  the  concrete 
instance  of  Jesus  Christ,  we  see  how  essential  the 
person  of  Christ  was  to  a  religion  which  spoke  of 


368     THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

God,  and  addressed  itself  to  the  soul  of  man  as 
man,  amid  influences  fitted  to  contaminate,  but 
not  to  purify  it.  And  besides  this  empirical  ground, 
is  not  the  individual  the  universal  element  in  re- 
ligion, and  is  not  the  recognition  of  what  is  uni- 
versal essentially  a  task  of  freeing  the  individual 
from  the  yoke  of  the  institution  ?  In  any  case 
Ritschl's  whole  view  of  the  early  history  of  Chris- 
tianity, his  whole  estimate  of  what  is  religious  in 
it,  and  his  whole  personal  relation  to  it,  made  him 
find  all  that  is  significant  in  it  in  Christ. 

The  value  of  the  Scriptures,  he  says,  is  not  to 
be  sought  in  any  doctrine  of  inspiration  but  in  the 
concrete  fact  that  they  are  essential  to  our  know- 
ledge of  Christ's  teaching,  of  its  presuppositions 
and  its  first  effect  in  the  community,  that  indeed 
we  have  no  other  source  of  knowledge.  All  the 
necessary  doctrines  of  salvation  through  Christ 
are,  therefore,  to  be  sought  in  Scripture,  but  all 
the  forms  of  life  and  all  the  hopes  connected  with 
them  in  the  early  Church  are  not  necessarily  valid 
for  us.  The  Scriptures  are  not  infallible.  The 
Apostles  never  speak  as  authorities  above  the 
community,  but  the  worth  of  the  epistles  lies  in 
the  very  fact  that  they  are  not  theological  science 
but  religious  utterances  from  the  bosom  of  the 
community  and  under  the  consciousness  of  the 
Christian  fellowship,  so  that  they  present  the  first 
impression  of  Christ  on  the  community.  Christ 
alone  is  an  original  source  of  revelation,  embracing 
all  He  says  "  in  the  interrelation  between  His  life's 
vocation  and  His  peculiar  relation  to  God  ".     That 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    369 

not  very  lucid  sentence  indicates  the  sense  in  which 
Christ  is  a  revelation.  He  maintains  Himself  in  a 
perfect  relation  to  God,  the  result  of  which  appears 
in  His  whole  life's  vocation.  This  vocation  was  to 
found  a  community  which  should  allow  themselves 
to  be  governed  by  God,  and  He  is  to  be  interpreted 
by  His  significance  for  this  community.  When, 
therefore,  we  speak  of  Him  as  the  Son  of  God  and 
the  Bearer  of  His  sovereignty,  we  are  not  dealing 
with  metaphysical  unknown  qualities,  but  with  the 
religious  recognition  that  the  forgiveness  and  grace 
necessary  for  entering  God's  Kingdom  are  through 
Him.  Belief  in  Christ,  pardon  of  sin  and  entering 
the  kingdom  go  together  and  derive  their  meaning 
from  each  other.  Christ  has  authority  to  forgive 
sins  for  the  sake  of  establishing  the  Kingdom  of 
God.  Christ  is  not,  however,  a  revelation  in  the 
sense  of  not  being  Himself  the  subject  of  religion, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  He  is  a  perfect  revelation  be- 
cause He  is  Himself  perfectly  the  subject  of  reli- 
gion. His  relation  to  the  Father  is  the  secret  of 
His  person  not  explicable  in  any  formula,  yet  it  is 
maintained  only  by  His  fulfilling  the  will  of  the 
Father.  The  unsurpassable  perfection  of  the  reve- 
lation of  Christ  is  in  making  God  known  as  love, 
in  showing  that  His  object,  and  therefore  the  ob- 
ject of  the  world,  is  the  Kingdom  of  God,  or,  in 
other  words,  the  organisation  of  love  realised  in  the 
new  religious  community. 

The  significance  of  Christ's  death  depends  on 
this  relation  to  the   community  of   believers.     It 

derives  its  meaning  from  His  resurrection  and  pre- 

24 


370     THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

sent  sovereignty  over  His  community.  Yet  to  ask 
whether  it  is  the  individual  or  the  community  that 
is  justified  is  to  draw  a  wrong  distinction.  It  is  the 
individual  who  is  justified,  but  his  justification  is 
in,  not  apart  from,  the  community.  Christ's  death 
is  always  compared  with  such  Old  Testament  sacri- 
fices as  presuppose  God's  covenant  mercy  towards 
the  people  of  His  choice.  It  is  the  crowning  act 
of  Christ's  obedience  in  the  task  of  establishing  this 
covenant  relationship,  and  its  significance  depends 
on  the  moral  perfection  of  His  character,  determin- 
ing Him  to  submit  His  life  to  the  Father  for  the 
good  of  men.  In  short  His  death  stands  for  obedi- 
ence in  His  vocation,  which  is  of  God's  appoint- 
ment. The  sin,  however,  with  which  it  deals  can 
only  be  ayvoia,  hardening  of  the  heart  and  dulling 
of  the  conscience,  not  dvo/xta  or  a-neiOeia,  obdurate 
wickedness.  That  is  to  say  it  can  only  appeal,  it 
cannot  compel. 

The  difference  between  Christ  and  the  Phari- 
sees turned  on  the  idea  of  righteousness.  The  Phari- 
sees laid  stress  on  ceremonial,  judged  men  legally, 
and  set  the  righteous  man  and  God  over  against 
one  another  with  mutual  rights.  Christ  took  the 
idea  of  God's  righteousness,  found  in  the  Psalpas 
and  elsewhere  in  the  Old  Testament,  as  fidelity  to 
His  covenant  relationship,  while  man's  righteous- 
ness was  steadfastness  of  mind  towards  this  suc- 
couring God.  All  the  New  Testament  writers 
represent  Christ's  idea  of  righteousness  as  active 
brotherly  love  cherished  in  the  power  of  the  Spirit 
and  on  the  grounds  of  faith.    Sanctification  follows 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    371 

and  is  essential,  yet  being  attained  in  this  way  it 
is  not  in  works,  but  in  one  life  work.  This  is  the 
righteousness  by  which  the  Kingdom  of  God  is  to 
be  wrought ;  and,  though  in  the  midst  of  earthly 
men  it  can  have  no  visible  sign,  it  is  there  for  all 
those  who  act  from  love  to  God  and  their  neigh- 
bour. 

Christ's  leading  thought,  the  Kingdom  of  God, 
does  not  dominate  the  epistles.  It  was  obscured 
by  the  expectation  of  His  immediate  return  and  by 
the  pressing  claims  of  the  society  established  for 
its  realisation.  Yet  none  of  the  Apostles  fail  to  in- 
sist on  that  rule  of  love  which  is  its  practical  reli- 
gious significance.  As  there  is  no  church,  so  there 
is  no  Apostle  great  enough  to  reflect  the  whole 
Christian  faith.  All  have  limitations  and  may  even 
take  up  erroneous  positions.  Paul's  purely  nega- 
tive view  of  the  Law  of  Moses,  for  example,  is 
controversial,  not  adequate.  Nor  is  it  Christ's. 
Yet  the  more  deeply  the  epistles  are  studied,  the 
more  clearly  Christ's  impress  upon  the  Apostles 
appears.  Paul,  for  instance,  removes  the  emphasis 
from  the  future  to  the  past.  Righteousness  from 
faith  is  with  him  a  relation  of  congruity  with  God 
resting  on  a  judgment  of  God  which  precedes  the 
righteous  life  and  makes  it  possible.  The  emphasis 
is  laid  upon  the  fundamental  relation  in  which 
sinners  are  placed  to  God  in  the  Christian  com- 
munity. But  this  emphasis  on  the  past  is  only  be- 
cause it  assures  the  future  accomplishment  of  the 
salvation  which  consists  in  the  blessedness  and  the 
tasks  of  the  Kingdom  of  God.    Paul's  idea  of  justi- 


372     THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

fication  is  the  exact  equivalent  of  John's  idea  of 
fellowship  with  the  Father  and  the  Son.  It  works 
peace,  giving  the  assurance  of  perseverance,  and  of 
profit  in  all  trial  ;  it  is  a  relation  to  the  world,  giv- 
ing us  an  end  beyond  it  which  is  yet  the  object  of 
it ;  and  it  is  a  relation  to  man,  teaching  us  to  hon- 
our his  destiny  and  at  the  same  time  to  see  that 
no  man  is  self-dependent  enough  to  impose  his 
judgment  on  us. 

In  the  third  volume,  wherein  Ritschl  sets  forth 
his  own  system  of  belief,  he  expands,  but  does  not 
always  make  plainer,  this  view  of  Christ  in  His 
vocation  as  the  Founder  of  the  Kingdom  of  God 
and  as  such  the  centre  of  all  revelation  of  God,  this 
insistence  that  the  society  of  the  Kingdom  is  an 
invisible  community  of  the  souls  who  obey  the 
Father's  rule  of  love,  and  this  idea  that  to  take  our 
place  in  this  moral  kingdom  is  the  sole  way  of 
receiving  the  revelation. 

Christ  is  Divine  in  two  senses,  as  the  Revealing 
Word,  the  perfect  Revealer  of  God,  and  as  Lord 
over  the  community  through  being  Lord  over  the 
world,  through  having,  that  is,  the  secret  of  God's 
purpose  in  the  world  and,  therefore,  in  men's  lives. 
This  divinity  is  not,  however,  to  be  interpreted  by 
any  doctrine  of  His  person,  such  as  that  of  the  two 
natures,  or  from  any  unknown  quality  behind,  of 
which  He  has  emptied  Himself,  or  which  He  keeps 
in  abeyance.  But  He  is  Divine  because  He  is  the 
perfect  embodiment  of  God's  will  of  love.  The 
criteria  of  His  Godhead  are  grace  and  truth,  not 
omnipotence,  omnipresence,  omniscience.     "  In  so 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    373 

far  as  God  is  spirit,  will  and  love,  He  can  be  efifec- . 
tive  in  a  human  life,  but  not  in  so  far  as  He  makes 
and  rules  the  world."  Christ  is  the  personal  will  of 
God  as  essentially  love.  He  incarnates  the  heart 
of  God.  The  power  He  has  is  only  what  we  all 
may  have,  in  so  far  as  we  are  one  with  God.  He 
is  Lord  over  the  world  solely  because  God  knows 
Him  and  He  knows  God.  And  the  statement  that 
the  world  was  created  by  Him,  is  to  be  similarly 
interpreted.  It  means  that  in  the  eternal  idea  of 
Him  in  God's  mind  the  world's  goal  was  set.  His 
death,  therefore,  sums  up  the  religious  worth  of 
His  person,  because  it  is  the  final  proof  of  the 
obedience  and  patience  which  showed  in  face  of 
all  trial  the  oneness  with  God  which  overcomes 
the  world. 

Knowledge  and  power  still  come  to  us  from  the 
Founder  of  the  spiritual  relationship  into  which 
through  Him  we  have  entered,  but  in  what  manner 
is  left  doubtful.  Is  it  only  through  the  influences  of 
His  historical  life,  or  has  He  present  relations  with 
the  believer?  Every  operation  of  Christ,  Eitschl 
says,  must  have  its  standard  in  His  historical  life. 
Some  consider  that  to  be  a  denial  of  anything  but  a 
historical  influence.  But  if  present  operations  need 
a  standard,  they  would  seem  to  exist.  Ritschl 
would  seem  only  to  be  guarding  against  the  very 
real  danger  of  replacing  the  Christ  who  conquers 
by  suffering  by  an  exalted  Christ  the  wielder  of 
might,  of  an  earthly  Christ  who  is  spiritual  by  a 
heavenly  Christ  who  is  very  material.  Further, 
he  says   Christ  is  still  Head  of   the  community. 


374      THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

That  relation  could  hardly  be  maintained  without 
present  operations.  The  careful  way  in  which  he 
guards  his  statement  is  not  to  minimise  this  rela- 
tionship, but  to  guarantee  that  it  is  understood  as 
a  free,  personal  relationship,  and  not  as  an  infusion 
of  power  we  cannot  reject.  This  leads  him  to  in- 
sist upon  the  use  of  the  means  which  allow  room 
both  for  Christ's  personality  and  for  ours.  The 
same  interest,  moreover,  appears  in  his  doctrine  of 
the  Holy  Spirit.  It  is  boundlessly  vague,  but  it 
insists  on  the  one  point  of  practical  importance, 
that  the  Spirit's  influence  is  free  and  personal, 
educative  and  helpful,  through  mind  and  heart,  and 
no  mere  pouring  in  of  love  and  power,  or  any 
other  Divine  gift.  God's  revelation,  therefore, 
must  in  a  sense  be  man's  work  as  well  as  God's 
gift,  not  partly  one  and  partly  the  other,  but  both 
at  once.  Christ's  significance  would  seem  to  be 
that  He  meets  this  requirement,  being  at  once  a 
perfect  revelation  of  God's  will  and  of  man's 
task. 

This  will  is  the  Kingdom  of  God  which  also  is 
not  less  an  achievement  for  being  a  gift.  It  is  not 
partly  one  and  partly  the  other,  but  both  at  the 
same  time.  As  God's  end  is  to  make  us  free.  He 
can  only  work  through  our  freedom.  And  this 
freedom  for  Ritschl  is  essentially  a  matter  of  the 
will.  It  is  a  choice  with  real  issues.  This  affects 
his  whole  view  of  truth.  The  choice  of  the  will 
has  a  sacredness  into  which  God  Himself  will  not 
intrude.  All  opposition  to  good  springing  from 
ignorance  God  will  patiently  overcome,  but  even 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    375 

He  must  accept  an  obdurate  choice  of  evil.  All 
history,  he  thinks,  would  be  unreal,  if  there  were 
election  of  individuals.  History  is  not  a  settled 
process,  but  a  great  struggle  in  which  actual  and 
uncertain  issues  are  decided.  In  respect  of 
having  things  undetermined  in  it,  time,  he  main- 
tains, must  exist  for  God  as  for  man.  God's 
blessedness  is  not  in  having  everything  settled 
beforehand,  but  in  the  feeling  of  His  eternity 
— apparently  the  final  security  of  His  purpose. 
Revelation  would  seem  to  be  simply  God's  side  of 
this  task  of  freedom. 

In  respect  of  freedom,  Ritschl  says,  Christianity 
is  not  a  circle  with  one  centre,  but  an  ellipse  with 
two  foci.  They  are  the  redemption  of  the  indi- 
vidual and  the  Kingdom  of  God,  and  the  one  in- 
volves the  other.  We  cannot  have  a  kingdom  of 
freedom  unless  it  is  fashioned  out  of  souls  made 
free ;  we  cannot  have  freedom  in  God  unless  we 
realise  our  liberty  in  a  Kingdom  of  God.  Christ's 
work  is  redemptive  in  both  senses,  bringing  pardon 
and  a  sense  of  victory  to  individuals,  and  uniting 
them  into  a  society  to  accomplish  God's  will  of 
love.  This  accords  with  Schleiermacher's  view 
that  Christ  is  the  completion  of  creation,  that  with 
Christianity  the  real  task  of  working  out  God's 
purpose  in  the  world  begins.  But  instead  of  the 
easy  explanation  that  it  is  by  way  of  process, 
Ritschl  finds  the  significance  of  Christ  precisely  in 
the  fact  that  through  Him  we  can  see  how  it  is  by 
way  of  providence  and  freedom. 

To  begin  with,  it  is  a  work  of  reconciling,  not 


376     THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

of  any  kind  of  constraining.  Keconciliation  is  the 
fountain  of  the  religious  sense  of  freedom.  It  is 
accomplished  through  justification,  which  is  de- 
scribed as  a  synthetic  judgment  of  God,  in  con- 
trast to  the  Catholic  view  that  it  is  God's  estimate 
of  what  will  happen  through  the  grace  poured  into 
a  man,  and  the  Pietistic  view  that  it  is  God's 
estimate  of  what  faith  will  ultimately  grow  to. 
These  are  both  described  as  analytic  judgments, 
because  if  they  add  anything  to  our  state  it  is 
through  a  mechanical  operation.  But  justification 
is  a  real  change  of  relation  to  God,  so  important 
for  our  religious  sense  of  freedom  that  it  alone 
would  make  Christianity  a  religion  and  not  merely 
a  morality.  Justification  is  not  to  be  understood 
as  altering  the  consequences  of  sin,  or  as  freeing 
us  from  the  evil  which  accompanies  it,  or  as  taking 
our  good  intentions  for  performance,  or  as  judging 
the  promise  of  faith  as  though  it  were  already 
realised,  but  as  that  pardon  which  recognises  sin 
and,  in  spite  of  it,  restores  fellowship.  Sin  being  a 
perverted  relation  to  God,  justification  is  a  restora- 
tion of  the  right  relation.  Not  by  the  removal  of 
imperfection,  but  in  spite  of  imperfection,  the  sinner 
enters  into  communion  with  God.  In  this  sense 
it  is  a  removal  of  guilt,  which  is  not  liability  to 
punishment,  but  a  real  disturbance  of  the  relation 
of  the  will  to  its  moral  destiny  and  to  God  who 
is  the  representative  of  that  destiny  in  the  world- 
order.  Like  pardon  among  men,  it  is  a  cancelling 
which  at  once  maintains  the  honour  of  the  person 
who  has  been  offended  and  restores  fellowship  with 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    377 

the  offender.  And  reconciliation  is  only  a  more 
positive  assertion  than  justification  that  a  sinner 
is  brought  into  harmony  with  God's  cherished 
purpose. 

E-econciliation  has  its  demonstration,  not  in  a 
feeling,  but  in  a  practical  attitude.  It  is  reconcilia- 
tion, not  with  God  in  the  heavens,  but  with  God 
in  our  lives.  The  attempt  to  appropriate  justifica- 
tion by  isolated  and  changing  feelings  exposes  us 
to  miserable  uncertainties  and  sorrowful  reactions. 
The  true  demonstration  is  the  possession  of  eternal 
life.  The  evidence  of  that  again  is  victory  over  the 
world.  In  being  reconciled  to  God  we  are  recon- 
ciled to  His  purpose  and  find  it  to  be  the  end  which 
the  whole  world  only  serves  as  means.  Wherefore, 
the  world  cannot  but  be  our  servant,  and  we  can- 
not but  be  its  master.  Thus,  apparently,  we  pos- 
sess our  blessedness  as  God  does,  in  the  confidence 
that  our  end,  being  God's,  is  ultimately  secure. 
The  right  assurance  of  salvation  is  faith  in  God's 
providence  and  patience  under  divinely  appointed 
trials — the  only  secrets  for  victory  over  the  world. 

This  the  true  significance  of  justification,  Eitschl 
maintains,  has  been  obscured  by  the  great  error  of 
regarding  faith  in  God's  providence  as  a  truth  of 
natural  theology.  It  is  never  a  real  and  energetic 
belief  except  through  reconciliation  to  God  and  to 
God's  purpose  in  the  world,  and,  even  the  vague 
general  acceptance  only  shows  that  for  a  great 
many  people  their  science  means  less  and  their 
Christianity  more  than  they  suppose.  Yet,  in 
spite   of   this   error,   the   Protestant  assertion   of 


378      THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

justification  by  faith  has  secured  a  practical  indepen- 
dence which  is  in  marked  contrast  to  the  dependence 
Catholicism  imposes.  By  conceiving  justification 
as  the  direct  gift  of  ability,  as  something  poured 
into  us,  we  reach  a  mechanical,  not  a  spiritual, 
relation  to  God.  But  if  justification  is  the  restora- 
tion of  our  religious  relation  to  God,  our  religious 
dependence  becomes  the  ground  of  our  personal 
independence,  for  it  is  a  relation  which  sets  us  free 
both  from  the  self-seeking  and  world-loving  im- 
pulses and  from  man  and  man's  ordinances.  How- 
ever much  we  may  find  it  our  duty  to  obey  human 
regulations,  whosoever  is  not  in  the  personal  sanc- 
tuary of  his  heart  independent  of  man,  has  not 
known  the  joy  of  reconciliation  to  God. 

This  focus  of  the  ellipse  requires  the  other  to 
correspond  to  it.  Personal  freedom  requires  a 
kingdom  of  the  free.  "  Justification  belongs  to 
individuals  only  as  they  attach  themselves  by  faith 
in  the  Gospel  to  the  community  of  faith,  that  terri- 
tory which  is  governed  by  the  forgiveness  of  sins." 
As  the  practical  way  of  assuring  ourselves  of  God's 
grace  is  to  have  victory  over  the  world,  the  prac- 
tical way  of  entering  into  communion  with  God  is 
to  belong  to  the  society  of  those  who  seek  to  ac- 
complish His  purpose.  This  relationship  gives 
God's  pardon  its  enduring  efficacy,  even  as  return- 
ing into  the  bosom  of  the  family  would  give  efficacy 
to  a  father's  pardon.  Thus  the  person  who  is  re- 
conciled to  God  is  reconciled  to  two  things — to 
those  among  whom  he  is  to  seek  God's  purpose, 
and  to  the  life  wherein  he  is  to  seek  it.     Where- 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    379 

fore  he  ranges  himself  in  the  community,  and  not 
above  it ;  and  he  exercises  his  freedom  in  life,  and 
not  apart  from  it. 

Here  again  we  have  a  hint  of  how  religious 
truth  is  made  up  of  God's  revelation  on  one  side 
and  man's  judgment  of  worth  on  the  other.  The 
perfect  realisation  of  the  Kingdom  of  God  would, 
Ritschl  says,  be  the  fall  revelation  of  God.  The 
essential  thing  in  the  revelation  of  God  is  not  any 
unfolding  of  His  secrets,  but  the  manifestation  of 
His  will.  As  that  will  ought  also  to  be  our  will, 
and  as  our  emancipation  is  in  doing  it,  we  find  the 
evidence  of  God's  revelation  in  the  exaltation  of 
our  true  personal  well-being.  "  All  religion  is  an 
exposition  of  the  course  of  the  world  in  such  a  way 
that  the  exalted  Person  who  rules  in  it  or  above 
it  sustains  or  maintains  for  the  personal  spirit 
its  worth  against  the  constraints  set  by  nature 
or  by  the  natural  operation  of  human  society."^ 
No  inference  from  the  world  can  meet  this  need. 
Nothing  can  meet  it  but  a  revelation,  an  unfolding 
of  the  end  for  which  God  rules  the  world,  and  for 
which  He  will  help  us  to  rule  it.  Of  that  revela- 
tion nothing  can  be  a  satisfactory  proof  but  the 
task  of  using  it  to  accomplish  this  victory.  Per- 
haps we  should  express  Ritschl's  opinion  by  saying 
we  are  sure  we  have  found  God's  will,  and  there- 
fore this  revelation,  when  our  religious  trust  and 
our  moral  duty  are  wholly  reconciled. 

Philosophy,  which  can  only  provide  us  with  an 
inference  from  the  world,  is  of  no  avail  to  help  us 
^  Theologie  und  Metaphysik,  p.  9. 


380      THEOLOGY  OF  EXPERIENCE  AND  RITSCHL'S 

to  rule  the  world.  But  to  help  us  to  rule  the  world 
is  religion's  supreme  concern.  Wherefore  we  must 
not  test  religion  by  philosophy,  but  by  adopting 
God's  end  and  by  showing  that  we  are  enabled  to 
use  the  world  for  it.  Thus  we  recognise  Jesus 
Christ  as  Divine,  not  when  we  have  given  a  meta- 
physical account  of  His  nature,  but  when  we  know 
ourselves  raised  by  Him  to  kingship — meaning 
lordship  over  the  world,  and  to  priesthood — mean- 
ing undisturbed  communion  with  God. 

Seeing  we  are  thus  brought  directly  into  con- 
tact with  God's  revelation  and  are  enabled  at  all 
times  to  test  its  spiritual  value,  we  are  free,  so  that 
no  human  creed  can  be  authoritative  for  us.  We 
are  not  even  dependent  upon  the  Fathers.  Herein 
the  very  significance  of  Christ's  person  and  work 
appears.  They  enable  us  to  go  behind  the  Fathers 
and  all  other  authorities.  The  Fathers  also  were 
influenced  by  the  atmosphere  in  which  they  lived. 
In  their  day,  as  in  ours,  the  Divine  revelation  pene- 
trated through  a  human  medium.  From  Greek 
Philosophy  and  the  organisation  of  the  Ancient 
State  they  imported  two  ideas  into  Christianity, 
which  no  doubt  were  links  with  minds  educated 
under  those  influences,  but  which  are  not  organic 
parts  of  Christianity,  which  have  led  to  much  cor- 
ruption, and  which  to-day  hinder  us  in  reaching 
the  minds  of  our  contemporaries.  The  Atonement 
was  interpreted,  not  through  the  idea  of  the  family 
and  so  through  the  Fatherhood  of  God,  as  it  is  in 
the  New  Testament,  but  after  the  analogy  of  the 
Ancient  State  and  through  the  idea  of  God  as  the 


JUSTIFICATION  AND  RECONCILIATION    381 

Supreme  Ruler.  Thus  the  conception  of  a  Father's 
pardon  was  changed  into  the  idea  of  State  condona- 
tion. Then  the  Divinity  of  Christ  was  interpreted, 
not  through  His  religious  worth  as  the  Revelation 
of  God,  the  Founder  of  His  Kingdom  and  the  Head 
of  His  community,  but  by  a  Neo-Platonic  abstract 
idea  of  the  Logos,  a  conception  entirely  different 
from  the  Logos  in  John,  representing  nothing  but 
an  abstract  idea  behind  the  plane  of  reality.  In 
the  same  way  God  was  conceived,  not  as  a  Person 
revealed  in  love,  but  as  an  abstraction  from  all 
existence,  a  qualityless  something  with  which  our 
souls  can  only  come  into  contact  by  a  mystical  sub- 
limation beyond  thought  and  action.  Hence  arose 
the  error  of  salvation  by  mysterious  dogmas  and 
the  mystical  piety  which  regards  God's  operations 
as  a  kind  of  material  force. 


LECTURE  IX 

METHOD  AND  KESULTS 


Books  op  Eeferenoe 

Of  adverse  criticisms  use  has  been  made  in  this  lecture  of  Die 
ritschl'sche  Theologie,  E.  A.  Lipsius,  1888,  Die  ritschl'sche 
Theologie  kritisch  beleuchtet,  0.  Pfleiderer,  1891,  Die 
kirchliche  Bedeutung  der  Theologie  A.  Bitschls,  Fr.  H.  E. 
Frank,  1888,  Die  Principien  der  ritschV schen  Theologie 
und  ihr  Werth,  L.  Lemme,  1891.  Of  works  on  the  philo- 
sophical aspects  of  Eitschl's  teaching,  Les  Origines  his- 
toriques  de  la  ThMogie  de  Ritschl,  Henri  Schoen,  1893, 
and  Ueber  Werthurtheile,  1895,  by  Otto  Eitschl,  and  of 
English  works  in  addition  to  those  mentioned  above,  The 
Christian  View  of  God  and  the  World,  1893,  and  Bitschlian- 
ism,  Expository  and  Critical  Essays,  by  Professor  Orr. 


LECTURE  IX 

METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

It  is  difficult  to  pass  a  calm  judgment  upon  the 
theology  of  Ritschl,  to  acknowledge  its  contribution 
to  the  task  of  humanity  while  seeing  even  in  its  de- 
fects an  indication  of  the  task  of  the  future,  be- 
cause we  have  now  reached  the  limit  of  what  may 
be  treated  as  history  and  are  passing  into  the  per- 
turbed territory  of  present  theological  controversy. 
An  estimate  of  Ritschl  in  his  due  historical  propor- 
tion may,  therefore,  be  impossible.  But  just  because 
he  is  the  most  important  link  between  the  past  and 
the  present,  we  must  conclude  by  summing  up  the 
position  as  he  left  it,  with  as  much  fairness  as  is  at 
our  disposal. 

With  the  abundant  inconsistency  in  detail  of 
which  many  of  his  critics  accuse  him  we  are  not 
concerned,  not  only  because  it  is  easy  to  find  such 
inconsistency  in  any  writer  who  departs  from  the 
beaten  track,  but  because  that  is  not  an  aspect  of 
the  matter  with  which  we  are  called  to  deal.  There 
is  also  a  kind  of  criticism,  as  easy  as  it  is  futile,  to 
which  Ritschl  has  been  frequently  subjected,  which 
we  must  try  to  avoid.     A  system  is  compared  with 

an  eclectic  summary  of  all  aspects  of  truth  and  the 

(385)  25 


386  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

author  is  chidden  for  the  very  concentration  upon 
what  has  stirred  his  own  soul  which  gives  him  sig- 
nificance. Such  generalised  criticism  is  specially 
unjust  to  E-itschl  whose  individuality,  force  and 
concentration  upon  one  issue,  whose  limitations  if 
you  will,  make  him  for  so  many  a  teacher  and  also 
somewhat  of  an  apostle,  so  that  he  has  founded  a 
school  in  a  sense  that  no  other  modern  theologian, 
not  even  Schleiermacher,  has  done — a  school,  more- 
over, which  has  not  restricted  its  interest  to  writing 
theological  treatises.  Nor  is  it  necessary  to  find  a 
great  many  things  to  praise  and  blame,  for  both 
the  force  and  the  weakness  of  the  system  spring 
from  one  root — its  reaction  from  Romanticism. 

The  defect  of  a  reaction  is  usually  sought 
merely  in  what  is  called  the  svv^ing  of  the  pendulum, 
in  an  undue  disregard  for  the  aspect  of  truth  which 
has  been  too  much  exalted  and  an  undue  insistence 
upon  the  aspect  of  it  which  has  been  ignored. 
There  is,  however,  usually  at  the  same  time  some 
inability  to  stand  apart  from  the  very  movement 
against  which  it  revolts.  The  man  who  is  strong 
enough  to  create  a  reaction  from  the  movement 
v/hich  governs  the  fashion  of  his  time,  must  not  only 
himself  have  gone  through  it,  but  must  have  gone 
through  it  with  enthusiasm  and  vigour.  Conse- 
quently he  is  precisely  the  man  who  carries  unex- 
pected and  inconsistent  marks  of  it,  so  that  his 
system  may  harbour  contradictions,  as  well  as  be 
inhospitable  to  certain  aspects  of  the  truth. 

This  eff'ect,  not  of  his  own  position  but  of  the 
position  he  opposed,  appears  in  liitschl  chiefly  in 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  387 

his  attitude  towards  physical  and  moral  law.  Phy- 
sical law  he  conceives  as  the  ordering  of  a  world 
designed  in  God's  ultimate  purpose  to  be  a  material 
scaffolding  for  the  spiritual  Kingdom  of  God ; 
moral  law  he  describes  as  the  organisation  of 
the  ends  of  this  kingdom,  the  organisation,  there- 
fore, of  the  supreme  law  of  love.  What  is  love  at 
the  centre,  he  says,  becomes  law  at  the  circum- 
ference. As  the  moral  law  is  nearer  God's  final 
purpose,  being  the  direct  organisation  of  it,  we 
should  expect  to  find  the  moral  system  less  tolerant 
of  interference,  because  more  profoundly  rooted  in 
the  nature  of  God  than  the  system  of  physical  law, 
which  on  the  hypothesis  has  its  ground  only  in 
utility.  Yet  E-itschl's  general  attitude  leaves  ex- 
actly the  opposite  impression.  Physical  law  seems 
to  suggest  rather  the  idea  of  fixed  process  than  of 
the  purposes  of  will,  whereas  moral  law  is  so  fluid 
as  almost  to  suggest  that  God  has  no  fixity  of 
operation.  Such  an  attitude  can  only  be  due  to  the 
subtle  influences  of  the  pantheism  he  so  strongly 
opposed. 

The  effect  appears  first  of  all  in  a  wholly  vague 
treatment  of  miracle.  With  the  old  significance  of 
miracle  as  the  seal  of  a  word  of  God,  alien  to  man 
and  only  to  be  confirmed  by  exceptional  external 
proof,  Ritschl  of  course  is  not  concerned.  His 
view  of  faith  does  not  require  miracle  to  lean  upon, 
and  it  is  his  merit  that  he  has  tried  to  base  it  on 
personal  and  strictly  religious  grounds.  But  is  his 
view  of  the  freedom  upon  which  he  bases  faith 
equally  independent  of  miracle  ?     If  he  had  really 


388  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

rid  himself  of  the  whole  pantheistic  feeling  towards 
life,  of  the  atmosphere  as  well  as  of  the  system,  and 
if  in  feeling  as  much  as  in  theory  he  had  set  free- 
dom at  the  heart  of  things,  he  could  scarcely  have 
avoided  a  frame  of  mind  to  which  miracle  would 
hardly  seem  strange.  Like  Rothe,  along  with  a 
perfect  readiness  to  discuss  and  reject  any  miracle, 
he  would  have  cherished  the  buoyant  faith  that 
miracle  is  the  likeliest  of  all  things  in  a  world  so 
marvellous  and  with  a  God  so  near.  True  he  never 
denies  the  possibility  or  even  the  reality  of  miracle, 
and  he  even  speaks  continually  as  if  the  resurrection 
of  Christ  were  an  essential  of  faith,  or  at  all  events 
that  it  was  so  to  the  Early  Church.  But  the 
question  is  always  remotely  touched  upon  and  the 
general  impression  left  upon  the  mind  is  of  a  view 
of  nature  more  akin  to  a  fixed  process  than  to 
means  in  the  hands  of  a  wise  and  loving  Will. 

The  doctrine  of  Christianity  most  affected  is  the 
estimate  of  Christ's  worth.  Christ  has  for  us, 
Kitschl  says,  the  worth  of  Godhead.  But  this 
worth,  he  proceeds  to  explain,  only  refers  to  God's 
attributes  of  love,  and  not  to  His  attributes  of 
power.  In  one  way  that  is  a  just  distinction,  yet, 
in  another,  quite  apparently,  the  system  labours  to 
recognise  in  Christ  might  as  well  as  grace,  or  rather 
to  find  that  in  Him  grace  is  might.  His  worth  is 
found  in  manifesting  the  Kingdom  of  God  as  God's 
personal  end,  and  in  enabling  us  to  conquer  the 
world  for  it.  The  final  issue,  therefore,  is  victory 
over  the  world.  The  means  for  accomplishing 
this  victory  are  said  to  be  fidelity  in  our  Divinely 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  389 

appointed  tasks  and  patience  under  trial.  Nor 
would  any  one  wish  to  deny  the  importance  for  our 
victory  of  Christ's  manifestation  of  this  faithful- 
ness and  patience  in  His  life,  and  of  His  perfect 
display  of  them  in  His  death.  Yet,  for  the  Apostles 
at  all  events,  it  was  not  the  death  of  Christ  but  the 
transfiguring  of  it  by  the  resurrection  which  created 
the  joyous,  triumphant  belief  in  a  providence  of 
God  which  makes  all  the  tasks  and  trials  of  life  the 
tribulation  whereby  we  enter  the  Kingdom.  In 
raising  Christ  from  the  dead  after  He  had  perfectly 
fulfilled  His  vocation  by  His  death  God  seemed 
to  them  to  have  made  Christ  a  revelation  of  His 
power  as  well  as  of  His  love,  a  revelation  that  love 
is  power,  a  revelation  that  it  is  meekness  which  in- 
herits the  earth.  We  may  not  say  either  that  Ritschl 
rejects  the  resurrection  or  that  we  could  not  de- 
rive much  help  from  Christ's  example  of  suffering 
patience  without  any  belief  in  a  resurrection  except 
beyond  the  grave,  but  considering  how  the  test  of 
everything  is  found  in  victory  over  the  world  and 
how  important  this  belief  has  been  for  that  victory, 
we  feel  it  should  not  have  been  dealt  with  soelusively. 
Either  what  it  means  for  us,  or  how  we  can  afford 
to  do  without  it,  should  have  been  clearly  shown, 
for  manifestly  the  statement  that  Christ  has  for  us 
the  worth  of  Godhead  depends,  at  all  events  for  the 
feelings  we  attach  to  it,  on  whether  He  conquered 
death  as  well  as  sin. 

In  contrast  to  this  impression  of  fixity  in  the 
system  of  physical  law  is  the  impression  of  fluidity 
in  the  system  of  moral  law.     The  influence  of  the 


390  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

Greek  idea  of  the  State  no  doubt  was  very  power- 
ful ill  the  minds  of  the  Gentile  converts  to  Christ- 
ianity, and  no  doubt  also  converts  from  heathenism 
imported  then,  as  they  do  now,  many  corruptions 
from  the  religions  in  which  they  had  been  brought 
up.  There  was  an  idea  of  God  which  made  men 
think  He  required  to  be  appeased,  which  was  pagan 
not  Christian,  and  a  Father's  pardon  was  too  much 
obscured  by  the  civic  idea  of  State  condonation. 
In  the  process  true  Christian  freedom  was  under- 
mined and  the  true  Christian  faith  perverted.  But 
after  Kitschl's  desert  in  exposing  the  roots  of  these 
evils  has  been  acknowledged  and  even  warmly  ap- 
preciated, something  still  remains  which  is  not 
the  result  of  a  mistaken  theology,  but  of  man's 
deepest  religious  need.  There  is  a  sense  in  which 
men  feel  they  need  to  be  reconciled  to  the  law  of 
God  which  they  have  broken  as  well  as  to  God 
Himself.  If  freedom  involves  the  reality  of  choice 
which  Ritschl  maintains,  it  must  involve  an  amaz- 
ing relation  to  the  moral  order  in  which  alone  it 
can  find  its  sphere  and  which  yet  it  is  in  a  position 
to  disturb.  Reconciliation  to  God  must  in  that 
case  involve  more  than  the  recognition  of  His 
honour,  and  Ritschl's  failure  to  recognise  that  more 
is  involved  in  his  premises  only  marks  his  inability 
to  rid  himself  of  the  idea  of  sin  as  the  mere  neces- 
sary shadow  of  evolution,  which  he  had  inherited 
from  Romanticism. 

Frank  finds  the  error  in  regarding  love  as  God's 
supreme  attribute,  and  His  Kingdom  as  His  per- 
sonal end.       Love,  he  maintains,   is  only  one  of 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  391 

many  equal  attributes  and  the  Kingdom  only  one 
of  many  ends/  Justice,  therefore,  must  be  set  by 
itself  and  not  be  subordinated  to  love,  and  justifica- 
tion must  be  considered  by  itself  and  not  merely  in 
reference  to  the  Kingdom  of  God.  But  Frank  can 
hardly  be  right  in  maintaining  that  the  Scripture 
writers  would  say,  God  is  justice,  in  the  way  in 
which  they  would  say,  God  is  love,  and  they  surely 
regard  His  Kingdom  as  in  a  very  special  sense  the 
end  of  all  His  operations.  The  belief  that  love  is 
supreme  in  God  is,  moreover,  necessary  for  our 
freedom  on  the  one  hand  and  for  any  sure  estimate 
of  what  is  Divine  on  the  other,  while  the  equality 
of  justice  with  love  is  not  necessary  for  maintaining 
that  solemn  sense  of  the  majesty  of  the  moral  order 
which  made  it  for  Kant  the  su^^reme  object  of 
reverence.  The  conviction  that  God  is  supremely 
and  wholly  and  exclusively  love  should  not,  if  we 
think  with  Ritschl  that  it  is  a  love  which  cherishes 
man's  freedom,  make  us  less  able  to  consider  with 
Butler,  "  what  it  is  for  us  creatures,  moral  agents, 
presumptuously  to  introduce  that  confusion  and 
misery  into  the  Kingdom  of  God  which  mankind 
have  in  fact  introduced ".  Wherefore,  however 
many  difficulties  may  surround  the  conception, 
Christ,  if  He  is  to  have  for  us  the  full  worth  of 
Godhead,  must  have  something  of  cosmic  as  well 
as  of  individual  significance,  a  relation  to  the  resti- 
tution of  the  moral  order  as  well  as  of  the  erring 
person. 

But  the  theology  of  Ritschl  is  also  a  reaction  in 

^  Geschichte  und  Kritik  der  neioeren  Theologie,  p.  310  ff. 


392  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

the  sense  of  being  an  extreme  revolt  from  a  pre- 
vailing error.  In  his  antagonism  to  the  pantheism  of 
Komanticism  and  the  artistic  intuition  upon  which 
it  rested,  he  fails  to  recognise  the  necessary  mystery 
in  human  life  and  to  do  justice  to  the  intuitions 
by  which  we  reach  out  towards  it.  The  warmth  of 
his  righteous  and  necessary  opposition  also  caused 
his  chief  limitation.  Against  every  form  of  pan- 
theism, and  especially  against  that  mysticism  which 
teaches  that  "  the  life  of  God  works  in  the  believer 
at  the  cost  of  moral  freedom,"  E-itschl  contended 
with  all  his  vigour  and  almost  with  his  last  breath, 
bringing  to  bear  against  it  not  only  general  argu- 
ments but  vast  historical  studies.  He  saw  in  it  a 
pantheism  which  sapped  the  moral  vigour  and  left 
men  exposed  to  the  fluctuations  of  feeling  which 
cause  a  baseless  and  hurtful  self-approbation  when 
exalted,  and  an  equally  hurtful  depression  when 
the  reaction  inevitably  follows.  It  seemed  to  him 
to  rob  Christianity  generally  of  its  right  to  be  called 
a  religion  of  the  freedom  of  the  children  of  God. 
Every  form  of  mysticism,  mediaeval  and  modern. 
Catholic  and  Protestant,  treats  men  as  mere  re- 
ceptacles for  God's  grace,  fails  to  recognise  that 
God  regards  both  our  personality  and  His  own,  and 
finally  introduces  unspiritual  elements  into  God's 
service  and  worship.  Nor  can  it  be  seriously  ques- 
tioned that  both  experience  and  history  afiFord 
corroboration  of  Hitschl's  contention.  In  view  of 
dangers  so  great  there  is  much  to  be  said  even  for 
Kitschl's  refusal  to  discuss  certain  mysteries  which 
lead  in  the  direction  of  this  pernicious  mysticism. 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  393 

He  will  not  enter,  for  example,  on  such  a  question 
as  how  a  man  is  laid  hold  of  by  the  Holy  Spirit,  but 
insists  that  our  task  is  to  verify  life  in  the  Holy 
Spirit,  by  calling  on  God  as  our  Father,  by  acting 
with  love  and  joy,  meekness  and  self-control,  and 
by  guarding  against  party  spirit  and  cherishing  a 
spirit  of  union.  A  certain  type  of  faith  needs 
nothing  so  much  as  this  objective  and  practical 
attitude,  and  Kitschl's  insistence  on  it  is  no  small 
service.  Nor  is  he  wrong  in  maintaining  that  the 
revelation  of  God  is  mainly  concerned  with  this 
practical  relationship  and  has  nothing  to  do  with 
relations  to  God  which  have  no  meaning  for  our 
thought.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a  mystical  element 
in  religion  which  has  been  too  general  and  per- 
sistent, and  is  too  vitally  connected  with  the  prac- 
tical religious  life  to  be  explained  as  due  solely  to 
an  error  of  the  early  Christian  teachers  who  had 
been  nurtured  on  Neo-Platonism.  Neo-Platonism 
no  doubt  was  a  vast  influence,  not  always  for  good, 
but  even  that  only  shows  that  it  appealed  to  some 
important  element  in  human  nature. 

In  regard  to  the  religious  intuition  by  which 
this  mysticism  is  nourished,  Ritschl  had  all 
Kant's  sense  of  its  danger,  and  he  had  more  than 
Kant's  justification,  for  he  had  lived  to  see  what 
Kant  had  only  predicted.  The  pride  of  the  re- 
ligious artist  had  disturbed  and  perverted  Christian 
humility,  while  the  easy  confidence  it  gave  of  being 
able  to  soar  to  truth  made  men  impatient  of  the 
travail  and  turmoil  of  seeking  truth.  Ritschl's  in- 
sistence on  the  more  arduous  way  seems  to  some 


394  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

of  his  followers  akin  to  Bacon's  insistence  on  the 
necessity  of  experiment  for  science.  Nor  is  the 
claim  without  a  measure  of  truth.  Yet,  just  as 
Bacon  spoke  as  if  science  needed  nothing  but  ex- 
periment, as  if  theory  and  intuition  and  all  the  uses 
of  the  scientific  imagination  were  mere  obstacles  to 
true  science,  forgetting  that  no  experiment  is  ever 
more  than  a  test  of  what  has  already  been  antici- 
pated, Ritschl  speaks  as  if  the  religious  intuition 
had  never  done  anything  but  hinder  the  true  re- 
ligious method  of  reaching  faith,  as  if  it  had  never 
contributed  anything  but  a  misleading  standard  of 
the  harmonious,  resulting  in  the  errors  of  pan- 
theism and  an  empty  mysticism.  But  though  the 
vision  of  the  truth  which  is  content  with  its  own 
artistic  satisfaction  is  an  excuse  for  not  treading 
the  arduous  way,  faith  lives  by  intuitions,  and  there 
is  nothing  faith  can  verify  unless  it  is  prepared  to 
follow  them.  The  man  who  does  great  things  in 
religion,  as  in  life,  is  the  man  who  has  large  visions 
and  who  is  prepared  to  realise  them  in  the  sweat 
of  his  brow. 

Now  the  man  who  follows  his  intuitions  and 
anticipations  will  never  get  rid  of  mystery,  more 
particularly  if  religion  is  a  matter  primarily  of  the 
will  and  not  of  the  intellect.  A  mystery,  if  it  is 
only  an  intellectual  mystery,  must  either  be  solved 
or  ignored,  but,  if  it  besets  the  will,  it  must  be 
endured.  The  mystery  of  the  road  we  must  travel 
over  is  not  a  mere  sense  of  ignorance.  It  is  an 
important  element  in  our  calculation.  Take,  for 
example,    the   mystery   of  the    person   of   Christ. 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  395 

Ritschl  says  its  origin  is  a  mystery,  and  as  a  mys- 
tery he  leaves  it  alone.  Were  we  solely  concerned 
with  an  intellectual  problem,  that  would  be  the  one 
reasonable  course  of  action.  But  Christ's  practical 
worth  as  a  Revelation  of  God  and  as  the  Founder 
of  His  Kingdom  involves  that  we  must  believe  and 
obey  under  the  sense  of  passing  over  the  infinite,  a 
sense  which,  however  little  it  may  be  explicable  to 
our  thought,  continues  to  be  an  essential  part  of 
our  feeling  and  of  our  life.  Though  the  doctrine 
of  Christ's  two  natures  may  be  no  adequate  expres- 
sion of  the  truth,  and  may  add  nothing  to  our 
thought  and  little  to  our  faith,  it  at  all  events  re- 
cognises a  mystery  of  practical  significance.  Nor 
can  we  altogether  ignore  a  mystical  element  in 
Christ's  death.  All  freedom,  if  it  is  to  face  the 
universe,  must  somehow  be  baptised  in  blood. 
Every  soul  of  man  that  stands  for  a  spiritual  issue, 
heedless  of  those  who  can  destroy  the  body,  stands 
in  the  shadow  of  a  great,  but  vitally  effective? 
mystery  of  which  the  death  of  Christ  is  the  inner 
sanctuary. 

Ritschl,  no  more  than  any  of  his  successors,  has 
spoken  the  final  word.  His  method,  nevertheless, 
sums  up  the  result  of  this  long  discussion  in  a  way 
not  to  be  ignored. 

First  of  all,  we  must  accept  the  very  thing 
which  to  so  many  has  been  the  chief  rock  of 
offence.  We  must  recognise  not  only  the  right  but 
the  duty  of  untrammelled  investigation,  under  the 
sense  of  the  obligation  laid  upon  us  by  personal 
freedom  in  God.     Ritschl  is  in  no  way  singular  in 


396  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

his  recognition  of  it,  only  he  applies  it  to  the  whole 
history  of  the  Church  in  a  way  to  show  how  far  it 
might  carry  us.  He  criticises  the  whole  theology 
of  Protestantism,  maintaining  that,  from  Melanch- 
thon  onwards,  it  failed  to  carry  out  its  own  con- 
ception of  faith  and  fell  back  upon  a  Catholic 
conception  of  faith  as  acceptance  of  a  body  of 
correct  doctrine.  Nor  does  he  stop  there.  He 
criticises  the  whole  theology  of  the  Early  Church, 
maintaining  that,  almost  from  the  beginning,  the 
doctrines  of  the  New  Testament  were  imperfectly 
understood  and  that  the  Fathers  were  deeply  in- 
fluenced by  the  practical  exigencies  of  the  time  and 
the  social  and  philosophic  views  amid  which  they 
lived.  Such  an  attitude  in  one  poor  mortal  seems 
mere  overweening  j^resumption. 

Mr.  Hutton  quotes  a  passage  from  Newman  for 
the  sake  of  the  style,  but  also,  it  would  appear, 
with  approval  of  the  sentiment,^  which  deals  with 
this  attitude,  and  which  might  almost  have  been 
directed  specially  against  Ritschl.  *'  For  me,  dear 
brethren,  did  I  know  myself  well,  I  should  doubt- 
less find  I  was  open  to  the  temptation  as  well  as 
others  to  take  a  line  of  my  own,  or  what  is  called, 
to  set  up  for  myself  ;  but  whatever  might  be  my 
real  infirmity  in  this  matter,  I  should,  from  mere 
common  sense  and  common  delicacy,  hide  it  from 
myself,  and  give  it  some  good  name  in  order  to 
make  it  palatable.  I  never  could  get  myself  to  say, 
'Listen  to  me  for  I  have  something  great  to  tell 

1  Modern  Guides  of  English  Thought  in  Matters  of  Faith, 
p.  58. 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  397 

you,  which  no  one  else  knows,  but  of  which  there 
is  no  manner  of  doubt'.  I  should  be  kept  from 
such  extravagance  from  an  intense  sense  of  the 
intellectual  absurdity  which,  in  my  feelings,  such  a 
claim  would  involve.  .  .  .  Not  religious  principle, 
but  even  worldly  pride  would  keep  me  from  so 
unworthy  an  exhibition."  Then  he  associates  the 
right  of  private  judgment  with  taking  up  some 
fancy  religion,  retailing  the  Fathers  and  jobbing 
theology. 

This  sounds  very  specious  until  we  remember 
that  no  improvement  has  ever  been  effected  in  the 
world  without  some  one  placing  himself  in  the  po- 
sition of  singularity  which  Newman  considers  so 
vulgar,  and  that  there  is  nothing  truth  so  much  re- 
quires as  solitary  witnesses  and  martyrs.  Stripped 
of  its  grace,  is  it  not  an  exaltation  of  deference 
above  conscientiousness  as  a  matter  of  good  taste  ? 
Obscure  the  issue  as  we  may,  it  comes  in  the  end  to 
a  surrender  to  the  brute  force  of  numbers.  Ritschl 
retorts  with  a  like  accusation  of  vulgarity.  In  the 
Catholic  Church,  he  says,  each  bishop  is  liable  to 
error,  but  all  together  are  infallible  :  each  Catholic 
is  bound  in  timor  fllialis  to  cherish  doubts  of  his 
own  salvation,  but  all  together  are  the  exclusive 
possessors  of  salvation.  "  The  spokesmen  who  have 
to  enforce  this  claim  ever  come  forward  with  that 
kind  of  bravery  which  draws  its  power  from  crowds, 
and  this  form  of  infallible  conviction  has,  in  con- 
sequence, always  a  savour  not  met  with  in  good 
society."^     That  is  not  quite  so  subtle,  yet  when 

^  Bechtfertigung  und  Versohnung,  vii.,  p.  619. 


398  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

all  is  said,  is  anything  really  vulgar  except  a  coward 
fear  of  being  singular  ?  Such  deference  to  numbers 
rests  on  a  standard  of  greatness  which,  in  our  day, 
reduces  all  human  affairs  to  insignificance.  It  is 
indeed  too  late  in  the  day  to  ignore  the  importance 
of  great  institutions,  whether  of  Church  or  State, 
but  it  is  equally  belated,  with  our  sense  of  the  vast- 
ness  of  the  universe  and  of  the  wide  reign  of  law, 
to  set  up  any  institution  as  the  source  of  spiritual 
authority.  The  institution  is  a  greater  unit  than 
the  individual  only  on  a  standard  of  size  which, 
measured  even  by  what  we  know  of  the  greatness 
of  the  universe,  leaves  neither  of  them  anything. 
We  may  confer  every  sacred  title  of  honour  on  the 
institution,  it  remains  only  an  insignificant  part  of 
the  visible  universe,  and  man,  regarded  merely  as 
the  subject  of  its  external  discipline,  is  under  the 
external  rule  of  law  in  a  way  which  leaves  him  too 
insignificant  for  consideration.  But  if  God's  law 
is  directly  announced  to  man,  if  the  Almighty  has 
condescended  to  ask  from  each  child  of  His  willing 
and  conscious  concurrence  and  to  tolerate  refusal, 
if  man  under  the  guidance  of  that  law  has  a  majesty 
which  may  defy  both  physical  and  social  pressure, 
a  new  measure  of  greatness  has  appeared  in  the 
world.  Then  whole-hearted  humility  with  God 
must  be  whole-hearted  sincerity  with  ourselves ; 
and  no  place  can  be  found  for  the  fear  of  man  under 
any  aspect  whatsoever.  If  freedom  is  not  mere 
arbitrary  action,  but  is  a  real  possibility  of  choice 
between  the  Eternal  Will  and  our  present  pleasure, 
conscience   must  be   fundamental   and   cannot  be 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  399 

combined  with  any  equal  authority.  To  acknow- 
ledge, as  Newman  does,  Butler's  doctrine  of  con- 
science as  fundamental  for  faith,  and  then  to  rest 
faith  on  any  external  infallible  authority  are  irre- 
concilable methods.  If  conscience  has  an  absolute 
right  to  govern  the  world,  it  cannot  divide  its  throne 
with  another  sovereign ;  if  the  very  mark  of  con- 
science is  to  announce  right,  free  from  all  other 
considerations,  all  other  considerations  whatsoever 
must  be  subordinated.  The  tremendous  thing  about 
right,  as  distinct  say  from  deference,  is  that  it  lays 
us  directly  on  the  bosom  of  reality.  If  right  is 
right,  and  not  a  misleading  synonym  for  conven- 
tion, it  rests  on  the  pillars  of  the  world,  and  makes 
a  man  in  all  humility  a  king  in  Divine  right. 

Our  present  chaotic  and  distressful  state  arises 
from  our  failure  to  realise  this  positive  and  en- 
nobling idea  of  freedom.  We  are  found  toiling 
hard  to  be  allowed  to  halt  between  two  opinions. 
An  external  authority  is  set  up  in  such  a  way  as 
to  leave  the  impression  that  freedom  consists  in 
mere  absence  of  restraints.  As  only  enough  of 
the  authority  remains  to  give  people  a  coltish  satis- 
faction in  kicking  over  the  traces,  it  is  felt  the  old 
bonds  must  be  strengthened.  Then  the  sole  result 
is  to  show  how  weak  they  are.  Had  the  same 
diligence  been  applied  to  the  task  of  calling  men 
into  the  glorious  liberty  of  the  children  of  God, 
of  teaching  them  all  it  means  of  personal  re- 
sponsibility, of  humble  love  of  the  truth,  of  the 
deej^est  of  all  agreements  with  men  through  the 
very  absence  of  temporal  compromises  and  the  pre- 


400  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

sence  of  one  desire  to  walk  in  the  light  of  God's 
truth,  we  should  have  been  much  farther  on  our 
way  to  the  only  enduring  and  perfect  order. 

But  it  may  be  argued  that  we  do  not  even  seem 
to  be  making  progress  in  that  direction,  and  that  if 
the  struggle  is  not  to  be  given  up  in  fear  of  the 
results,  it  is  time  it  was  abandoned  under  the  sense 
of  its  futility.  What  have  the  vast  labours  of  the 
last  two  centuries  been  but  sowing  the  wind  and 
reaping  the  whirlwind  ?  Yet  even  so,  if  ''it  is  the 
glory  of  God  to  conceal  a  thing,  but  the  honour  of 
kings  to  search  out  a  matter,"  the  struggle  itself 
is  a  high  testimony  to  man's  greatness,  and  to 
renounce  our  share  in  it  for  any  cause  is  treason 
to  the  spiritual  hopes  of  our  race.  To  suffer  the 
battle  to  go  by  default,  and  to  lose  faith  in  the 
future  and  a  hopeful  diligence  in  the  present,  is 
only  a  coward's  act  whether  in  things  practical  or 
intellectual. 

But,  in  view  of  the  magnitude  of  the  task,  have 
we  any  right  to  be  discouraged  by  the  result  ?  We 
have  not,  it  is  true,  wrung  any  absolute  secret  from 
the  universe,  we  have  not  yet  made  a  secure  syn- 
thesis of  all  knowledge,  we  have  not  been  able  to 
finish  off  the  lessons  of  history  with  the  fine  point 
of  a  formula,  but  we  have  attained  a  deeper  sense 
of  the  meaning  of  freedom  in  so  great  a  world  and 
of  its  significance  as  a  basis  for  our  spiritual  hopes. 

The  great  difficulty  is  to  obtain  the  right  point 
of  view  from  which  to  consider  the  work  of  both 
centuries.  For  that  task,  Ritschl's  reaction  from 
the  Romanticism  of  the  nineteenth  century  is  im- 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  401 

portant.  It  helps  us  to  see  that  the  Romanticism 
which  has  been  so  near  us  that  we  imagined  it  the 
sum  of  all  truth,  was  also  of  the  nature  of  a  reaction, 
and  that  its  weakness  lay  in  ignoring  the  labours 
of  the  eighteenth  century.  Yet  the  task  is  not 
merely  to  return  to  Kant  as  the  culmination  of 
these  labours.  We  must  carry  back  with  us  the  his- 
torical sense  of  the  nineteenth  century — the  sense 
of  process,  of  development,  of  infinitely  varied  in- 
dividuality, and  then  interpret  everything  by  the 
authority  of  conscience  and  the  significance  of  man 
as  man. 

One  result  is  already  apparent.  Freedom  is  not 
merely  the  fundamental,  it  is  the  exclusive  basis  of 
spiritual  belief  now  left  to  us.  We  must  now 
found  faith  upon  the  very  thing  we  have  so  long 
feared  would  destroy  it.  In  seeking  to  understand 
that  assertion,  we  must  not  forget  that  there  is  no 
more  question-begging  adjective  in  the  language 
than  this  word  spiritual  It  is  used  everywhere  to 
justify  men's  own  judgments  of  things.  Authorities 
well  incarnated  both  in  flesh  and  upholstery  are 
called  spiritual  powers ;  observances  visible  to  the 
eyes  of  all  and  governed  by  rules  known  to  all  are 
called  spiritual  exercises  ;  activities  directed  with 
much  use  of  material  means  towards  objects  to  be 
established  in  calculable  results  are  said  to  be 
spiritual  service.  What  is  spiritual  may  in  some 
distant  way  be  attained  through  these  authorities 
and  organisations,  but  so  far  is  it  from  being  identical 
with  them,  that  we  might  even  conceive  it  opposed 

by  them.     These  are  all  visible  things,  incapable 

26 


402  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

of  rising  out  of  the  world  of  vastness  measured  by 
which  man  at  his  best  estate  is  altogether  vanity. 
His  spiritual  hopes  must  be  built  on  a  greatness 
which  has  no  relation  to  size,  a  higher  order  which 
can  only  be  the  things  of  freedom.  If  man  is  not 
free,  if  he  is  a  mere  part  of  the  great  nexus  of 
mechanical  necessity,  the  only  problem  to  explain 
is  by  what  accidental  combination  of  selfish  motive 
the  distinction  between  spiritual  and  material  was 
ever  coined,  and  how  actions  which  are  merely  the 
resultant  of  all  the  forces  at  work  could  be  accom- 
panied by  things  so  irrational  as  struggle  and  pain, 
aspiration,  endeavour  and  self-condemnation. 

But  if  the  law  of  freedom  makes  right  might, 
not  merely  might  right ;  if  conscience  ought  to 
govern  the  world ;  if  it  is  corrupted  when  it  listens 
to  other  voices  than  its  own  and  weighs  other  con- 
siderations than  its  own  word  of  duty,  the  last 
word  was  not  spoken  by  the  law  of  gravitation,  or 
by  any  mechanical  law  of  motion,  though  it  may 
govern  the  vast  worlds  out  to  their  remotest  dis- 
tance and  down  to  their  minutest  particle. 

If  freedom  is  a  reality,  if  man's  destiny  is  not 
shaped  for  him  but  he  does  something  to  shape  it 
himself,  the  vast  process  of  evolution  also  is  not  to 
be  measured  solely  by  the  countless  ?eons  which 
have  been  invoked  to  give  scope  to  the  operation 
of  happy  accident,  and  by  the  law  of  the  survival 
of  the  fittest.  Development  without  the  idea  of 
freedom  is  an  utterly  unspiritual  process.  If  the 
only  process  is  the  struggle  for  existence,  there  is 
no  higher  order,  there  being  no  upwards  and  no 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  403 

downwards,  but  only  fitness  to  persist  in  living,  a 
battle  manifestly  not  to  the  good  and  generous  but 
to  the  morally  cunning  and  the  physically  strong. 
And  it  helps  little  to  exalt  the  process,  if  it  remains 
all  of  process.  If  it  is  all  merely  a  great  network 
drawn  across  the  face  of  the  world,  very  little  is 
effected  by  calling  it  reason,  for  if  it  is  an  involun- 
tary, it  is  an  unspiritual  force  with  no  better  cri- 
terion for  what  is  higher  than  greater  complexity. 
Spiritual  worth  we  can  only  acknowledge  when  we 
have  to  do  with  a  soul  struggling  upwards  to  free- 
dom, to  a  freedom  which  is  lost  in  mean  ends  and 
found  in  high.  If,  however,  there  is  such  an  issue 
as  freedom,  if  any  creature  ever  acted,  not  by  the 
mere  forces  driving  him  on,  but  by  a  voluntary  ac- 
ceptance of  the  eternal  laws,  process  ceases  to  be 
mere  process  and  bears  in  its  bosom  the  beginning 
at  least  of  a  conscious  work  for  a  purpose.  Then 
the  world  must  be  interpreted,  not  by  what  it  is 
but  by  what  it  will  become,  and  therefore  by  a 
spiritual  standard  of  worth. 

Yet  what,  it  may  be  asked,  have  the  past  two 
centuries  contributed  to  such  a  conception  of  free- 
dom 1  The  commonplaces  of  morality  and  freedom 
are  not  new.  Was  Butler  a  discoverer,  when  he 
set  up  the  absolute  right  of  conscience  to  rule,  or 
Kant,  when  he  insisted  that  it  must  utter  its  own 
verdict  and  listen  to  no  alien  voice  ?  As  for  Ritschl, 
what  does  he  say  about  the  significance  of  choice 
that  every  person  not  bamboozled  by  philosophy 
has  not  said  from  the  beginning  ? 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  much  to  know  that  the 


404  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

sensible  person  has  a  right  to  his  opinion,  and  that 
in  fundamental  matters  philosophy  must  conform 
to  him,  not  he  to  philosophy.  Then,  even  were 
it  all  commonplace,  a  revelation  of  the  full  mean- 
ing of  a  commonplace,  a  recognition  that  it  is  not 
commonplace  but  elemental,  is  scarcely  equalled  in 
importance  by  a  new  discovery.  And  there  has 
been  much  more  than  a  repetition  of  what  has 
been  from  the  beginning.  The  true  significance  of 
freedom,  its  overpowering  importance  for  all  our 
thinking  and  acting,  only  became  fully  manifest 
when  it  was  seen  setting  up  the  rule  of  right  amid 
a  system  of  vast  and  ceaseless  mechanical  law,  and 
asserting  its  power  to  accept  or  reject  in  face  of  the 
might  of  an  endless  process  of  development.  It 
then  manifested  itself  as  a  new  order  of  greatness, 
carrying  with  it  incalculable  consequences,  so  that 
the  very  frequency  with  which  the  plain  witness  of 
freedom  has  been  denied,  is  just  the  measure  of 
its  significance  in  view  of  our  modern  conception. 

If  the  issues  of  freedom  are  genuine,  there  are 
distinctions  in  life  which  are  absolute.  A  view 
of  life  is  involved  which  has  God  on  one  side  and 
whatever  we  like  to  call  the  absence  of  good  on  the 
other.  Evil  can  no  more  be  the  mere  necessary 
shadow  of  good.  Between  the  choice  of  agreement 
with  eternal  right  and  disagreement  with  it  there 
must  be  something  of  the  absolute  distance  of 
heaven  and  hell. 

Just  this  absoluteness  of  moral  distinctions, 
however,  has  seemed  to  be  destroyed  by  the  doc- 
trine of  evolution.     It  has  seemed  to  do  away  with 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  405 

the  significance  of  human  choice  and  to  swallow 
everything  up  in  a  great  relentless  process  in  which 
what  is  most  permanent  is  continually  changing 
and  the  individual  is  nothing.  But  in  the  first 
place,  if  we  have  moral  assurance  of  the  signifi- 
cance of  the  individual  and  of  the  eternal  issues 
of  every  action  which  is  based  on  living  experience 
in  the  present,  no  theory  of  what  has  happened  in 
the  past  can  ever  rise  to  that  height  of  certainty 
which  would  justify  us  in  modifying  it ;  and  in  the 
second,  the  theory  rightly  understood  has  no  such 
effect,  for  the  process  of  evolution  is  simply  a  re- 
duplication and  increase  of  the  significance  of  the 
individual.  The  Darwinian  theory  of  it  in  par- 
ticular. Professor  James  points  out,  depends  in  no 
way  on  a  necessary  unfolding  according  to  an  even 
process.^  It  shows  that  the  individual,  as  he  ex- 
presses it,  becomes  a  "  ferment  in  the  race  ".  The 
slightest  improvement  in  the  individual  is  of  vital 
importance  for  the  whole  stock.  These  improve- 
ments, indeed,  are  looked  upon  as  involuntary,  but 
there  is  no  reason  why  they  should  not  also  be  volun- 
tary. Then  man's  will  becomes  the  supreme  force 
for  a  higher  development.  Above  all  there  is  no- 
thing in  Darwinism  to  support  indifference.  The 
slightest  variation  from  the  law  of  life  is  visited 
with  heavy  penalty.  There  is  no  place  of  repent- 
ance even  for  a  mistake,  though  it  should  be  sought 
carefully  with  tears. 

If,  however,  man  develops  slowly  into  a  moral 
creature,  how  can  this  absoluteness  of  the  distinc- 

1  The  Will  to  Believe,  p.  222  ff. 


406  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

tion  between  good  and  evil  be  maintained  ?  In 
reply,  it  may  be  asked,  How  does  the  slow  recog- 
nition of  the  distinction  affect  its  absoluteness  ? 
Suppose  an  animal  develops  eyes,  the  light  is  not 
thereby  developed  ;  and  suppose  it  refuses  to  walk 
by  the  light  it  sees,  the  calamity  that  would  over- 
take it  would  be  absolute.  Only  one  question  very 
deeply  affects  the  moral  situation.  In  this  process 
of  development,  is  man  being  made  free,  and  is  his 
destiny  in  the  midst  of  it  determined  in  any  way 
by  the  use  of  the  freedom  he  has  ?  In  that  case, 
at  whatsoever  point  man  stood  between  right  and 
wrong,  free  to  choose  between  them,  he  never  could 
be  in  doubt  about  the  absoluteness  of  the  distinc- 
tion, as  soon  as  it  appeared,  however  much  he 
was  confused  in  its  application.  History  is  a  long 
record  of  the  development  of  man's  moral  ideals, 
and  we  have  proof  every  day  of  how  much  his 
moral  nature  needs  development.  But,  however 
much  preparation  went  before,  the  rise  of  the  sense 
of  right  and  wrong  and  the  consciousness  of  ability 
to  choose  between  them  must  have  been  a  crisis. 
A  distinction  unlike  all  other  distinctions  had  come 
upon  him.  Without  it  he  had  been  a  mere  animal  ; 
with  it  he  was  a  man.  Intellect  may  have  been  a 
slow  growth,  and  feeling  may  have  been  a  slow 
growth  ;  and  moral  discrimination  depends  on  the 
former,  and  moral  sensitiveness  on  the  latter.  Both 
intellect  and  feeling  develop  slowly  in  the  child, 
yet  the  sense  of  right  and  wrong  and  the  im- 
perative need  of  choosing  between  them  come 
upon  a  child  with  a  flash.      And  it   is   hard   to 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  407 

see  how  it  could  have  come  otherwise  upon  man- 
kind. 

It  has  also  been  the  custom,  under  the  influence 
of  the  idea  of  slow  development,  to  minimise  too 
much  the  clearness  and  force  of  the  earliest  moral 
issues,  and  so  to  decide  that  any  less  sinful  and 
tragic  course  of  moral  development  was  impossible. 
Though  a  child  has  a  very  limited  moral  horizon, 
just  because  he  is  so  much  freer  from  the  great  net- 
work of  evil  which  has  woven  itself  so  closely  round 
the  grown  man,  confusing  his  judgment  and  per- 
verting his  will,  he  may  within  his  smaller  horizon, 
have  the  clearest  moral  issue,  and  upon  his  obedi- 
ence to  it  the  whole  development  of  his  life  may 
depend.  Similarly  for  the  primitive  man  physical 
impulse  may  have  been  strong,  seeing  that  hitherto 
it  had  entirely  controlled  his  life,  but  moral  evil 
had  not  yet  drawn  its  black  streak  through  it. 
Hence  in  the  very  limited  issue  that  could  arise, 
there  may  have  been  a  quite  clear  vision  of  the 
amazing  nature  of  the  choice  and  a  quite  unper- 
verted  attitude  of  the  will  towards  it,  upon  which 
great  matters  for  the  method  whereby  the  race  was 
to  arrive  at  its  heritage  of  freedom  had  to  depend. 
Wherefore  the  thing  that  is  crucial  in  the  doctrine 
of  the  Fall,  the  absolute  significance  of  the  choice 
of  right  and  wrong,  the  significance  of  it  as  the 
supreme  "  ferment  in  the  race,"  follows,  in  spite  of 
every  conceivable  doctrine  of  evolution,  from  the 
introduction  at  any  point  of  things  so  absolute  as 
right  and  freedom.  Our  error  lies  in  supposing 
that  the  choice  had  to  be  made  on  the  plane  of 


408  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

our  present  moral  ideals,  or  even  on  the  plane  of 
the  absolute  moral  ideal.  We  forget  that  there 
may  be  the  same  absoluteness  of  responsibility 
regarding  the  lowest  ideal. 

The  possession  of  freedom  would  thus  draw  an 
absolute  distinction  between  man  and  the  lower 
animals,  relating  him  in  a  totally  difterent  way  to 
the  world,  and,  therefore,  to  God.  So  long  as 
an  animal  is  merely  the  creature  of  impulse,  it  is 
simply  a  phase  of  the  universe,  a  vehicle  for  the 
forces  of  the  world.  The  possibility  of  a  choice 
between  agreeing  to  work  out  the  purpose  of  the 
world  and  disagreeing  alters  everything.  It  shows 
that  the  purpose  of  the  world  is  of  a  nature  which 
blind  forces  cannot  work  out,  but  involves  a  haz- 
ardous experiment  in  which  God  as  well  as  man 
has  high  responsibilities.  Force  only  involves  a 
relation  of  power  ;  freedom  involves  a  relation  at 
least  of  righteousness. 

Further,  if  we  believe  in  the  genuine  issues  of 
freedom,  we  cannot  avoid  drawing  absolute  lines  in 
history.  History  must  always  have  an  aspect  of 
unreality  so  long  as  it  is  conceived  as  a  process 
upon  which  man's  actions  depend,  but  which  does 
not  at  all  depend  on  man's  actions.  It  is  mere 
gossip  about  our  insignificant  family,  unless  its 
incidents  were  genuine  decisions  between  good  and 
evil  with  an  important  issue  at  stake.  History 
interests  itself  in  institutions,  but  is  a  long  record 
of  their  insecurity,  and  if  they  were  not  for  the 
Imilding  up  of  something  spiritual  they  were  all 
passing  vanities.     History  interests  itself  in  culture, 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  409 

but  if  that  only  concerns  the  intellect  it  is  writing 
upon  sand.  History  interests  itself  in  races,  but  if 
they  are  only  the  playthings  of  destiny  they  are  as 
the  swarm  of  summer  files.  To  find  the  strings 
which  work  this  puppet-show  may  add  to  the 
interest :  it  cannot  add  to  the  sense  of  reality. 
Astronomy  with  its  3eons  in  which  the  few  thou- 
sand years  of  human  history  are  nothing,  and  its 
spaces  in  which  even  the  whole  theatre  of  man's 
actions  is  a  mere  mote  in  the  sun,  may  have  some 
pretension  to  a  knowledge  of  things  in  their  due 
proportion,  but  history  merely  treats  a  small  eddy 
as  if  it  were  the  great  stream.  If,  however,  free- 
dom is  a  genuine  act  of  choice,  and  if  the  sense  of 
right  is  a  guide  to  the  eternal  and  the  ultimate 
meaning  of  things,  history  becomes  the  record  of 
man's  advance  towards  God's  purpose,  and  has  a 
significance  not  measured  by  space  and  time.  The 
ideals  and  purposes  of  individual  men  have  an 
absolute  worth  which  societies,  institutions  and 
cultures  cannot  in  themselves  provide.  Scientific 
histories  may  be  written  which  ignore  men  and 
deal  with  movements.  Mankind  continue  to  ig- 
nore them  and  to  be  interested  precisely  in  those 
individual  heroisms  which  are  said  to  be  only  the 
gossip  of  history.  The  story  they  love  is  of  the 
man  who  continues  to  be  free  in  face  of  dire 
calamity,  fierce  opposition,  death  with  all  its  ter- 
rors. They  conclude  rightly  that  the  ideals  and 
moral  strength  of  the  race  have  been  won  precisely 
by  such  heroisms,  and  that  even  the  record  of  them 
continues  to  be  a  blessed  heritage. 


410  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

Freedom  embodied  in  an  institution  may  be  on 
its  way  to  decay  ;  freedom  embodied  in  a  heroic 
soul  is  absolute  in  its  worth  and  eternal  in  its  in- 
fluence. Man's  heroic  decisions,  the  working  out 
of  his  heroic  ideals,  the  response  to  high  Divine 
calls  in  word  and  act,  build  up  all  that  is  worthy  of 
being  remembered  and  justify  our  belief  that  human 
history  has  an  infinite  as  well  as  a  merely  finite  sig- 
nificance. Then  **  the  proper  study  of  mankind  is 
man,"  and  his  explorations  into  nature  which  have 
so  long  seemed  to  yield  him  the  vastness  otherwise 
denied  him  and  the  finality  otherwise  slow  of  arriv- 
ing, will  also  take  their  place  simply  among  the 
great  heroisms  of  labour  and  love  of  truth,  to  be 
valued  mainly  by  what  they  add  to  our  vision  of 
good  and  our  ideal  of  life. 

History,  being  in  this  way  a  continual  dealing  of 
man  with  God,  is  all  of  the  nature  of  a  revelation, 
and  when  we  speak  of  the  history  of  the  religions, 
of  the  faiths  by  which  man's  freedom  has  sought  to 
live,  as  being  concerned  with  revelation,  it  is  only 
to  be  understood  by  way  of  pre-eminence.  Yet 
that  history,  so  tangled  and  perplexing,  has  pre- 
eminent interest,  for,  if  freedom  is  a  reality,  the 
history  of  man's  religions  is  the  history  of  his 
struggle  for  footing  amid  the  shifting  sands  of  time. 
If  all  issues  are  fixed  in  a  system  determined  from 
the  beginning,  religion  is  a  wholly  inexplicable  and 
superfluous  disturbance  of  man's  peace.  The  uni- 
verse produces  us  and  does  not  consult  us,  and  why 
it  should  have  complicated  life  by  making  us  sup- 
pose that  there  is  some  interchange  of  thought  and 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  411 

purpose,  is  hard  to  understand.  No  conception  of 
fixed  process,  however  specious  it  may  be  made  to 
appear,  can  find  room  for  that  interaction  between 
obedience  and  succour  which  every  religion  has 
presupposed.  But  with  real  freedom  of  choice, 
there  must  be  that  interaction  between  ourselves 
and  the  world  which  requires  faith  both  in  a  free 
agency  in  ourselves,  and  in  a  free  agency  behind 
the  world.  In  that  case  religion  must  be  as  vital 
a  concern  as  morality,  and  right  morality  and  true 
religion  must  be  in  entire  accord. 

Yet  religion  is  not  merely  another  name  for 
morality.  Not  in  that  sense  is  the  will  fundamen- 
tal in  religion.  Keligious  faith  involves  feeling. 
Unless  it  is  an  intuition  of  the  heart,  it  is  not  faith. 
It  also  involves  thought.  We  must  know  in  what 
we  believe.  And  these  various  elements  must  not 
only  be  present  in  faith,  but  be  united  into  one 
vision.  To  reach  this  vision,  however,  we  must  do 
more  than  argue  :  we  must  judge  ourselves  and 
judge  the  world  from  the  vantage-ground  of  spirit- 
ual beings  engaged  in  winning  our  freedom  in  a 
world  which  in  one  aspect  is  our  mightiest  opponent 
and  in  another  is  wholly  consecrated  to  our  aid. 
Without  that,  emotion  were  an  absurdity  and  insight 
an  illusion.  Faith  has  thus  a  prior  conviction  to 
its  formulated  conclusion,  so  that  in  a  sense  reason 
is  merely  servusjidei  and  credo  ut  intelligam  a  neces- 
sary form  of  procedure.  Faith  is  not,  however,  on 
that  account  a  flight  of  baseless  confidence  soaring 
out  of  sight  of  inquiry.  Rather  it  is  the  one  thing 
which  insists  on  the  whole  experiment  of  life.     At 


412  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

every  step  faith  can  only  reach  one  arm's  length 
in  front  of  us.  We  can  then  take  hold  to  gain 
another  step,  but  we  cannot  reach  another  arm's 
length  till  we  have  taken  that  step.  This  way  of 
advance  is  slow  and  perplexing,  and  the  history  of 
the  religions  is  accordingly  tedious  and  confused. 
But  it  is  a  high  task  and  only  life  can  forward 
us  in  it,  and  it  is  this  groping  of  freedom  which 
gives  interest  to  all  phases  of  man's  religious 
struggle. 

At  the  same  time  this  significance  of  freedom 
does  something  to  answer  the  question  whether 
there  is  any  absolute  distinction  between  Christian- 
ity and  the  other  religions,  or  whether  Christianity 
is  merely  the  highest  phase  of  a  graduated  series. 
As  an  institution  embodying  ecclesiastical  authority, 
as  a  visible  Church,  Christianity  is  only  one  among 
many  phases  of  temporal  things,  possibly  the  highest, 
but  scarcely  the  ultimate.  Suppose  it  were  even 
the  possessor  of  infallibility,  would  that  be  more 
than  a  temporal  device  ?  Can  a  society  with  one 
infallible  head  and  all  other  persons  submissive 
members  be  the  eternal  order  ?  But  if  Christianity 
is  rather  obscured  by  those  external  buttresses  which 
we  have  tried  so  hard  to  maintain  ;  if  its  real  mean- 
ing lies  in  the  absence  of  these  external  authorities, 
and  if  the  process  which  to  so  many  has  seemed 
to  be  sapping  its  foundation  has  only  been  dis- 
playing its  true  proportions  ;  if  it  trusts  to  nothing 
in  the  last  issue  except  reconciliation  and  grace ; 
if  it  will  be  satisfied  with  nothing  less  than  a  re- 
lation to  God  in  which  we  shall  be  wholly  free 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  413 

intellectually  and  morally,  it  must  belong  to  the 
absolute,  the  eternal  order. 

Whether  Christianity  is  absolutely  different  from 
other  religions  must,  however,  in  the  last  issue, 
depend  on  whether  Christ  is  absolutely  different 
from  other  men.  As  freedom  must  be  an  acquisi- 
tion as  well  as  a  gift,  Christianity  had  to  descend 
into  the  world  and  be  mingled  with  its  evil,  so  that, 
when  we  would  understand  it  in  its  purity,  we  must 
ever  go  back  to  Christ.  This  does  not  mean,  as 
some  suppose,  that  Christ  can  be  understood  apart 
from  the  Church.  But  it  does  mean  that  there  can 
be  no  kind  of  understanding  of  the  Church  apart 
from  Christ.  The  nearest  analogy  to  the  position 
of  Christ  in  the  Christian  religion  is  the  idea  of 
right  in  morals.  In  spite  of  all  confusion  and  mis- 
understanding and  misapplication,  the  idea  of  right 
remains  for  every  moral  being  an  absolute  distinc- 
tion. Similarly,  in  spite  of  all  uncertainty  regarding 
His  life,  misapprehension  of  His  significance,  and 
misappropriation  of  His  approval,  He  remains  for 
every  religious  soul  not  of  relative  but  of  absolute 
significance.  And  the  reason  is  that  in  Him  we 
find  the  perfect  freedom  which  could  only  be  sus- 
tained by  the  perfect  relation  to  God. 

According  to  notions  too  long  inculcated  upon 
us  nothing  is  final,  all  is  relative.  The  struggle 
never  attains  anything  except  the  right  to  make  a 
further  attempt.  Possibly  it  may  be  a  higher  at- 
tempt, but  if  there  is  no  absolute  good  within  our 
reach,  it  is  hard  to  tell  what  is  higher  and  what  is 
lower.     Yet  even  in  history,  when  we  meet  with 


414  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

freedom,  we  meet  with  what  is  final.  This  is  the 
conviction  which  is  enshrined  in  the  idea  that  the 
works  of  genius  are  imperishable.  The  man  of 
genius  may  err  and  even  sin.  The  thing  he  cannot 
do  is  to  be  conventional,  a  mere  slave  of  the  accepted 
order.  After  some  fashion  he  must  go  up  into  the 
mount  and  meet  with  God.  Then  men  accept  his 
work  neither  as  new  nor  as  old,  but  as  a  permanent 
enrichment  of  the  race.  It  is  not  a  case  of  "  accept- 
ing absolute  truths  of  reason  on  contingent  grounds 
of  history  ".  Rather  is  it  true,  that  only  in  this  way 
has  any  absolute  conviction  come  into  human  life. 
For  right  agreement  in  it  argument  should  be  absent 
and  the  compulsion  of  human  opinion  disregarded. 
Then  only  can  it  evoke  the  insight  by  which  it  is 
approved. 

All  God's  revelation  to  man  is  of  this  heroic 
nature.  It  speaks  to  man  because  by  it  "  the 
heroic  that  is  in  all  men  finds  a  Divine  awakening 
voice  ".  Herein  we  see  the  folly  of  the  demand 
that  a  Divine  revelation  should  be  written  on  the 
skies.  It  is  written  on  something  far  greater — on 
the  souls  it  has  made  free.  Who  were  the  Prophet 
and  the  Apostle  ?  Men  who  through  God  feared 
neither  men  nor  events,  who  were  incapable  of 
being  dismayed  by  adversity  or  of  being  corrupted 
by  fortune.  And  what  did  they  record,  except  the 
liberty  wherewith  they  had  been  made  free. 

Among  other  things  this  conception  of  revela- 
tion might  in  time  afford  us  some  rudiments  of  the 
principles  of  criticism  on  the  basis  of  our  common 
human   nature.      These  principles    would    not  fix 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  415 

writings  to  any  date,  but  they  would  refuse  to 
tolerate  the  dulness  which  grows  burdensome,  of 
men  who  never  wrote  an  inspired  sentence  in  their 
lives  and  who  do  not  know  that  an  inspired  sen- 
tence never  was  written  except  with  an  attitude 
of  inward  freedom  towards  living  events.  A  vital 
writing  can  no  more  be  made  out  of  extracts  in  the 
study  than  a  vital  body  out  of  specimens  in  the 
dissecting  room.  Wherefore  a  duty  would  be 
forced  upon  the  critic  of  showing  what  heroic 
warmth  of  action  ,and  of  feeling  smelted  all  these 
elements  into  literature,  and  thus,  whatsoever  con- 
clusions of  date  or  authorship  were  arrived  at,  the 
Scriptures  would  remain  the  heroic  record  of  God's 
dealings  with  heroic  man. 

But  what  bears  more  directly  on  our  subject  is 
that  this  conception  of  revelation,  as  God's  response 
to  man's  aspirations  after  freedom,  at  once  shows 
the  necessary  relation  of  all  revelation  to  Christ 
and  the  necessary  subordination  of  it  to  the  re- 
velation in  Him.  Jesus  speaks  with  a  directness 
and  simplicity  to  the  hearts  made  in  God's  image, 
and  meets  them  so  entirely  on  the  basis  of  their 
human  needs,  that  He  stands  quite  alone  in  His 
significance  for  our  freedom  as  children  of  God. 
Ritschl  speaks  as  if  this  were  accomplished  solely 
by  revealing  the  moral  qualities  of  God,  in  par- 
ticular His  will  of  love.  But  that  is  not  where  he 
or  any  one  who  seriously  rests  his  life  on  the  faith 
of  Christ  comes  to  a  halt.  In  order  to  gain  victory, 
Christ  must  also  in  some  way  embody  God's  will  of 
power.     He  must  show  that  God's  will  of  power  is 


416  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

His  will  of  love.  Is  He  not  the  supreme  source  of 
the  freedom  of  God's  children,  just  because  the 
glory  of  God  in  His  face  is  a  transformation  of  the 
idea  of  God's  power  ?  Relentless  force  is  too  small 
a  thing  for  the  Infinite.  All  it  could  make  would 
be  a  dead  universe.  No  process  can  breathe  into 
God's  work  the  breath  of  life.  Life  refuses  to  look 
out  of  its  vastness  with  the  light  of  the  soul  in  its 
eye.  But  when  God  undertakes  to  work  with 
freedom,  He  undertakes  to  bear  and  forbear,  and 
the  method  of  Christ  becomes  the  revelation  of  a 
higher  Omnipotence.  Power  becomes  love,  and 
gains  in  power  by  being  love.  Power  can  only  rule 
by  iron  law,  love  can  rule  with  the  freedom  of 
God's  children  ;  power  can  only  create  a  vast  play- 
thing, love  can  create  a  Kingdom  of  God. 

With  this  distinction  clearly  before  us,  we  may 
hope  in  time  to  attain  a  patience  in  our  thinking 
in  some  degree  corresponding  to  God's  patience  in 
working.  We  shall  see  that  a  method  which  works 
by  freedom  must  necessarily  be  slow  and  irregular, 
full  of  failure,  apparently  having  more  of  man  in  it 
than  of  God,  but  we  shall  see  that  nothing  else  has 
in  it  any  spiritual  promise.  One  requirement  it 
must  wait  for — the  faith  which  works  by  love,  for 
by  it  alone  can  God  enter  a  life  in  freedom.  But 
it  makes  no  other  demand,  for  it  never  is  God's 
power  or  willingness  that  is  in  question,  but  only 
the  difficulty  Omnipotence  has  not  to  annihilate 
the  finite  will,  the  difficulty  of  so  helping  as  to  set 
free,  and  not  to  enslave,  God's  children.  Then  also 
it  will  appear  that  grace  cannot  be  mere  propulsion, 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  417 

or  humility  the  abnegation  of  independence,  or 
God's  work  the  annihilation  of  man's.  On  the 
contrary,  grace  is  the  power  to  be  truly  ourselves 
and  humility  a  sense  of  God  that  overshadows  the 
sense  of  our  fellowman. 

Finally,  the  institution  will  not  be  of  less  im- 
portance, but  it  will  be  strictly  regarded  as  means 
not  end.  We  shall  thereby  be  always  in  a  position 
to  keep  it  in  the  sunlight  of  just  criticism,  and  so 
preserve  it  from  the  decay  which  always  overtakes 
Church  or  State,  or  any  other  institution,  when  it 
lives  for  itself  and  forgets  to  judge  itself  by  what 
it  ought  to  accomplish.  If  in  some  way  it  is  not 
serving  the  Kingdom  of  God,  the  kingdom  of  souls 
organised  only  through  love,  it  is  an  encumbrance 
and  a  positive  evil.  Every  living  institution  ought 
to  be  attempting  to  abolish  itself ;  every  statutory 
arrangement  should  be  anticipating  a  higher  than 
legal  obedience  ;  every  appointment  for  men  by 
others  should  contemplate  itself  as  a  discipline  for 
teaching  men  to  recognise  no  appointment  but  their 
own.  Human  authority  may  have  done  much  to 
secure  the  conditions  of  man's  freedom,  but,  if  it  is 
to  do  still  more,  it  must  always  stand  farther  and 
farther  back  from  man  and  leave  him  to  a  higher 
rule  than  man's. 

Of  the  Church  this  must  in  a  very  special  sense 
be  true.  No  institution  is  more  in  need  of  being 
subjected  to  constant  comparison  of  its  present 
state  with  the  purpose  it  should  serve  ;  nor  should 
any  institution  live  so  continually  in  the  thought 
that  compulsion  is  the  worst  of  all  disloyalty  to  the 

27 


418  METHOD  AND  RESULTS 

kingdom  it  is  meant  to  accomplish.  It  should  be 
her  part  to  call  men  into  the  glorious  liberty  of  God's 
children,  always  demanding  of  them  a  higher,  more 
personal  faith,  and  a  more  inward,  more  personal 
obedience,  than  she  has  any  right  to  demand  of 
them  for  herself. 

Perhaps  we  may  find  here,  too,  something  re- 
sembling a  philosophy  of  history.  Freedom  is  a 
burdensome  task  and  God  does  not  impose  the 
whole  weight  of  it  upon  us  at  once.  Wherefore  He 
appoints  the  statutory  element  in  life  and  in  re- 
ligion to  be  a  substitute  for  freedom  when  men  are 
weary  of  it,  and  a  disci23line  when  they  misuse  it. 
It  is  a  legitimate  though  only  a  temporary  resting- 
place.  History  thus  consists  of  recurring  periods 
of  Law  and  Gospel.  The  Promise  always  was 
before  the  Law,  but  the  Law  always  is  a  necessary 
preparation  for  the  Promise.  Yet  such  periods  of 
external  rule  are  always  more  or  less  marks  of 
present  failure,  so  that  the  duty  of  every  man  who 
can  appropriate  the  promise  of  freedom  is  to  live, 
not  for  the  Law,  but  for  the  Gospel. 

When  a  great  movement  is  waning  there  is  a 
danger  of  an  extreme  repudiation  of  what  has  been 
extremely  affirmed.  This  appears  in  the  desire  at 
present  to  reject  altogether  the  conception  that  the 
world  is  an  ordered  whole  on  any  plan  we  can  guess 
at.  We  have  been  crushed  into  insignificance  by  a 
vast  mechanical  law,  our  doings  have  been  made 
futile  and  meaningless  by  a  relentless  process  of 
development.  Now  that  the  newness  of  the  in- 
cubus has  worn  off  we  realise  in  spite  of  everything 


METHOD  AND  RESULTS  419 

that  the  issues  of  life  are  of  supreme  importance, 
and  that  man  should  not  be  daunted.  These  vital 
issues  we  know  are  not  touched  by  any  scientific 
results.  Wherefore,  it  is  beginning  to  be  main- 
tained, that  we  ought  to  take  the  liberty  of  ignoring 
these  results. 

But  I  have  entirely  failed  in  my  purpose  if  I 
have  not  shown  you  that  it  is  just  when  set  in  the 
midst  of  this  vastness  that  freedom  and  faith  attain 
their  high  significance.  Not  till  we  have  traversed 
immensity  and  eternity  have  we  attached  any  ade- 
quate meaning  to  the  assertion  that  the  things  of  the 
spirit  have  greater  issues  depending  on  them  than 
the  mightiest  law  or  the  vastest  process.  In  the 
present  feeble  beginnings  of  man's  freedom,  nour- 
ished tenderly  by  God's  grace,  we  see  the  baby  hand 
that  holds  the  sceptre  of  this  realm,  and  we  should 
resent  nothing  that  displays  either  its  vastness  or 
its  permanence.  Thus  in  a  higher  sense  than  his 
we  realise  the  force  of  Hegel's  great  saying  :  *'  The 
truth  of  necessity  is  freedom  ". 


NOTES 

I.— PASCAL'S  WAGEE  AKGUMENT 

No  reference  has  been  made  in  the  lecture  on  Pascal  to  the 
famous  passage  on  the  reasonableness  of  staking  on  the 
chance  of  the  existence  of  God,  yet  it  would  seem  to  affect 
seriously  our  view  of  his  attitude  towards  faith.  What  he 
says  is  to  this  effect : — 

God  exists  or  He  does  not  exist.  Let  us  put  it  at  an 
even  chance,  with  no  more  reason  on  one  side  than  on  the 
other.  It  would  then  appear  to  be  right  not  to  stake  at 
all.  But  you  must  stake,  you  must  in  some  way  say 
heads  or  tails  in  spite  of  you.  You  must  therefore  weigh 
truth  and  well-being,  reason  and  will,  knowledge  and 
blessedness.  Truth,  reason,  knowledge,  however,  being 
evenly  balanced,  do  not  influence  the  result.  It  is  all  then 
a  question  of  well-being.  By  believing  in  God  we  lose 
nothing  and  stand  a  chance  of  an  infinite  gain.  If  there 
is  an  infinity  of  life,  infinitely  blessed,  it  would  be  rational 
to  stake  on  it,  not  merely  v^ith  equal  chances,  but  on  an 
infinitely  small  chance.  It  is  no  answer  to  say  that, 
though  what  we  sacrifice  is  finite,  it  is  certain,  while  what 
we  should  gain,  though  infinite,  is  uncertain.  In  life  we 
consider  it  rational  to  stake  a  certainty  against  an  uncer- 
tainty on  an  even  chance.  True,  we  cannot  believe  because 
we  will.  We  can,  however,  seek  to  be  cured  of  unbelief 
by  diminishing  the  passions.  To  this  end  we  must  act 
altogether  as  those  who  do  believe,  taking  holy  water, 
saying  masses,  etc.    "  Naturally  that  will  make  you  believe, 

(421) 


422  NOTES 

will  make  you  simple  (abetira).  '  But  that  is  what  I  fear  ! ' 
And  why?  What  have  you  to  lose?"  Instead  of  losing 
there  is  everything  to  gain,  all  the  Christian  virtues  and  a 
growing  assurance  that  what  we  lost  was  no  real  good  at 
all,  and  that  what  we  stand  to  gain  is  certain  as  well  as 
infinite. 

Were  that  a  deliberate  and  final  utterance,  we  could 
only  say  with  Sully  Prudhomme  that  the  dramatic  form 
of  it  does  not  save  it  from  being  shockingly,  cynically  in- 
terested, and  we  should  scarcely  be  inclined  to  accept  the 
good  he  afterwards  finds  in  it.^  Principal  Tulloch  says 
that  it  is  no  lofty  mood  and  no  higher  in  Pascal  than  in 
any  other,  yet  it  appeals  to  a  man  who  in  the  grip  of  the 
wave  of  scepticism  clings  to  the  Divine  with  something  of 
the  gamester's  thought  that  it  is  the  winning  side.^  Pro- 
fessor James  regards  it  as  a  last  desperate  snatch  at  a 
weapon  against  the  hardness  of  the  unbelieving  heart. 
"  We  feel,"  he  adds,  "  that  faith  in  masses  and  holy  water 
adopted  wilfully  after  such  a  mechanical  calculation  would 
lack  the  inner  soul  of  faith's  reality ;  and  if  we  were  our- 
selves in  the  place  of  the  Deity,  we  should  probably  take 
particular  pleasure  in  cutting  off  believers  of  this  pattern 
from  their  infinite  reward," 

The  supposed  way  of  winning  might  thus  be  precisely 
the  way  of  losing.  God  might  regard  what  is  truthful  in 
motive  above  what  is  merely  true  in  point  of  fact,  even 
though  it  concerned  belief  in  His  own  existence.  Intel- 
lectual sincerity  might  be  the  first  requirement  in  His 
sight,  and  to  seek  to  believe  in  His  existence  merely  on 
interested  grounds  might  earn  the  same  kind  of  disapproval 
that  speaking  wickedly  for  Him  earns  in  Job.  To  be 
biassed  in  our  inquiries  by  a  sense  of  the  greatness  of  the 
issue  is,  as  Butler  says,  "  a  prejudice  as  much  as  anything 
else  ".     And  this  applies,  not  merely  to  Pascal's  argument, 

^  La  vraie  Beligion  scion  Pascal,  p.  267  tf. 
2  Pascal,  p.  193. 


NOTES  423 

but   to   every   attempt   to   urge   truth   either   by  fear  or 
favour. 

If  the  word  ahetira  is  rightly  translated,  as  Professor 
James  translates,  "  stupefy  our  scruples,"  if  the  effect  of 
masses  and  holy  v^^ater  is  expected  purely  from  the  might 
of  custom,  which  Pascal  elsewhere  describes  so  graphically, 
the  most  difficult  of  all  conditions  of  seeking  truth,  the 
deliverance  of  our  souls  from  the  fetters  of  custom,  is  not 
only  ignored,  but  deliberately  rejected.  It  would  then 
appear  that  Pascal  cared  for  nothing,  if  he  could  only  en- 
tangle a  man  in  the  toils  of  the  Church. 

A  different  impression  is  made  on  our  minds,  however, 
when  we  recognise,  as  M.  Havet  does,  Paul's  usage  in  such 
passages  as  "  the  wisdom  of  this  world  is  folly  before  God  ". 
This  shows  two  things,  first,  that  Pascal  was  only  writing 
for  himself  and  was  careless  of  misunderstanding,  and 
second,  that  he  is  not  hoping  for  the  effect  of  custom  to 
stifle  inquiry,  but  for  the  discipline  of  the  passions,  and 
especially  of  intellectual  pride,  to  direct  inquiry  into  its 
right  course.  To  stake  and  be  done  with  more  thought 
about  the  matter  is  not  Pascal's  own  way  in  the  least 
degree.  He  is  not  recommending  the  highest  and  best, 
but  is,  as  Professor  James  says,  "  playing  his  last  trump  ". 
Where  so  great  an  issue  is  at  stake,  he  thinks  no  inquiry 
could  be  too  arduous.  "Negligence  in  a  business  which 
concerns  themselves,  their  eternity,  their  all,  stirs  me  to 
anger  rather  than  to  pity  ;  it  astonishes  and  dismays  me  ; 
it  is  a  monstrous  thing  to  me."  It  is  to  this  stupidity 
and  extravagance  that  he  directs  his  argument,  not  as  a 
high  appeal,  but  deliberately  as  the  last  and  lowest. 

Perhaps  no  passage  in  the  Fense'es  requires  to  be  read 
with  a  more  careful  recollection  of  Vinet's  warning,  that 
much  of  it  is  still  in  the  form  in  which  the  author  was 
only  writing  for  himself,  jottings  of  what  were  recognised 
as  unqualified  statements,  which,  had  Pascal  lived  to  com- 
plete his  work,  would  have  been  balanced  by  the  opposite 


424  NOTES 

truth,  modified,  or  at  least  differently  expressed.  Regarded 
in  this  way,  something  might  even  be  said  for  the  masses 
and  holy  water,  especially  seeing  they  are  finished  off  with 
a  vague,  etc.,  on  the  ground  that  they  stood  to  Pascal's 
mind  as  a  sort  of  shorthand  note  of  certain  conditions  of 
worship  and  fellowship,  necessary  for  withdrawing  the 
carnal  man  from  the  dominion  of  the  world,  and  for  open- 
ing his  sympathies  to  the  appeal  of  things  spiritual.  At 
all  events  that  was  their  significance  to  Pascal's  own  soul. 

We  can  then  recognise  that  there  is  something  here 
new  as  well  as  true,  something  lying  very  close  to  Pascal's 
contention  that  the  whole  of  man's  activities  are  concerned 
in  the  issues  of  faith.  An  argument  of  this  kind.  Professor 
James  says,  would  no  more  revive  devotion  to  masses  and 
holy  water  in  most  of  us  than  an  appeal  from  the  Mahdi 
to  weigh  our  infinite  gain,  if  he  is  genuine,  against  our 
infinite  sacrifice,  if  he  is  not.^  Yet  with  options  which  are 
still  living  issues,  the  willingness  to  go  in  for  life  has  a 
great,  and  a  legitimate,  influence  on  our  beliefs.  "  Pascal's 
argument  instead  of  being  powerless,  then  seems  a  clin- 
cher." "  Our  passional  nature  not  only  may,  but  must, 
decide  an  option  between  propositions,  whenever  it  is  a 
genuine  option  that  cannot  by  its  nature  be  decided  on 
intellectual  grounds."  ^ 

We  might  even  argue  that  all  the  merit  of  faith  lies  in 
this  venture  beyond  the  conclusions  of  the  understanding. 
Should  we  admire  the  determination  of  Socrates  to  die 
rather  than  to  do  wrong,  to  choose  the  uncertain  evil  of 
death  rather  than  the  certain  evil  of  disobeying  the  laws, 
if  he  had  seen  the  country  to  which  he  was  going  ?  Are 
not  his  most  impressive  words—"  But  now  it  is  time  for 
us  to  go,  I  to  death  and  you  to  hfe  ;  and  which  of  us  goes 
to  the  better  state  is  known  only  to  God" — words  not 
really  of  doubt  but  of  a  noble  venture  of  the  heart  ? 

1  The  Will  to  Believe,  p.  6. 
Ubid.,  p.  11. 


NOTES  425 

A  remarkable  likeness  exists  between  Pascal's  Wager 
understood  in  this  way,  and  Butler's  doctrine  of  Probability. 
Butler  insists  on  "an  absolute  and  formal  obligation  in 
point  of  prudence  and  interest  to  act  even  upon  a  low 
degree  of  probability,"  and  he  is  impressed  by  the  amazing 
ignorance  amid  which  every  inan  must  conduct  the  busi- 
ness of  life.  Butler  is  more  guarded  in  his  expression, 
connects  action  upon  probabilities  more  definitely  with  the 
need  of  constantly  falling  back  upon  the  sure  guidance  of 
conscience,  applies  it  more  generally  and  therefore  more 
justly,  sets  it  in  the  midst  not  of  one  Church  but  of  that 
Church  which  consists  of  all  persons  scattered  all  over  the 
world  who  live  in  accordance  with  Christ's  laws :  but  he 
has  precisely  the  same  overwhelming  sense  of  the  dimness 
of  the  light  with  which  we  are  compelled  to  act  and  of  the 
need  of  our  whole  nature,  and  not  merely  our  faculty  of 
argument,  in  searching  for  that  faith  which  the  conduct  of 
life  imposes  on  us. 


II.— GEEMAN  THEOLOGIANS  AND  BUTLER 

In  the  great  intellectual  commonwealth  which  is  re- 
gardless of  political  boundaries,  the  thought  of  the  great 
thinkers  permeates  from  one  nation  to  another,  and  from 
one  class  of  thinkers  to  another,  and  even  to  classes  w^hich 
do  not  consciously  recognise  their  obligations  to  the  thinker 
at  all,  by  channels  of  communication  to  which  transla- 
tions form  very  httle  guidance.  The  books  which  have 
been  translated  as  soon  as  they  appeared,  and  which  have 
been  much  reviewed  and  talked  about,  were  often  mere 
echoes  of  the  great  books  which  remained  in  the  back- 
ground scarcely  referred  to.  Yet  the  smallness  of  the 
attention  paid  to  Butler  in  Germany  is  almost  a  unique 
instance  of  neglect.  So  great  a  student  of  English  theology 
as  Lechler  accords  him  just  five  not  specially  discrimin- 
ating lines  in  his  History  of  English  Deis7n.  The  explana- 
tion is  due  at  least  in  part  to  the  extraordinary  absence  of 
any  reference  to  Butler  in  earlier  German  writers  which 
could  have  afforded  a  hint  of  his  significance.  At  a  period 
when  all  kinds  of  EngHsh  books,  especially  books  of  theo- 
logical controversy,  were  translated,  the  only  writer  who 
has  shown  enduring  quality  appears  to  have  been  almost, 
if  not  totally,  neglected.  As  late  as  1877,  in  an  article  on 
Apologetics  in  the  second  edition  of  Herzog's  Beal-Encyclo- 
pddie,  the  only  source  of  information  to  which  Christlieb 
can  refer  his  German  readers,  is  a  summary  of  the  Analogy 
in  Gass's  History  of  Protestant  Dogmatics.  In  the  first 
edition  of  Herzog  there  is  no  article  on  Butler  at  all.  In 
the  first  volume  of  the  first  edition  under  Apologia  he  is 

(426) 


NOTES  427 

referred  to  as  "Job.  Buttler  of  Durham,"  and  there  is  a 
brief  notice  of  the  Analogy  in  the  Appendix  under  the 
heading  Oxford  Essayists.  In  the  second  edition  the  editor 
evidently  wakened  up  at  the  end  to  recognise  an  omission, 
and  an  article  on  Butler,  manifestly  written  to  order, 
appears  in  the  Appendix.  In  addition  to  the  article,  there 
are  two  references  to  him,  both  by  Christlieb.  In  the 
reference  already  spoken  of,  Christlieb  shows  that  he  is 
fully  aware  of  the  important  place  assigned  to  Butler  in 
England,  but  he  also  shows  that  he  is  merely  repeating 
the  common  English  view  of  what  that  reputation  rests 
on.  He  represents  the  Analogy  as  of  the  same  school 
as  Paley's  Evidences,  being,  he  says,  "a  defence  of  Christ- 
ianity as  a  body  of  doctrine  and  not  as  a  new  Divine 
principle  of  life ".  Under  the  article  Predigt,  he  deals 
somewhat  more  adequately  with  the  Sermons,  though  with 
a  touch  of  rhetorical  platitude  which  creates  a  suspicion 
of  the  sources  of  his  knowledge,  and  a  total  neglect  of  the 
significance  of  Butler's  doctrine  of  conscience  which  con- 
firms the  suspicion.  The  explanation  of  this  indifference 
is  no  doubt  due  to  the  fact  that  the  estimate  of  Butler  by 
his  English  readers  almost  always  turned  on  elements  in 
him  which  the  Germans  believed  had  been  outlived,  but 
why  no  one  ever  troubled  himself  to  go  behind  that 
estimate  is  hard  to  say,  unless  there  may  be  some  truth 
after  all  in  Sir  James  Mackintosh's  theory  about  his  style, 
the  German  being  accustomed  to  the  type  only  in  his  own 
language. 


III.— THE  JUDGMENT  OF  WOETH 

The  translation  "judgment  of  worth"  for  Werthurtheil 
has  been  preferred  to  "value-judgment"  for  several 
reasons.  First,  judgment  of  worth  seems  to  be  uniformly 
used  by  English  philosophers ;  and  as  the  term  was 
originally  borrowed  from  philosophy,  there  is  no  good 
reason  at  this  date  for  attempting  to  establish  a  different 
terminology.  Second,  the  expression  "value-judgment" 
without  explanation  represents  no  conceivable  meaning  to 
the  English  reader,  whereas  "  judgment  of  worth  "  at  once 
suggests  the  double  meaning  of  intrinsic  worth  and  worth 
to  me.  Third,  the  German  word  has  exactly  this  double 
significance,  and  it  is  begging  a  very  important  question 
to  use  an  expression  which  apparently  is  meant  to  exclude 
the  former. 

To  deal  adequately  with  all  the  controversies  regarding 
the  meaning  and  just  application  of  the  judgment  of  worth 
would  require  a  treatise,  not  a  note.  Fortunately,  such 
an  aspect  of  the  subject  hes  outside  the  scope  of  this  work, 
yet  a  little  fuller  elucidation  may  not  be  unacceptable. 

Two  streams  which  had  previously  flowed  apart  meet 
in  the  judgment  of  worth,  and  the  point  in  dispute  is  the 
method  and  the  legitimacy  of  their  union.  First,  there  is 
a  philosophical  stream,  connected  mainly  with  Kant's 
assertion  of  the  significance  of  freedom  as  the  basis  of  a 
worth  in  man  which  is  above  price.  A  good  will  alone, 
Kant  taught,  can  give  man's  existence  absolute  worth  ;  and 
only  in  relation  to  this  worth  can  the  world  be  conceived 
as  an  absolute  whole  with  a  purpose.     Here  we  have  not 

(428) 


NOTES  429 

only  an  idea  of  intrinsic  worth,  but  a  connection  of  it 
with  our  moral  personality,  which  are  the  two  elements 
in  the  idea.  Otto  Eitschl  in  his  pamphlet  Ueber  Werthur- 
theile  traces  the  development  of  the  idea,  through  Herbart, 
Schleiermacher  and  De  Wette,  to  Lotze.  Lotze  brought 
the  question  into  its  present  form  by  definitely  raising  the 
question  how  worth  for  me  and  worth  absolutely  are 
related.  Worth  and  unworth,  he  maintained,  are  purely 
forms  of  our  feeling,  while  feeling  is  simply  inclination  or 
disinchnation,  the  sense  that  a  thing  forwards  or  hinders 
our  personahty.  The  whole  soul  is  in  all  its  operations, 
and  from  the  beginning  we  are  not  open  to  any  impression 
that  has  not  this  feeling  of  worth  or  unworth  for  us. 
In  this  feeling  for  the  worth  of  things  "  the  reason  has  a 
genuine  revelation,  just  as  in  the  principles  of  rational 
inquiry  it  has  a  necessary  instrument  of  experience  ". 

The  other  current  has  always  existed  in  religious 
thinking.  It  goes  back  to  the  Master's  own  words,  "He 
that  doeth  the  deed  shall  know  of  the  doctrine  ".  Luther 
is  rightly  enough  referred  to  as  having  brought  the  idea 
again  to  due  recognition,  by  insisting  on  the  significance 
of  the  believer's  personality  for  his  faith.  But  there  has 
also  been  a  growing  sense  that  the  idea  is  a  guide  through 
the  perplexities  of  our  modern  time.  ,  Pascal,  Butler, 
Schleiermacher  might  be  adduced.  Butler  is  specially  im- 
portant because  of  his  connecting  self-love  with  conscience 
as  the  two  regulative  principles  of  human  nature.  Butler's 
doctrine  of  probability  guided  by  the  absolute  authority  of 
conscience  is  very  closely  allied  to  Herrmann's  doctrine  of 
worth  guided  by  the  categorical  imperative  of  the  moral 
law. 

These  two  currents  are  united  in  the  modern  use  of 
the  expression  "judgment  of  worth,"  so  that  it  is  not  fully 
explained  when  it  is  described  as  merely  a  modern  way  of 
saying,  "  He  who  does  the  deed  shall  know  of  the  doctrine," 
for  a  very  important  element  is  the  modern  way  of  saying 


430  NOTES 

it.  The  justification  for  this  practical  faith  is  found  in 
the  relation  of  our  personality  to  all  ideas  of  worth.  In 
short  the  characteristic  element  in  the  doctrine  is  the  way 
in  which  the  right  to  follow  a  practical  judgment  is  related 
to  the  significance  of  personal  freedom.  The  question  is 
whether  my  rational  purposes  have  the  same  relation  to 
reahty  as  my  rational  perceptions.  We  know  that  the 
vagaries  of  both  are  astray,  but  can  I  understand  the  pur- 
pose of  the  world  by  my  use  of  it,  as  I  understand  the 
connection  of  the  world  by  my  study  of  it,  and  has  there 
been  built  up  a  practical  realm  of  truth  regarding  the 
meaning  and  use  of  life  by  service  and  character,  as  there 
has  been  built  up  a  theoretical  realm  of  truth  regarding 
its  laws  by  study  and  research  ?  All  the  soul  is  in  all  its 
operations,  and  no  kind  of  judgment  can  be  utterly  separ- 
ated from  another,  but  there  is  this  distinction  between 
what  the  world  is  and  what  it  is  meant  to  be,  and  the  ques- 
tion is  whether  the  desire  to  know  the  purpose  of  life  throws 
us  back  as  essentially  upon  character  as  the  desire  to  know 
the  connected  facts  of  life  throws  us  back  upon  observa- 
tion. Worth  must  mean  worth  for  the  purposes  of  a 
spiritual  being,  and  the  only  spiritual  being  by  whose 
purposes  I  can  test  it  is  myself,  and  it  is  this  vital  rela- 
tion of  my  own  self  to  the  understanding  of  the  Divine 
meaning  of  things  that  is  meant  to  be  indicated  by  the 
expression  "judgment  of  worth". 

Worth  does  not  mean,  therefore,  what  I  value  accord- 
ing to  my  fancy,  but  what  I  value  according  to  real 
spiritual  significance  for  me,  and  therefore  according  to 
real  spiritual  significance  for  God,  in  whose  image  I  am 
made.  Thus  it  is  a  judgment  of  worth  regarding  the  real 
meaning  of  things,  and  not  merely  for  the  vagaries  of  the 
individual.  It  is  not,  therefore,  to  be  distinguished  from 
a  judgment  of  truth,  or  from  a  judgment  of  existence, 
for  the  highest  truth  is  what  ought  to  be,  and  it  is  the 
eternal  in  all  existence.     What  we  are  to  distinguish  it 


NOTES  431 

from  is  a  theoretic  judgment.  Nor  in  considering  this 
distinction  should  we  speak  of  theoretic  judgments  as 
objective  and  judgments  of  worth  as  subjective,  for  both 
are  subjective  and  objective  at  the  same  time.  The  differ- 
ence is  that  I  can  force  a  theoretic  judgment  upon  any 
man  who  uses  his  eyes  and  his  intelHgence  aright,  whereas 
I  can  only  force  a  judgment  of  worth  upon  a  man  who 
uses  his  conscience  and  will  aright. 

The  place  of  the  judgment  of  worth  in  life  is  not 
doubtful.  The  difficulty  begins  with  its  application  to 
history.  The  question  of  how  far  it  can  measure,  not 
merely  the  things  now  before  us,  but  the  past  events  upon 
which  our  present  estimates  so  largely  depend,  has  come 
to  be  of  vital  importance  in  these  days  when  we  seem  so 
much  at  the  mercy  of  the  historical  critic,  and  when  the 
authority  of  Scripture  can  no  more  be  asserted  as  literal 
and  legal.  The  supreme  interest  of  history,  as  has  been 
said  above,  is  the  building  up  of  the  judgment  of  worth. 
The  unique  interest  of  history  also  is  derived  from  the  ap- 
pHcation  to  it  of  the  judgment  of  worth.  And  that  is  more 
particularly  true  of  the  history  of  Jesus.  No  one  can  read 
it  without  relating  it  to  his  own  personahty,  and  its  in- 
fluence is  embedded  deeply  in  the  whole  estimate  of  hfe 
amid  which  we  live.  Now  what  sort  of  answer  could 
the  judgment  of  worth  give,  say,  to  Strauss' s  Life  of 
Jesus  ? 

When  George  Eliot  was  translating  it,  she  revolted  at 
last  at  its  negative  character.  "  The  soul,"  she  says,  "  that 
has  hopelessly  followed  Jesus — its  impersonation  of  the 
highest  and  best — all  in  despondency  :  its  thoughts  all 
refuted,  its  dreams  all  dissipated  !  Then  comes  another 
Jesus — another  but  the  same,  the  same  highest  and  best, 
only  chastened,  crucified  instead  of  triumphant — and  the 
soul  learns  that  this  is  the  true  way  to  conquest  and  glory. 
And  there  is  the  burning  of  the  heart  which  assures  us 
that  '  this  is  the  Lord,'  that  this  is  the  inspiration  from 


432  NOTES 

above,  the  true  comforter  that  leads  into  truth."  That,  as 
far  as  it  goes,  is  a  judgment  of  worth. 

A  judgment  of  worth  of  the  same  kind  but  more 
positive  set  Kitschl  to  the  study  of  the  early  centuries, 
the  result  of  which  appeared  in  the  second  edition  of  his 
AUkatholische  Kirche.  In  estimating  the  meaning  of  the 
judgment  of  worth  for  Eitschl  that  study  must  never 
be  forgotten.  A  new  judgment  of  worth  set  him  to  new 
research.  Then  he  found  the  unreality  of  all  the  supposed 
impersonal  forces.  Above  all  he  saw  the  unique  signifi- 
cance of  the  person  of  Christ.  He  saw  that  the  right  way 
to  study  history  was  not  to  be  without  prepossession,  but 
to  have  the  true  prepossession,  that  in  particular  the 
absence  of  all  prepossession  in  studying  our  Lord's  life 
is  the  absence  of  any  key  to  its  meaning.  The  immense 
force  of  the  impression  of  Christ's  personality,  its  immense 
significance  for  his  own  inner  life  which  came  upon  him 
in  these  historical  studies,  was  the  determining  force  in 
his  whole  theology. 

But  two  questions  still  remain,  How  far  can  such  a 
judgment  of  worth  guarantee  the  accuracy  of  the  docu- 
ments ?  and.  How  much  can  it  tell  us  of  the  Divine  secret 
of  Christ's  nature  ?  Some  way  of  dealing  more  directly 
with  the  veracity  of  Scripture,  especially  of  reaching  the 
conviction  that  the  impression  of  Christ  as  we  receive  it 
is  generally  true  to  fact,  other  than  the  criticism  of  the 
Gospels,  were  greatly  to  be  desired.  Not  only  is  that 
fluctuating  and  uncertain.  It  is  not  a  religious  require- 
ment at  all.  The  ordinary  man  cannot  engage  in  it  and 
should  not  be  dependent  upon  it.  Are  we  then  to  say 
with  Bender,  Let  us  profit  by  the  impression  without 
troubling  ourselves  as  to  how  it  was  put  before  us,  or 
whether  there  ever  was  a  man  who  corresponded  with 
it,  and  let  us  take  advantage  of  the  influence  of  the 
Christian  religion,  however  much  or  however  little  of  it 
was  connected  with  Jesus  of  Nazareth  ?     Be  thankful  for 


NOTES  433 

historical  ideals,  in  short,  however  they  arise.  But  this 
view  of  the  case  Eitschl  and  all  his  followers  have  emphati- 
cally opposed.  In  Eitschl's  view,  so  far  as  the  realisation 
of  our  freedom  reaches,  reality  reaches.  While  the  judg- 
ment of  the  worth  of  Christ's  life  for  our  spiritual  lives 
cannot  silence  historical  criticism  and  cannot  guarantee 
us  against  any  special  error  in  the  narrative,  it  can  legiti- 
mately assure  us  that  the  impression  we  receive  is  generally 
true,  which  is  all  we  require  for  our  religious  life.  The 
limitation  which  Eitschl  sets  upon  the  reach  of  the  judg- 
ment of  worth  in  regard  to  Christ's  person  has  already 
been  discussed.  It  is  what  Eeischle  describes  as  a  "  judg- 
ment of  trust  directed  towards  a  normative  Divine  revela- 
tion," and  beyond  that  normative,  regulative  value  Eitschl 
will  not  go. 

Eightly  or  wrongly  one  gains  the  impression  in  read- 
ing Eitschl  that  his  general  theory  of  religion  also  started 
from  this  impression  made  upon  him  by  the  personality  of 
Jesus.  God,  he  thought,  forms  the  same  kind  of  impression 
on  us  in  life  that  Christ  does  in  history.  His  reaHty  also 
is  involved  in  the  reality  of  our  freedom.  That  does  not 
give  us  a  natural  religion,  something  that  can  be  argued 
out  as  an  inference  from  the  world,  but  freedom  is  met  by 
something  we  might  describe  as  a  natural  revelation,  a 
succour  of  God  in  events  and  in  men. 


28 


IV.— FEEEDOM  AND  SOCIALISM. 

The  position  maintained  in  the  last  lecture  that,  as 
freedom  advances,  the  institution  will  stand  farther  and 
farther  back  from  the  individual,  may  w^ell  seem  to  be 
refuted  by  the  movement  at  the  present  day  in  all  countries 
of  Western  Europe  towards  State  organisation  of  many 
matters  formerly  left  to  individual  enterprise.  In  reply  it 
might  be  said  that  the  last  thirty  years  do  not  sum  up  the 
history  of  the  world,  that,  strange  as  it  may  appear  to  us 
whose  own  history  they  do  sum  up,  they  are  probably  not 
much  more  important  in  the  whole  scheme  of  things  than 
any  other  thirty  years.  The  present  tendency,  which  some 
call  Socialistic,  might,  therefore,  only  be  one  of  those  eddies 
which  prove  the  strength  of  the  current.  It  would  then 
suffice  to  point  out,  as  Herbert  Spencer  does,  how  the 
earlier  civilisations  subordinated  man  to  the  institution, 
regulating  his  dress  and  his  opinions,  and  how  the  State 
has  at  least  in  some  degree  realised  that  there  are  matters 
outside  its  province,  with  a  result  that  has  tended  to  order 
as  well  as  to  freedom.  But  it  would  be  said  in  reply,  are 
we  to  content  ourselves  with  a  Philistine  individuahsm, 
with  a  cruel  and  wasteful  social  basis  of  competition,  which, 
considering  how  much  success  goes  by  men's  wits  and  how 
little  by  real  public  service,  is  only  a  kind  of  legahsed 
robbery?  Are  we  not  to  hail  the  present  tendency  to- 
wards corporate  control,  and  regard  it  with  hope  as  a 
beginning  of  the  process  which  will  end  in  nationalising 
all  the  means  of  production  ?     At  all  events  we  are  sick  of 

that  individualism  whose  Kingdom  of  Heaven  is  in  Park 

(434) 


NOTES  435 

Lane  with  a  Gehenna  only  a  few  streets  away  to  give  zest 
to  the  joy  of  being  in  the  Abraham's  bosom  of  opulence. 
Are  we  to  sit  down  in  the  midst  of  this  appalling  state  of 
society  and  simply  wait  for  the  millennium  ? 

To  this  it  may  be  conceded,  that  the  one  thing  we 
may  not  do  is  to  sit  down  and  do  nothing.  The  most 
necessary  and  difficult  of  tasks  must  be  done.  We  must 
ourselves  walk  in  freedom.  We  are  not  to  be  enslaved 
to  riches,  nor  honour  ourselves  for  the  possession  of  them  ; 
and  we  are  not  to  be  afraid  of  poverty,  nor  despise  any 
man  for  being  poor.  Perhaps  the  latter  task  is  the  greater 
and  more  necessary.  A  movement  among  the  rich  not  to 
trust  to  their  uncertain  riches  and  to  honour  men  for  what 
they  are  and  not  for  what  they  have,  would  be  a  power. 
But  a  movement  among  the  poor  not  to  envy  the  rich  and 
not  to  esteem  man  for  his  riches  would  promise  a  regenera- 
tion of  society.  The  system  which  can  make  a  man  who 
never  was  a  benefactor  to  society  at  all  a  millionaire,  and 
the  man  who  has  done  the  hardest  and  most  disagreeable 
and  most  necessary  work  a  pauper,  the  system  whereby 
the  ready-witted  win  and  the  simple  go  to  the  wall,  is  only 
made  tolerable  at  all  to  a  sense  of  justice  by  the  assurance 
that  the  first  may  yet  be  last  and  the  last  first.  It  has  at 
least  no  other  relation  to  any  Christian  ideal  of  the  strong 
serving  the  weak.  But  the  power  which  upholds  the  sys- 
tem is  not  a  defective  government.  It  is  the  commonness 
of  the  belief  that  a  man's  life  consists  in  the  abundance  of 
the  things  he  possesses.  Nor  will  it  ever  be  remedied 
merely  by  capturing  the  government.  It  is  not  remedi- 
able at  all,  perhaps  it  would  be  no  gain  to  the  world  were 
it  remedied,  until  man's  true  life,  his  worth  as  an  indi- 
vidual and  the  sphere  in  which  he  finds  scope  for  his 
individuality,  is  found  in  the  things  which  the  State  must 
cease  to  regulate.  Then  it  may  be  possible  for  men  to 
enjoy  the  fruits  of  the  earth  as  much  in  common  as  they 
now  breathe  the  air  of  heaven.     But  not  till  meat  and 


436  NOTES 

drink  are  no  more  our  Kingdom  of  Heaven,  not  till  they 
occupy  as  small,  if  as  necessary,  a  place  in  our  conscious 
happiness  as  breathing,  can  any  decree  of  parliaments  ever 
bring  such  an  issue  to  pass.  In  an  optimistic  mood  one 
hopes  that  the  increase  of  public  management  of  matters 
for  the  general  well-being  indicates  the  growth  of  this 
moral  basis  ;  in  a  pessimistic  mood  it  suggests  only  weari- 
ness of  the  way  of  freedom.  In  any  case  Christ's  method 
was  to  advance  the  moral  basis,  not  to  capture  the  ma- 
chinery. He  set  no  special  store  by  the  machinery, 
but  rested  everything  on  men  being  free  in  their  own 
souls ;  and  it  is  a  grave  question  whether  the  churches 
have  gained  anything  by  departing  from  His  method. 
Perhaps  the  crisis  through  which  the  Church  is  passing  is 
not  in  the  last  issue  intellectual  at  all.  The  thing  that 
may  prove  whether  Christ  is  a  reality  or  not  may  be  the 
attitude  of  His  followers  to  the  things  of  this  world.  At 
present  we  cannot  say  that  it  is  manifestly  and  conspicu- 
ously Christ's  own  attitude.  Moreover  the  issue  will  not 
be  decided  by  movements  but  by  men.  Just  this  personal 
significance  makes  Tolstoi,  like  the  prophet,  a  sign.  His 
way  may  not  be  normal,  it  may  be  full  of  exaggerations, 
but  in  the  midst  of  those  who,  sacrificing  nothing  person- 
ally, expect  to  work  with  spacious  schemes  in  which  force 
occupies  a  large  and  undisguised  place,  the  nobleman 
seeking  to  solve  the  problem  in  his  shirt  sleeves  is  heroic, 
and  it  is  heroisms  alone  that  tell.  Our  state  is  less  des- 
perate and  may  require  less  drastic  remedies,  but  we  also 
have  come  to  a  pass  which  requires  us  to  show  that  the 
possession  of  money  is  not  our  heaven,  nor  the  want  of  it 
our  hell. 


INDEX 


Absoluteness  of  God,  363. 

Absolute  philosophy,  355. 

Accommodation,  157,  164. 

Acton,  Lord,  269. 

Alexander  the  Great,  304. 

Analogy,  the,  118. 

Apocalypse,  310. 

Apologia,  the,  258. 

Apostles,  316,  317,  321,  368,  371, 

389. 
Apostolic  Decree,  317. 
—  Fathers,  318. 
Apostolical  Succession,  262. 
Aristotle,  218. 
Art,  204,  221,  263,  270,  358. 
Athanasius,  69. 
Atheism,  144,  267,  305. 
Atonement,  329,  330-37,  380. 
Aufkldrung,  147,    151,   156,   158, 

164,  177. 
Augustine,  16,  48,  49. 
Augustinus,  47-50. 
Authority   within,   20 ;    infallible, 

23,  266. 

Bacon,  394. 

Bahrdt,  151-53. 

Barry,  Dr.,  290. 

Basedow,  153,  154. 

Baumgarten,  160,  162. 

Baur,  295-310,  320,  356. 

Bender,  432. 

Bengel,  202. 

Berkeley,  139,  140,  260. 

Bible,    Rationalist  view  of,    163 ; 

Lessing's  view  of,  166. 
Biedermann,  340  if. 
Blount,  91. 
Bolingbroke,  141. 
Bossuet,  50-53,  58,  258. 
Bradley,  Prof.,  292. 
Butler,  118-34,  154,  391,  403,  422, 

425,  429. 


(437) 


Butler  and  Paley,  117,  137  ;  style, 
119  ;  influence,  137  ;  in  Ger- 
many, 160, 161,  177,  426  ;  and 

Newman,  262,  399. 

Caird,  Edward,  207  n. 

Calvin,  16,  47,  48. 

Calvinism,  14. 

Calvinistic  doctrine  of  Atonement, 
332 

Campbell,  M'Leod,  329,  331-33. 

CandUsh,  334. 

Carlyle,  141,  142,  150,  163,  204, 
350. 

Catholic,  327,  352,  353. 

Catholicism,  281,  288,  378. 

Catholic  revival,  255. 

—  truth,  264. 

Charron,  45. 

Christ— in  order  of  love,  58  ;  Pas- 
cal's view  of,  61,  70  ;  miracles 
of,  110  ;  and  conscience,  131  ; 
Schleiermacher's  view  of,  232, 
254 ;  contemplative  idea  of, 
236  ;  significance  of,  244,  311, 
375  ;  sinlessness  of,  299  ;  free- 
dom of,  312-15  ;  and  the 
Church,  321,  353,  413  ;  merit 
of,  333 ;  humiliation  of,  335  ; 
our  representative,  337  ;  and 
a  living  faith,  345  ;  a  moral 
phenomenon,  349  ;  the  second 
Adam,  351 ;  person  of,  357, 
365,  366,  394,  433  ;  a  revela- 
tion, 366,  367,  395,  415  ;  death 
of,  369,  389  ;  divinity  of,  372, 
381,  391 ;  resurrection  of,  137, 
298,  308,  369,  389 ;  historical 
life  of,  373  ;  religious  worth 
of,  381,  388,  389  ;  vocation  of, 
389  ;  method  of,  436. 

Christianity — original  intuition  of, 
230 ;    Apostolic,     265,     301  ; 


438 


INDEX 


early,  303  ;  primitive,  381 ; 
universalism  of,  304  ;  Ration- 
alist idea  of,  304  ;  a  recon- 
ciliation, 305  ;  a  moral  religion, 
182,  307  ;  an  Epicui-ean,  339  ; 
its  two  principles,  349;  and 
culture,  353  ;  historical,  357 ; 
early  history  of,  368 ;  the 
religion  of  freedom,  327,  392, 
412. 
Christiieb,  427. 

Church — a  woi'ld-power,  8  ;  true 
claim  of,  9  ;  and  science,  11  ; 
and  organised  society,  16 ; 
material  success  of,  22  ;  spirit- 
ual conception  of,  24 ;  one, 
69,  70  ;  its  perfection,  254 ; 
witness  of,  284,  334 ;  author- 
ity of,  327  ;  as  an  institution, 
417. 
Butler's  idea  of,  121,  425. 
Catholic,  17,  46,  301,  303,  310, 

316,  318,  320,  397. 
English,  90-93,  282. 
Frank's  idea  of,  347. 
History  of,  164,  200,  302,  311. 
Invisible,  8. 
Kant's  idea  of,  184. 
Mediaeval,  263. 
Pascal's  relation  to,  68. 
Primitive,  263,  396. 
Protestant,  13. 
Ritsclil's  idea  of,  354. 
of  Rome,  265,  287. 
Rothe's  idea  of,  351. 
Schleiermacher's  idea  of,  233  ff. 
and  State,   17,   18,  234,  262, 
352. 
Visible,  7,  211,  233,  234,   235, 

262,  266. 
Western,  19. 
Church  History   of   First    Three 

Centuries,  302. 
Churches,  State,  17. 
Civil  War,  83. 
Clarke,  56,  97. 
Claude,  50. 

Coflfee-houses,  101,  104,  119. 
Coleridge,  204,  259,   283-85,  290, 

331. 
Collins,  no  ff.,  147. 
Commerce,  10. 
Confession,  42. 


Conscience,  126, 128, 130, 132, 177, 

399. 
Cosmopolitanism,  163. 
Counter -reformation,  52. 
Cousin,  58. 
Critical  Investigations  regarding 

the  Gospels,  295. 
Criticism,    Higher,    279    ff.,    331, 

414. 

—  Textual,  279. 
Crusades,  10. 
Cudworth,  49. 
Culture,  205,  219,  408. 
Cultured,  appeal  to,  216. 

Dale,  3,  336. 
Darwin,  87,  96. 
Darwinian  evolution,  199. 

—  theory,  405. 
Daub,  339. 

Deism,  102-18,  125,  159,  198,  279, 
305. 

Deism  in  England,  The  Growth  of, 
103. 

Deistical  Writers,  Vieiv  of,  81  n. 

Democracy,  269. 

Descartes,  50,  53-58,  59,  61,  62, 
84,  85,  124,  144. 

Development,  Romantic  concep- 
tion of,  237. 

—  theory  of,  198,  274,  287,  402. 
Dogma,  260,  261,  291. 
Dogmatism,  scientific  and  religious, 

13. 
Dorner,  328,  349  ff. 
Draper,  Prof.,  12. 
Duns  Scotus,  330. 

Ebionitism,  301. 
Ecclesiastic,  21. 
Edwards,  Jonathan,  331. 
Egyptian  fellah,  186. 

—  temple,  11. 
Ehrenfeuchter,  205  n. 
Eichhorn,  280,  295. 
Eighteenth  century,  193. 

—  century  in  France,  65. 
Eliot,  George,  431. 
Encyclopedie,  142. 

English  influence  in  Germany,  160. 

—  theology,  330  ft". 

—  thinking,  337. 
Epicureanism,  305. 


J 


INDEX 


439 


Erasmus,  89. 
Ernesti,  279. 

Erskine  of  Linlathen,  331. 
Escobar,  40. 
Eudaemonism,  305. 
Evangelicals,  330. 
Evangelical  Movement,  139. 
Evolution,  12,  76,  132,  198,  199. 
Ewald,  281. 

Faith  and  the  old  order,  5  ;  abso- 
lute, 4 ;  surmounts  difficulties, 
133 ;  Catholic  idea  of,  138  ; 
and  feeling,  411. 

Fall,  doctrine  of,  76,  407. 

Fathers,  26.3,  295,  380,  396. 

Father  confessor,  49,  63. 

Feuerbach,  339. 

Fichte,  206,  214. 

Filliucius,  41. 

Fischer,  Kuno,  39,  171. 

Fox,  George,  83. 

France,  44,  47,  52,  53. 

Frank,  Fr.  H.  R.  von,  221  n.,  345, 
346  ff.,  361,  390. 

—  Gustav,  157. 

Frederick  the  Great,  148, 149,  202, 
241. 

—  William  III.,  178. 
Freedom — absolute,  4  ;  a  reality, 

5  ;  relation  to  God,  14 ;  re- 
lation to  the  world,  17  ;  and 
responsibility,  20 ;  and  faith, 
24  ;  and  mechanical  law,  25  ; 
and  justification,  33  ;  a  genuine 
option,  122  ;  a  high  responsi- 
bility, 123  ;  essence  of  person- 
ality, 176  ;  Romanticist  idea 
of,  246;  form  of,  250;  per- 
sonal, 263,  356,  378;  Hegel's 
idea  of,  291  ;  two  foci  of,  375  ; 
and  Greek  ideas,  390  ;  and 
mystery,  395  ;  and  the  Eter- 
nal Will,  398 ;  absence  of  re- 
straints, 399  ;  basis  of  spiritual 
belief,  401-19  ;  and  belief  in 
God,  433 ;  and  socialism,  434. 
French  drama,  146. 

—  influence  in  England,  81,  84,  90. 

—  influences    in    Germany,    146, 

159. 

—  Revolution,  178,  241,  245,  249, 

255,  257. 


Frenchified  courts,  150. 
Froude,  Hurrell,  262. 

Gabler,  296. 
Galloway,  364  n. 
German  patriotism,  343. 

—  theology,  328,  338. 
Gesenius,  281. 
Glaubenslehre,  242  ff". 
God,  personality  of,  363. 

—  Pascal's  conception  of,  64. 
Goethe,  153,   201,  204,  206,  217, 

260. 
Gospels,  criticism  of,  294  ff. 

—  with  a  purpose,  308. 

—  harmonies  of  the,  295. 
Gravitation,   Law  of,   12,   96,   97, 

107,  142,  199. 
Greek  philosophy,  304,  380. 

—  State,  380,  390. 

Habits,  123. 

Heathenism,  304. 

Hegel,!  198,  199,  208,  242,  244-54, 
259,  270,  273,  289-95,  298, 
343,  358,  366,  419. 

Hegel's  Philosophy  of  Religion, 
242  253  ff". 

Hegelian,  303,  311,  321,  322,  339, 
340,  355. 

Hengstenberg,  344,  348. 

Herbart,  429. 

Herbert,  Lord,  81-83,  85,  117- 

Herder,  154,  194,  203,  280. 

Heresies,  291. 

Heroisms,  410. 

Herrmann,  W.,  167,  177. 

Herzog,  426. 

History — mistakes  in,  4  ;  Semler's 
idea  of,  163  ;  contingent  truths 
of,  169  ;  in  nineteenth  century, 
200  ;  the  movement  of  spirit, 
249 ;  and  infallibility,  271  ; 
and  prophecy,  346  ;  a  moral 
process,  351 ;  a  struggle,  375  ; 
heroic,  408-11  ;  and  finality, 
413 ;  philosophy  of,  228,  272, 
292,  418. 

High  Churchman,  256. 

High  Church  Lutheranism,  343, 
349,  353. 

movement,  274,  279. 

Hobbes,  84-90,  104. 


440 


INDEX 


Hofmann,  344  ff.,  347. 

Holy  Spirit,  131,  374,  393. 

Hug,  296. 

Human  nature,   Pascal's  estimate 

of,  73  ff. 
Hume,  120,  139-41,  161,  170. 
Humility,    false   reading    of,    270, 

282. 
Hutcheson,  161. 
Hutton,  396. 

Incarnation,  332,  339. 
Individuality,  203,  204,  209,  218, 

220,  228. 
Individualism,  22,  57,  434. 
Individual,  redemption  of,  375. 

—  significance  of,  405. 
Infallibility,  267. 
Inquisition,  36,  37,  41,  285. 
Inspiration,  285. 

Institutions,  398, 412,  417  ;  interest 

in,  291. 
Intellect,  pride  of,  268. 
Intuition  of  a  religion,  229. 

—  393,  411. 

James  I.,  81. 

James  II.,  92. 

James,  Prof.,  311,  405,  422. 

Jansen,  47-50. 

Jansenists,  43,  47,  63,  67,  68. 

Jerusalem,  155. 

Jesuit  Society,  34-58  ;  formation 
of,  34-36 ;  watchword  obedi- 
ence, 34 ;  immediate  success 
of,  37  ;  and  the  princes,  38  ; 
and  probabilism,  39. 

Jesuit  morals,  84  ;  schools,  142, 143. 

Jesuitism — and  Protestantism,  35, 
39  ;  and  St.  Thomas,  49  ;  issue 
of,  50  ;  and  learning,  53 ;  indi- 
vidualistic, 57. 

Jesus — AufkUirung  view  of,  157  ; 
Kant's  view  of,  182  ;  and  the 
social  pi'oblem,  306  ;  greatness 
of,  308  ;  person  of,  322. 

John  the  Apostle,  297,  308,  310, 
316. 

Judaism,  228,  304, 

Judaistic  Christianity,  310. 

Judgment  of  worth,  357,  362,  363, 
365,  379,  428  ff. 

Jurieu,  50. 


Justification — and  freedom,  33  ; 
Kant's  deduction  of,  183  ; 
Paul's  idea  of,  371 ;  and  recon- 
ciliation, 377  ;  Ritschl's  ex- 
position of,  376  ff. 

Justification  and  Reconciliation, 
367. 

Kahnis,  256,  275. 

Kant,  169-199,  216,  228,  260,  283, 
290,  357,  391,  393,  401 ;  auto- 
nomy of  conscience,  56,  100, 
403  ;  style,  119,  178  ;  and 
Hume,  140  ;  What  is  Auf kid- 
rung,  147  ft". ;  arguments  for 
God's  existence,  156  ;  and 
Butler,  161  ;  and  Pietism, 
203;  dualism  of,  207;  Meta- 
physic  of  Ethics,  250 ;  and 
the  judgment  of  worth,  428. 

Kattenbusch,  341,  357. 

Keats,  306. 

Keble,  262. 

Kingdom  of  God,  25,  141,  312,  341, 
343,  362,  371,  391,  395,  416, 
417  ;  identified  with  the 
Church,  89,  354;  Kant's  de- 
duction of,  184,  187,  228  ;  goal 
of  development,  228,  358  ; 
God's  goal,  364,  369,  388,  390  ; 
an  achievement,  374  ;  and 
freedom,  375 ;  Ritschl's  ex- 
position of,  378  ft'. 

Kingsley,  267. 

Kipling,  10. 

Kirchmann,  179. 

Klopstock,  203. 

Knowledge,  Ritschl's  theory  of, 
359. 

Lardner,  118. 

Laud,  261. 

Lavater,  203. 

Laveleye,  269,  342. 

Lechler,  83,  426. 

Lecky,  53  n. 

Leibnitz,  12,  169. 

Leo  X.,  31. 

Leslie,  Charles,  92,  115,  122. 

Lessing,  149,  161,  165-69,  203. 

Leviathan,  84-90. 

Liberal  School,  339  ft'. 

Liberalism,  258,  263,  269. 


INDEX 


441 


Lipsius,  340  ff. 

Locke,   95,  104-6,   113,  138,   139, 

141. 
Logia,  308. 
Loisy,  Abbe,  320. 
Lotze,  3(55,  429. 
Louis  XIV.,  61,  52. 
Loyola,  Ignatius,  35. 
Luke,  296,  297,  308,  310,  315. 
Luther,  13,  14,  34,  35,  49,  168,  170, 

340,  429. 
Lutheran  theology,  347. 

—  Church,  353. 

—  confessions,  344. 
Lutheranism,  290. 

Macaulay's  History,  300. 
Macchiavelli,  36. 
Mackintosh,  Sir  James,  119. 
Marheineke,  339. 
Mark,  296,  297,  308,  315. 
Marriage,  351. 
Materialism,  269. 
Mathematical  law,  173. 

—  method,  54,  59,  85. 
Matthew,  296,  297,  308,  315. 
Maurice,  334  ff. 
Mediating  School,  348-57. 
Mediation,  336. 
Mediator,  347. 
Mediators,  225. 
Melanchthon,  147,  170,  396. 
Mendelssohn,  155. 
Messiah,  297,  301. 
Metaphysical  knowledge  of   God, 

363. 
Metaphysics,  rejection  of,  364. 
Michaelis,  169,  280. 
Middle  Ages,  6,  25,  257,  259,  321. 
Middleton,  261. 
Milton,  105,  111. 
Miracle,  110,  117,  181,  352,  387. 
Mockery,  142. 
Modern  Time,  6. 
Monistic  philosophy,  339. 
Monologues,  214,  215. 
Montaigne,  43,  44,  47,  73  ;  Essays, 

45. 
Morality  and  religion,  99. 
Moral  distinctions,  404. 

—  law,  176,  389. 
Moravians,  202,  227. 
Morgenstunden,  156. 


Morley,  Mr.,  143,  145. 
Mozley,  336. 
Mystery,  395. 
Mysticism,  392. 

Nantes,  Edict  of,  51. 
Napoleon,  343. 
Nature,  laws  of,  74. 
—  works  of,  60. 
Nazarenes,  318. 
Nebular  theory,  172. 
Neo-Platonism,  305,  393. 
Newman,  220,  258-75,  282-92,  319, 

320  321   399. 
New  Testament,  322,  324,  356,  370, 

396  ;  amazing  freedom  of,  287. 
Newton,  54,  96, 141,  171,  172, 176. 
Nicolai,  151,  167. 
Nineteenth  century,  question  of, 

193. 
Nominalism,  7. 
Northern  nations,  19. 
Noumenal  World,  174. 

Old  Testament,  163,  304,  305,  307, 

324,  335,  370. 
Optimism,  5,  22,  133, 134,  144, 322. 
Original  Sin,  64. 
Orthodox  School,  343  ft'. 
Owen,  331. 

Paley,  117,  137,  138,  427. 
Pantheism,  222,  236,  253,  254,  347, 

350,  355,  387,  392.^ 
Papacy,  264. 
Papal  hierarchy,  310. 
Pascal,  50,  58-77,   105,  134,  429 ; 

Provincial  Letters,  40  ff.,  63  ; 

Wager-argument,  421  ff. 
Paul,  the  Apostle,  123,  129,  301, 

303,  306,  308,  313,  316,  317, 

318,  322,  323,  371. 
Paulsen,  170. 
Pensees,  62. 
Personality,  430. 
Pessimism,  132,  311,  313. 
Peter,  the  Apostle,  309,  316. 
Pfleiderer,  263,  340  ff. 
Pharisees,  370. 
Philanthro'pinum,  153,  154. 
Philippi,  344. 
Philosophy,  73,  200,  252,  350,  379, 

404. 


28^ 


442 


INDEX 


Physical  law,  387. 

Pietism,  160,  170. 

Pietistic  Revival,  203. 

Piety,  definition  of,  243. 

Platonism,  304. 

Plato's  Republic,  250. 

Pope,  141. 

Pope,  the,  47,  68,  69,  88,  142,  269. 

Popular  philosophers,  155. 

Port-Royal,  63. 

Prayer,  181. 

Priestcraft,  82,  Jlo,  137. 

Primitive  man,  407- 

Principia,  96,  141. 

Pringle-Pattison,  Prof.,  292,  293. 

Probability,   Butler's  doctrine  of, 

124,  129. 
Protestant,  322,  327,  349,  352. 
Protestantism,  18,  43,  288, 353,  396. 
Providence,  125,  156. 
Puritanism,  18. 

Quaker,  83. 
Quixote,  Don,  36. 

Rainy,  Principal,  23. 

Ranke,  History  of  the  Papacy,  35  n. 

Rationalism,  158-70,  194,  201, 
202,  212,  223,  224,  225,  226, 
258,  264,  268,  272,  279,  280, 
281,  305,  347. 

Rational  theologians,  168. 

Realism,  7. 

Real  Presence,  263. 

Reason,  Absolute,  209. 

—  and  the  heart,  71. 

Reconciliation,  231,  329  ;  and  free- 
dom, 355,  376  fi".,  390. 

Reformation,  5,  6,  8,  11-23 ;  re- 
ligious life  of,  20 ;  its  schol- 
astic theology,  147. 

Reformed  Church,  353. 

Reformers,  16,  263. 

Reimarus,  166. 

Religion — and  the  Church,  8  ;  and 
science,  12  ;  feeling,  222  ;  not 
knowledge,  224  ;  essentially 
doctrine,  253  ;  philosophy, 
294,  298  ;  theory  of,  360,  379  ; 
and  morality,  411. 

Religion,  natural,  130,  131. 

Religion  within  the  Limits  of 
Reason,  177. 


Religions,  historical,  226-32,  410. 
Religious  wars,  44,  81. 
Restoration,  the  English,  90. 
Revealed  religion,  284. 
Revelation,  23,  109,  114,  125,  345, 

365,  375,  379,  414. 
Revival  of  learning,  10. 
Revolution,  English,  104. 

—  French,  53,  178,  241,  257,  258. 

—  problem  of,  245,  266,  291. 
Ridicule,  120. 
Righteousness,  370. 

Ritschl,  24,  26,  156,  230,  242,  296, 
302,  303,  323,  353-81,  403, 432  ; 
criticism  of,  385  If.  ;  Die 
Altkatholische  Kirche,  314-20. 

Ritschl,  Otto,  230,  251,  429. 

Ritual  and  moral  rehgion,  185. 

Ritualism,  19. 

Romanticism,  201-8,  210,  212,  218, 
219,  220,  226,  227,  257,  258, 
263,  268,  272,  274,  280,  292, 
357,  386,  392,  400. 

Romantic  Movement,  vice  of,  273. 

Roman  Empire,  Holy,  257. 

—  system,  270. 

Rome,  Church  of,  41,  47. 

—  Imperial,  8,  304. 
Rothe,  350  ff.,  366,  388. 
Rousseau,  100,  143,  145,  146,  153, 

171,  172. 
Rule  of  faith,  319. 

Saci,  M.  de,  46. 

Sacraments,  270,  347. 

Sacramental  idea,  289,  319,  322. 

Saint-Cyran,  47,  48,  49. 

Sainte-Beuve,  41,  45,  47,  48. 

Schanz,  23. 

Schelling,  198,  206,  339. 

Schiller,  204. 

Schleiermacher,  160,  198,  199,  203, 
205,  208-37,  259,  296,  328,  3A 
345,  349,  353,  357,  358,  359, 
361,  366,  375,  386,  429. 

—  and  Hegel,  241-55. 
Scholasticism,  44,  46,  48,  97. 
Scholastic  distinctions,  104  ;  spirit, 

47. 

—  basis  of  doctrine,  18. 
Schoolmen,  7,  36. 
Schulz,  152. 
Schwegler,  301,  302. 


INDEX 


443 


Science,  12,  352,  358. 

Scripture — misuuderstanding  of, 
13  ;  a  view  of  the  world,  121  ; 
and  origin  of  evil,  180  ;  and 
doctrine,  262  ;  and  the  Church, 
284 ;  interpretation  of,  289 ; 
authority  of,  327,  337,  338, 
354 ;  an  external  principle, 
349 ;  and  the  judgment  of 
worth,  432. 

Secularisation,  20,  21. 

Self-love,  127. 

Semler,  161-65,  280. 

Seventeenth  century,  43,  44. 

Shaftesbury,  98,  99-102,  161. 

Shakespeare,  203. 

Sherlock,  112,  117. 

Sin,  246,  247. 

Socrates,  305,  424. 

Son  of  God,  183. 

Sorbonne,  142. 

Southey,  259. 

Speeches  on  Religion,  209-36. 

Spencer,  Herbert,  434. 

Spinoza,  100,  104,  205,  298. 

State  organisation,  434. 

Stephen,  Sir  Leslie,  104,  118. 

Stoicism,  305. 

Strauss,  230,  289,  296-99,  301, 
339,  356,  363,  431. 

Substitution,  336. 

Sully-Prudhomme,  67  n.,  422. 

Taylor,  Jeremy,  105. 
Tendenz,  300. 
Tertullian,  289. 
Theoretic  judgment,  431. 
Theosophy,  350. 
Thinkers,  limit  to,  26. 
Thirty-nine  Ai'ticles,  261. 
Thirty  Years'  War,  146,  201. 
Thomas  Aquinas,  46,  48,  49,  59. 
Tillotson,  104. 
Timor  fiUalis,  397. 
Tindal,  113,  116,  120,  127,  151. 


Toland,  John,  109,  111. 

Toleration,  106. 

Tolstoi,  26,  436. 

Tractarianism,  258  ff. ;  and  artistic 
pride,  268  ;  and  criticism,  281 ; 
and  Scriptui-e,  284  ;  and  Cole- 
ridge, 290  ;  and  Atonement, 
330. 

Tracts  for  the  Times,  264. 

Transcendental  Philosophy,  260. 

Travel,  10. 

Trent,  Council  of,  34. 

Trinity,  153,  158,  188,  249,  334, 
340,  346. 

Troeltsch,  365. 

Tubingen  criticism,  355. 

—  School,  281,  293-95,  302. 
TuUoch,  Principal,  66,  422. 
Twelfth  century,  9. 

Union,  Lutheran  and  Reformed, 
349,  353. 

Utilitarianism,  86. 

—  and  Orthodoxy,  98. 

Value- judgments,  364. 
Via  Media,  264. 
Vinet,  61,  65,  77. 

Voltaire,  53,  141,  142,  145,  159, 
170. 

Ward,  264. 

Wesley,  139. 

Wette,  De,  281. 

Will,  autonomy  of  the,  177. 

—  primacy  of,  358. 
Winkelmann,  203. 
Wit  and  humour,  101. 
Wolfenhilttel  Fragments,  165  ff. 
Wolff,  160. 

Woolston,  117. 

Wordsworth,  204,  217,  241,  259. 

World-spirit,  292. 

Zscharnack,  159. 


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